

University of Warsaw
Faculty of Journalism and Political Science

Davut Han Aslan

***Turkey's Foreign Policy of the Justice and Development
Party Governments (2002–2011)***

PhD Dissertation
Supervisor: Prof. Dr. Hab. Ryszard Zięba

Warsaw, June 2012

Table of Contents

Abbreviations.....	1
Acknowledgments	2
Introduction.....	3
Chapter I	
Turkey's Foreign Policy from Historical Perspective.....	17
1. Geostrategic Position of Turkey.....	17
2. Turkey's Foreign Policy under Mustafa Kemal Atatürk Rules.....	19
3. Turkey's Foreign Policy during the Second World War.....	28
4. Turkey's Foreign Policy during the Cold War	30
5. Turkey's Foreign Policy in the post-Cold War Era.....	33
6. Legacies in Turkey's Foreign Policy	35
6.1. Legacies of Ottoman Empire.....	36
6.2. Legacies of Kemalism.....	40
7. Main Principles of Turkey's Foreign Policy	43
7.1. Status Quo Principle.....	43
7.2. Westernization Principle	44
8. Conclusions	45
Chapter II	
Justice and Development Party and Its Foreign Policy Concept.....	48
1. Historical Background of Justice and Development Party (AK Party).....	48
1.1. Political Islam in Turkey	48
1.2. Political Islam and National Vision	52
1.3. The Birth and Development of Justice and Development Party	57
2. AK Party and Its Political Identity	61
3. Analysis of AK Party's Foreign Policy Concept	65
3.1. The Change	65
3.2. Party Program and Election Manifestos.....	67
3.3. The Influence of Özalism.....	70
3.4. Ahmet Davutoğlu Factor.....	72
3.4.1. The Strategic Depth Doctrine.....	73
3.4.2. Zero Problem Principle	77
4. Conclusions	79
Chapter III	
The Eastern Direction.....	81
1. The Middle East and Turkey	81
2. Iraq	85
3. Syria	96
4. Iran	106
5. Israel and Palestinian Issue	115
6. The Arab Spring and AK Party Government.....	130
7. Conclusions	132

Chapter IV

The Western Direction.....	135
1. The West and Turkey	135
2. The United States of America	136
3. The European Union and Cyprus Issue	157
4. Balkans	172
4.1. Greece.....	176
5. Conclusions	184

Chapter V

The Northern Connection.....	186
1. Russian Federation	186
2. Southern Caucasus States	199
2.1. Georgia.....	201
2.2. Azerbaijan	206
2.3. Armenia.....	214
3. Central Asian Republics.....	220
3.1. Kazakhstan.....	223
3.2. Turkmenistan.....	225
3.3. Kyrgyzstan	227
3.4. Uzbekistan.....	230
3.5. Tajikistan.....	231
4. Conclusions	231

Chapter VI

Relations with Emerging Powers	233
1. China	235
2. India.....	245
3. Brazil	250
4. Conclusions	255

Chapter VII

Evolution of Turkey's Foreign Policy of the Justice and Development Party

Governments in 2002-2011 in 2002-2011	257
1. Relations with the East	257
2. Relations with the West.....	262
3. Relations with the North	268
4. Relations with Emerging Global Powers	272

Findings and Conclusions.....	276
--------------------------------------	------------

Bibliography	283
---------------------------	------------

Abbreviations

AKP	– Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (eng. Justice and Development Party)
ASALA	– The Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia
BSEC	– Black Sea Economic Cooperation
CENTO	– Central Treaty Organization
EU	– European Union
CSCP	– Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Platform
JDP	– Justice and Development Party
FIFA	– International Federation of Association Football
HLCC	– High Level Cooperation Council
IAEA	– International Atomic Energy Agency
IMF	– International Monetary Fund
JDP	– Justice and Development Party
OECD	– Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
OIC	– Organization of the Islamic Conference
PKK	– Partiya Kerkari Kurdistan (eng. Kurdistan Workers' Party)

Acknowledgements

This dissertation would not have been possible without the guidance and the help of several individuals who in one way or another contributed and extended their valuable assistance in the preparation and completion of this study.

First and foremost, my utmost gratitude to my supervisor **Prof. Dr. Hab. Ryszard Zięba** Head of PhD Studies Program, Faculty of Journalism and Political Science, University of Warsaw; Head of the Department of History and Theory of International Relations at the Institute of International Relations, Faculty of Journalism and Political Science for his course that provided me with precious academic buildup and his guidance, advice, criticism and insight throughout the research.

I would like to thank my father and mother; for their patience and steadfast encouragement, they were always with me stood by through the good and bad time.

Last but not the least, the one above all of us, the omnipresent Allah, for answering my prayers for giving me the strength to plod on despite my constitution wanting to give up and throw in the towel, thank you so much Dear Lord.

Introduction

The Research Problem

Being a “middle size state”¹ and a “regional power”² with global ambitions occupying a highly strategic peculiar position,³ Republic of Turkey is a member of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the sole candidate of the European Union (EU) with a predominant Muslim population passionate for the full membership. The unique feature of Turkey lays on the fact that it is a democratic, secular state, at the same time among the best allies of the West in the region that situates at the very heart of trouble zones encompassed with Balkans, the Middle East and Caucasus.⁴ Due to its geographic location between the “East and West”,⁵ it gives an easy access to strategically important regions and major energy resources. Besides, thanks to its character as a modern country, culturally, Turkey stands as a bridge between the West and Islam.⁶ Henceforth, Turkey as a geopolitical and geostrategic center has constantly occupied a prior level agenda in region politics.

Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, AK Parti, AKP, eng. JDP hereinafter: AK Party)⁷ entered to Turkish political scene at the year of 2001 under the leadership of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan.⁸ Shortly after its establishment, the Party swept the victory at the general elections held in 2002 while major center parties that ruled the country for decades failed to pass ten percentage thresholds.⁹ AK Party formed the government and

¹ Baskın Oran, „TDP'nin Kuramsal Çerçevesi” („Theoretical Framework of Turkish Foreign Policy”) Baskın Oran (ed.) *Türk Dış Politikası (Turkish Foreign Policy)* İletişim Yayınları, İstanbul 2001, p. 30.

² Gökhan Bacık, Bülent Aras, “Turkey’s Inescapable Dilemma: America or Europe?”, *Alternatives: Turkish Journal of International Relations*, 2004, Vol. III, No. 1, p. 56.

³ “The New Ottomans?”, *Aljazeera English*, 16 June 2011.

⁴ Graham Fuller, “Turkey’s Strategic Model: Myths and Realities”, *The Washington Quarterly*, Summer 2004, pp. 51-54.

⁵ Maciej Herbut, “Turcja między wschodem a zachodem”, (“Turkey between the East and the West”), in Teresa Łoś-Nowak Teresa (ed.), *Polityka zagraniczna: aktorzy – potencjały – strategie (Foreign Policy: Actors – Potentials – Strategies)*, Poltext, Warsaw 2011, pp. 312-330.

⁶ Hasan Bağcı, Şaban Kardaş, “Post September 11 Impact: The Strategic Importance of Turkey Revisited”, *CEPS/IISS European Security Forum*, Brussels 2003, p. 20.

⁷ The acronym of the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi) since its establishment in 2001 has been a theme of discussion in Turkish domestic politics. In accordance with the official party records given by the Ministry of Interior, the acronym of the party is “AK Parti.” In Turkish the word “Ak” means white and clean; that refers a clear reference to the party image of uncorrupted character. Instead of AK Parti, however, many scholars (and most political opponents) insist on using AKP, which is a misnomer. In the course of the dissertation all acronyms are going to be applied to avoid engaging into similar debates and to secure neutrality of the dissertation.

⁸ “History of the Justice and Development Party”, (source: www.akparti.com.tr, <http://eng.akparti.org.tr/english/index.html>), October 2011).

⁹ Soner Çağatay, “The November 2002 Elections and Turkey’s New Political Era”, *Middle East Review of International Affairs Journal*, Vol. VI, No. 4, December 2002, p. 46.

hitherto ruled Turkey gaining all legislative and local elections held since 2002 with an increasing vote percentage.¹⁰

In the course of Justice and Development Party government periods in 2002-2011, foreign policy outlook of the Party formed by Professor Ahmet Davutoğlu who is appreciated as the architect and mastermind of AKP's foreign policy concept.¹¹ Ankara, in accordance with foreign policy doctrines of Davutoğlu, proposing a "Zero Problem" principle with Turkish vicinity, matured immensely close affiliations and solidarity in terms of politic, economy, commerce, trade and diplomatic sphere with the Middle East, Eurasia, Balkans and South Caucasus contrariwise to secluded structure of Turkey's established foreign policy tendency towards the regions.¹² Additionally, under the framework of Professor Davutoğlu's vision,¹³ AK Party advanced a proactive rhythmic diplomacy with Turkey's neighborhood, while putting forward the geopolitical and geostrategic role of Turkey through the rehearsal of "Strategic Depth" theory.¹⁴

Since Justice and Development Party came to power, Ankara has acquired the general secretary position of Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), assumed an observer status at the Arab League, joined the G-20 group of the largest world economies, held a non-permanent seat on the United Nations (UN) Security Council, appointed an Assistant Secretary General of NATO, as well as a Secretary General of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) while sought seats on the International Monetary Fund (IMF) along with World Bank executive boards.¹⁵ Accordingly, the new multifaceted foreign policy involvement of the Republic of Turkey under the AKP rule toward the Ottoman periphery and Muslim world, had magnetized the concerns that gave rise to tempestuous controversies both domestically and abroad. Notwithstanding to the fact Justice and Development Party high rank charter members repeatedly notified that they have changed their political views as refer to their Islamist past publicly, preferring to use "Conservative

¹⁰ Soner Çağatay, "The AKP's Overwhelming Victory", *Foreign Affairs*, June 2011.

¹¹ Gürkan Zengin, *Hoca: Türk Dış Politikası'nda Davutoğlu Etkisi (Teacher: Impact of Davutoğlu on Turkey's Foreign Policy)*, İnkilap Yayınları, İstanbul 2010, pp.1-10.

¹² Bülent Aras, "Davutoğlu Era Period in Turkish Foreign Policy", *Insight Turkey*, Vol: 11, No.3, pp. 127-142.

¹³ Justyna Głowska, "Koncepcja strategicznej głębi (Strategik Derinlik) jako nowa doktryna polityki zagranicznej Turcji" ("The Concept of Strategic Depth (Strategik Derinlik) as a New Foreign Policy Doctrine of Turkey"), *Stosunki Międzynarodowe*, (source: www.stosunki.pl, <<http://www.stosunki.pl/?q=content/koncepcja-strategicznej-g%C5%82%C4%99bi-strategik-derinlik-jako-nowa-doktryna-polityki-zagranicznej-tu>>, December 2011).

¹⁴ Ahmet Davutoğlu, *Strategik Derinlik; Türkiye'nin Uluslararası Konumu (Strategic Depth: International Location of Turkey)*, Küre Yayınları, İstanbul 2001, pp. 1-23.

¹⁵ Caroll Migdalovitz, "Turkey: Selected Foreign Policy Issues and U.S.View's", *Congressional Research Service*, November 2010, p. 6.

Democracy”¹⁶ as the identity of new political formation. Yet, a number of foreign policy analysts, experts, observers and critics have judged the very new foreign policy engagement of the party as an “axis shift”¹⁷ of traditional line of Turkey’s foreign policy.¹⁸ It was also argued that it is a split from traditional Western oriented foreign policy of Turkey to East, whilst the ideological identity of Justice and Development Party is regarded. Therefore, one of the most controversial issues as regard to Justice and Development Party throughout its government periods subsisting is its new foreign policy concept due to the Islamist pedigree of the Party and its charter members. Justice and Development Party was occasionally suspected of applying an “Islamist”¹⁹ and “Neo-Ottomanist”²⁰ foreign policy understanding instead of Turkey’s Western orientated foreign policy orientation holding a hidden agenda in terms of foreign policy that has its roots in National Vision Movement.²¹

Scope and Objective

The main goal of the dissertation is to contribute to the academic debate with an objective scientific research as regard to Turkey’s foreign policy under AKP rule in 2002-2011. Thence, the main objective of the dissertation is to examine main directions of Turkey’s foreign policy during Justice and Development governments in 2002-2011. Within this scope, it analyzes two government periods of AKP from 4th of November 2002 since 12th June 2012.²² Within the content of the study, political,²³ economic, trade, commerce, military, diplomatic and security related foreign policy issues between Turkey and its neighbors, allies as well as with other international actors is deeply elaborated. Turkey’s foreign relations with the Middle East states, the United States of America, the European Union, Balkans, Greece, Cyprus, Central Asian States, Southern Caucasus and Russian Federation along with the

¹⁶ Yalçın Akdoğan, *Ak Parti ve Muhafazakar Demokrasi (AK Party and Conservative Democracy)*, Alfa Yayınları, İstanbul 2004, pp. 5-13.

¹⁷ İdris Bal, “Axis Shift or Boom of Self Confidence?”, *USAK Yearbook of International Politics and Law*, No.4, 2011, p. 304.

¹⁸ Ziya Öniş, “Multiple Faces of the New Turkish Foreign Policy: Underlying Dynamics and a Critique”, *GLODEM Working Papers*, No. 04, 2010, p. 1.

¹⁹ Hakan Yavuz, *Secularism and Muslim Democracy in Turkey*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2009, pp.2-20.

²⁰ Soner Çagatay, “Is Turkey Leaving the West?”, *Foreign Affairs*, October 2009.

²¹ Buğra K Kantat, “AK Party’s Foreign Policy: Is Turkey Turning a way from the West?”, *Insight Turkey*, Vol. 12, No. 1, 2010, p. 207.

²² “Turcy ponownie wybrali Partię Sprawiedliwości i Rozwoju” (“Turks Re-elected Justice and Development Party”), *Wprost*, 12 June 2011.

²³ Aleksandra D Szuszczykiewicz, “Polityka zagraniczna Turcji w kontekście czerwcowych wyborów parlamentarnych i “Arabskiej Wiosny” (“Turkey’s Foreign Policy in the Context of June Parliamentary Elections and Arab Spring”), *National Security Bureau*, 29 July 2011, p. 2.

emerging global powers like China, India and Brazil compose the main scope of the dissertation.

Aside from analyzing Turkey's foreign policy practices with a deep focus on internal and external determinants influencing the decision making processes under the AKP rule, the dissertation also examines Turkey's foreign policy practices chronologically in this time frame from a comparative perspective to traditional context of Turkey's foreign policy line under the light of historical background of relation prospects. Alternately, the dissertation purpose to comprehend and elucidate the key characteristic features of Turkey's foreign policy under Justice and Development Party rule period and in what way and wherefore Turkey's foreign policy changed. In turn, it aims to apprehend if Ankara's new initiatives in the Middle East, Balkans, North Africa, South Caucasus and Russia signify a divergence from Turkey's formerly recognized Western connected policy and may be appreciated as a departure from the West. In addition to that, the dissertation tries to find answers whether Turkey's foreign policy in the course of Justice and Development Party government periods experienced an "axis shift" or a radical transformation from its orthodox path in comparison to traditional line of Turkey's foreign policy or Turkey continued to keep its traditional foreign policy concept. Eventually, the dissertation aims to study whether foreign policy initiatives of Justice and Development Party bears an Islamist agenda and it promote an imperialist expansion instinct under the Neo-Ottomanism rhetoric or AK Party applies a sovereign foreign policy practice due to the newly emerged conjecture in international politics emerged following the post 9/11 terror attacks.

Theory

States, as the members of international community, have definite aims and standing points regarding their external relations toward the other states and international organizations. There exist diverse "methods and means"²⁴ that are applied either to achieve their goals or to protect their interests in the course of formulation and realization process of their foreign policies.²⁵ According to Ryszard Zięba,²⁶ a doyen of international relations discipline who is a

²⁴ Ryszard Zięba, „Cele polityki zagranicznej państwa” („Foreign Policy Goals of States”), in Ryszard Zięba (ed.), *Wstęp do teorii polityki zagranicznej państw (Theory of State Foreign Policy: An Introduction)*, Wydawnictwo Adam Marszałek, Toruń 2004, p. 48.

²⁵ In the Polish literature see: Teresa Łoś-Nowak, *Polityka zagraniczna: aktorzy - potencjały - strategie*, (red.) (*Foreign Policy: States - Actors - Potentials*), Poltext, Warszawa 2011, pp. 42-61.

²⁶ Ryszard Zięba, *Wstęp do teorii polityki zagranicznej państwa* (ed.) (*Introduction to Theory of Foreign Policy*), Wydawnictwo Adam Marszałek, Toruń 2004, pp. 17-55.

recognized scholar both domestically and abroad, the main goal of a state's foreign policy is to secure its entity, protect it, to increase its power, provide and develop prestige of the state in international relations. Professor Zięba reckons that the conditions determining the fundamentals of foreign policy are divided into two main categories: objective conditions and subjective conditions; these very conditions also have their domestic and international dimensions that are highly influential on foreign policy making process of a state. The objective conditions of foreign policy are generally similar for all states and they maybe understood as the protection of the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and realization of national interest, its protection and development. As for the subjective conditions of foreign policy, they differ for each state; and constitute the national and specific feature of the foreign policy of a given state. In retaliation, status quo principle may constitute the objective fundamental of a state while expansionism may constitute the subjective fundamental of another state's foreign policy aim.²⁷ Hence, while performing foreign policy and evaluating world and regional politics the first and utmost standing point of states is to secure its sovereignty as well as territorial integrity, to protect its national interest and to develop it that may be appreciated as the fundamental objective of a state's foreign policy. As for the subjective factors, they may diverse per state and shaped by historical, geographical and national ideology of a state. In addition to that, in order to achieve their goals or to protect their national interests, throughout foreign policy making process, states may apply hard power usage like military means or soft power applications like diplomacy, negotiation, foreign aid or other economic tools.²⁸

Notwithstanding to the fact that since the emerge of foreign policy as an independent sub-category of study within political science,²⁹ change or reconstructing phenomena in terms of foreign policy analysis occupies a vital issue in the realm of international relations discipline. Nonetheless, there exist a quite intermittent foreign policy analysis literature concerning the change and reconstructing issue in foreign policy. "The Study of Political Adaptation"³⁰ put down on paper by James Roseau is appreciated among the early works as regard to foreign policy change and reconstructing literature. The main thesis of the book, in basic, defends the arguments that, the change in foreign policy takes place upon emerge of

²⁷ Ibidem, pp. 18-54.

²⁸ Justyna Zając, „Środki i metody polityki zagranicznej państwa” („Means and Methods of Foreign Policy”) in Ryszard Zięba (ed.), *Wstęp do teorii polityki zagranicznej państwa (Theory of State Foreign Policy: An Introduction)*, Wydawnictwo Adam Marszałek, Toruń 2004, pp. 79-97).

²⁹ Ayşe Keşler, *Dimensions of Foreign Policy in Turkey: A Comparative Analysis of AKP Government and DSP - MHP - ANAP Coalition*, Unpublished MA Thesis at Sabancı University, İstanbul 2005, p. 14.

³⁰ James N Rosenau, *The Study of Political Adaptation: Essays on the Analysis of World Politics*, Nichols Publishing, New York 1981, pp. 1-10.

need and demand both in domestic and external level.³¹ Kalevi Jaakko Holsti's "Why Nations Realign: Foreign Policy Restructuring in the Postwar World"³² is a remarkable landmark for the literature of foreign policy change where he explicates foreign policy restructuring patterns and occurs, while proposing many definition regarding the change. Jerel Rosati's "The Frustrating Study of Foreign Policy Analyze",³³ along with his collective book with Joe Hagan and Mart Sampson "Foreign Policy Restructuring: How Governments Respond to Global Change",³⁴ are accepted among the magnum opus books at the field of change in foreign policy. Besides, David Welch's masterpiece "Painful Choice: A Theory of Foreign Policy Change"³⁵ suggests an organizational theory along with cognitive and motivational psychological approaches constituting a prospect theory as regard to foreign policy change attitudes.

All the above mentioned literature stresses the fact that the change phenomenon in terms of foreign policy bears different meanings and contexts. However, it may be proposed that in today's world, states in very rare cases tend to change their foreign policies. In fact, change in foreign policy may take place due to wars, economic reasons, or due to conjectural changes in international system. Apart from these, there may appear changes that arise due to the regime changes of a state or as a consequence of state transformations. New foreign policy orientations of Central and Eastern Europe countries, in the course of post-Cold War constitute a good example to this category. In addition to that, as it has been underlined by Holsti, domestic politics of a country may as well influence the foreign policy direction of a state, thus internal politics has the potential to cause a foreign policy change. Kalevi Jaakko Holsti, after analyzing foreign policy change patterns in different countries, comes to conclusion that many foreign policy change cases mostly stem from leader oriented, alias personal perceptions of the elites or leader led orientations that affect foreign policy decision making process which are highly determinant at the change of foreign policy process.³⁶

Charles Hermann in his article "Changing Course: When Governments Choose to Redirect Foreign Policy", accordingly, points out that a foreign policy change tendency which

³¹ Ayşe Keşler, op.cit., p. 15.

³² Kalevi J Holsti, *Why Nations Realign: Foreign Policy Restructuring in the Postwar World*, Allen and Unwin, London 1982, pp. 1-10.

³³ Jerel Rosati, "The Frustrating Study of Foreign Policy Analyze", *International Studies Review*, Vol. VI, No.1, March 2004, p. 110.

³⁴ Jerel Rosati, Joe Hagan, Mart Sampson, *Foreign Policy Restructuring: How Governments Respond to Global Change*, University of South Carolina Press, South Carolina 1994, pp. 3-22.

³⁵ Dawid A Welch, *Painful Choice: A Theory of Foreign Policy Change*, Princeton University Press, New Jersey 2005, pp. 10-30.

³⁶ Kalevi J Holsti, op. cit., pp. 1-10.

occurs when a government opts to create different policy orientations in comparison to traditional foreign policy directions³⁷ of a country has different connotations, the categories foreign policy changes pattern of a country as follows:

1- Adjustment Change: Changes occur in the level of effort (greater or lesser) and/or in the scope of recipients (such as refinement in the class of targets) what is done, how it is done, and the purposes for which it is done remain unchanged.

2- Program Change: Changes are made in the methods or means by which the goal or problem is addressed. In contrast to adjustment changes, which tend to be quantitative program changes are qualitative and involve new instruments of statecraft. What is done and how it is done changes, but the purpose for which it is done remain unchanged.

3- Problem/Goal Changes: The initial problem or goal that the policy addresses is replaced or simply fortified. In this foreign policy change, the purposes themselves are replaced.

4- International Orientation Change: The most extreme form of foreign policy change involves the redirection of the actor's entire orientation toward world affairs. In contrast to lesser forms of change that concern the actor's approach to a single issue or specific set of other actors, orientation change involves a basic shift in the actor's international role and activities. Not one policy but many are more or less simultaneously changed.³⁸

In this context, the "change within continuity"³⁹ theory formulated by Mesut Özcan and Ali Resul Usul constitutes the theoretical background of the dissertation. As proposed by Mesut Özcan and Ali Resul Usul, under the frames of change within continuity theory, taking into consideration the foreign policy practices of Justice and Development Party government in 2002-2011, the new concept of Turkey's foreign policy has not influenced traditional orientation of Turkey's foreign policy per se. The fact that, there exist some changes in Turkey's foreign policy is not ignored by the scholars though it has been classified as "adjustment changes"⁴⁰ as refer to classification of Charles Hermann.

³⁷ Charles Hermann, "Changing Course: When Governments Choose to Redirect Foreign Policy", *International Studies Quarterly*, 1990, pp. 3-21.

³⁸ Ibidem, pp. 5-20.

³⁹ Mustafa Özcan, Resul Usul, "Understanding the "New" Turkish Foreign Policy: Changes within Continuity Is Turkey Departing From The West?", *Uluslararası Hukuk ve Politika*, Vol. VI, No. 1, 2010, p. 110.

⁴⁰ Ibidem, p. 110.

The “change within continuity” theory simply advocates the idea that, the new understanding introduced to foreign policy of Turkey by Ahmet Davutoğlu proposes multidimensionality in terms of external relations that cannot be interpreted as a radical departure of Turkey from the West. Besides, as considered the claims blaming AK Party to follow a Neo-Ottomanist foreign policy with a hidden Islamist agenda, Özcan & Usul hold the point that the Neo-Ottomanism is not a monolithic concept, moreover the Neo-Ottomanism understanding does not constitute an alternative policy for the Justice and Development Party decision makers just because owing to the fact that Ottoman Empire was a Balkan / European state in practice rather than an Asian as well as modernity movement of Turkey has its roots in late Ottoman period.

As it has been theorized by Özcan & Usul,⁴¹ Turkey’s foreign policy ruled by Justice and Development Party in 2002-2011 coincides to the “adjustment change” category taking into consideration that Justice and Development Party’s endeavored to develop Turkey’s affiliations with the European Union, particularly in the course of first government period of AKP. In comparison to previous Republic of Turkey governments, Turkish - EU relations have not dramatically transformed, contrarily JDP government improved relations with EU as Turkey acquired a candidate status during AKP government in 2005 which may be appreciated Turkey’s “level of efforts” as regard to strengthen relations with the European Union.⁴²

Accordingly as regard to Hermann’s classification, Özcan & Usul highlights that Turkey’s foreign policy experienced a qualitative but not a quantitative transformation referring to Justice and Development Party’s foreign policy practices toward Middle East states. Albeit it is a theme of controversy and on contrary to mainstream literature accusing AKP to shift Turkey’s traditional Western axis that was established by Mustafa Kemal, AK Party did not challenge Turkey’s Western connection quantitatively. Although, the extent and scale of change as regard to program may constitute a theme of discussion, when taken into consideration worsening relations with Israel, nonetheless it still should be accepted as a type of “program change” whilst notified by Turkish FM Davutoğlu “the axis of our foreign policy is toward NATO, the EU and the transatlantic process”.⁴³

⁴¹ Ibidem, p. 110.

⁴² Murat N Arman, *Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi Hükümetleri Döneminde Türkiye - Avrupa Birliği İlişkileri (Turkish - European Union Relations during Justice and Development Party Governments)*, Kitap Atelyesi, Ankara 2010, p. 47.

⁴³ Ahmet Davutoğlu, “Rules out Shift from Transatlantic Axis”, *Today’s Zaman*, 23 March 2009.

As it is argued by Özcan & Usul,⁴⁴ the new rhetoric of Turkey's foreign policy promoting maximum collaboration prospects in terms of political, economical and diplomacy sphere, with a multidimensional character as regard to "strategic depth" of Turkey, may not be merged for Turkey's foreign policy's fundamental principle that symbolized as the desire to be full membership of the European Union for decades. Justice and Development Party so as to increase its negotiation deal with the EU, tried to consolidate its influence in Turkish periphery hinting the EU that Turkey's strategic significance would be hard tenet for Brussels to refuse in the course of negotiation process.

Hypothesis

Regardless of the fact that in terms of foreign politics Turkey challenged some controversies when it rejected the U.S. demands to deploy its army in the course of the occupation of Iraq due to 1 March permit crisis in 2003, or due to Gaza Flotilla attacks of Israel in 31 May, 2010, where its diplomatic relations experienced the worst period since the establishment of reciprocal relations, Turkey continued to be the strategic, military ally of the European Union, the United States of America as well as Israel under the rule period of AKP in 2001-2011 period.

After ten years of AK Party governments, Turkey highly improved its relations with the European Union where it achieved to obtain an official candidate status in 2005. Apart from that, Ankara continued to possess good relations with Greece while experienced unorthodox affiliations with Armenia. It also supported negotiations in Cyprus Island as regard to unification of the Island under the frames of Annan Plan. On the other hand, due to the rhythmic diplomacy attempts, Ankara initialized a tie-up process with Middle East, Caucasus and Balkan states, that Republic of Turkey has ethnic, cultural, religious and historical associations because of its Ottoman past. Still, the main motivation of a similar policy orientation was not aim to create new paradigm instead of traditional foreign policy concept of Turkey. Quite the contrary, the main objective of similar foreign policy initiative was to gain new alternatives dimension for Republic of Turkey to enforce its relations with Western allies in the course of EU full membership negotiations.

Furthermore, the changing dynamics of the region and global politics following the collapse of the Cold War paradigm, and post 9/11 September era, blooming Turkish economy

⁴⁴ M. Özcan, R. Usul, op.cit., p. 111.

as well as the newly emerged conjecture highly influenced the development of a similar foreign policy assignment. Therebeyond, Turkey's strict engagement with Ottoman periphery is not an ideological preference peculiar to AKP whilst similar policy engagements initialized due to changing regional and international dynamics following the end of the Cold War. Opposite to all close connections with Middle East states principally, Ankara both institutionally and psychologically is far a way of having a strategic partnership as a substitute for its West direction.

Henceforward, the main hypothesis of the dissertation lays on the argument that conversely to claims of mainstream literature,⁴⁵ blaming AKP to shift Turkey's traditional Western oriented foreign policy to Eastward with an Islamist agenda that resulted in an "axis shift",⁴⁶ the dissertation supports the argument that, though Turkey experienced some quantitative changes in terms of foreign policy in AKP rule, a similar quantity change may not be interpreted as an axis shift that caused a radical convert or a transformation of Turkey's traditional foreign policy orientation. What is more, as an outcome of drastic changing regional and international dynamics following the 9/11 terror attacks that resulted in occupation of Afghanistan and Iraq, similar to previous Turkish governments AKP continued Turkey's foreign policy orientation that tuned within 90s mostly as a consequence of the end of the Cold War. Therefore, the dissertation argues that in the course of AK Party rule periods in 2002-2011, the essential character of Turkey's foreign policy preserved its fundamental feature that aims to be a part of the West.

Methodology

According to David Collier, comparison is an essential method of analysis to describe similarities and contrast among the cases. In political science and related disciplines not excluding international relations, comparison is widely used to test proposed hypothesis, also it is highly fruitful in theory building process. In the field of political science discipline, form

⁴⁵ For a detailed literature on the popular axis shift discussion see: Tarık Oğuzlu, "Middle Easternization of Turkey's Foreign Policy: Does Turkey Dissociate from the West?", *Turkish Studies*, 2008, Vol. 9, pp. 3-20; Soner Cagaptay, "Secularism and Foreign Policy in Turkey: New Elections, Troubling Trends", *Washington Institute Policy Focus*, No. 67, April 2007; Ziya Öniş, Yılmaz Şuhnaz, "Between Europeanization and Euro - Asianism: Foreign Policy Activism in Turkey during the AKP Era", *Turkish Studies*, Vol. 10, No. 1, March 2009, pp. 7-24; Nicholas Dantfroth, "Ideology and Pragmatism in Turkish Foreign Policy: From Atatürk to the AKP", *Turkish Policy Quarterly*, Vol. 7, No.3, pp. 83-95; Tarık Oğuzlu, Mustafa Kibaroglu, "Is the Westernization Process Losing Pace in Turkey: Who's to Blame?", *Turkish Studies*, 2009, Vol. 10, pp. 577-593.

⁴⁶ William Hale, "Turkey and the Middle East in the New Era", *Insight Turkey*, Vol. 11, No. 3, 2009, pp. 143-159.

of comparative method in general contains a wide diversity including analysis based on statistics and historical studies. In this sense, comparative method has a broad scope of usage meaning where it refers to “methodological issues that arise in the systematic analysis of a small number of cases”.⁴⁷ Late 1960s and initial of 70s evidenced a boom in literature studying comparative method analysis. The notorious article of Arend Lijphart “Comparative Politics and Comparative Analysis”,⁴⁸ Richard Merrit and Stein Rokkan’s “Comparing Nations: The Use of Quantitative Data in Cross National Research”⁴⁹ along with Arthur Kalleberg’s “The Logic of Comparison: A Methodological Note on the Comparative Study on Political System”⁵⁰ are appreciated among the classics of comparative method literature with its application in political science.

Owing to the fact that the main purpose of the dissertation is to analyze the directions of foreign policy of Turkey in Justice and Development Party governments, to conceptualize whether the principal foreign policy character of Turkey shifted or not, the comparative method constitutes the spine methodological approach of the dissertation. So as to respond the interrogation if Justice and Development Party under its rule introduced an unorthodox policy in terms of foreign politics that resulted in an axis shift or not, it is imperative to compare foreign policy practices of AK Party to previous governments of Republic of Turkey, therefore the comparative method is used to a great extent to respond given question properly. It is a widely agreed fact that both in terms of domestic and international politics, language plays a crucial role. The discourse of political speaking, namely the speeches of Presidents, Prime Ministers, Foreign Affairs Minister and other foreign policy decision makers constitute a domestic and international significance. Thus, to decipher policy orientations of foreign policy decision makers, Critical Discourse Analysis is a unique method.

Regardless of the fact that, the phenomena of discourse is a broadly used concept ranging from sociology, philosophy to political science, within the scope of methodological approach in terms of foreign policy analysis, it will be handled as the “data that is liable for empiric analysis”.⁵¹ As it was argued by Van Dijk Teun, “Critical Discourse Analysis” is

⁴⁷ David Collier, *The Comparative Method in Political Science: The State of Discipline II*, American Political Science Association, Washington DC 1993, p. 105.

⁴⁸ Arend Lijphart, “Comparative Politics and Comparative Analysis”, *The American Political Science Review*, Vol. LXV, No. 3, September 1971, pp. 682-693.

⁴⁹ Richard Merrit, Stein Rokkan, *Comparing Nations: The Use of Quantitative Data in Cross National Research*, Yale University Press, New Haven 1996, pp. 1-22.

⁵⁰ Arthur Kalleberg, “The Logic of Comparison: A Methodological Note on the Comparative Study on Political System”, *World Politics*, 1966, Vol.XIX, pp. 69-82.

⁵¹ Stefan Titscher, Michael Mayer, Ruth Woda, Eva Vetter, *Methods of Text and Discourse Analysis*, Sage Publications Ltd, London 1998, p. 44.

obviously not a homogeneous model, nor a school or a paradigm, but at most a shared perspective on doing linguistics, semiotic or discourse analysis".⁵² The main objective of the critical discourse analysis is to perceive language use in social and political practice. It should be noted that in terms of language use in politics -both in domestic and abroad sense- utilization of language may not function in isolation but under the frameworks of social, psychological and political context. Hence, critical discourse analysis appreciates the socio - political context of language and it studies the correlation between text structures and it takes the very context to explore its function in terms of politics.

Correspondingly, the critical discourse analysis is also used within the scope of the dissertation owing to the fact that official statements of Presidents, Prime Ministers, and Foreign Ministers generate a crucial argument so as to understand policy orientation of states. Thus, official statements, press conferences, informative releases of Foreign Affairs Ministries and official responds as regard to questions during press conferences regarding Turkey's foreign policy in this period examined via critical discourse. Ultimately, direct sources like party program, election manifestos, government programs as well bilateral agreements, not excluding memorandum of understanding along with other types of official documents signed during the rule period of JDP also constitute a remarkable source to examine foreign policy concept and practice of the Party.

In addition to that, the literature resources, policy analysis, and academic publications including articles are also examined critically via text analysis method so as to study AK Party's foreign policy concept and practices during its rule period in 2002-2011. Henceforth critical text analysis is also applied in the scope of the dissertation to a wide extent. Apart from that the critical analysis of documents in terms of international relations and critical analysis of literature that focusing Turkey's foreign policy of the AKP governments in 2002-2011 periods also used under the frame of the dissertation as a part of political science research method approach.

In a nutshell, the comparative analysis, critical rhetoric analysis, and critical text analysis form the main methodological approaches that are applied in the course of the dissertation to thoroughly analyze the main directions of Turkey's foreign policy in Justice and Development Party government periods from 2002 to 2011.

⁵² Van Dijk Teun, „Discourse, Power and Access” in Caldas-Coulthard, and M. Coulthard (eds.) *Texts and Practices: Readings in Critical Discourse Analysis*, Routledge, London 1996, p.131.

Literature Overview

The dissertation “Turkey’s Foreign Policy of the Justice and Development Party Governments (2002-2011)” covers a range of bounds from political diplomatic, economic, commerce issues to trade, military, culture and religious liaisons. The list may be extended regarding to the fact that the scope of bilateral relation prospects of Republic of Turkey with its Eastern, Western, and Northern along with the newly emerged global actors occupy a broad field to analyze at a whole.

Subsequently, in consistency with the primary objectives of the dissertation, essential resources in related fields are deeply examined. As an indispensable part of the research and data collection throughout the preparation process of the dissertation, library resources, including first and second literature sources, books, academic journals, monographs, periodicals, newspapers releases, articles are utilized to a great extent. Over and above, internet resources not omitting on-line books, periodicals, newspapers, articles are explored along with the official websites of political parties, Foreign Affairs Ministries, embassies; state departments research and think thank centers. Hereafter, the direct sources like party and government programs, election manifestos, and bilateral agreements, memorandum of understandings, press briefs and releases constitute primary source of the dissertation in terms of literature.

Organization of the Dissertation

The dissertation is organized in seven chapters. The first chapter bears an introductory character focusing on theoretical framework of Turkey’s foreign policy along with its historical background. The second chapter provides profound information with respect to Justice and Development Party and its foreign policy concept. It explores the history of political Islam in Turkish context, including critical analysis of National Vision Movement. The chapter also examines the birth and development period of AK Party along with the dynamics determine its foreign policy concept.

The Eastern direction of Turkey in terms of foreign policy relations under the rule of Justice and Development Party government periods in 2002-2011 is examined in the third chapter. The chapter is organized under six subtitles. Firstly, the chapter introduces the historical background of Turkey’s relation prospects with Middle East region. Following that, Turkish - Iraqi, Turkish - Syrian, Turkish - Iranian, Turkish - Israeli relations including

Palestinian issue, along with AK Party's position toward the process commonly named as Arab Spring is elaborated. Within the context of the chapter, foreign policy interactions of AKP rule is examined from a comparative manner taking into consideration the historical perspective of bilateral relations with mentioned states. The fourth chapter of the dissertation focuses on the Western direction of Turkey's foreign policy in Justice and Development Party governments. The chapter contains four subtitles. It initially introduces historical background of Turkish - Western relations. Following that it examines Republic of Turkey's relations with the United States of America, the European Union, Balkans and Greece. Republic of Turkey's foreign policy direction in the course of AKP's office period from 2002 to 2011 with Russian Federation, Southern Caucasus and Central Asia is focused at the fifth chapter. The Northern direction of Turkey's foreign policy in this chapter is examined under the subtitles of relations with Russia, Southern Caucasus and Central Asia. Chapter six elaborates relation perspectives of Ankara's with emerging global actors in the course of government period of JDP in 2002-2011. Within the scope of the chapter bilateral relations between Turkey and China, India and Brazil are studied under three subtitles.

The seventh and final chapter of the dissertation bears an evaluative character. Under four subtitles it evaluates foreign policy performance of Justice and Development Party in 2002-2011 period from a comparative perspective so as to find answer whether foreign policy orientation of the Republic evidenced a radical change that caused an axis shift in this period. The Eastern, Western and Northern connections of Turkey's foreign policy along with the relation prospects with emerging global actors is examined in this chapter to find proper responds to for the above mentioned question.

Chapter I

Turkey's Foreign Policy from Historical Perspective

The chapter analyzes the general framework of Turkey's foreign policy from a theoretical perspective, along with the main determinants shaping it and the characteristic features of Turkey's external policy concept. The main objective of the chapter is to conceptualize fundamental components of Turkey's external policy that influence decision making processes. It assesses historical aspect of Turkey's foreign relations policy along with the geostrategic dimension of Turkey thoroughly. It also considers internal dynamics in order to sketch out the basic principles and theoretical framework of Republic of Turkey's foreign affairs.

1. Geostrategic Position of Turkey

It is a general assumption that the geographical position of a given country plays a vital role in the determinacy of its security and foreign policy perception priorities. Plus, as it has been repeatedly highlighted in the literature of international relations, the geostrategic position may introduce many opportunities for a country on one hand, while on the other hand it may as well poses serious threats against. And same is the case for Turkey.

Territory of Republic of Turkey situates at a highly geostrategic post as it cohabits with Balkans, Caucasus and Middle East, at the same time it constitutes a natural bridge between Western industries and Caspian energy basin. From this aspect, Turkey has a highly significant geopolitical and geostrategic position that introduce many precious and unique advantageous. Thanks to its geopolitical location, Turkey plays an uppermost function in world politic, nonetheless⁵³ from the historical perspective; this very bridge role turned its territories to a transit route from East to the West which seriously threaten its security perceptions.⁵⁴ Yasemin Çelik highlights the prominence of Turkey laying on the fact that its territories rest on Asia and Europe, while it borders with the Middle East, post-Soviet states as well as with the European Union. Moreover, Turkey is also surrounded on three sides by the

⁵³ Mustafa Aydın, "The Determinants of Turkish Foreign Policy and Turkey's European Vocation", *The Review of International Affairs*, 2003, Vol. III, No. 1, p. 197.

⁵⁴ B. Oran, "TDP'nin Kuramsal....", op.cit., p. 7.

Black Sea, Aegean Sea and Mediterranean Sea, that makes it a natural passage between Europe and Asia.⁵⁵

Referring to the classical masterpiece of Lewis F. Richardson's, "Statistics of Deadly Quarrels",⁵⁶ there exist a strict correlation between the external wars and custom quantity of a given state. On that account, Republic of Turkey neighboring with seven states, and eight due to aftermath of division of Soviet Union nearby to Turkish border, obliged to remove its security concerns. Similarly, as the complex and unstable structure of Middle East, Caucasus and Balkans aggravated threat perception that pushed Turkey's foreign policy decision makers to seek allies to balance this very negative geopolitical disadvantage. Mustafa Aydın denotes that Turkey is located at the crossroads of land connections between Europe, Asia and Africa and it has many neighbors with different characteristics, regimes ideologies and aims. According to his point of view a country's border maybe a source of strength and weakness depending on their length, number and intentions of neighbors and the relative power. Another geostrategic importance of the Republic of Turkey is Turkish Straits.⁵⁷ Thanks to the Straits, the strategic significance of Turkey gains a global dimension. Geographical location of Turkey has played an influential role in terms of shaping its foreign policy.⁵⁸ Mustafa Aydın also notifies that the possession of the Straits conveys political and military advantages, and raises Turkey from the position of a purely local power to one having crucial international influence.⁵⁹ Yet, Turkish Straits constitute a highly vulnerable place in terms of defense as regard to air and sea attacks.⁶⁰ Taking into account all mentioned parameters, the geopolitical and geostrategic location of Turkey are both advantageous and disadvantageous, according to which Turkey's foreign policy decision makers determine foreign policy orientation in accordance with national security perceptions.

⁵⁵ Hüseyin Bağcı, Aslahan A Doganlar, "Changing Geopolitics and Turkish Foreign Policy", *Annales Universitatis Mariae Curie-Skłodowska*, Vol. XVI, No. 2, 2009, pp. 98-115.

⁵⁶ Lewis F Richardson, *Statistics of Deadly Quarrels*, Quadrangle Books, Chicago 1960, pp. 1-20.

⁵⁷ For detailed reading on Turkish Straits see: Jonathan Knight, "America's International Guarantees for the Straits: Prelude to the Truman Doctrine", *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. XIII (2), 1977, pp. 241-250; Visuizi-Dontas, Domna, *Greece and Turkey: The Regime of the Straits*, Lemnos, and Samotrace, G. C. Eleftheroudakis, Athens 1987; Anthony R Luca, *Great Power Rivalry at the Turkish Straits: The Montreux Conference and Convention of 1936*, Eastern European Monographs, Colombia University, New York 1981; Philip P Graves, *The Question of the Straits*, E. Benn, London 1931; Hakov J. M., "The Great States, Turkey and the Issue Concerning the New Regime of the Straits During the First Years of World War Two", *Archiv Orientální*, Vol. LIV (1), 1986, pp. 47-60; Jacob C Hurewitz, *The Background of Russia's Claims to the Turkish Straits*, TTK, Ankara 1964.

⁵⁸ Yasemin Çiftçi, *Contemporary Turkish Foreign Policy*, Praeger Publishers, Westport 1999, pp. 1-10.

⁵⁹ Mieczysław Tanty, *Bosfor i Dardanele w polityce mocarstw (The Bosphorus and Dardanelles in Power Politics)*, Państwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe, Warsaw 1982, pp. 1-22.

⁶⁰ Mustafa Aydın, "The Determinants of Turkish Foreign", op.cit., p. 198.

2. Turkey's Foreign Policy under Mustafa Kemal Atatürk Rules

The foreign policy followed by Mustafa Kemal⁶¹ during this time line can be categorized in three periods. The first period includes Turkey's foreign policy during the National Independence war when the battle and international diplomacy were undertaken concurrently. The second period includes the Turkey's foreign policy during Lausanne treaty when Turkey gave a diplomatic test and the third period from Lausanne till the death of Mustafa Kemal.⁶²

Independence War (1919-1922)

The National Movement initialized against the occupation of Anatolia due to the conditions arose after the First World War. It commenced its struggle against England, Greece, France Italy and Armenia on 19th May 1919 when Mustafa Kemal arrived in Samsun from İstanbul. The leaders of National Movement organized an irregular army, besides they established a de facto government and started diplomatic relations with foreign states. After series of conferences held in different places of Eastern Anatolia with delegations coming from different points of the country, the National Movement under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk opened the Turkish Grand National Assembly (1923). It initially accepted and enacted the National Oath in order to formulate both internal and external political principles of Turkish National Movement. Thus, National Oath became the cornerstone of Turkey's foreign policy aftermaths.

While the National Movement was in warfare status with England, Greece, France, Italy and Armenia it developed positive relations with United States and Soviet Socialist Republican Union in order to compensate diplomatic circumstances against it and to earn a

⁶¹ **Mustafa Kemal Atatürk:** (1884-1938) Founder of modern Turkey. Dedicated by his father to military service, he graduated near the top of his class in military school. As a young officer, he was critical of the government of the Ottoman Empire and became involved with the Turkish nationalist Committee of Union and Progress. He nevertheless fought for the government during World War I (1914-18), achieving great success against Allied forces during the Dardanelles Campaign. The eventual Allied victory brought British, French, and Italian troops to Anatolia; appointed to restore order there, he used the opportunity to incite the people against the Allied occupation. Greece and Armenia, territorial beneficiaries of the Ottoman defeat, opposed the Turkish nationalists, but Mustafa Kemal overcame all opposition, and the Republic of Turkey was established in 1923. He was given the name Atatürk ("Father of the Turks") in 1934. He pursued a policy of Westernization and secularization, in which Western styles of dress and appellation were made mandatory, seclusion of women was abolished, and the legal and educational system was overhauled.

"Kemal Atatürk" in Encyclopedia Britannica (source: www.britannica.com, <<http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/40411/Kemal-Atatürk>>, June 2010).

⁶² Jan Reychman, *Historia Turcji (History of Turkey)*, Zakł. Nar. im. Ossolińskich, Wrocław 1973, pp. 1-10.

wide maneuver capacity.⁶³ Besides, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk skillfully took advantage of the dissidence among occupying forces and their interest clashes as well.⁶⁴ To find resolution patterns in this period, some leading members of National Movement used to support the idea that Turkey had to go under an American mandate in order to gain its independence. Owing to the fact that, under the frame of Wilson Principles, the United States of America advocated the idea of self-determination, rights of nations. Because of its distance to Turkey, American mandate seemed to be a good solution against the occupation under the present circumstances of that time for the supporters.⁶⁵ Nevertheless, The United States of America did not indicate any sort of inclination to regional politics of Middle East and selected the isolation policy to external politics. The American mandate proposal was discussed during the conferences and under the roof of Turkish Grand National Assembly broadly, however it was not accepted.

On the other hand, the leader of Independence Movement, Atatürk, developed highly positive relations with Soviet Union to support Turkey,⁶⁶ which may be recognized as a perfect example of bright foreign policy and diplomacy practice.⁶⁷ USSR was experiencing hard times after Bolshevik revolution; conjointly Vladimir Ilyich Lenin denounced the secret treaties against Ottoman Empire that was signed during the Tsarist period. Thus, Ankara was persuaded that Russia was not in search of any territorial claims against it anymore. Lenin, realizing a civil war after the Bolshevik revolution shared a strategic affiliation with Ankara.

Instead of leaving Turkey to imperialist the West, he favored to build relations with Turkey as it was in advantage of Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to guarantee its borders and widen its periphery including Turkey to socialist bloc.⁶⁸ As for Ankara, it was mainly occupied with its Independence War seeking financial and weapon support, therefore Ankara sent a delegation to Moscow in order to sign a treaty with Soviet Russia. However, Moscow due to Armenia changed its point and asked Turkey for some additional conditions, which were against Turkish National Oath. Mustafa Kemal being highly jealous on Turkish sovereignty, due to Soviet Russia's demands initialized a huge military operation, because of

⁶³ Yamauchi, Masayuki, "The Foreign Policy of Turkey and Her Relations with the East During the National War of Independence, 1920-1921: The Turco - Soviet Relationship over the Batum Crisis", *Journal of Asian and African Studies*, Vol. XIII, 1977, pp. 67-76.

⁶⁴ Toktamış Ateş, *Ulusal Kurtuluş Savaşında Türk Dış Politikası (Turkey's Foreign Policy during the Independence War)*, Der Yayınları, İstanbul 1989, p. 3.

⁶⁵ Harris Howard, *Turkey, the Straits and U.S. Policy*, John Hopkins University Press, Baltimore 1974, pp. 1-15.

⁶⁶ Halil I Karal, *Turkish Relations with Soviet Russia during the National Liberation War of Turkey, 1918-1922: A Study in the Diplomacy of the Kemalist Revolution*, University of California Press, Los Angeles 1967, pp. 1-12.

⁶⁷ Fethi Tevetoglu, "Atatürk's Soviet Policy", *Cultura Turcica*, Vol. II (1), 1965, pp. 51-55.

⁶⁸ Taha Akyol, *Ama Hangi Atatürk? (But which Atatürk?)*, Doğan Kitap, İstanbul 2008, p. 214.

which Moscow was forced to sign an initial agreement with Ankara.⁶⁹ Even though it took more time than planned due to Soviet intention of getting Turkey to Soviet influence, the Moscow agreement was signed at 1921.⁷⁰ Henceforth, Turkey left Batumi to Russia although it was declared as a part of Turkey on the National Oath, while it signed with Armenia Kars agreement.⁷¹

When it comes to relations with the occupying forces, while the diplomatic relations in different levels were carried out by National Movement,⁷² there was still the struggle undertaken by irregular armies using guerrilla war tactics in different fronts. The relations with France experienced a fluctuating period.⁷³ Firstly, France occupied south part of Anatolia with the aim of securing Syrian mandate.⁷⁴ However, because of severe Turkish resistance and due to economic relations initialized a relatively mild relation with Ankara government.⁷⁵

Occupying the south - west of Turkey, Italy followed a soft oriented policy from the beginning of occupation. Rome, so as to protect its stakes and not to endanger its advantageous position in Anatolia mostly undertook charity, building, education etc. activities in order to keep the sympathy of local Turks. The motivation of Italy's Turkish friendly policy was mainly due to the status of Twelve Islands that caused deep dissidences with England. At the year of 1921, Italian forces left Turkey, although Rome asked some economic priorities and capitulations that Ankara government did not accept.⁷⁶ The toughest relations of the period were experienced with England and Greece. England undertook all sort of persecution in order to suppress National Movement. London, perceiving Ottoman Empire as the greatest obstacle preventing it from reaching its ideas, was highly motivated to punish Turkey severely in order to avoid similar obstacles in future.⁷⁷ The fear that Turkish national liberation movement would create a positive wave for Indian Muslims pushed England to

⁶⁹ Kadir Kasalak, "Milli Mücadele Başlarında Türk - Rus İlişkileri" ("Turkish - Russian Relations at the Initial Period of Independence War"), *Askeri Tarih Bülteni*, 1994, Vol. XIX, No. 37, p. 27.

⁷⁰ Vitali Alexandrov, "Soviet - Turkish Cooperation", *International Affairs*, No. 12, December 1986, pp. 33-38.

⁷¹ T. Akyol, op.cit., p. 260.

⁷² Salahi Sonyel, *Kurtuluş Savaşı Günlerinde Batı Siyasamız (Our Western Policy during the Independence War)*, Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, Ankara 1986, pp. 1-20.

⁷³ Jacques Godchot, "Mustafa Kemal Atatürk et la France", *Mondes et Cultures*, Vol. XLVIII (4), 1988, pp. 595-610.

⁷⁴ Hülya Baykal, "Kurtuluş Savaşında Türk - Fransız İlişkileri ve bir Fransız: Bir Türk Dostu Albay Mougin" ("Turkish - French Relations during the Independence War and a French; a Friend of Turkey, Colonel Mougin"), *Atatürk Yolu*, 1991, Vol. II, No. 7, p. 457.

⁷⁵ Yavuz Bilge, *Türk Kurtuluş Savaşı Esnasında Türk - Fransız İlişkileri (Turkish - French Relations during the Independence War)*, Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, Ankara 1994, p. 65.

⁷⁶ "Tripartite Agreement Between the British Empire, France and Italy Respecting Anatolia, Signed at Sèvres, August 10, 1920", H.M.S.O., London 1920, pp. 1-5.

⁷⁷ Briton Cooper, *Mudros to Lausanne: Britain's Frontier in West Asia, 1918-1923*, State University of New York Press, Albany, New York 1976, pp. 357-391.

follow a fierce policy. It is substantial to underline that in addition to Soviet aids Turkey found pretty much help in previous English colonies like Afghanistan, India and Pakistan.⁷⁸ The tense relations between England and Turkey continued even after Lausanne Conference due to the status of Mosul.⁷⁹

As a consequence of diplomatic and military strategies of National Movement, Turkey obtained a very determinant victory against Entente powers, which urged them to arrange a peace talk and in Lausanne, Switzerland. As a result of successful military operations undertaken through Turkish armies, the Entente powers declared to sign armistice and asked Turkish independence movement to organize peace talks in Lausanne, Switzerland.⁸⁰ Although, the leaders of Turkish liberation movement insisted on the idea to collect the conference in Turkey, the Entente powers did not accept the proposal. Furthermore, in order to urge their future plans the Entente powers invited the İstanbul government to participate in the conference. But the suggestion was vehemently rejected by Turkish parliamentary assuming itself as the sole representative of Turkey.

Lausanne Conference

After the Independence War, Ankara government was highly occupied by Lausanne peace treaty, which determined the general outlines of Turkey's contemporary foreign policy.⁸¹ Ankara mostly obtained its demands proposed in Lausanne Conference and signed a peace treaty with Entente powers.⁸² In addition to this, Lausanne Conference may be appreciated as the explicit evident of Turkey's acceptance as a sovereign state by international community. Turkey achieved rights to regulate Ottoman debts preventing capitulation claims of Western states and liberalized its economy completely.⁸³

Withal, the themes like the status of Mosul, Hatay and Turkish Straits were still in ambiguity,⁸⁴ moreover Turkey had to make concessions in the themes like religious and

⁷⁸ Mustafa Keskin, *Hindistan Müslümanlarının Milli Mücadeleye Yardımları, 1919-1923 (Supports of Indian Muslims' to the Turkish National Struggle)*, Erciyes University, Kayseri 1999, pp. 1-15.

⁷⁹ Peter J Beck, "A Tedious and Perilous Controversy: Britain and the Settlement of the Mosul Dispute, 1918-1926", *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. XVII (2), 1981, pp. 256-276.

⁸⁰ İskender Akbaba, "Lozan Barış Andlaşması" ("Lousanne Peace Treaty"), *Askeri Tarih Bülteni*, 1982, Vol. VII, No. 13, p. 103.

⁸¹ Joseph Grew, "The Peace Conference of Lausanne, 1922-1923", *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society*, Vol. XCVIII, 1954, pp. 1-10.

⁸² Hulme A Beaman, "Lausanne and Its Lessons", *Nineteenth Century and After*, Vol. XCIII, March 1923, pp. 318-327.

⁸³ Philip M Brown, "The Lausanne Conference", *The American Journal of Law*, Vol. XVII. No. 12, April 1923, pp. 290-296.

⁸⁴ Al Macfie, "The Straits Question: The Conference of Lausanne, November 1922 - July 1923", *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. XV (12), May 1979, pp. 211-238.

ethnic minorities, Cyprus and lose of Twelve Islands.⁸⁵ The turn out of Soviet - Turkish relations, which would crystallize later, commenced with the Lausanne conference. Additionally, the Lausanne may be appreciated as the touchstone of the Republic's entrance to the West as well as the formation of Turkey's foreign policy orientation compatible with Western norms and values. It is crucial to underline that Mustafa Kemal's abolishment of Monarchy shortly before the initiation of Lausanne Conference also may be accepted as a clear evidence of this idea. Atatürk's primary policy was to convince Western world that modern Turkey would have a new political orientation along with the desire to integrate with Western political system. Yet, Mustafa Kemal's delay about the abolishment of Caliphate needs to be understood as a diplomatic tactic in order to suppress the potential internal reactions.

The participants of the conference consisted of Turkey, England, France, Italy, Japan Greece, Romania, and Yugoslavia, nevertheless Turkey insisted on participation of Russia, Ukraine, and Georgia in order to follow sessions where the Straits theme was going to be discussed.⁸⁶ Lausanne peace conference lasted eight months and witnessed vehement discussions between Turkey and Entente powers. Turkish delegation was headed by "İsmet İnönü"⁸⁷ who was appointed by Mustafa Kemal as a victorious general of Western front⁸⁸ and held the post of Minister of Foreign Affairs,⁸⁹ although he was an "amateur diplomat"⁹⁰ having no previous experience in terms of diplomacy. One additional point to highlight is, Turkey's foreign affairs of the period were not that perfectly organized but above all Mustafa

⁸⁵ Nimet Beriker, Daniel Druckman, "Simulating the Lausanne Peace Negotiations, 1922-1923: Power Asymmetries in Bargaining", *Simulation and Gaming*, Vol. XXVII (2), June 1996, pp. 160-183.

⁸⁶ Meray Seha, *Lozan Barış Konferansı, Tutanaklar - Belgeler (Lausanne Peace Conference, Records and Documents)*, Ankara University Political Science Publications, Ankara 1969, pp. 1-13.

⁸⁷ **İsmet İnönü**: Turkish army officer, statesman, and collaborator with and successor to Mustafa Kemal as president of the Republic of Turkey. Identified with one-party rule between 1939 and 1946, he later emerged as a champion of democracy. he served on the general staff of the 3rd Army at Edirne and as chief of staff of the army in Yemen. During World War I, he commanded the 4th Army in Syria (1916), and, at the time of the Ottoman surrender (Oct. 30, 1918), he was the undersecretary of war in Constantinople. Later he joined Mustafa Kemal's movement to resist the Allied occupation of Anatolia. In 1920 he was elected to the last Ottoman Parliament as deputy for Edirne. After the Greek occupation of western Anatolia, he was appointed chief of the general staff of the nationalist army and repelled the invaders in the two battles of İnönü (near Ankara) in January and April 1921. From those engagements he later took his surname. Appointed foreign minister in the government of the Grand National Assembly in Ankara in 1922, İsmet succeeded, with the support of Mustafa Kemal, in gaining most of the Turkish demands in the Treaty of Lausanne (Switz.; July 24, 1923). When the republic was proclaimed on Oct. 29, 1923, İsmet became the prime minister. He remained in power until 1937.

"İsmet İnönü" in Encyclopedia Britannica, (source:www.britannica.com, <<http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/288786/Ismet-Inonu>>, April, 2012).

⁸⁸ Mahmut Bırsel, "Büyük Devlet Adamı İnönü ve Lozan Anlaşması" ("Great Statesman İnönü and Lozan Agreement"), *Ege Üniversitesi İktisadi ve Ticari Bilimler Fakültesi Dergisi*, 1974, Vol.VIII, No. 12, p. 47.

⁸⁹ Muhittin Gül, *İsmet İnönü'nün İlk Diplomatlık Yılları: Mudanya ve Lozan (First Years of İsmet İnönü'nün as a Diplomat ; Mudanya ve Lozan)*, Gazi University, Ankara 1994, p. 13.

⁹⁰ T. Akyol, op.cit., p. 362.

Kemal did not want to send any former Ottoman diplomats under the fear that the Ottoman legacies could negatively influence the talks. Nevertheless, the decision of the founder of modern Turkey has been critiqued by scholars and historians for being a factor causing power dissipation of Turkey against the Entente powers.⁹¹ In general, the peace talks may be summarized under three topics; the Turkish Straits, financial matters and immigration issues. First cycle of the talks witnessed harsh debates between Turkish and English delegations due to the fact that English armies were situated around Turkish Straits at that time. The financial matters were mostly discussed with French delegation as France did not want to lose its capitulation privileges seized from Ottoman Empire.⁹²

When it comes to immigration issues, it was among the hottest topic of the Lausanne agenda that took place with Greece. Similar issues mainly consisted of border debates, exchange of population, minorities and war hostages.⁹³ The Iraqi border including Mosul and the status of Turkish Straits with England,⁹⁴ the rights of Christian minorities residing in Turkey with Greece, finally French insistence on keeping the economic privileges seized during Ottoman times blocked the negotiations among the parts. With the effect of similar dissidences between the parts the talks came to a halt. Turkish delegation turned back to Ankara in order to discuss further strategy with President Mustafa Kemal in detail. Meanwhile, in order to balance the negative atmosphere against Turkey Atatürk acquired a more dominant pro Western rhetoric, while he accelerated Turkey's Westernization process leaving Soviet friendly and Islamist discourses that he utilized in the course of Independence War.

To signalize modern Turkey's Western inclination, Kemalist regime put a heavy pressure on Russian and socialist supporters, moreover Mustafa Kemal's marriage with Latifa -as a modern Turkish woman prototype symbolizing Western values- coincided with the same period. Furthermore, the reforms undertaken in civil code regulating women rights, the laws protecting foreign investments as well as religious - ethnic minority issues and the augmentation of secularization process via laws created a highly positive image of Turkey in

⁹¹ Ibidem, p. 363.

⁹² Roderic H Davison, "Middle East Nationalism: Lausanne Thirty Years After", *Middle East Journal*, Vol. VII (3), Summer 1953, pp. 324-348.

⁹³ Nimet Beriker, *Negotiating Styles of the Minor Parties in Multilateral Peace Negotiations: Greece and Turkey at the Lausanne Peace Conference, 1922-23*, unpublished Ph.D dissertation at George Mason University, Washington DC 1993, pp.1-5.

⁹⁴ Norman J Padelford, "Solutions to the Problems of Turkish Straits: A Brief Appraisal", *Middle East Journal*, Vol. 2 (2), April 1948, pp. 175-190.

Western media and public view.⁹⁵ Under the roof of Turkish Grand National Assembly, all aspects of the Lausanne were discussed vehemently along with the heavy critics of opposition.⁹⁶ Subsequently, Turkish delegation settled back to Switzerland in order to continue negotiations. The second cycle of talks went rather smoothly in comparison to first one; consequently the parts arrived at the agreement, in defiance of severe opposition, Lausanne treaty was ratified at the Turkish Grand National Assembly.

It may be claimed that in comparison to Sèvres, the Lausanne treaty may be accepted as a diplomatic victory of Turkey's foreign policy. Turkey mostly obtained its demands defined in the National Oath. Ultimately, Ankara solved many of its border problems with its neighborhood and ended a long term war with Greece.⁹⁷ Turkey determined its place in the West and found acceptance as a sovereign state not only economically but also politically. On the other hand, it did not resolve the Mosul and Hatay issues, which were included in the borders of National Oath. In addition to that, though Turkey freed the Straits, it could not have complete authority on them. Finally, Turkey lost the Twelve Island conceding some rights in Aegean Sea and lost major advantages in Cyprus. Up to the present time, the Lausanne peace treaty has been a controversial issue in Turkish public view. There exist a constant public debates as regard to the consequences of treaty in terms of current security dilemmas of foreign policy as an inheritance that restricts Turkish national security.⁹⁸

After the signature of Lausanne peace treaty, Turkey's foreign policy followed an affiliation period to the Western direction in accordance with Atatürk's foreign policy principles. Notwithstanding to the fact that in the world, notably in Europe, the steps of the Second World War were heard gradually, Turkey as a consequence of well programmed foreign policy decision making process realized its main goals and followed a peaceful foreign policy principle that based on status quo principle. Turkey's foreign policy agenda of the time period was mainly occupied with Mosul question,⁹⁹ which could not be resolved in

⁹⁵ Faik Armanoğlu, "Atatürk Diplomasisi" ("Atatürk Diplomacy"), *Kemalizm*, 1976, Vol. XIV, No. 165, p. 20.

⁹⁶ Kadir Mısıroğlu, *Lozan Zafer mi? Hezimet mi? (Is Lausanne a Victory or a Defeat?)*, Sebil Yayınları, İstanbul 1992, p. 5.

⁹⁷ Yılmaz Aktuna, "Lozanda Sınırlar Sorunu" ("Border Problems in Lausanne"), *Belgelerle Türk Tarihi Dergisi*, 1970, No. 34, p. 40.

⁹⁸ K. Mısıroğlu, op. cit., p. 8.

⁹⁹ **Mosul Question:** The Mosul Vilayet was part of the Ottoman Empire until the end of the First World War. Following the war it was occupied by Britain and the Vilayet became the bone of contention between the Ottoman Empire and Britain. After the War of Independence, the new Republic of Turkey considered Mosul one of the crucial issues determined in the National Pact. Despite constant resistance, Britain managed to bring the issue into the international arena, scaling it down to a frontier problem between Turkey and Iraq. In the Turkish historical literature, the Mosul Question has been studied until the Frontier Treaty (1926). According to these studies, the Turkish government, in accordance with the exchange of letters annexed to the Frontier Treaty

the course of Lausanne talks.¹⁰⁰ Along with the population exchange theme with Greece and the Greek Patriarch question, the issues like the movement of capital from İstanbul to Ankara and Turkey's entrance to the League of Nations occupied Turkey's foreign policy agenda.

The Mosul question constituted the toughest agenda for young Turkey as it remained as a question that was not clarified after the Lausanne Conference. Turkish government declared Mosul as a part of Turkey in National Oath and asked Britain to leave the region; all the same, Britain rejected the proposal.¹⁰¹ In order to discuss the issue, Turkish and British sites gathered in İstanbul. Ankara held on to the point that geographically Mosul is a natural part of Turkey, owing to the fact that majority of inhabitants of region were Turks and Kurds.¹⁰² Thus, Britain had to leave Mosul to Turkey. However, Britain insisted on the idea of leaving Mosul within British mandate Iraqi borders paying a special attention to Christian minorities.¹⁰³ The relations between both countries due to Mosul gradually tensed to reach harassing fires at the borders. The sites could not reach a consensus, thus brought the issue to the League of Nations in order to come to a decision and passed the deal to international enquiry commission. After series of discussions, the commission decided the leave of Mosul within Iraqi borders, which caused a huge reaction of Ankara.¹⁰⁴ The Mosul issue even today constitutes a huge volume of discussion in Turkish public view, beyond that the relations with Iraq in terms of border security aggravate the mutual relations due to terrorist leakage that seriously threat Turkey's national security.¹⁰⁵

As regard to the relations with Greece, the majority of population exchange issues were settled during the Lausanne and initially some part of population were exchanged. Due to the social and economic aspects of the population exchange issue, Greece and Turkey

(1926), agreed to receive a fixed cash settlement of 500,000 pounds, rather than calculating the amount on a ten percent basis. That is to say, the Turkish government received the 500 000 pounds and the folio of the Mosul Question was closed. But some findings proved that this was not the case. Some figures in the Turkish state budgets indicate that Turkey received payments on a ten percent basis instead of the fixed cash settlement. From 1931 to 1952 Turkey received royalty payments regularly. After 1952, two issues caused serious problems between Turkey and Iraq; namely, the unpaid years and insufficient payments. In latter period, Turkey chose to pursue a conciliatory policy and the issue was put aside for the purpose of establishing friendly relations with Iraq.

Nevin Coşar, Sevtap Demirci, "The Mosul Question and the Turkish Republic: Before and After the Frontier Treaty, 1926", *The Turkish Year Book*, Vol. XXXV, 2004, p. 43.

¹⁰⁰ Peter J Beck, op. cit., pp. 256-276.

¹⁰¹ Ibidem, pp. 256-276.

¹⁰² Fadhil Hussain, *The Mosul Problem: A Study in Anglo - Iraq - Turkish Diplomacy and Public Opinion*, Asad Press, Baghdad 1967, pp. 10-15.

¹⁰³ Harry C Lukes, *Mosul and its Minorities*, M. Hopkins, London 1925, pp. 1-13.

¹⁰⁴ Philip Q Wright, "The Mosul Dispute", *American Journal of International Law*, Vol. XX, 1926, p. 463.

¹⁰⁵ Durmuş Yılmaz, *Musul Meselesi Tarihi (Mosul Issue History)*, Çizgi Kitabevi Yayınları, Konya 2003, p. 20.

experienced serious conflicts that later on caused deep breaks in diplomatic relations. The main focus of disagreements cumulated due to Greece's reluctance to remove Greek population of İstanbul and unwillingness to pay for immovable estates. Another issue that caused controversy between the parts was the situation of Greek Patriarchy and its ecumenism claims that situated in İstanbul. Turkish part developed all possible tactics in order to stop activities of Patriarchy in Turkish territories due to negative approaches of Patriarchy as an institution that acted against Turkish War of Independence and supported occupying forces.

After series of negotiations, the previous Patriarch's mission ended while changed with a fresh one that was not politicized, besides the political mission of Patriarchy was entirely limited and remained as a religious body. The reflections of the Greek Patriarch and ecumenism question still may be found as a theme causing fierce debate between Turkey and Greco it also constitutes a huge obstacle before Turkey's EU membership. Additionally, the minority schools, and their real estates status are among the top agendas related to the issue now. Turkey's entrance to League of Nations may be accepted among the important occurrences of the after Lausanne period in terms of foreign policy. As it has been mentioned previously, Turkey's shift to the West after the Lausanne was flattened thanks to its entrance to League of Nations. Turkey indicated some inclinations to Soviet Union as a negative result of Mosul conflict experienced with Britain in order to balance situation.¹⁰⁶ Apart from that, Republic of Turkey became neighbor with Italy through Twelve Islands and France through Syrian mandate; hence, it paid attention to keep friendly and peaceful relations with Paris and Rome. Nevertheless, the relations with Italy started to worsen after Mussolini's rise to power when Italy threatened Turkey through Twelve Islands. As for the France, there were some controversies on the payment of Ottoman debts and the continuation of capitulations.

Additionally, Ankara initialized positive relations with Middle East and Balkan states aiming to secure its eastern borders. Therefore, it signed a non-aggression treaty called Sadabat Oath in Tehran in 1937 with Afghanistan, Iran, and Iraq.¹⁰⁷ Turkey also gained a more advantageous position by converging an entire sovereignty at Straits with signed Montreux agreement (1936).¹⁰⁸ Thus, it partially compensated some negative conditions that emerged in Lausanne treaty. In addition to that, it also developed highly constructive relations

¹⁰⁶ Mehmet Saray, *Atatürk'ün Sovyet Politikası (Atatürk's Soviet Policy)*, Acar Yayınları, İstanbul 1987, p. 65.

¹⁰⁷ Erik J Zurcher, *A Modern History*, I.B. Tauris, New York 2004, p. 201.

¹⁰⁸ Barry Buzan, "The Status and the Future of the Montreux Convention", *Survival*, November - December 1976, pp. 242-247.

with Afghanistan while Afghan King visited Turkey to observe it as a model country to be followed during modernity and nation building process of Afghanistan.¹⁰⁹

3. Turkey's Foreign Policy during the Second World War

The representatives of Turkey's foreign policy decision makers witnessing deadly results of the First World War, keenly evaded to follow adventurous policies applying an "active neutral"¹¹⁰ foreign policy practice in the course of the Second World War.¹¹¹ Ankara preferred to follow a realist, non adventurist outlook as well applied all possible diplomatic methods in order to protect itself from the destructive affects of the War. However, principally toward the end of the War, because of pressures by Alliance powers and not to have a disadvantageous position at the post War era cut its relations with Germany and Japan declaring war against Berlin and Tokyo. In addition to that, the emergence of Soviet threat also played an essential role in the decision making process of Republic of Turkey.¹¹²

On contrary to peace treaties signed after the First World War, Turkey did not accept to accord with Sèvres treaty proposed by the winners, enforcing to sign Lausanne treaty instead, consequently it mostly reached majority of territorial claims determined by the National Oath. İsmet İnönü, the second President of Turkey, as the closest friend, companion of Mustafa Kemal and as a follower of Kemalist doctrines in terms of foreign policy, absolutely dominated Turkey's foreign policy decision making procedures in this period. İnönü played a crucial role in Turkey's foreign policy priorities, albeit, he was highly criticized for applying oppressive and anti-democratic methods in the course of his rule period. Due to his skillfully managed diplomatic methods, Turkey evaded influencing from the Second World War.¹¹³ From diplomatic point of view, it may be asserted that Turkey's foreign policy decision makers in the course of Second World War gave a good example of successful, well managed, versatile diplomacy.¹¹⁴ Ankara in spite of the slippery atmosphere

¹⁰⁹ Annette Destree, "Reformisme "Laïcisant" en Iran, Turquie et Afghanistan 1920-1930", *Civilisations*, Vol. XXXII (1), 1982, pp. 167-186.

¹¹⁰ Selim Derengil, *Turkish Foreign Policy during the Second World War: An "Active" Neutrality*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1989, p. 133.

¹¹¹ Selim Derengil, *Denge Oyunu: İkinci Dünya Savaşında Türkiye'nin Dış Politikası (Balance Game: Turkey's Foreign Policy during the Second World War)*, Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, İstanbul 1994, pp. 2-10.

¹¹² Ataöv Türkkaya, "The Policy of the Great Powers Towards Turkey on the Eve of the Second World War", *Turkologischer Anzeiger*, Vol. III, 1972, pp. 321-328.

¹¹³ Selim Derengil, "Turkey's Diplomatic Position at the Outbreak of the Second World War", *Boğaziçi Üniversitesi Dergisi*, Vol. VIII-IX, 1980-81, pp. 63-88.

¹¹⁴ Annette B Fox, *The Power of Small States: Diplomacy in World War II*, University of Chicago Press, Chicago 1959, p. 50.

of international arena achieved to continue its positive relations with Germany, Soviet Union, England along with France together in as much as possible.¹¹⁵

Shortly after the death of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, Ankara felt the steps of forthcoming war. Accordingly, it signed aid and non-aggression treaties. Signing analogous treaties, Turkey estimated that it would keep a balanced policy among European states, all the same when Russia signed a friendship treaty with Germany,¹¹⁶ for example, it felt insecure and turned the current treaties to alliance cooperation. Turkey's tactical movements in terms of diplomacy in this period, may be interpreted as the break point of Turkish - Soviet relations that bloomed since the Independence War, while it may be understood as Turkey's certain shift to Western alliance in terms of strategic, military, political and economical sense following an affiliation process that initialized after the Lausanne Conference.¹¹⁷ Additionally, Ankara's timing of signing a friendship agreement with Berlin turned the situation to a more complex character as Germany declared war against Soviet Union. Since then, Turkey was persistently explored deep pressure from both Russia and England to declare war against Germany and Japan. In order to persuade Turkey to wage war, then Winston Churchill of Great Britain visited Turkey where he had secret meetings with senior Turkish officials, yet Turkey under the pretext of weapon and supply shortage rejected all similar insinuations.¹¹⁸ The main motivation of similar behests to plunge Turkey into the war was the fear that Turkey, as a geopolitically and geostrategically significant country, could take place within the rows of Axis Powers that would change the destiny of entire war against Alliance Powers. Nevertheless, toward the end of the Second World War, Turkey's foreign policy decision makers, upon the approaching post war conjecture as well as the emanating Soviet ménage abreast, froze diplomatic relations with Berlin and Tokyo, declared war against these countries.¹¹⁹

As it has been featured in the chef d'oeuvre of Edward Weisband "Turkey's Foreign Policy, 1943-1945: Small State Diplomacy and Great Power Politics",¹²⁰ Republic of Turkey from the very initial to the end of the Second World War endeavored to refrain from the War

¹¹⁵ Servet Avşar, *İkinci Dünya Savaşı ve İsmet İnönü'nün Uyguladığı Dış Politika (Second World War and Foreign Policy of İsmet İnönü)*, Genel Kurmay Başkanlığı Yayınları, Ankara 1999, p. 123.

¹¹⁶ Frank G Weber, *The Evasive Neutral: Germany, Britain and the Quest for a Turkish Alliance in the Second World War*, University of Missouri Press, Columbia 1979, pp. 3-10.

¹¹⁷ Ibidem, 1-20.

¹¹⁸ Ataöv Türkaya, *Turkish Foreign Policy: 1939-1945*, Ankara Üniversitesi, Ankara 1965, pp. 2-11.

¹¹⁹ Fahir Armaoğlu, "İkinci Dünya Harbinde Türkiye" ("Turkey in the Second World War") *SBF Dergisi*, 13 (2), pp.139-179.

¹²⁰ Edward Weisband, *Turkish Foreign Policy, 1943-1945: Small State Diplomacy and Great Power Politics*, Princeton University Press, Princeton 1973, pp. 3-10.

trying to reconcile confronting developments emerged in the course of the World War Second. Ankara merely preferred to sign nonaggression treaties in this period to guarantee its borders avoiding any engagement that would result in participation to the world war. Turkish diplomacy deeply shaped by the leadership of İsmet İnönü launched resolute relations with the West at the dawn of the prospective the Cold War.

4. Turkey's Foreign Policy during the Cold War

The end of the Second World War proposed to the international system a conjecture that shared the world between the "West and the East"¹²¹ clustered around the United States of America and Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. The newly emerged bipolar structure of the world obliged many states to develop alternative foreign policy paradigms convenient to the recent conditions of the Cold War. Ankara too was constrained to conform this.¹²² Mehmet Gönlübol, for instance, denotes that due to the oncoming realities of the Cold War, Turkey's foreign policy decision makers were obliged to abandon Turkey's neutrality policy, which was applied successfully during the Second World War, de facto and enforced to search for close allies with the West and in particular with the United States of America.¹²³

Baskın Oran, in order to underline the chaotic ambiance of the Cold War eve period prefers to utilize "psychological warfare"¹²⁴ expression. With regard to Oran's opinion, Soviet Union's separation from the war as a political, economical, and military giant immediately beside to Turkey highly augmented Ankara's national security concerns. What is more, the image of emerging "Soviet threat image"¹²⁵ in Western mass media also influenced Turkish public view and foreign policy decision makers.¹²⁶ Oral Sander in his article "The Reasons of Continuity in Turkey's Foreign Policy"¹²⁷ defends the following arguments to interpret Turkey's choice of Western bloc during the Cold War. Apart from the Soviet exerted pressure and claims, domestic political system transiting to multiparty democracy along with the free market economy system of modern Turkey played a crucial role on its shift to the West.

¹²¹ Michael Boll, "Turkey between East and West: The Regional Alternative", *World Today*, Vol. XXXV (9) September 1979, p. 360.

¹²² William Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy (1974-2000)*, Frank Cass, Portland 2000, p. 15.

¹²³ Mehmet Gönlübol, *Turkey's Foreign Policy in Transition: 1950-1974*, E. J. Brill, Netherlands 1975, p. 20.

¹²⁴ B.Oran, "TDP'nin Kuramsal....", op.cit., p. 492.

¹²⁵ Ibidem, p. 493.

¹²⁶ Günter Endruweit, "Turkey's Option for Alignment and Non Alignment: A Sociological Perspective", *Orient*, Vol. XXII (2), 1981, p. 257.

¹²⁷ O. Sander, "'Türkiye'nin Dış Politikasında", op. cit., p. 112.

Ultimately, benefits of Turkish elites were also highly determinant at Turkey's opt. Nonetheless, Sander maintains the idea that the above-mentioned factors played a substantial role in decision-making process. Ankara's inclination to Western bloc, Oral Sander asserts, was the continuation of westernization movement that initialized with late Ottoman periods harmonious to Mustafa Kemal's Westernization principles.¹²⁸

In 1945, Turkey along with the fifty countries signed the founding treaty of United Nations charter.¹²⁹ Aftermaths, Turkey applied for the full membership upon the establishment of North Atlantic Treaty Organization, just the same Ankara did not find positive acceptance. Washington highly appreciating the role of Ankara in the course of Korea War lobbied in favor of Turkey, as a result of which Turkey became North Atlantic Treaty Organization member in 1952.¹³⁰ Upon Its entrance to NATO, Republic of Turkey played an utmost important role in terms of maintaining security in the Euro-Atlantic area, and became a crucial military alliance in the history of North Atlantic Treaty Organization.¹³¹

Following the NATO membership, Turkey was accepted in European Council, and Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, thus it became strict and natural alliance of the West mostly adjusting its foreign policy priorities in accordance with the demands of Western allies. Additionally, in accordance with the Truman doctrine,¹³² Turkey played an essential role in the course of surrounding policy against USSR, while modernized its army soundly as brought it to NATO standards, plus Republic of Turkey upgraded its industry infrastructure under the frame of Marshall plan, whereas became highly dependent on the United States of America both in economical and political sense.¹³³ Ankara in the period of the Cold War, mostly launched its foreign policy to Western dynamics, it orientated external policy perspectives in accordance with the demands of bipolar world conditions. Soviet policies in Turkish vicinity were appreciated as attempts of invasion by the Soviet Union; vice versa Moscow constantly feared that Turkey would constitute a basement for a Western attack. Therefore, Turkey, along with the encouragements of its allies, initialized pact policies in order to secure its eastern borders where it participated to Baghdad Pact

¹²⁸ Ibidem, p. 113.

¹²⁹ Mehmet Gönülöbol, "Turkish Participation in the United Nations, 1945 - 1954", *Ankara University Publication of Political Science Faculty*, Ankara 1963, p. 142.

¹³⁰ Yusuf Sarıay, *Türkiye'nin Batı Ittifakına Yönelişi ve NATO'YA Girişi (Turkey's Leading toward the West and Entrance to NATO)* Kültür ve Turizm Bakanlığı Yayınları, Ankara 1998, p. 83.

¹³¹ "Turkey's Relations with NATO", (source: www.mfa.gov.tr, <<http://www.mfa.gov.tr/nato.en.mfa>>, May 2011).

¹³² Sinan Toprak, *The Evolution of Turkey's Foreign Policy: The Truman Doctrine and Turkey's Entry into NATO*, unpublished MA thesis, Western Michigan University, 1987, pp. 1-24.

¹³³ Joseph Satterthwaite, "The Truman Doctrine: Turkey", *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences*, No. 401, May 1972, pp. 74-84.

(Central Treaty Organization)¹³⁴ with eastern neighbor countries against Soviet expansion. Another aspect of Turkey - Middle East relations in this period was Ankara's official recognition of Israel state.¹³⁵

After the death of Joseph Stalin, the Cold War entered to détente period and Moscow declared that it had denounced the Stalin's claims on Turkey aiming to warm bilateral relations;¹³⁶ all the same Turkey's foreign policy approached similar attempts still very cautiously. Turkey's foreign policy in this period continued to be highly dependent on the West particularly to the United States of America appreciating Soviet Russia still the biggest threat against its sovereignty.¹³⁷ Turkey, since its establishment, could not undertake fundamental economic reforms. It was still in need of subsidies that would be provided through International Monetary Fund and World Bank in order to continue its economic development.

Another remarkable incident of the period was the military coup undertaken by Turkish Armed Forces, that highly negative affected Turkish democracy. The military coup was severely criticized by Western democracies, nevertheless in order not to harm delicate relations with Turkey under the Cold War conditions, Western allies of Turkey on purpose hesitated to undertake any sort of persecutions against Ankara. Apart from the military coup, Cyprus issue became an important theme for Turkey in this period. As an outcome of the Cyprus problem, Turkey's decision makers commenced to question Turkey's unilateral foreign policy structure that highly depend to the West, ergo Ankara initialized a multifaceted external policy dynamic as regard to negative conjecture due to Cyprus issue. Parallel to the new concept that emerged as a reaction to feeling of isolation owing to Cyprus, Republic of Turkey developed constructive relations with Soviet Union aiming to engage USSR to the issue to create a balance regardless of the Cold War conditions.

¹³⁴ **Central Treaty Organization** (CENTO): Formerly Middle East Treaty Organization, or Baghdad Oath Organization mutual security organization dating from 1955 to 1979 and composed of Until March 1959. "Central Treaty Organization" in Encyclopedia Britannica Online, (source: www.britannica.com, <<http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/102693/Central-Treaty-Organization-CENTO>>, June 2010).

¹³⁵ Ofra Bengio, *The Turkish-Israeli Relations: Changing Ties of Middle Eastern Outsiders*, Palgrave Macmillan, New York 2004, p. 2.

¹³⁶ Hamit Batu, "La Turquie dans la Détente", *Politique Etrangère*, Vol. XLI (5), 1976, pp. 459-483.

¹³⁷ Friedrich W Fernau, "La Turquie, l'alliance Atlantique et la Détente", *Orient*, Vol. XII, No. 47-48, 1968, pp. 73-89.

5. Foreign Policy of Turkey in the post-Cold War Era

Due to the collapse of Berlin wall in the year of 1989 and as a consequence of dissolution of Soviet Union, the political system of the world encountered fundamental changes which led structural shifts in international system. The bare peculiarity of the post Cold War era laid on the fact that the international politics sphere was highly dominated by instability and conflicts that obliged states to create new foreign policy paradigms. Furthermore, the political order of the world shifted from a bipolar constitution to a predominant American hegemony.

In this vague atmosphere, not only Turkey but also many other “flank states”¹³⁸ would not determine their foreign policy orientations without considering the hegemony of United States of America.¹³⁹ İdris Bal appreciates the new conjecture as “Turkey as a neighbor of former USSR, a member of NATO and located at the center of a sensitive region covered by Caucasus, Balkans and Middle East, has been affected by the end of Cold War fundamentally. Turkey has lost some of its bargaining cards in the new era and therefore has needed new arguments. This need encouraged Turkey to take active steps in post Cold War era”.¹⁴⁰ Whereas, Sabri Sayari views the new dynamic policy engagement of Turkey in the post Cold War era conjecture as “new activism” with the signs of “daring and cautiousness”.¹⁴¹

The end of the Cold War introduced both new opportunities and challenges for Turkey’s foreign policy.¹⁴² At first glance, the end of the Cold War seemed to be a deep relief for Turkey’s foreign policy decision makers since the immediate Soviet threat diminished.¹⁴³ Nasuh Uslu reckons that apart from the termination of Turkey’s major security threat, the end of the Cold War also weakened regional enemies of the Republic such as Syria, Iran and Iraq.¹⁴⁴ With the end of the Cold War, Turkey found itself with an opportunity to take part in cross border activities on the contrary to highly dependent structure of the Cold War

¹³⁸ Stephen F Larrabee, *Turkey as a US. Security Partner*, Rand Cooperation, Pittsburgh 2008, p. 3.

¹³⁹ For detailed information on USA foreign policy in the post Cold War period, see: Justyna Zajac, *Polityka zagraniczna USA po zimnej wojnie* (red.), (*USA Foreign Policy in the Post Cold War Period*), Wydawnictwo Adam Marszałek, Torun 2005.

¹⁴⁰ Hüseyin Bağcı, İdris Bal, *Turkish Foreign Policy in Post Cold War Era: New Problems and Opportunities in Turkish Foreign Policy in Post Cold War Era*, Brown Walkers Press, Florida 2004, p. 97.

¹⁴¹ Sabri Sayari, “Turkish Foreign Policy in the post-Cold War Era: The Challenges of Multi Regionalism”, *Journal of International Affairs*, Fall 2000, No.54, p.169.

¹⁴² Justyna Misiągiewicz, *Polityka zagraniczna Turcji po zimnej wojnie (Turkey’s Foreign Policy after the Cold War)*, Wydawnictwo Adam Marszałek, Toruń 2009, pp. 5-15.

¹⁴³ Meltem S Müftüler, “Turkey’s Predicament in the post - Cold War Era”, *Futures*, Vol. XXVIII, April 1996, pp. 255-268.

¹⁴⁴ Nasuh Uslu, *Turkish Foreign Policy in the post-Cold War Period*, Nova Science Publishers Inc, New York 2004, p. 2.

period.¹⁴⁵ Turkey enjoyed a wide maneuver area where it became a more centralized region.¹⁴⁶ Henceforward, it utilized this new conjecture to the maximum. Just the same, the newly emerged unipolar structure of the international system introduced some challenges for Ankara as the strategic position of Turkey became a matter of question.¹⁴⁷

Above all, Turgut Özal's liberal understanding also positively contributed to the acceleration of Turkey in terms of foreign policy perspectives in the post Cold War era period.¹⁴⁸ The most considerable change took place in Ankara's foreign policy in this period in the Middle East due to occupation of Kuwait in 1990. Turgut Özal closely allied with the United States of America as Turkey actively participated in United Nations coalition against Iraq.¹⁴⁹ Republic of Turkey leading a pioneer role in the Gulf War, intended to indicate its position in the rows of Western alliance stressing Turkey's geostrategic location and unique position as a pro Western, Muslim populated democratic secular state in the Middle East.¹⁵⁰ In addition to that, Ankara developed highly strict ties with the newly independent republics of Central Asia.¹⁵¹ The newly independent Central Asian republics expected Turkey to play a "model role" for their development and integration with the world.¹⁵² A similar role model policy of Turkey was supported by United States too in order to balance the fundamental

¹⁴⁵ Ekavi Athanassopoulou, "Ankara's Foreign Policy Objectives after the End of the Cold War: Making Policy in a Changing Environment", *Orient* (Hamburg), Vol. XXXVI (2), June 1995, pp. 269-285.

¹⁴⁶ Kemal Kirişçi, "The End of the Cold War and Changes in Turkish Foreign Policy Behaviour", *Foreign Policy* (Ankara), Vol. XVII (3-4), 1993, pp. 1-43.

¹⁴⁷ William Hale, "Turkish Foreign Policy after the Cold War", *Turkish Review of Balkan Studies*, Vol. I, 1993, pp. 231-248.

¹⁴⁸ **Turgut Özal:** (1927-1993) Turgut Özal studied electrical engineering at İstanbul Technical University, where he met the future prime minister Süleyman Demirel. Özal became an under secretary at the Turkish State Planning Organization (1967-71), and during the 1970s he worked as an economist for the World Bank. In 1979 he became an adviser to Demirel's government. When the military overthrew Demirel in 1980, Özal was asked to stay on as deputy prime minister. He implemented a program of economic reforms, including the lifting of exchange controls and extensive liberalization of trade. In 1983 Özal became prime minister after the right-of-centre Motherland Party (ANAP), of which he was the founder, won a majority in parliamentary elections; the party won again in 1987. As prime minister Özal continued his free-market, Western-oriented economic policies. He sponsored Turkey's unsuccessful bid to join the European Community (EC) in 1987. Toward the end of the decade his popularity began to decline, partly because of persistent inflation and rising unemployment; critics also claimed that he behaved like an autocrat and that he tolerated human-rights violations. Özal responded in 1989 by having the parliament elect him president, a post traditionally regarded as above politics; he was thus able to retain high office after the ANAP's 1991 electoral defeat. He then set out to expand the role of the president. During the 1991 Persian Gulf War, he led Turkey to join the United Nations coalition against Iraq; he also supported increased rights for Turkey's Kurds.

"Turgut Özal" in Encyclopedia Britannica Online, (source: www.britannica.com, <<http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/437131/Turgut-Özal>>, May 2010)

¹⁴⁹ James Brown, "Turkey and the Persian Gulf Crisis", *Mediterranean Quarterly*, Vol. II, 1991, pp. 46-54.

¹⁵⁰ "Turkey and the West after the Gulf War", *International Spectator*, Vol. XXVII (1), January - March 1992, pp. 33-46.

¹⁵¹ Mustafa Aydın, "Turkey and Central Asia: Challenges of Change", *Central Asian Survey*, Vol. XV (2), 1996, pp. 157-177.

¹⁵² Hasan, Rubab, "Role of Turkey in the Central Asian Republics", *Journal of European Studies*, Vol. IX (1), Jan. 1993, pp. 97-108.

religious policies of Iran toward the Central Asia region. Turkey provided long term credits, supported military reconstructions and renovations, as well as proposed scholarship opportunities for the students and invested in many other spheres in order to enforce its existence in the region and brought alternative dimensions to its foreign policy outlook.¹⁵³

On the other hand, Turkey faced serious conflicts with its close neighborhood because of increasing “Kurdistan Workers’ Party”¹⁵⁴ (PKK) terror acts.¹⁵⁵ The Kurdish problem gained an international character, and along with human rights violations which caused harsh criticism against Turkey in the course of the European Union candidacy talks.¹⁵⁶ Moreover, Turkish cross border attacks against Kurdistan Workers Party camps caused tense debates among Syria, Iraq and Iran.¹⁵⁷ Mustafa Aydın holds the point that “Republic of Turkish had experienced dramatic shifts and transformations in its political structure, economic system, social strata, cultural patterns, religious expressionism, and foreign policy”.¹⁵⁸ Following the ten years, after the end of the Cold War, in parallel with radical systemic changes took place in the world, Aydın emphasis that “Turkey moved suddenly from a staunchly pro Western isolationist existence in its immediate neighborhood into a central posture with an intention to have an effect across a vast region extending 'from eastern Europe to western China'. This change in Turkey's stance and mentality was due to wider changes experienced within and around Turkey during the 1980s”.¹⁵⁹

6. Legacies in Turkey’s Foreign Policy

The section aims to describe main structural determinants of Turkey’s traditional foreign policy that shape its foreign policy concept

¹⁵³ Graham E Fuller, *Turkey Faces East: New Orientations Toward the Middle East and Old Soviet Union*, RAND Corporation, Santa Monica 1992, pp. 65-70.

¹⁵⁴ **Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK)**: A militant Kurdish nationalist organization founded by Abdullah Öcalan in late 1970s. Although in initial period of groups terrors act, it aimed the establishment of an independent Kurdish state, afterwards its stated aims were later tempered to calls for greater Kurdish autonomy.

¹⁵⁵ Michael M Gunter, “Kurdish Militancy in Turkey: The Case of PKK”, *Crossroads*, No. 29, 1989, pp. 43-59.

¹⁵⁶ Alex A Cruickshank, “International Aspects of the Kurdish Question”, *International Relations*, Vol. III (6), October 1968, pp. 411-430.

¹⁵⁷ Robert Olson, “The Kurdish Question and Turkey's Foreign Policy, 1991-1995: “From the Gulf War to the Incursion into Iraq”, *Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. XIX (1), 1995, pp. 1-30.

¹⁵⁸ Mustafa Aydın, “Turkish Foreign Policy at the End of Cold War: Roots and Dynamics” *The Turkish Yearbook*, Volume XXXVI, 2005, p.1.

¹⁵⁹ Ibidem, p.3.

6.1. Legacies of Ottoman Empire

The first structural determinant shaping the traditional foreign policy concept of Turkey is legacies of Ottoman Empire that are highly influential on conceptualization of Republic of Turkey's foreign policy.¹⁶⁰ Being one of the greatest empires before its downfall, the Ottoman Empire¹⁶¹ even in its worst periods -when referred as the "sick man of Europe"-¹⁶² was a determinant authority not only in European, but also in world politics. The outbreak of the First World War set the end of Ottoman Empire, along with the other Empires leading them to disappear from the history scene and giving birth to the various nation states along with an entire new international political conjecture. Thus, the First World War introduced an epoch entirely new to the international political system.

Since the establishment of Turkey, there has been a continuous theme of discussion among historians, politicians and scholars whether modern Turkey is a continuation of Ottoman Empire or not as well as to what extent Ottoman legacies are deterministic at Turkey's foreign policy decision making processes.¹⁶³ According to some distinguished

¹⁶⁰ For further reading on the legacies of the past on Turkey's foreign policy concept and practice see: Michael E Meeker, *A Nation of Empire: The Ottoman Legacy of Turkish Modernity*, University of California Press, California 2002, p. 372; Ahmed S Ahmadov, "Les Antagonismes Interalliés sur les Problèmes Turcs après l'armistice de Moudros Jusqu'au Traité de Sèvres", *Etudes Balkaniques*, Vol. XIX (1), 1983, pp. 27-48; Salima Akram, *Turkey, Old and New*, Charles Scribner's Sons, New York 1947; Selim Deringil, "Aspects of Continuity in Turkish Foreign Policy: Abdülhamid II and İsmet İnönü", *International Journal of Turkish Studies*, Vol. IV (1), 1987, pp. 39-54.

¹⁶¹ **Ottoman Empire:** It was named for Osman I (1259-1326), a Turkish Muslim prince in Bithynia who conquered neighboring regions once held by the Seljūq dynasty and founded his own ruling line c. 1300. Ottoman troops first invaded Europe in 1345, sweeping through the Balkans. Though defeated by Timur in 1402, by 1453 the Ottomans, under Mehmed II (the Conqueror), had destroyed the Byzantine Empire and captured its capital, Constantinople (now)İstanbul, which henceforth served as the Ottoman capital. Under Selim I (1512-20) and his son Süleyman I (the Magnificent; 1520-66), the Ottoman Empire reached its greatest peak. Süleyman took control of parts of Persia, most of Arabia, and large sections of Hungary and the Balkans. By the early 16th century the Ottomans had also defeated the Mamlūk dynasty in Syria and Egypt; and their navy under Barbarossa soon seized control of much of the Barbary Coast. Beginning with Selim, the Ottoman sultans also held the title of caliph, the spiritual head of Islam. Ottoman power began to decline in the late 16th century. Ottoman forces repeatedly besieged Vienna. After their final effort at taking the Austrian capital failed (1683), that and subsequent losses led them to relinquish Hungary in 1699. Corruption and decadence gradually undermined the government. In the late 17th and 18th centuries the Russo - Turkish Wars and wars with Austria and Poland further weakened the empire, which in the 19th century came to be called the "sick man of Europe." Most of its remaining European territory was lost in the Balkan Wars (1912-13). It sided with Germany in World War I (1914-18); postwar treaties dissolved the empire, and in 1922 the sultanate was abolished by Mustafa Kemal, Atatürk who proclaimed the Republic of Turkey the following year.

"Ottoman Empire" in *Encyclopædia Britannica*

(source: www.britannica.com,

<<http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/434996/Ottoman-Empire>>, June 2010).

¹⁶² Charles Swallow, *The Sick Man of Europe: Ottoman Empire to Republic of Turkey, 1789-1923*, E.Benn, Tonbridge 1973, p. 143.

¹⁶³ Nuri Yurdusev, "Osmanlı Mirası ve Türk Dış Politikası Üzerine" ("About Ottoman Heritage and Turkish Foreign Policy"), *Yeni Dönemde Türk Dış Politikası: Uluslar arası IV. Türk Dış Politikası Sempozyumu Tebliğleri*, Usak Yayınları, Ankara 2010, pp. 47-54

historians like Prof. İlber Ortaylı, the modern Turkey is a continuation of “modernity”¹⁶⁴ movement that started in 19th century in Ottoman Empire and it is a consequence of “autocratic modernity”.¹⁶⁵ Ortaylı considers that this very movement does not bring Turkey from middle century darkness to 21st century, but it is a sort of continuation which started in the last decade of Empire. Professor Halil İnalcık, being a tenet on Ottoman Empire history, advocates the thesis proposing the idea that the roots of Turkish modernity needs to be searched in its Ottoman past. In order to clarify his thoughts professor continues as follows:

The ruling élite played a key role in promoting Westernization, and an alliance and identification with the West as the best policy for ‘the state’. For the integrity of the empire or for the preservation of the imperial political and social system, the central bureaucracy decided that Westernization and western alliance was the only way out. The immediate danger posed by the military imperialism of the rival empires of the Habsburgs and Romanovs always served as the incentive and excuse for the intensification of the westernization process introduced by the reformer bureaucrats. On the other hand, it has rightly been observed that the civilian and military bureaucrats emerged at the moment of the collapse of the imperial system as the champions of the independence of the Turkish nation and culture. In the footsteps of the nineteenth century reformer bureaucrats, they espoused again, in a most radical fashion, the western ideals-this time ideals of nationalism and democracy, the preliminary forms of which were introduced already in the Tanzimat period. Westernism was a tradition rooted in the élite during the Young Turk revolution of 1908 and the Independence War. If Turkey emerged as an independent state, developing its own identity and national culture in the modern world, that only became possible as a result of the ideological zeal and elevation of the great leaders who emerged from the ranks of the Ottoman bureaucrats. In other words, the independent national state of Turkey owes its existence and development primarily to this group who tried in the decades after the national victory to bring about a complete westernization of the state and society.¹⁶⁶

Notwithstanding to the fact that the founder elites of modern Turkey endeavored to disassociate, the Republic of Turkey from its Ottoman Past, newly established modern Turkey inherited many tendencies including foreign policy and diplomacy. Baskın Oran defends the point that Turkey thanks to its attentive foreign policy perception, as an inheritance through Ottoman Empire, played a more important state role. He pledges that Turkish diplomacy is a natural extension of Ottoman diplomacy, as Republic of Turkey did not experience any ineptitude in terms of diplomacy even during the Lausanne peace talks.¹⁶⁷ Furthermore,

¹⁶⁴ Dietrich Jung, Wolfango Piccoli, *Turkey at the Crossroads: Otoman Legacies and Greater Middle East*, Zed Books Ltd, London 2001, p. 28.

¹⁶⁵ İlber Ortaylı, *İmparatorluğun en Uzun Yüzyılı (The Longest Century of the Empire)*, İletişim Yayınları, İstanbul 1998, p. 65.

¹⁶⁶ Halil İnalcık, “Turkey between West and the Middle East Perceptions”, *Journal of International Relations*, 1998, Vol. III, No. 1, p. 6.

¹⁶⁷ B. Oran, “TDP’nin Kuramsal...”, op.cit., pp. 21-24.

George Harris, for instance, points, “two thirds of Ottoman foreign service made the transition into the Republic’s Foreign Ministry”.¹⁶⁸

It goes without saying that Ottoman Empire, being among the most powerful and long-lasting empires ever seen, imposed an influential political system on a vast territory. The imperial legacies of Ottoman Empire as an outcome of intercourse with diverse ethnic groups, nations or members of religious groups introduced Republic of Turkey both advantages and disadvantages in terms of political, economical, religious, cultural and linguistic spheres.¹⁶⁹ In order to comprehend the influences of Ottoman past on Turkey’s foreign policy substantially, it is essential to refer Mustafa Aydın who is accepted among the doyens on Turkey’s foreign policy. In terms of legacies of Ottoman Empire, Professor Aydın notes that the present skeptical structure of Turkish diplomacy is a natural consequence of continuous external attacks and aggression against Ottoman Empire especially during its last century. As a result, up to now not only Ministry of Foreign Affairs workers but also majorities of Turks perceive external relations highly cautious. Aydın explains Ottoman legacies on Turkey’s foreign policy as follows:

Religious groups, by appealing to European care, continued participation of the Europe in Ottoman internal affairs. Consequently, as the Ottoman authorization undermined, the national system, that used to be a perfect method of governing, accelerated the demolition of the Empire. Primarily, Greek Orthodox and Armenians were used as an instrument to interfere with Ottoman authority during the nineteenth and early twentieth century. Consequently, Turkish sensitiveness about Greece’s attempts on internationalizing the Orthodox Patriarchy in Istanbul, or any chance of recognizing so-called Armenian genocide claims, perceived against similar previous experiences. Obviously, Europeans' intervention in Ottoman internal affairs, on behalf of Christian minorities, gave rise to a feeling among Turks, that this dissimilarity in religious origin, albeit seldom hinged, is highly relevant to their international relations. This is especially authentic for those who as a rule look up to the European Union as a “Christian Club” as well as voice their concerns about if these non Muslims would welcome an Islamic country.¹⁷⁰

Second sour inheritance from the Ottoman Empire, as per Mustafa Aydın, is the remembrance of the financial control on Turkish lands, practiced by the Europeans through

¹⁶⁸ George S Harris, “The Bureaucratic Reform: Atatürk and the Turkish Foreign Office”, *Journal of American Institute for the Study of Middle Eastern Civilization*, 1980-1981, Vol. III, No. 1, p. 44.

¹⁶⁹ Bernard Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*, Royal Institute of International Affairs Series, Oxford University Press, London 1961, pp. 50-75.

¹⁷⁰ Mustafa Aydın, *Turkish Foreign Policy Framework and Analysis*, Center for Strategic Analysis, Ankara 2004, p. 20.

the Public Debt Service (Duyun-u Umumiye), since the Ottoman Empire proceeded bankrupt. Mustafa Kemal, parallel to this sensibility, in the course of Independence War declared that by complete independence, Turkish people mean complete economic, financial juridical, military, cultural independence and freedom in all matters. Being deprived of independence in any of these factors for a nation is equivalent to being deprived of all its independence.¹⁷¹ Ottoman Empire, throughout its demise period, had lost its freedom, due to the foreign interferences, privileges granted to foreigners, as well as the economic capitulations. Therefore, young Republic was highly sensitive about contraventions upon its sovereignty and economy. In terms of economic activities, for example, Ankara's skepticism reflected itself by tense distrust over international companies activating in Turkey.¹⁷²

On the other hand, in its last days, Ottoman administration in the areas where it had ruled left a sort of ill will against the Turks; hence Republic of Turkey was obliged to befriend neighbors that have resentful remembrances of the Ottomans. Of course, for instance, Ottoman past to some degree has some influence in the unpleasantness between Turkey and Greece or Armenia. As the last century of Ottomans countersigned ascension of Greek nationalism, Greeks became the first nation in the Balkan Peninsula to come into existence as a result of conflicts between nationalism and the Ottoman Empire.¹⁷³

Conclusively, in terms of Turkish national security perceptions, northern neighbor of Turkey symbolizes the principal menace to against Turkey's safety measures, along with its deep historical roots. Ever since the Seventeenth century, Russian expansion became the "arch enemy" of the Ottoman Empire. A sequence of major failures against Russians encountered the Ottomans with the facts of its diminishing authorization. Furthermore, it was Tsar Nicholas I, who characterized the Ottoman Empire as the "sick man of Europe". The Russo - Turkish wars had evidently created a sense of hostility as well as suspicion among Turks and Russians. Even during the period of the Treaty of Friendship and Neutrality,¹⁷⁴ when competent amicable terms were enjoyed by both sides, the chronicled Turkish mistrust for the Russians was highly apparent.

¹⁷¹ Mustafa. K Atatürk as cited in Mustafa Aydın, *Turkish Foreign Policy Framework and Analyze*, Center for Strategic Analysis, Ankara 2004, p. 22.

¹⁷² M. Aydın, "Turkish Foreign Policy", op.cit., p. 23.

¹⁷³ Ibidem, p. 23.

¹⁷⁴ **Treaty of Friendship and Neutrality:** It is the first non aggression and neutrality agreement signed between Republic of Turkey and Soviet Union in 1927. The most important feature of the agreement is in case one of part expose an aggression the part would stay neutral. İsmail Soysal, *Türkiye'nin Siyasal Andlaşmaları*. (Political Agreements of Turkey), C.I, A.Ü.SBF Yayınları, Ankara 1989, p. 271; Kamuran Gürün, *Türk - Sovyet İlişkileri (Turkish - Soviet Relations)*, TTK Yayınları, Ankara 1991, p. 117.

Like to all other states, Turkey established its foreign policy concept as regard to its identity and ideology that inherited through internal dynamics and legacies of the history. On contrary to general opinion, the West orientation, as the main feature of Turkey's foreign policy concept in terms international system is a bequest of Ottoman Empire that started in 19th century. Though the main purpose of Ottoman Westernization was to prevent Empire's dissolution, foreign policy decision makers of Turkey too adopted a pro Western policy orientation in order to complete new Republic's nation building process through Western norms.

The status quo principle of Turkey's foreign policy concept, aiming to protect the present as well, has its roots in Ottoman heritage. As a consequence of losing its momentum due to changing power balances in Europe, to a large extent in 19th century, Ottoman Empire nullified participation in wars, and opted to protect its present situation (status quo). Following this path, Republic of Turkey mostly focused to protect its national borders, abided by natural borders to survive instead of global passions and evaded to follow an expansionist foreign policy perception.

It may be suggested that when taken into consideration, institutions, demography, and international relations perspectives of modern Turkey maybe appreciated as the continuation of Ottoman Empire. Although, Republic of Turkey was established due to collapse of Ottoman Empire, it should be evaluated not as a break but as a reconstruction, owing to the fact that there exist no sudden breaks and sudden starts in the dynamic course of history. Henceforth, albeit Ottoman Empire seemingly collapsed, an Empire that ruled for centuries certainly leaves deep impressions on the geography it dominated for ages, thus it is as well impossible for Turkey to isolate itself from Ottoman periphery at all. From this perspective, it may be concluded that modern Turkey has reconstructed Ottoman heritage with Western style, thus legacies of Ottoman Empire are highly deterministic in terms of constructing theoretical framework of Turkey's foreign policy paradigm.

6.2 Legacies of Kemalism

The second and latest structural determinant shaping traditional Turkey's foreign policy is Kemalism. Legacies of Kemalism are highly influential on foreign policy concept of Turkey.¹⁷⁵ The ideological framework and principles dominating contemporary Turkey's foreign policy have been mostly identified by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk as the founding father

¹⁷⁵ Robert Olson, Nurhan İnce, "Turkish Foreign Policy from 1923 to 1960: Kemalism and its Legacy, a Review and a Critique", *Oriente Moderno*, Vol. LVII, No. 516, 1977, pp. 227-241.

of Republic of Turkey.¹⁷⁶ Turkey's external policy has been initiated, formulated and directed by Atatürk and till now the traces of Kemalist doctrines are the principle shaping factors of Turkey's foreign policy. Mustafa Aydın remarks as regard to influence of Mustafa Kemal on Turkey's foreign policy as bellow:

Although experiences and memories of the Ottoman past, together with its geostrategic location served as a foundation for and influenced the subsequent foreign relations of Turkey, it is Atatürk's theory and practice of foreign policy which has been the most important factor in shaping Turkey's foreign policy. He not only completely controlled Turkey's foreign policy in his lifetime, but he also put forward an ideological framework by which the pursuit of Turkey's foreign policy could be achieved.¹⁷⁷

Mustafa Kemal as a person, who had been highly influenced by the Western positivist philosophy approaches, struggled for the establishment of his ideas and founded the modern Turkey as a European style nation state¹⁷⁸ with deep stress on Turkish nationalism.¹⁷⁹ Unlike to heterogeneous structure of Ottoman Empire and its huge territories, Kemal supported the idea of a defendable territory with a homogeneous population enforcing nationalization process within its borders. Respectively, instead of following a foreign policy concept similar to Ottoman Empire, Kemalism deeply focused on protection of Turkey's natural borders.¹⁸⁰ In a speech on Turkish Grand National Assembly, Mustafa Kemal notifies as follow while Turkey continues its Independence Movement:

Sirs, we are not among those who are running for big ideas. As a consequence of running for big ideas we attracted animosity of whole world to our nation. We do not follow Pan-Islamist policies, we seem to tell we follow or we will follow pan-Islamism, thus our enemies not to let us follow Pan-Islamist policies tried to kill us. We neither do follow Pan-Turanist¹⁸¹ policies; we seem to tell we follow or we will follow Pan-Turanism, thus our enemies not to let us follow Pan-Turanist policies one more time tried to kill us. Owing to the fact that, we do not follow similar policies, we

¹⁷⁶ Jerzy Ł. Siemisław, *Ojciec Turków: Kemal Atatürk (Father of the Turks: Kemal Atatürk)*, Społeczny Instytut Historii i Kultury Turcji, Cracow 1994, pp. 1-5.

¹⁷⁷ M. Aydın, "Turkish Foreign Policy Framework", p. 23, p. 20.

¹⁷⁸ Sina Akşin, *Atatürk'ün Dış Politika İlkeleri ve Diplomasisi (Foreign Policy Principles of Atatürk and his Diplomacy)*, İnkılap ve Aka Kitapevleri, İstanbul 1964, p.15.

¹⁷⁹ M. Aydın, "The Determinants...", p. 308.

¹⁸⁰ Cengiz Çandar, "Ataturk's Ambitious Legacy", *The Wilson Quarterly*, Vol. 24, No 4. Autumn 2000, pp. 88-96.

¹⁸¹ **Pan Turanianism:** Late 19th and early 20th century movement to unite politically and culturally all the Turkic, Tatar, and Uralic peoples living in Turkey and across Eurasia from Hungary to the Pacific. Its name is derived from Turan, the Persian word for Turkistan (i.e., the land to the north of Iran). It was popular mainly among intellectuals and developed from a now largely discarded theory of the common origin of Turkish, Mongol, Tungus, Finnish, Hungarian, and other languages (the Ural-Altaic languages). In the half-century before World War I, some Hungarians sought to encourage Pan-Turanism as a means of uniting Turks and Hungarians against the Slavs and Pan-Slavism. The movement was never more than a sidelight, however, to the more important Pan Turkism

"Pan Turanism" in Encyclopedia Britannica, (source: www.britannica.com, <<http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/440695/Pan-Turanianism>>, June 2010).

do not augmented our enemies because we are a nation who desire to live and independence and we will spend our lives solely for similar reasons.¹⁸²

Another principle of Kemalism is the promotion of Turkey to the level of contemporary civilizations that pose a development pattern for modern Turkey modeling Western Europe which is identified as the ultimate level of civilization. Adaptation of many Western style laws and reforms barely indicates this feature of Kemalist outlook as regard to foreign policy. Mustafa Kemal's aim to promote Turkish society to the level of contemporary civilization highly contributed an affiliation between European states and Turkey.

In spite of the fact that Turkey undertook its Independence War as a struggle against the Western powers, the chief of the Turkish National Liberation war's notification: "Turkish War of Independence is not against the West but imperialism"¹⁸³ is crucial to comprehend modern Turkey's approach to the West. Likewise, the realist, non-adventurous principles of Kemalist paradigm as regard to foreign policy concept constitutes the general red lines of Turkey's foreign policy concept. Kemalist foreign policy doctrine poses a diplomacy oriented foreign policy prioritizing peaceful solutions of problems under the frame of international law instead of audacious policies of Young Turks.¹⁸⁴ During his lifetime, Mustafa Kemal achieved the control over Turkey's foreign policy entirely and he clearly underlined the ideological structure that Turkey's foreign policy should follow. Mustafa Aydın summaries the issue in a detailed way illustrating the impacts of Kemalist ideology on Turkey's foreign policy outlines:

Though the original Kemalist goals of national foreign policy underwent various mutations, practically all Turkish governments, regardless of their standpoints, put his "indisputable dogma" into their programs and have not, and could not implement policies that ran counter to Kemalist principles. His influence over the Turkish people, in general, and through Turkey's foreign policy in particular, has been so deep and so fundamental that there are at times intimations, and often open warnings, that anything other than strict adherence to his principles would be disloyal to him and to the country. Atatürk's foreign policy views, like his political views, represented a break with the past. He aimed at a renunciation of three strains which had been important during Ottoman times: the imperial Ottomanism, Pan Islamism, and Pan-Turanism. Incidentally, policies

¹⁸² Mustafa K Atatürk, *Nutuk (Discourse)*, Akvaryum Yayınevi, İstanbul 2008, p. 201.

¹⁸³ Baskın Oran, *Atatürk Milliyetçiliği: Resmi İdeoloji Dışı Bir İnceleme (The Nationalism of Atatürk, a non- Official Ideological Study)*, Dost Kitabevi, Ankara 1988, p. 48.

¹⁸⁴ **Young Turks Movement:** Coalition of various reform groups that led a revolutionary movement against the authoritarian regime of Ottoman sultan Abdülhamid II, which culminated in the establishment of a constitutional government. After their rise to power, the Young Turks introduced programs that promoted the modernization of the Ottoman Empire and a new spirit of Turkish nationalism. Their handling of foreign affairs, however, resulted in the dissolution of the Ottoman state.

"Young Turks" in Encyclopædia Britannica, (source: www.britannica.com, <<http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/654123/Young-Turks>>, June 2010).

which could break these strains coincided with three of his political principles: Republicanism, Secularism and Nationalism respectively.¹⁸⁵

7. Main Principles of Turkey's Foreign Policy

The main purpose of this section is to describe main principles of traditional peculiarities of Turkey's traditional foreign policy as well as the determinants shaping these very principles.

7.1. Status Quo Principle

The first principle determines main axiom of traditional Turkey's foreign policy is its status quo principle. As it has been mentioned beforehand, the status quo principle might be understood as the preservation of present situation as an inheritance of Ottoman Empire to Turkey. Principally, after the 17th century due to the recession of Ottoman Empire as a rule Empire did not prefer to be engaged in wars to prevent direct danger menacing its entity and unity.¹⁸⁶ Accordingly, Baskın Oran remarks that, the main perception of status quo for Turkey is the conservation of present Turkish borders; as a consequence of this understanding Turkey's foreign policy makers conscientiously abstain from applying irredentist policies.¹⁸⁷ The founder of the Republic explicitly underlined modern Turkey's new approach as regard to Turkey's status quo principle notifying Peace at home, Peace at Word.¹⁸⁸ The resolution of "Hatay question"¹⁸⁹ in favor of Turkey may be accepted as an exceptional case for Turkey's status quo oriented policies, yet since annex of Hatay to mainland Republic of Turkey has not followed any irredentist policy application. The internal turmoil of Turkish domestic policies in the course of transition period and the emergence of Soviet Union adjacent to Turkey became boosting factors for Turkey to stick to status quo principle. As a result of revisionist

¹⁸⁵ M. Aydın. "Turkish Foreign Policy.....", op.cit., p. 23.

¹⁸⁶ B. Oran, "TDP'nin Kuramsal...", op.cit., p. 45.

¹⁸⁷ Ibidem, p. 47.

¹⁸⁸ Harold C Armstrong, *Grey Wolf, Mustafa Kemal: An Intimate Study of a Dictator*, Arthur Barker Ltd., London 1932, p.10.

¹⁸⁹ In accordance with Franco - Turkish treaty, Ottoman Turkish territory Hatay ceded to mandatory France. When in 1936 Paris introduced independence to Syria and Lebanon, Turkey demand Hatay's independence owing to the fact that France was a mandate. The independence of Hatay issue was brought to League of Nations and the district was recognized as a quasi independent. The Turkish population residing in Hatay proclaimed independence then thanks to referendum it was ceded to Turkey. Hatay issue since then became a theme of discussion between Damascus and Ankara.

attitude of Mustafa Kemal and founder cadres of modern Turkey,¹⁹⁰ Ankara mostly achieved territories that were defined at “National Oath” (Misak-i Milli).¹⁹¹

7.2. Westernization Principle

The second principle determines the traditional foreign policy concept of Turkey is its Western orientation. From history point of view, as it has been repeatedly mentioned, the roots of Turkey’s Westernization date back to late Ottoman Empire period.¹⁹² According to Baskin Oran, there are historical, geographical, ideological, and sociocultural factors that push Turks to follow a pro Western foreign policy orientation.¹⁹³

The geographical structure of Anatolian peninsula highly contributed to Turkey’s Westernist orientation, while Turks continuous interaction with the West as well highly contributed this very process.¹⁹⁴ From cultural point of view, Turks prefer to call them as Europeans instead of Asians. Scholars who study Turkey’s foreign policy’s Western orientation have two views; First view advocates the thesis that the “West” itself constitutes a role model for the Republic. The word of Mustafa Kemal “Which nation that wanted to be civilized had not turned toward the West”¹⁹⁵ supports this idea. As for the second idea, the West has been interpreted as the model to improve Republic of Turkey. Relations with the West perceived as an obligatory prerequisite for Turkey’s economic and political development.

¹⁹⁰ B. Oran, “TDP’nin Kuramsal...”, op.cit., p. 48.

¹⁹¹ **National Oath:** On January 28th, the Parliament made public that it accepted the "National Oath" in conformity with the principles of the Sivas Congress and the decision of the Society for the defense of the Rights of Anatolia and Thrace (The Society for the Protection of Anatolian and Rumelian Rights). The principles of the "National Oath" were as follows:

1-The future of the territories inhabited by an Arab majority at the time of the signing of the Mondros Treaty will be determined by a referendum. On the other hand, the territories which were not occupied at that time and inhabited by a Turkish-Moslem majority are the homeland of the Turkish nation.

2-The status of Kars, Ardahan and Artvin may be determined by a referendum.

3-The status of Western Thrace will be determined by the votes of its inhabitants.

4-The security of İstanbul and Marmara should be provided for. Transport and free-trade on the Straits of the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles will be determined by Turkey and other concerned countries.

5-The rights of minorities will be issued on condition that the rights of the Moslem minorities in neighboring countries are protected.

¹⁹² It is crucial to note that though Turkey’s modernity and Westernization date back to 19th century, the Westernism of Ottoman Empire did not involve a Western oriented foreign policy or a Westernization concept with its cultural aspects.

Nejat Kaymaz, *Misak-ı Milli Üzerinde Yapılan Tartışmalar Hakkında (Upon Discussions on National Oath)*, VIII. Türk Tarih Kongresi, Ankara 1977, p. 2.

¹⁹³ B. Oran, “TDP’nin Kuramsal...”, op.cit., p. 48.

¹⁹⁴ Mustafa Akdağ, *Türkiye’nin Batılılaşmasını Zorunlu Kılan Tarihsel Koşullar (The Conditions Made Westernization a Must for Turkey)*, Ankara Üniversitesi, Ankara 1973, pp. 5-7.

¹⁹⁵ Ziya Karal, *Atatürk ve Devrim (Atatürk and Revolution)*, ODTÜ, Ankara 1998, pp. 56-57.

On the other hand, Turkey's gradual independence to the West, especially after the emergence of the Cold War following the Second World War became a theme of criticism.

After the establishment of the Republic, Turkey's foreign policy decision makers persistently put a special mark on relations with the West in political, diplomatic, cultural, military, strategic and economic meaning. Oral Sander notifies that, it is an obvious fact that the factors, like the emergence of Soviet threat, or the interest of Turkish elites coincided with the favor of continuation relations with the West, and this very fact constituted an additional motivation for Ankara to take part in Western Alliance. Nevertheless, the continuous threat perception or the choice of elites itself still is not an enough explanation in order to conceptualize Turkish foreign policy's Western dimension and preference priorities properly.¹⁹⁶ The Westernization process, at this respect in Oral Sander's opinion, should be appreciated as the strict engagement to Western norms and value system, the root of which should be searched in foundation philosophy of the Republic. Therefore, Western orientation and status quo constituted the general framework of Turkey's Foreign policy since her foundation 1923. Parallel to above mentioned transformation period, the Westernist interpretation of civilization profoundly influenced Turkey's foreign policy. According to this idea, foreign policy makers of the Republic conceived that the modernization/civilization idea can best be accomplished through the harmonizing measures domestically with a Westernist foreign policy to reach Western standards as the ideal sample of civilization.

8. Conclusions

A "medium power state",¹⁹⁷ situates in an extremely crucial position which makes it a geopolitical and geostrategic asset, Republic of Turkey plays a determinant role in regional politics. Yet, referring to "Aron paradigm",¹⁹⁸ the medium power states do not have an elastic opportunity to move regardless of blocs in terms of international politics. In this sense, Turkey not excluded from the very reality, continuously has been acting in line with bloc power balances in order to survive since its establishment.

According to Ramazan Gözen, the main characteristic feature and the basic understanding of Turkey's foreign policy could be summarized under the following

¹⁹⁶ Oral Sander, "Türkiye'nin Dış Politikasında Sürekliliğin Nedenleri" (*The Reasons of Continuity in Turkish Foreign Policy*), *A.U. Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Dergisi*, 1982, Vol. XXXVII, No. 3-4, p.107.

¹⁹⁷ B.Oran, "TDP'nin Kuramsal...", op.cit., p.30.

¹⁹⁸ Raymond Aron, *Peace and War: A Theory of International Relations*, Anchor, New York 1973, p. 125.

dimensions: In terms of its main orientation and stance in international system, Turkey is directed to the West. The Westernization principle that accelerated with the establishment of the Republic may be divided to two sub periods; the period when young Republic attempted to approach and the period since the Cold War. During the period that commenced with the emerge of the Cold War, Turkey highly integrated in terms of institutions with the West -the United States of America, the European Union and NATO- as determined its internal and external compatible to Western standards. Besides, Gözen stresses that Turkey's foreign policy has shaped due to Western norms and principles under the frames of modernity, nation state and sovereignty. In terms of foreign policy tools and methods internationalist realist skepticism, that has its roots in late Ottoman period, and use of hard power tool highly dominated Turkey's foreign policy. The political, military, strategic, both economic and social as well as diplomatic relation perspectives of Turkey have been also determined through its Westernization objectives. Eventually, from historical perspective foreign policy orientation of Republic of Turkey since the emerge of the Cold War has not experienced a fundamental shift or transformation, main foreign policy orientation, ideology and tools of Republic continued to be the U.S., NATO and the EU centered.¹⁹⁹

As for the practice, Philip Robins summarizes the history of Turkey's foreign policy as follows: Republic of Turkey, hitherto, has met four major foreign policy challenges. Firstly, in the early and mid 1920s, it saw the challenge of consolidating the emerging state of Turkey, principally through external recognition. The second appeared with the Second World War as the need to remain outside of a conflict that raged all around spinning most of Europe and the Middle East. the third came with the territorial and security challenge from the Soviet Union, in particular at the early period of the Cold War; and the fourth coincided with the end of the Cold War due to the collapse of bipolarity, as the need to navigate carefully through the transitional period in the international system.²⁰⁰

Turkey, in accordance with the Westernization principle established its political, economic and legal system compatible to Europe and set up a Western style democratic, secular, nation state that became the principle component of Turkey's foreign policy concept and opted to be a part of Western bloc system. Tough in many cases as regard to foreign policy it inherited both positive and negative legacies of Ottoman Empire it strictly followed the

¹⁹⁹ Ramazan Gözen, "The Basic Understanding of Change and Transformation of Turkish Foreign Policy aftermath the Cold War", *Evaluation Meeting on Current Issues of Turkish Foreign Policy*, (source: www.stratejikongoru.org, <<http://www.stratejikongoru.org/pdf/turkdispolitikasi.pdf>>, May 2012).

²⁰⁰ Robert P Robins, *Suits and Uniforms, Turkish Foreign Policy since the Cold War*, Hurst & Company, London 2003, pp. 1-10.

foreign policy doctrines of the founder and the first President Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. Kemalist paradigm has become the official doctrine of Turkey's foreign policy that shaping its theoretical outline along with its practical implementations since its establishment.

Chapter II

Justice and Development Party and Its Foreign Policy Concept

The chapter analyzes Justice and Development Party through a historical perspective focusing on ideological transition from political Islam to conservative democracy with a strong stress on the main factors shaping its foreign policy concept. The main objective of the chapter is to properly conceptualize main determinants constructing foreign policy concept of AK Party so as to understand foreign policy decision making process of the Party during its government periods in 2002-2011.

The first section of the chapter analyzes the historical background of Justice and Development focusing on the period from late Ottoman times to National Vision Movement including construction and development period of Justice and Development Party. The second section examines ideological transformation of administration staff of AKP and the process of taking them from a political Islamic background engaging them in conservative democracy with a focus on the theoretical and practical aspects of its political ideology. As for the third and final section, it explores foreign policy concept and principles of AK Party with an accent on Strategic Depth Doctrine and Zero Problem Principle along with election manifestos and Party program.

1. Historical Background of Justice and Development Party (AK Party)

In order to delve deep into the historical background of AKP, it is necessary to go over the history of political Islam and National View Movement in Turkey.

1.1. Political Islam in Turkey

The adventure of political Islam in Turkey cannot be understood properly without considering Pan Islamist ideology. Pan Islamism emerged as a reactive doctrine proposing alternative solution models to the demise of the Ottoman Empire. It was a political view or a sort of “revivalist movement”²⁰¹ against the collapse of Ottoman Empire; it bore an anti-imperialistic rhetoric, which aimed the “union of all Muslims”.²⁰² In his book “The Politics of

²⁰¹ Kemal Karpat, *The Politicization of Islam. Reconstructing Identity, State, Faith and Community in the Late Otoman State*, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2001, p. 20.

²⁰² Azmi Özcan, *Pan - Islamizm: Indian Muslims, the Ottomans and Britian, 1877 - 1924*, Koninklijke Brill, Leiden 1997, p. 25.

Pan Islam: Ideology and Organization”,²⁰³ Jacob Landau accentuates that in order to provide unity of Muslim world Pan Islamic ideology suggests two methods: To create a single Muslim state or to build a Muslim union harmonious with Muslim states. Pan Islamism introduced alternative resolution prescriptions against imperialism, underdevelopment and enthrallment in Islam world. As a political view, it suggested rational, modernist and eclectic ideological proposals against above mentioned problems that Muslims encountered between 19th and 20th century.²⁰⁴ Oxford Dictionary of Islamic Studies describes Pan Islamism as follows:

Ideology calling for sociopolitical solidarity among all Muslims has existed as a religious concept since the early days of Islam. It emerged as a modern political ideology in the 1860s and 1870s at the height of European colonialism, when Turkish intellectuals began discussing and writing about it as a way to save the Ottoman Empire from fragmentation. Became the favored state policy during the reign of Sultan Abdulhamid II (r.1876 -1909) and was adopted and promoted by members of the ruling bureaucratic and intellectual elites of the empire. With the rise of colonialism, became a defensive ideology, directed against European political, military, economic, and missionary penetration. Posed the sultan as a universal caliph to whom Muslims everywhere owed allegiance and obedience. It sought to offset military and economic weakness in the Muslim world by favoring central government over the periphery and Muslims over non-Muslims in education, office, and economic opportunities. Ultimately failed and collapsed after the defeat and dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire after World War I. Resurrected during the resurgence of Islam after World War II. It was expressed via organizations such as the Muslim World League and the Organization of the Islamic Conference, which seek to coordinate Islamic solidarity through political and economic cooperation internationally. It has also served as an important political tool in recruiting all-Muslim support against foreign aggressions.²⁰⁵

The emergence of Pan Islamism in the Ottoman Empire coincides with the rule period of Abdulhamid II²⁰⁶ (Ottoman Sultan)²⁰⁷ who “tried to mobilize the opinion all over the Muslim world in support of the flattering Ottoman state, as well to provide it with much needed help against its numerous and powerful enemies”.²⁰⁸ Pan Islamism idea in Ottoman intelligentsia indispensably advocated the proposal that the Ottoman Empire should keep its positive

²⁰³ Jacob M Landau, *The Politics of Pan Islam: Ideology and Organization*, Clarendon Press, Oxford 1990, pp. 1-9.

²⁰⁴ İsmail Kara, *Türkiye’de İslamcılık Düşüncesi (Islamism Ideology in Turkey)*, Risale Yayınları, İstanbul 1986, p. 15.

²⁰⁵ “Pan-Islamism” in Oxford Dictionary of Islam, (source: www.oxfordislamicstudies.com, <<http://www.oxfordislamicstudies.com/article/opr/t125/e1819>>, November 2010).

²⁰⁶ K. Karpat, “The Politicization of Islam.....”, op.cit., p. 20.

²⁰⁷ **Abdülhamid II**: Ottoman sultan from 1876 to 1909, under whose rule the reform movement of Tanzimat (Reorganization) reached its climax and who adopted a policy of pan-Islamism in opposition to Western intervention in Ottoman affairs. Abdülhamid used pan-Islamism to solidify his internal absolutist rule and to rally Muslim opinion outside the empire, thus creating difficulties for European imperial powers in their Muslim colonies. “Abdülhamid II” in Encyclopædia Britannica, (source: www.britannica.com, <<http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/931/Abdulhamid-II>>, May 2011).

²⁰⁸ Bernard Lewis, *Islam and the West*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1993, p. 137.

relations and solidarity with other Muslims as well as with the “Ummah”²⁰⁹ living all around the world. Similarly, Pan Islamist model aimed to gather all world Muslims around the “Shari’a”²¹⁰ under the authority of Caliph. In spite of the fact that Pan Islamism did not reach its main goal to evade the collapse of Ottoman Empire to collect all Muslim nations under the same roof, thanks to tight relations developed with other Muslim societies -particularly with Indian Muslims (today’s Pakistan, India and Bangladesh)- young Turkey gained a substantial material support during its Independence War.²¹¹

After the break down of the Empire, Pan Islamism ideology gradually transformed to “Islamism” in modern Turkey. According to Şerif Mardin, “Islamism is an ideological behavior that consolidated in Ottoman periphery and India, then got strength at the center of state and thereafter turned out to be a political view”.²¹² Instead of gathering all world Muslims together, Pan Islamism became part of the Turkish internal politics and mostly engaged in the independence of Anatolia in a different outpost, which was namely Islamism. Islamism developed under different fractions reacting against the occupation of Anatolia. In the meantime, Islamist ideologists established several organizations like Association for the Exaltation of Islam (Teal-i Islam Cemiyeti) in order to raise awareness among the Turkish society against the invasion.²¹³ Mustafa Kemal, as the leader of Turkish War of Independence in the course of his struggle also used a pro-Islamist rhetoric,²¹⁴ while addressing religious emotions of the people around him. Islamism mostly defended religious and spiritual solidarity against the occupation, but it also supported the protection of Caliphate institution. Subsidiarily, the supporters of Islamist ideology actively participated in the Independence War initialized by Atatürk. Yet, the abolition of Caliphate constituted a new problem to be discussed, besides the conversion to Latin alphabet, Westernization with an immerse stress on secularization along with tough interpretation of laicism principle erasing the official religion

²⁰⁹ **Ummah:** It is an Arabic origin word, which may be translate into English as community. It is most commonly used in order to describe world Muslims who believe and accept the prophecy of Muhammad and collect around his ideas.

²¹⁰ **Shari’a:** Also spelled Sharia, the fundamental religious concept of Islam, namely its law, systematized during the 2nd and 3rd centuries of the Muslim era (8th-9th centuries ad). Total and unqualified submission to the will of Allah (God) is the fundamental tenet of Islam: Islamic law is therefore the expression of Allah’s command for Muslim society and, in application, constitutes a system of duties that are incumbent upon a Muslim by virtue of his religious belief. Known as the Shariah (literally, “the path leading to the watering place”), the law constitutes a divinely ordained path of conduct that guides the Muslim toward a practical expression of his religious conviction in this world and the goal of divine favor in the world to come.

“Shari’a” in Encyclopedia Britannica (source: www.britannica.com, <<http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/538793/Shariah>>, June 2011).

²¹¹ A. Özcan, op. cit., p. 23.

²¹² Şerif Mardin, *İslamcılık, (Islamizm)*, Tanzimat’tan Cumhuriyete Türkiye Ansiklopedisi, İletişim Yayınları, İstanbul 1958, Vol. V, p. 1400.

²¹³ Binnaz Toprak, *Islam and Political Development in Turkey*, E.J.Brill, Leiden 1981, p. 59.

²¹⁴ T. Akyol, op.cit., p. 137.

expression in Turkish constitution accelerated the transformation process of critical approach to an opposition against Kemalist paradigm. The gradual replacement of Islamic institutions to secular ones, the establishment of Directorate of Religious Affairs (Diyaret İşleri Başkanlığı) in order to augment state control on religious issues boiled the tension. Some members or supporters of the Islamist association (both in administrative and member level) were highly marginalized and they actively attended social revolutions against the Kemalist regime.

On the other hand, the moderate Islamists who preferred pacifist methods continued their struggle via political activities under the roof of opponent parties like conservative Progressive Republican Party (Terakki Perver Fırkası).²¹⁵ Nevertheless, due to the enact of “Tranquility Statement Laws”²¹⁶ so as to repress the Sheikh Said²¹⁷ revolt supported by Kurdish tribes in the south eastern part of Anatolia, the pressure on the Islamists along with other opposition groups increasingly augmented, therefore the activities of all other political parties except for Republican People’s Party were banned. Henceforward, under the shade of “shock therapy”²¹⁸ which was applied to Turkish society through newly emerged Kemalist bureaucracy and military elites, Pan Islamism ideology that formerly proposed a Muslim union gradually converted to Islamism, thus it commenced to advocate an Islam based state model in Turkey. Nonetheless, since the international and domestic conjecture rose after the First World War, Islamism was obliged to abandon its public discourse and eventually initialized to be politicized mostly focusing on the conservation of religious and traditional norms in Turkish society.

Thanks to transition to multi party system in Turkey, the pressure on Islamists decreased relatively.²¹⁹ Islamists at this period commenced to participate in policy making process of the country at the rows of Democrat Party. The Islam friendly policy approaches of

²¹⁵ **Progressive Republican People’s Party:** (November 1924 - June 1925) is the second political party that established after Republican People’s Party. The establishers of the party are high rank generals who participated to Turkish War of Independence War and close friends of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. he small Progressive Republican Party. It had only 29 members and closed after the Sheikh Said revolt.

²¹⁶ **Tranquility Statement Laws:** are set of temporary laws enacted after the Sheikh Said revolt in order to provide public order in new Turkey. Under the frame of laws many anti - democratic regulations was applied under the pretext of protecting the principles of republic limiting human rights and independence of expression.

²¹⁷ **Sheikh Said Revolt:** Is a religion based rebellion against Kemalist reforms that is accepted as the biggest revolt against Republican regime. Kurdish originated Said Piran being an influential clergy at the South East part of Turkey realized along with his followers regional rebellion against the that Republic was suppressed.

²¹⁸ Ernest Gellner, *Muslim Society*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1981, p. 169.

²¹⁹ Mümtazer Türköne, *Siyasi İdeoloji Olarak İslamcılığın Doğuşu (The Birth of Islamism as a Political Ideology)*, İletişim Yayınları, İstanbul 1991, p. 53.

Adnan Menderes²²⁰ -like the conversion of Azan (call for prayer) from Turkish to Arabic-.²²¹ And it highly contributed to this very affiliation process. However, as a consequence of 27 May 1960, coup d'état Democrat Party was closed by Military regime and the activities of Islamist were abolished.

1.2. Political Islam and National Vision

The main organization of Political Islam was realized, thanks to the initiatives of Prof. Mehmet Zahit Kotku.²²² Zahit Kotku as a reaction to never ending struggles and political intrigues at right wing parties and in order to express the ideas of Islamists more explicitly decided to establish a political party “that can stand itself”²²³ with an Islamic orientation. Kotku favored the leadership of Necmettin Erbakan as a promising and outstanding personality of first Islamist political party in Turkey. Thus, Necmettin Erbakan thereafter undertook the indisputable charismatic, traditional Islamist leadership that made him as the most notable figure of political Islam in Turkey.

²²⁰ **Adnan Menderes:** Born 1899, Aydın, Turkey - died Sept. 17, 1961, İmralı), Turkish politician who served as prime minister from 1950 until deposed by a military coup in 1960. The son of a wealthy landowner, Menderes was educated at the American College in İzmir and the Faculty of Law at Ankara. Later in life he sold or distributed most of his estates to small shareholders, maintaining only one farm, which became a model of modern agricultural methods. In 1930 he entered parliament as a member of Kemal Atatürk's Republican People's Party (RPP). The RPP was at that time the only legal party in Turkey and was firmly pro-Western. It had broken drastically with many social and cultural traditions of the past and had introduced a rigidly controlled state economy.

In 1945 Menderes was expelled from the RPP, and he and three others founded (1946) the Democrat Party (DP), which became Turkey's first opposition party. The 1950 elections, which were the first free elections held in Turkey in more than 25 years, resulted in a landslide victory for Menderes and his party. Menderes was more tolerant than the RPP of traditional ways of life. While still pro-Western in foreign policy, he tried to establish closer ties with Muslim states. Recognizing the deep-seated religious fervor of the populace, Menderes relaxed much of the official antipathy of Atatürk and the RPP towards some of the more conservative manifestations of Islamic religious feeling.

The DP encouraged private enterprise as opposed to a planned economy, but it eventually brought the country to insolvency by a policy of heedless importation of foreign goods and technology. While the lot of the average villager did improve, it was done at the sacrifice of national economic integrity. In spite of Turkey's crushing economic problems, Menderes maintained his popularity with the peasantry, and in the 1954 elections the DP again won by a substantial majority, returning Menderes to office. Always intolerant of criticism, Menderes then set out to silence his opposition. Press censorship was instituted, journalists were jailed at whim, and local elections were rigged. These policies not only angered the intellectuals but alienated the military, a group that saw itself as the guardians of Kemalist ideals and felt that the Atatürk reforms were being directly challenged. Although the national economy continued to decline, Menderes still had popular support and won the 1957 elections. But the opposition to him was intensifying, and on May 27, 1960, a military coup overthrew his government. Menderes and hundreds of Democrat Party leaders were arrested. During a trial lasting 11 months, Menderes was accused of embezzling state funds, extravagance, and corruption, among other charges. He was sentenced to death and, following a suicide attempt, was hanged.

“Adnan Menderes” in Encyclopedia Britannica, (source: www.britannica.com, <<http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/374821/Adnan-Menderes>>, May 2011).

²²¹ B. Toprak, op. cit. p. 60.

²²² Hakan Yavuz, *Islamic Political Identity in Turkey*, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2003, p. 209.

²²³ Doğan Duman, *Çok Partili Dönede Türkiye'de İslamcılık (Islamism in Turkey during Multi Party Period in Turkey)*, Dokuz Eylül Üniversitesi, Atatürk İlkeleri ve İnkılap Tarihi Enstitüsü, unpublished PhD Thesis, İzmir 1996, p.58.

Necmettin Erbakan was born in 1926 in Northern Turkey.²²⁴ His father, who came from a long-standing family, was a civil servant worked in different places of Turkey while his mother was a member of a reputable family. Being a bright student during his initial learning life, he studied mechanical engineering at Istanbul Technical University which is the most prestigious and oldest university of Turkey in the field of Technology and earned his PhD degree from Aachen University. During his stay in Germany, he was highly influenced by German discipline and technology that would reflect his political discourse in the course of his future career. His achievements and bright intelligence were noticed by German scholars and was invited to undertake projects for German army.²²⁵ Erbakan got acquaintance with religious ideas in İstanbul after his father's retirement.²²⁶ He gradually became a popular figure among Islamic and conservative circles. After his return to Turkey, Erbakan worked on the project of producing Turkish cars, which increased his popularity and constituted a national, conservative, reference for his political activities.

Inspired by Kotku along with the support of many religious groups and communities Necmettin initialized "National Vision Movement"²²⁷ (Milli Görüş Hareketi) which was also published as a manifesto afterwards.²²⁸ In their corporate book "Religion and Politics in Turkey", Ali Çarkoğlu and Barry M. Rubin make the inference that "the term National Vision constitutes the key concept in the ideology of Islamic parties in Turkey"²²⁹ So as to describe ideological axiom of the National Vision Movement and Islamist parties established by the movement Çarkoğlu and Rubin notifies as follows:

The political vision of Islamist parties in Turkey is based on a certain way of interpreting Muslim history and Western influence in the world. They argue that Muslim World has experienced a decline for several centuries, although it used to be advance than the West. They explain their greatness with the moral and spiritual strength that comes with the nation's faith. As Turkey has imitated the Western values and utilized inappropriate Western technology by a Western-oriented it

²²⁴ Elizabeth Özdalga, *Political Leaders and Democracy in Turkey*, Lexington Books, Maryland 2002, p. 128.

²²⁵ "Necmettin Erbakan", (source: www.necmettinerbakan.org, <<http://www.necmettinerbakan.org/ozgecmis.asp>>, November 2010).

²²⁶ **Nakshibendi Tariqa:** Nakshibendi's are the followers of Islamic sufi order, which traces its traditions directly back to the life-style and teachings of Prophet Muhammad, peace and blessings be upon him. Sufism ('Tasawwuf', in Arabic) is one of the Islamic sciences. Under the guidance of a Sheykh of the Tarikat, sufism is the way of purifying oneself from bad manners and characteristics in preparation for passing clean to the afterlife. Sufism is the spirituality in Islam. The chain of transmission (of the teachings) is documented through the 40 Grand Sheykh of the Tarikat back to Abu Bakr Siddik, the first companion to whom the Prophet passed the Sufi knowledge of the heart.

²²⁷ Necmettin Erbakan, *Milli Görüş (National Vision)* Dergah Yayınları, İstanbul 1974, p.15.

²²⁸ Banu Eligür, *The Mobilization of Political Islam in Turkey*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2010, p. 66.

²²⁹ Ali Çarkoğlu, Barry M. Rubin, *Religion and Politics in Turkey*, Routledge, Oxon 2006, p. 63.

has fallen behind. They point a better future when Turkey properly blends and synthesis moral spiritual and material development.²³⁰

To boot, Mehmet Ali Soydan summarize the social and political doctrines of the Movement in five points:

- 1- Reject Western imitation
- 2- Reject Western Capitalism
- 3- Develop moral and material well-being of citizen
- 4- Reject Western dependency and adopt Islamic unity
- 5- Realize Islamic Justice.²³¹

Thereafter, the movement established National Order Party (Milli Nizam Partisi) in 1970 as the first Islamist political party in Turkey. The first Party of National Vision Movement had an Islamic - Conservative discourse highlighting the spiritual and national upgrading of Turkish nation. Apart from stress on social justice, a natural culture and education,²³² the Party program openly objected to market economy and interest system,²³³ while it advocated a state oriented economy based on “Fair Order”.²³⁴ The idea of “Fair Order” (Adil Düzen) soon became a slogan of Erbakan oriented political Islam in Turkey with a socialist accent remarkably against American imperialism.²³⁵ Erbakan’s strong opposition against Western imperialism, his interpretation of the European Union as a Christian Club along with vehement critics of Turkish secularism and Kemalist paradigm, turned him out to be a controversial figure in Turkish politics. National Order Party under the leadership of Necmettin Erbakan harshly opposed Turkey’s close association with Europe and NATO membership as he proposed an Islam union. Eventually, he critically approached toward Israel - Turkish alliance with an anti-Zionist stress (he was criticized for being anti-Semist) as well as searched close ties with other Islamists around the world.²³⁶ Yet, the National Vision

²³⁰ Ali Çarkoğlu, Barry M. Rubin, op.cit., p. 64.

²³¹ Mehmed A Soydan, *Dünden Bugüne ve Yarına Refah Gerçeği (Refah Reality, From Yesterday to Today and Tomorrow)*, Birey Yayıncılık, İstanbul 1994, p. 33.

²³² Ruşen Çakır, *Ne Şariat, Ne Demokrasi: Refah Partisini Anlamak (Neither the Shari’a Nor Democracy: Understanding the Welfare Party)*, Metris Yayınları, İstanbul 1994, p. 21.

²³³ “Party Program of National Order Party”,
(source: www.belgenet.com, <www.belgenet.com/parti/program/mnp.html>, November 2010).

²³⁴ Serdar Şen, *Refah Partisi'nin Teori ve Pratiği: Adil Düzen ve Kapitalizm (The Theory and Practice of Welfare Party : Fair Order and Capitalism)*, Sarmal Yayınevi, İstanbul 1995, pp. 1-3.

²³⁵ Birol A Yeşilada, *Comparative Political Parties and Party Elites*, Essays in Honor of Samuel J. Eldersweld, The University of Michigan Press, Michigan 2002, p. 131.

²³⁶ Graham E Fuller, *The New Turkish Republic: Turkey as a Pivotal State in Islam World*, United States of Peace Press, Washington 2008, pp. 5-10.

Movement proposed resolution models that turned out to be chronological problem for Turkey. Hence, these actions were highly welcomed by masses thanks to rhetoric used by his charismatic leader. The identity and anti-corruption policies along with its address to conservative and religious sentiments of Turkish people made the party rise gradually.

National Order Party was represented under the roof of Turkish Grand Assembly, but it also experienced the same end as Democrat Party did. The leader of the Party, Necmettin Erbakan, was obliged to leave Turkey for Switzerland. Aftermaths, Necmettin Erbakan established the National Salvation Party (Milli Selamet Partisi) as a successor of National Order Party at 1972. National Salvation Party took 11% of total votes and entered to Turkish Grand National Assembly with 48 deputies, while the Justice Party lost its votes from 46.5 to 28.9. Consequently, National Salvation Party set up a coalition government with Republican People's Party.

As an outcome of the 1980 military coup d'état, Turkish civic politics repeatedly entered under the influence of military regime. National Salvation Party along with all other political parties in Turkey was dissolved, as the high rank members and executives of the Party were banned from political activities. At the year of 1983, military government permitted to reestablishment and activity of all political parties back in Turkey, thus Necmettin Erbakan established Welfare Party (Refah Partisi),²³⁷ as the following political organization, though he could not participate in it due to the continuation of his political prohibition. After referendum held at national level, it removed political bans related to coup and Erbakan became the leader of the party and continued his political life under the roof of Welfare Party.

The real rise of political Islam in Turkey took place with Welfare Party when the Party won İstanbul and Ankara metropolitan municipalities during the local elections held in 1994.²³⁸ "This burst in support for Erbakan's party set the stage for its landmark victory (with 21 percent of the vote) in the December 1995 elections that marked the first time an Islamist political party had ever won a plurality in a Turkish national elections".²³⁹ Aftermaths, Welfare Party formed a coalition government with True Path Party (Doğru Yol Partisi), in which Necmettin Erbakan performed the Prime Minister task. The boom of political Islam in

²³⁷ Jenny B White, „Islam and Politics in Contemporary Turkey” in *The Cambridge History of Turkey*, Vol. 4, Resat Kasaba (ed.) Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2008, p. 366.

²³⁸ Ronnie Marquies, Ergin Yıldızoğlu, *The Resurgence of Islam and the Welfare Party in Turkey in Political Islam: Essays from Middle East Report*, University of California Press, California 2005, p. 144.

²³⁹ Zeyno Baran, *Torn Country: Turkey between Secularism and Islamism*, Hoover Institution Press Publication, California 2010, p. 41.

Turkish political scene caused panic among bureaucratic and military elites of Turkey.²⁴⁰ The pro Islamists activities of Welfare Party along with its public discourse of administration staff agitated the tension. Prime Minister “Erbakan embarked on some bold symbolic changes in domestic and foreign politics. For instance he paid his first state visit to a number of Muslim countries, allowed female bureaucrats to wear headscarves in the office and agreed on adjustment of working-hours during Ramadan, the holy month of fasting”.²⁴¹ Ultimately, the controversial reception program for Sheikhs at Prime Minister residency increased the concern of General Staff of Turkish Armed Forces (Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri) appreciating itself as the protector of secular regime in Turkey absolutely. Therefore, agitated also by the provocative rhetoric of mass media The Chief of General Staff of Turkish Armed Forces issued a memorandum at 28 February 1998, which obliged the resignation of Welfare - True Path Party coalition government. The indirect intervention of military forces to civil politics registered to Turkish political history as a “Post - modern coup d'état”²⁴² introducing harsh pressures not only against political Islam but also toward all Islamic movements.²⁴³

Following the 28 February coup, the Welfare Party was closed by the decision of constitutional court under the accusation of undertaking political activities against the secularity principle of constitution, henceforward, high rank officials were banned from politics including Necmettin Erbakan. As an outcome of the verdict, the movement established the next political party of National View Movement, this time it was called as Virtue Party (Fazilet Partisi). However, this period was also pregnant upcoming political turmoil for National Vision Movement itself. The new generation National Vision Movement politicians started to question and criticize aggressive and non-conformists attitude of hawk wing of National Vision Movement politicians with the dominant powers of republic.

The inner party critics of milder wing of National Vision Movement as well as their opposition against tough attitude versus the settled secular system in Turkey reached to its peak level particularly when a woman deputy, Merve Kavakçı, entered to National Assembly with veil and was enforced to leave the session under the protests of opposition deputies. The incident caused tough discussions as regard to interpretation of laicism and religious symbols almost at all level of Turkey, harsh criticism directed to political Islamist under the pretext to

²⁴⁰ Ibidem, p. 42.

²⁴¹ Dietrich Jung, Wolfango Piccoli, *Turkey at Crossroads*, Zed Books Ltd., New York 2001, p. 119.

²⁴² Meliha B Altunışık, Özlem Tür, *Turkey: Challenges of Continuity and Change*, Routledge Curzon, Oxon 2005, p. 60.

²⁴³ For further reading on clashes between Islamists and Kemalist in Turkish political scene see: Adam Szymański, *Między Islamem a Kemalizmem: problem demokracji w Turcji (Between Islam and Kemalism: Democracy Issue in Turkey)*, PISM, Warsaw 2008.

be provocative, while Turkish public view clasped to the incident for weeks. The destiny of Virtue Party that established instead of Welfare Party became similar to its predecessor and Turkish Constitutional Court dissolved it too under the allegation of being the successor of Welfare Party.²⁴⁴ One more time, the following political party of National Vision Movement was closed by Turkish justice system under the blame of their anti-secular activities. As the political struggle between conservatives and innovators continued, the Turkish Constitutional Court closed the party that replaced with Felicity Party. (Saadet Partisi).

1.3. The Birth and Development of Justice and Development Party

The 28 February postmodern coup process and continuous antagonist structure of political Islam versus secular elites gradually augmented disappointments among the members of National Vision Movement.²⁴⁵ Among the NVM members, it was “concluded that the only way the Islamists could succeed was by avoiding a direct confrontation with the secularists and deemphasizing the religious agenda”.²⁴⁶ Additionally, the following closure case disclosed deep discussions, which gained a public character. Thereby, the inner-party dissidence gave birth to “intense internal debate and rethinking within the Islamic movement about the movement’s future political strategy and agenda, and a growing philosophical and political rift emerged within the movement between two different groups”.²⁴⁷

The fraction called as Traditionalist (Gelenekçiler) wing of Virtue Party consisted of old generation political Islamists who used to be tightly connected to ideas of Erbakan, advocating the orthodox struggle tools of National Vision Movement. Oppositely, the reformist Innovators (Yenilikçiler) upheld a mild manner instead of igniting tension with secular elites led by Recep Tayyip Erdoğan²⁴⁸ and Abdullah Gül.²⁴⁹ The struggle between the

²⁴⁴ “The Closure Case of Virtue Party”, (source: www.belgenet.com.tr, <<http://www.belgenet.com/arsiv/fpdava.html>>, May 2010).

²⁴⁵ Sebnem Gümüşçü, Deniz Sert, “The Power of Devout Bourgeoisie: The Case of Justice and Development Party in Turkey”, *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 45, No. 6, 2009, pp. 953-968.

²⁴⁶ Angel Rabasa, Stephen F. Larrabee, *The Real Rise of Political Islam in Turkey*, Rand Corporation, Pittsburgh 2008, p. 45.

²⁴⁷ Ibidem, p. 46.

²⁴⁸ **Tayyip Erdoğan**: He was born at 1954 in a middle class family coming to İstanbul from North Eastern part of Turkey. He took his primary education at Religious Vocational School, which influenced the development of his personal character and build his political orientation. He studied economics and commercial sciences. During his studies, he was the leader of National Union of Turkish Student’s and entered to politics at National Salvation Party rows. After series of different successful positions, he flourished his political career when he was selected as the Mayor of İstanbul -the biggest city in Turkey-. It was a time, when Welfare Party increased it’s vote percentage all around the Turkey, and showed a great success during local elections gaining big cities of Turkey including İstanbul and capital Ankara.

During his presidency, he followed a trustworthy policy against corruption, resolved many chronicle problems of İstanbul metropolitan like pollution, water shortage, cabbage, traffic, shattered houses and became a public figure beyond political ideology earning support the wide range of İstanbul residents emphasizing service

Traditionalists and Innovators displayed publicly during the ordinary congress of Virtue Party that was held to select a new chairman following Erbakan's political ban. The Innovators intended to take the control of the party putting Abdullah Gül against the Conservatives' candidate supported by Necmettin Erbakan. In the end the candidate of Innovators was almost reaching the victory. The success that the innovators gained during the above mentioned Congress paved the way for the emergence of them as a new party in Turkish political arena on 14th August 2001.²⁵⁰ This new party was called the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi) under the leadership of Tayyip Erdoğan. Soon after completing its organizational process, Justice and Development Party took part in general elections held on 3rd November 2002. Despite being a comparatively young party, it achieved to collect 34 % of

oriented politics instead of engaging ideological structures. Erdoğan as well developed highly positive relations with mass media representatives in order to introduce his performance ably on public view, yet was criticized through suspicious seculars due to ban of alcohol in some districts of İstanbul open to public. On the other hand, the policies developed during his administration in İstanbul was not perceived as Islamist but implicated as Neo Ottomanist as he allocated huge amounts of municipality budget to restore Ottoman monuments and "change of some street names" During a public meeting at the year of 1997, He read a poem published by the permission of Ministry of Education and sentenced to a ten year prison punishment, banned from politics and ended his mayor post of İstanbul municipality.

"Recep Tayyip Erdoğan" in Britannica Encyclopedia Online,
(source: www.britannica.com, <<http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/913988/Recep-Tayyip-Erdogan>>, May 2012).

²⁴⁹ **Abdullah Gül:** (born Oct. 29, 1950, Kayseri, Tur.), Turkish politician who served as prime minister and president of Turkey (2007-). Gül inherited his politics from his father, who owned a modest metalworking shop and who had stood unsuccessfully as a parliamentary candidate of the National Salvation Party (NSP; Millî Selâmet Partisi), the first Islamist party to make an Oath. After Gül graduated (1971) with a degree in economics from İstanbul University, where he was active in the nationalist Turkish National Students' Union, he spent two years conducting postgraduate studies in Exeter, Eng. He then returned to Turkey and was briefly detained after the 1980 military coup. In 1983 he earned a PhD. from İstanbul University and subsequently became an economist at the Islamic Development Bank in Jiddah, Saudi Arabia.

In 1991 Gül launched himself full-time into Turkish politics, becoming the international spokesman for the Welfare Party (WP; Refah Partisi), a reincarnation of the NSP, which had been outlawed by the constitutional court because of a ban in Turkey on religiously based political parties. He later became minister in the coalition government headed by WP leader Necmettin Erbakan. When Erbakan was eased out of office by the military in 1997 and the WP was closed down, Gül became a leading member of a group of modernizers who broke away from Erbakan and formed the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi; AKP) as a democratic, conservative, but non confessional movement. Gül deputized for the AKP leader İstanbul mayor Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, who was imprisoned on the eve of the 2002 parliamentary elections. In the elections the AKP won an absolute majority, and Gül served as prime minister for four months until Erdoğan was allowed back into politics. In 2003 Gül became foreign minister in Erdoğan's government. During his four-year tenure at the Foreign Ministry, Gül concentrated on pushing forward Turkey's application for membership in the European Union, and he acquired a reputation as a skillful and non confrontational negotiator who was as popular with his staff as he was with his foreign constituents. A pious practicing Muslim himself, Gül seemed ideally placed to represent the mass of conservative Turks who practiced Islam while maintaining loyalty to the secular republic and remaining open to the outside world in their outlook.

"Abdullah Gül" in Britannica Encyclopedia Online, (source: www.britannica.com, <<http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/1330995>>, May 2012).

²⁵⁰ "Justice and Development Party", (source: www.akparti.org.tr, <<http://eng.akparti.org.tr/>>, April 2011).

general polls and became the ruling party after the first elections that it participated. With this result, the party gained the absolute majority of seats in Turkish National Grand Assembly.²⁵¹

First government of Justice and Development Party and the 58th of Republic of Turkey were formed under the leadership of Abdullah Gül as Erdoğan was legally banned from political activities due to the conviction he was sentenced to in 1998. The political ban of Tayyip Erdoğan was removed thanks to a constitutional amendment that was supported by the opposition parties as well in 2002. And he was elected as a deputy after the interim elections held in Siirt. On the first ordinary general assembly of JDP, party members elected Recep Tayyip Erdoğan as the chairman unanimously. The 58th government established under the leadership of Abdullah Gül held the power from November 18, 2002 since March 14, 2003 resigned and the 59th government of the Republic was established under the leadership of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, thence he became the new Prime Minister of Turkey.

In local elections held in 2004, Justice and Development Party increased its vote proportion to 42 % of prevailing at the majority of metropolitan, provincial, country and district municipalities.²⁵² AK Party increased its vote percentage during the general elections, which was held at July 22, 2007. AK Party recorded 46.6 % percentage allocating 341 seats at Turkish Grand Assembly.²⁵³ Following that, during the local elections held at 29 of March 2009 the vote rates of Justice and Development Party fell to 38.78 percentages of total votes though became the first party, however it lost some important cities at the Eastern and Southern part of Turkey. Ultimately, in the national elections held in 12 June 2011, Justice and Development Party achieved to collect almost 50 % of total votes in Turkey. AK Party signed a historical record not only in Turkish democracy but also in Europe as a political party being elected three times in row with an increasing vote percentage.²⁵⁴ It was a historical success at Turkish political history as a rare case for a ruling party increasing its vote percentage, which has not been met since 1950 general election.

In spite of the fact that, Justice and Development Party entered to general elections shortly after its establishment, it succeed an unexpected increase among other political parties the origins, which date back almost to the establishment of Republic. The unforeseen achievement of a new party with an Islamist background caused deep dissents among

²⁵¹ "Election Results", (source: www.akparti.org.tr, <<http://eng.akparti.org.tr/english/elections.html>>, April 2011).

²⁵² Ibid.

²⁵³ Ibid.

²⁵⁴ "AK Parti Tarihe Geçti" ("AK Parti Made History"), (source: www.trt.net.tr, <<http://www.trt.net.tr/Haber/HaberDetay.aspx?HaberKodu=086e3bd3-2b64-492b-ac61-1e486e0e95f2>>, April 2011).

scholars, academicians and intellectuals specialized in political sciences and sociology. All the same, the success of AK Party may be shortly summarized as bellow: First of all, Turkish political scene from the death of Turgut Özal till the Justice and Development Party period was full of political deadlocks. Because of continuous coalition-governments corroded political ethics and caused a great despair of Turkish people toward politics as an institution (interpreting as an institution serving solely for the stakes of privileged group of people). The perception of politics was seriously injured by continuous fluctuations due to shallow, causal interest struggles of coalition governments, henceforward Justice, and Development Party as a new political formation turned out to be hope for Turkish society.

Secondly, the degreasing economy of country made Turkish people search new alternatives in order to stop critical situation. The devaluation of foreign currency against Turkish Lira during True Path Party and Social Democrat Party coalition caused almost half million people jobless, furthermore as a reflection of Russian financial crisis, at the year of 1999 Turkey experienced the worst economic crisis in the history that caused a deep shake for Turkish people. Besides, the corruption, continuous inflation, and increasing Kurdish separatist terror became deterministic at the political behavior of Turks. As a result, Turkish voters estimated that the coalition governments couldn't manage the crisis. Another reason, parallel to above mentioned factors, Turkish policy tired with old images and old political actors activating at political scene almost since the establishment of Republic and a newly born party who proved its success through its members during previous post caused an affiliation of voters. Notwithstanding to the fact that, it is not the main concern of this dissertation to examine internal and external dynamics made the AKP first party shortly after its establishment and increase its vote proportion stably in the course of three period at the office consecutively, there are many other factors deterministic at this very phenomena. Owing to the transformation under the roof of National Vision Movement, the new discourse of Justice and Development Party embraced wider parts of Turkish society; furthermore the negative effects of 28 February military coup and favor to democracy as well highly contributed Justice and Development Party's achievement.

2. AK Party and Its Political Identity

Conservatism as an ideological phenomenon and political doctrine firstly emerged with the motto to preserve the existing in France as a reaction to social and economical transformation rose aftermath the French Revolution.²⁵⁵ Scholars from continental Europe like Edmund Burke, Hugh Cecil, Lord Hailsham and Roger Scruton had constructed the philosophical fundamentals of Conservative Democracy doctrine.²⁵⁶ The “Reflections on the Revolution in France” of Burke and the masterpieces of Russell Kirk “The Conservative Mind” as well as “The Politics of Prudence” are the reference books of Conservative Democracy in political philosophy literature.²⁵⁷

As a reference to Conservative Democracy experience in the West, AK Party put a distance between political Islam attempting to create a political philosophy within a theoretical frame that is understandable at all levels of the society adopting the Conservative Democrat political party identity.²⁵⁸ Seeking legitimacy in front of Kemalist elites of the Republic, Justice and Development Party developed a new political discourse conversely to its staff members’ former political Islamist identity. Therefore, the “Conservative Democracy”²⁵⁹ had become the new political identity of former Islamist to explain political orientation of the newly established Party. AKP undertook an academic work headed by Yalçın Akdoğan, who is an academician and political adviser of Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, to manifest its ideological position called as “Conservative Democracy”.²⁶⁰

Justice and Development Party decision makers, undergoing a considerable change in the course of its establishment process publicly announced that the Party has cut all its National Outlook past. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan as the chairman of the AK Party adopted the popular discourse of “we have took out our National Outlook shirt”²⁶¹ to indicate the conservative democrat orientation of AK Party. The party program of JDP as well barely reflected its transition and break from National Vision Movement tradition. The expression

²⁵⁵ Bekir Berat Özipek, *Muhafazakarlık, Akıl, Toplum, Siyaset, (Conservatism, Mind, Society, Politics)* Liberte Yayınları, Ankara 2004, p. 73.

²⁵⁶ Yalçın Akdoğan, *The Meaning of Conservative Democratic Political Identity in, The Emergence of a New Turkey: Democracy and AK Parti*, The University of Utah Press, Utah 2006, p. 50.

²⁵⁷ Ibid., p.51.

²⁵⁸ Ali Bulaç, “AK Parti ve Muhafazakar Demokrasi” (“AK Party and Conservative Democracy”), *Köprü*, No. 97, 2007, (source:www.koprudergisi.com, <<http://www.koprudergisi.com/index.asp?Bolum=EskiSayilar&Goster=Yazi&YaziNo=824>>, June 2012).

²⁵⁹ Yalçın Akdoğan, *AK Parti ve Muhafazakar Demokrasi (AK Party and Conservative Democracy)*, Alfa Yayınları, İstanbul 2004, pp. 90-105.

²⁶⁰ Ibidem, pp. 90-105..

²⁶¹ Güneri Civaoglu. “Dün, Bugün Yarın” (“Yesterday, Today, Tomorrow”), *Milliyet*, 21 May, 2008.

“loyalty to the fundamental values and constitution of the Republic”²⁶² was barely exposed in the program.²⁶³ The respect for fundamental principles toward democracy, the right of freedom and acceptance of religion as a unifying element of society were explicitly stressed. In addition to that, secularity as a principle guarantying religious independence of individual and regulating state individual relation in term of religion was as well highlighted in the party program, while protection of representatives of other religions and nonbelievers also added to the party program of the JDP.²⁶⁴ Besides, by contrast to anti-Western attitude of National Vision Movement ideology that appreciate the West an enemy of Islam and Turkey, Justice and Development Party “has increasingly emphasized Western political values such as democracy, respect for human rights, and the rule of law in its public discourse”.²⁶⁵

İhsan Yılmaz so as to express the ideological shift of JDP decision makers stresses “the AK Party is a successful example showing that political participation and the opportunities available for the Islamist parties can generate political change, resulting in the transformation of Islamism to non-Islamism in the Turkish context”.²⁶⁶ Bilal Sambur highlights unique case of AK Party and its dissimilarity to orthodox political Islam and Islamist movements’ as bellow:

This movement formed itself as a political party. Its members are politicians, not militants. It constantly and explicitly rejects radical and militant types of Islamism, stays away from religious literalism, tries to produce a kind of conservatism with a liberal tone. AKP does not approve violence and militancy in the name of religion. The exclusion of militancy, literalism and violence gives opportunity to AKP to accommodate religiosity, plurality, democracy, secularity and modernity together. The case of AKP should not be analyzed the way Taliban or Al-Qaida has been presented in the world press. Instead of a militancy presentation, AKP should be understood in terms of its political, social and cultural dimensions.²⁶⁷

Yasin Aktay, as regard to ideological transition of AKP’s decision makers, points out that “after AK Party’s break from National Outlook political line they entered to a purification process of Islamic symbols though they did not isolated through Islamic ontology at all”.²⁶⁸ Professor Aktay adds that, Justice and Development Party created a new rhetoric in order to continue its connection and communication with its natural grassroots thanks to this new

²⁶² Angel Rabasa, Stephen F Larrabee, op.cit., p. 46.

²⁶³ “Justice and Development Party Program”, (source: www.akparti.org.tr, <http://www.akparti.org.tr/parti-programi_79.html>, November 2010).

²⁶⁴ Ibid.

²⁶⁵ Angel Rabasa, Stephen F Larrabee, op.cit., p. 47.

²⁶⁶ İhsan Yılmaz, “Muslim Democrats in Turkey and Egypt: Participatory Politics as a Catalyst”, *Insight Turkey*, Vol. XI, No.2, p. 99.

²⁶⁷ Bilal Sambur, “The Great Transformation of Political Islam in Turkey: The Case of Justice and Development Party and Erdoğan”, *European Journal of Economic and Political Studies*, Vol. II, 2009, p. 119.

²⁶⁸ Yasin Aktay, “İkrar ile İnkâr arasında AKP’nin Kimliği” (“AKP’s Identity between Acceptance and Refusal”), (source: www.anlayis.net, <<http://www.anlayis.net/makaleGoster.aspx?dergiid=31&makaleid=4706>>, June 2012).

conservative political party identity that adopted compatible with the *realpolitik* and conjecture.²⁶⁹ Yalçın Akdoğan, in order to classify political party identification of definition among Justice and Development Party grassroots stands out as follows:

In a political profile query Justice and Development Party members identifies themselves as “democrats, nationalist, conservatism, social democrat, and Islamist” in sequence. Those who identify themselves in all surveys occupy a 5 % to 10 %. It is vital to remind that this proportion is 85 % in Islamic oriented parties.²⁷⁰

The radical change from heavy political Islamist ideological engagement as well as Islamist discourse accented with religious symbols to a central axis political orientation carried the party to a more central position under conservatism rhetoric. Thus, political elites of JDP aimed to evidence that AK Party does not have a secret Islamist agenda as refer to a universal political party identity with a complete legitimacy. Thanks to conservative democracy party identity, AKP instead of staying under the ideology patterns highly stocked to Islamic rhetoric and depend on a limited vote percentage became a central party embracing wider masses. JDP as refer to European style Christian Democrats consolidates its legitimacy signaling to dominant elites that the party has cut all its affiliations with political Islam.

AKP charter members consciously avoided to identify party as a “Muslim Democrat”²⁷¹, while preferred to refer political identity of party as conservative democrat in order to prevent future association with Islamism or Political Islam. Notwithstanding to the fact that the Party authority publicly declared that Justice and Development Party does not refer to Islam anymore, the Party administration staff preferred to call themselves as observing Muslims in their private lives. Justice and Development Party adopted the idea that, true interpretation of secularity is the sole warranty of religious freedom in Turkey, however dissimilar to traditional French style laicism interpretation; AK Party argued that it is not possible to be a laic at individual level,²⁷² while state should be laic in order to protect its neutral position toward all its citizens. Apart from Muslim Democrat reference, AKP administration staff as well approached cautiously toward the Moderate Islam or Moderate Islamist political party identity. In his book “AK Party and Conservative Democracy, Akdoğan prefers to use neo Islamism concept instead of Moderate Islam as regard to Party’s

²⁶⁹ Ibid.

²⁷⁰ Y. Akdoğan, “AK Parti ve Muhafazakar...”, *op.cit.*, p. 108.

²⁷¹ Eyüp Can, “AK Parti Neyi Muhafaza Ediyor?” (“What Conserve Ak Party?”), *Zaman*, 27 August 2003.

²⁷² Ahmet Kuru, “Laiklik ve Yanlış Anlaşılmalar (“Laicism and Misunderstadings”)), *Zaman Avrupa*, 09 July 2008.

stance,²⁷³ as for Tayyip Erdoğan he fervently rejects the Moderate Islam concept notifying as follows:

Turkey is not a country, where dominates Moderate Islam. First of all the notion of Moderate Islam is wrong as regard to Islam. Islam itself is Islam, when you call as moderate there may appear alternative views are not moderate. Islam rejects all sort of extremism. I am not an extremist Muslim; we are Muslims who find moderate way.²⁷⁴

As the leader of ruling party and Prime Minister Erdoğan many times repeated that Turkish army is the sole defender of Turkey to balance fragile momentum between civic politics and armed forces in Turkey. Yet, particularly in the course of second term in the office, Justice and Development Party, Erdoğan government supported the juridical actions against junta settlements in Turkish army who used to organize coup attempt against his government. Subordinately, owing to the previous experiences – where Turkish military regarding itself as the sole guarantor of Kemalist secular state structure where always interfered to civil governments- Justice and Development Party increased the authority civil governments on Turkish military while signed radical reforms related to civil control on army in the course of EU accession talks.

Eventually, apart from declaring the new political identity of Justice and Development Party as Conservative Democrat, in order to spread party grassroots to a central axis often, AK Party decision makers referred to favor an Özalist - Menderesist rhetoric. Besides, AK Party repeatedly declared itself as inherit, follower, eventually the contemporary representative of Özal and Menderes school where it aimed to stress its centralist position in Turkey's political system. Justice and Development Party frequently referred to Turgut Özal and Adnan Menderes as the heroes of democracy aiming to refer its democracy struggle against the settled secular elites. Concisely, though majority of the high rank party members used to be political Islamists; newly formed AKP preferred to define its political orientation as conservative democracy. The founder cadres of JDP repeatedly underlined the Party's distinction from National Outlook line and political Islam. The conservative democracy notion in Turkish example still keeps its ambitious feature and there exist hot debates as regard to new concept proposed by Justice and Development Party. On the other hand, AKP thanks to its new rhetoric achieved to legitimize itself both in domestic and international meaning and accelerated its vote percentage regularly from 2002 to 2011. Apart from that,

²⁷³ Y. Akdoğan, "AK Parti ve Muhafazakar.....", op. cit., p. 118.

²⁷⁴ "İslamcılık mı Demokrasi mi?", ("Islamism or Democracy"), *Zaman*, 01 June 2004.

Justice and Development Party calling the new establishment as the inheritor and predecessor of Mother Land Party (Anavatan Partisi) and Justice Party (Adalet Partisi) located itself in center right of political scale in Turkey.

3. Analysis of AK Party's Foreign Policy Concept

The aim of the section is to analyze on foreign policy concept of AKP. The main principles determining AK Party's foreign policy outlook like Özalism and the party and government program of JDP as well as the election manifestos of the Party are examined. The concept of "Strategic Depth" and "Zero Problem Principle" with Turkish neighborhood theorized by Ahmet Davutoğlu that constituted the spine of Justice and Development Party's foreign policy approach is worked out.

3.1. The Change

In general terms, National Vision Movement and the parties established parallel to NVM ideology bear conspicuous differences to a large scale in comparison to Justice and Development Party's foreign policy concept. Yasemin Çelik describes foreign policy orientation of National Vision Movement and Erbakan both in terms of theory and practice as bellow:

Erbakan had campaigned for and end to interest rates, called for jihad (holy war) against Jerusalem, and he had acclaimed that he would withdraw Turkey from NATO to form an Islamic NATO if he were elected. [.....] On his first official visit in August 1996, for example, Erbakan traveled to Iran openly defying Washington's wishes to isolate Iran. A few months later, he visited Colonel Muammar al-Qaddafi of Libya and declared that Libya rather than being a terrorist state was actually victim of terrorism.²⁷⁵

Çelik also underscores that, in the time period when Welfare Party was in office with True Path Party under the Prime Ministry of Necmettin Erbakan Turkey's commitment to the United States of America was highly jeopardized.²⁷⁶ Euro skeptic attitude of National Vision Movement appreciated the European Union as a "Christian Club"²⁷⁷ and enemy of Turkey that aims to divide Turkey. Additionally, in the course of its rule period in the office Welfare Party under the leadership Necmettin Erbakan initialized an economic union project among Muslim nations like Turkey, Iran, Indonesia, Malaysia, Egypt, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and

²⁷⁵ Yasemin Çelik, op.cit., p. 159.

²⁷⁶ Ibidem, p. 160.

²⁷⁷ Ahmet T Kuru, op.cit., p.144.

Nigeria that is known as Developing Eight (D-8).²⁷⁸ Ismail Duman in his article “Turkey's Erbakan and his “National View Movement” summarize foreign policy understanding and foreign policy goals of National View Movement following:

- 1- Establishment of the Organization of Muslim United Nations to the end the Zionist conspiracy against the Muslims;
- 2- Establishment of the Muslim Defense Organization;
- 3- Formation of a Muslim common market
- 4- Common currency among Muslim nations
- 5- Establishment of Muslim countries' Organization of Cultural Cooperation.²⁷⁹

Opposite to Necmettin Erbakan, who turned his face toward East, Tayyip Erdoğan paid his first visit to White House while he was banned quasi chairman of AKP. After being elected as Prime Minister, Erdoğan paid his first official visits to EU capitals in 2002.²⁸⁰ Actually, owing to the fact that being a Party the founding members of which composed of former political Islamist, and the legitimacy of which is highly questioned, the extern policy was an important agenda for AKP. Consequently, Justice and Development Party strained pretty much to proof that the Party adopted a central path in terms of foreign policy concept as well to consolidate its legitimacy.²⁸¹ In stark contrast to National Vision Movement doctrines, AK Party advocated the continuation of Turkey's institutional strategic relation prospects with the West.²⁸² Yet instead of engaging Turkey's foreign policy orientation to a one-side orientation, AK Party acquired a new attitude stressing the necessity of constituting a multi dimensional foreign policy concept. Additionally, AK Party foreign policy decision makers supported alternative paradigms as regard to foreign policy issues.²⁸³

Justice and Development Party, in both party and government programs, focused on the necessity of building constructive relations with the Middle East, Russia, Caucasus and

²⁷⁸ Ibidem, p.145.

²⁷⁹ İsmail Duman, “Turkey's Erbakan and his National View Movement”, (source: www.worldbulletin.net, <<http://www.worldbulletin.net>>, June 2010).

²⁸⁰ İlhan Uzgöl, “Dış Politikada AKP: Stratejik Konumdan Stratejik Modele”, (“AKP in Foreign Policy, From Strategic Location to Strategic Model”), *Mülkiye Dergisi*, Volume XXX, No. 252, p.70.

²⁸¹ Ibid.

²⁸² “Party Program of Justice and Development Party”, (source: [www.akp.org.tr](http://eng.akparti.org.tr/english/partyprogramme.html), <<http://eng.akparti.org.tr/english/partyprogramme.html>>, April 2010).

²⁸³ Mehmet Yılmaz, “Conceptual Framework of Turkish Foreign Policy in the AK Party Era”, *Turkish Review*, (source: www.turkishreview.com, <http://www.turkishreview.org/tr/newsDetail_getNewsById.action?newsId=223052>, May 2011).

Central Asia, Balkans and with the emerging global powers of the world.²⁸⁴ On the other hand, it was deliberately highlighted in the “government programs”²⁸⁵ that alternative paradigm quests in terms of foreign policy do not constitute an alternative for Turkey’s established relations with the West.²⁸⁶ Founding members of Justice and Development Party on purpose did not pay special attention not to utilize a rhetoric that might sound anti-Semitic or anti-Zionist both in government and party programs.²⁸⁷ It adopted a realist approach in terms of foreign policy issues adherent to balance principles of traditional Turkey’s foreign policy pattern. AK Party preferred to embrace a more central, realist, pragmatic position in terms of foreign policy concepts. As it was mentioned in the party program “against changing regional and global realities, our Party believes that Turkey must redefine its foreign policy priorities. And create a balance between these realities and its national interests”,²⁸⁸ on contrarily to abiding Islamist ideology like National Vision Movement.²⁸⁹

3.2. Party Program and Election Manifestos

Party program and election manifestos of Justice and Development Party constitute its outlook as regard to foreign policy understanding of the Party. The party program of Justice and Development Party and the election manifesto as well as the government programs of AKP in 2002 and 2003 bear the identical style owing to the fact that the same expressions took place almost in the same manner at official documents.²⁹⁰ At the party program, Justice and Development Party manifest its theoretical framework in terms of Foreign policy as follows:

The geopolitical location of Republic of Turkey has the prospective to create a magnetism zone for many collaboration opportunities. The ability to alter this potential into a regional and global creativeness depends on the logical use of the geopolitics in international political, economic and security relations. The dynamic environment that emerged due to the

²⁸⁴ “Program of Justice and Development Party”,

(source: www.akp.org.tr, <<http://eng.akparti.org.tr/english/partyprogramme.html>>, April 2010).

²⁸⁵ “Government Program of 59th Justice and Development Party Government”,

(source: www.belgenet.com, <<http://www.belgenet.com/hukumet/program/59-1.html>>, April 2012).

²⁸⁶ “Government Program of 58th Justice and Development Party Government”,

(source: www.belgenet.com, <<http://www.belgenet.com/hukumet/program/58-1.html>>, April 2012).

²⁸⁷ “Party Program of Justice and Development Party”,

(source: www.akp.org.tr, <<http://eng.akparti.org.tr/english/partyprogramme.html>>, April 2010).

²⁸⁸ “Party Program of Justice and Development Party, Foreign Policy Charter”,

(source: www.akp.org.tr, <<http://eng.akparti.org.tr/english/partyprogramme.html#6>>, May 2011).

²⁸⁹ Hasret D Bilgin, “Foreign Policy Orientation of Turkey’s pro-Islamist Parties: A Comparative Study of the AKP and Refah”, *Turkish Studies*, September 2008, Vol. IX, No. 3, pp. 407-421.

²⁹⁰ “Party Program of Justice and Development Party”,

(source: www.akparti.org.tr, <<http://eng.akparti.org.tr/english/partyprogramme.html>>, May 2011).

post Cold War epoch produced an opportunity for growing an international policy with various options. The meticulousness of Oaths and blocks to turn out to be the causal factor essentials of international relations had extremely decreased, and collaboration assignments have become a collective tool of relations between the Nations. In these new circumstances, Turkey as well obliged to reorganize and formulate her relations with hubs of power with choices, flexibly and with various axes.²⁹¹

Justice and Development Party will chase a pragmatic foreign policy harmonious with the past and geographic location of Turkey, liberated from biases and preoccupations, stationed on mutual of benefits. Turkey, which is respectful of the territorial integrity and sovereignty of other states, considers it her right for other states and international institutions to esteem her territorial integrity and sovereignty. In contrast to changing dynamics of regional and global facts, AK Party maintains that Turkey must redefine its foreign policy superiorities and compose equilibrium between these realities and her national interests.²⁹²

AK Party is of the point of view that the regional security condition arranges a prominent input to economic progress. Therefore, Turkey shall perform more attempts for providing security and steadiness in her near neighborhood, she will boost her endeavors to assert good willed relationship with her vicinity stationed on mutual communication. Hence, it will donate more to the advancement of regional collaboration. Turkey has been in close connection with Europe both geographically and historically. For this reason, relations with Europe will carried to be at the uppermost of the list in Turkey's foreign policy itinerary. Turkey shall expeditiously accomplish its promises in its relations with the European Union, which the EU requests of other candidate states as well. Therefore, it will avoid the occupation of foreign policy agenda with artificial problems. Analogous to the contributions made by Turkey inside North Atlantic Trade Organization till the present day efforts will be affirmed for Turkey to take the place it merits within the new European Security and Defense Concept formulated within the structure of the new European security strategy. The political and economic liaison that proceeds to survive since a long time between Turkey and ally states and will be maintained and this partnership will be boosted in diverse spheres.²⁹³

The cooperation with the USA which had been security oriented will be maintained and this association shall be enlarged to extents of the economy, commerce, as well. Friendly relationships with the Russian federation shall be continued established on collaboration

²⁹¹ Ibidem.

²⁹² Ibidem.

²⁹³ Ibidem.

rather than rivalry in Middle - Asia and the Caucuses. Relationship with Greece based on mutual economic interests shall be maintained increasingly and thanks to the environment of security provided by these relations. The ground will be prepared for the resolution of more difficult political problems. As for the resolution of the Cyprus issue, the presence of the Turkish residents on the isle, its identity, and its right for self-determination cannot be disregarded. AK Party maintains the idea that the resolution in Cyprus must be based on consent between the two States present on the island and that entrance of the Greek Cypriot parts into the European Union before the solution of this question will cause this problem gain a complex character.²⁹⁴ In spite of its historical, cultural and kinship to Turkey's of Middle Asia, it is a fact that Turkey could not live up to anticipations of the Central Asian newly emerged countries. Justice and Development Party will carry relationship with the newly independent republics of Central Asia to the strongest level and undertake attempts to realize maximum cooperation.²⁹⁵ When it comes to Justice and Development Party's relations perspectives with Islamic countries, it is underlined below:

Our Party attributes a special importance to Turkey's relation with Islamic countries. Thus, it shall make efforts for the increase of our bilateral cooperation with these nations on the one hand, while continuing attempts on the other for the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) to have a more respectable place in the international arena and to have a dynamic structure able to take initiatives. Again in this conjunction, it shall try to impart more substance to the work of the standing committee for Economic and Commercial Cooperation of OIC which is chaired by the President of the Republic of Turkey.²⁹⁶

After its tenure in office from 2002 to 2007, Justice and Development Party revised its election manifesto section as regard to foreign policy following 2007 general elections.²⁹⁷ Foreign policy section of the third AKP and 60th Turkish government program as well may be considered as an epitome of the 2007 election manifesto. In fact, the influence of Ahmet Davutoğlu's Strategic Depth theory may be observed in the party program, election manifestos and government program as regard to foreign policy issues profoundly. After the first government period, due to gained experiences in the office and exceedance of legitimacy problem relatively, the foreign policy principles of the party commenced to be presented in a clearer manner.

²⁹⁴ Ibidem.

²⁹⁵ Ibidem.

²⁹⁶ Ibidem.

²⁹⁷ "AKP Election Manifesto 2007", (source: www.yayed.org.tr, <http://www.yayed.org.tr/resimler/ekler/718499c1c8cef67_ek.doc?tipi=&turu=&sube=>, June 2011).

3.3. The Influence of Özalism

Turgut Özal as a dominant leader established a wide vision for AKP founders. In spite of the fact that it has been more than a decade since his death, his vision and mission on Turkish internal and external politics is still influential and directive. Özalism as an ideology aimed to turn Turkey to a regional and global power in foreign politics while in domestic aspect shift Turkey to civic, democrat, and liberal state reconciled with all diversities present in Turkey. His principles and political philosophy has been adopted by Justice and Development Party as a new formation shifting from National Vision Movement to a more centralized- conservative position embracing all layers of society. Erdoğan and his administration staff adopted many parallel political orientations introduced by Turgut Özal like; The European Union, realist and positive relation perspectives with the United States of America as well as non military approaches toward Kurdish question and finally in the field of economy. Foreign policy concept of Justice and Development Party bears heavy traces of Turgut Özal's liberal foreign policy approaches that called as "Özalism".²⁹⁸ Similar to his liberal oriented policy openings in domestic sphere, Turgut Özal also introduced a positive dynamic to Turkey's foreign policy.²⁹⁹ His controversial statements with respect to foreign relation perspectives of Turkey, for instance, are highly illustrative to comprehend his alternative paradigm. It conversely established Kemalist paradigm like; "The next century will be a Turkish century or Turkey cannot be a prisoner of Misak-i Milli (National Oath) border",³⁰⁰ he also proposed the idea that "peace at home, peace at world"³⁰¹ principle highly limits Turkey's foreign policy concept.³⁰²

İhsan Uzgel remarks the point that AKP seems to have taken the Özal period as a sample in terms of foreign policy practices. Uzgel holds the point that AK Party government in a reminiscent way the foreign policy practices realized in Özal period pragmatically bypasses the bureaucratic mechanism engaging to foreign policy decision making process consultants with

²⁹⁸ Sedat Laçiner, "Turgut Özal Period in Turkish Foreign Policy: Özalism", *USAK Yearbook of International Politics and Law*, 2009, Vol. II, p. 153.

²⁹⁹ For a detailed analysis of Turkey's foreign policy in Özal period see: Ramazan Gözen, *Amerikan Kışkırcısında Dış Politika: Körfez Savaşı, Turgut Özal ve Sonrası (Foreign Policy under American engagment: Gulf War, Turgut Özal and aftermaths)*, Liberte, Ankara 2000; İhsan Dağı, *Özallı Yıllarda Türk Siyaseti İnsan Hakları Demokrasi ve Avrupa Birliği, (Turkish Policy in Özal Period: Human Rights, Democracy and European Union)*, Boyut Kitapları İstanbul 2001; İhsan Sezel, İhsan Dağı, *Özal, Siyaset, İktisat, Zihniyet (Özal, Politics, Economy, Mentality)*, Boyut Kitapları İstanbul 2001.

³⁰⁰ S. Laçiner, "Turgut Özal Period.....", op. cit., p. 153.

³⁰¹ Mehmet Gönübol, "Yurtta Barış, Cihanda Barış" ("Peace at Home, Peace at theWorld"), *Atatürk Araştırmaları Merkezi Dergisi*, Vol. 9, No. 25, November 1992, p. 10.

³⁰² Bülent Aras, "Dispensing with Tradition? Turkish Politics and International Society during The Özal Decade 1983 - 1993", *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. XXXVII, No.1, January 2001, p.78.

businessman background.³⁰³ Özlem Terzi concludes the idea that “The foreign policy practice of AKP can mostly be seen as a continuation of the Özal era in Turkey’s foreign policy”.³⁰⁴ She views the influence of Özalism on foreign policy concept of AKP in the following way:

It was Özal’s aim that Turkey should become a country, which can solve regional problems through political negotiations and not through military means. This idea is similar to the “soft power” conception of AKP today. Özal describes the existing link with Western countries and the promotion of close relations with the Middle Eastern and Islamic countries as complementary to each other as in the view point of AKP. He stated that despite its denial, Turkey was the remainder and the heir of Ottoman Empire and that the former Ottoman lands from geographical areas in which Turkey’s interests and security should be preserved, which is the prevailing agenda of AKP’s strategic depth doctrine developed by Ahmet Davutoğlu.³⁰⁵

Thereby, foreign policy attitude of Turgut Özal, as a liberal diplomat gained Turkey wider perspectives, which influenced Justice and Development Party deeply as well. The main idea of Özalist ideology laid on the idea that, Islamic and Ottoman identity of Turkey was not an outpacing reason for Turkey, the Muslim majority of Turkey does not constitute an obstacle for Turkish integration to Europe, as he accepted Turks as European Muslims. While Özal supported the possible tight relation with the West, he barely underlined that the European civilization was not the ultimate model for Turkey stressing the alternative cultural interaction with other cultural basins implying Islamic and Turkic origins of the Republic. Likewise, to Özalism, Justice and Developments foreign policy also based on the fact Turkey’s establishment to new paradigms for its foreign policy concept referring to cultural richness of geographic situation of Turkey. Foreign Policy decision makers of Justice and Development Party, likewise Özal’s political doctrines did not appreciate Turkey’s North Atlantic Treaty Organization membership or access to full European Union membership as a danger against Turkey’s security concept. AK Party estimated that many security issues threatening Turkey would heal thanks to Turkey’s participation to traditional European security.

To boot, similar Özal’s views on foreign policy, AKP foreign policy decision makers hold the idea that Turkey might increase its model role for the other Middle East countries governed by authoritarian regimes due to its integration with Europe. Justice and Development Party administrators, as did former President, accepted Turkey as the continuation of Ottoman Empire. Although, Kemalists constantly stressed the negative inheritance of Ottoman past, both Özal and AK Party authorities argued that Ottoman Empire

³⁰³ İ. Uzel, “Dış Politika AKP”, op.cit., p. 69.

³⁰⁴ Özlem Terzi, *The Influence of the European Union on Turkish Foreign Policy*, Ashgate Publishing Company, Surrey 2010, p. 31.

³⁰⁵ Ibidem, p. 31.

past, if solved the problematic issues, would gain a lot for Turkey and Turkey will turn a regional and global power with deep influence both at her periphery and global politics.³⁰⁶

3.4. Ahmet Davutoğlu Factor

Being a distinguished scholar in Turkish academia and a doyen on Turkey's foreign policy,³⁰⁷ Ahmet Davutoğlu was appointed as the chief foreign policy advisor to Prime Minister and ambassador following the national elections in 2002 November.³⁰⁸ "On 1st of May 2009, he was appointed as the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the 60th Government of the Republic of Turkey".³⁰⁹ Professor Davutoğlu "having an academic background, can be argued to provide the theoretical basis for the foreign policy understanding of the AKP with its seminal work "Stratejik Derinlik: Türkiye'nin Uluslararası Konumu (Strategic Depth: Turkey's International Position)"³¹⁰ which was published in 2001".³¹¹ Soli Özel, supporting the above mentioned ideas, points out that "In Ahmet Davutoğlu, the AKP has had a very articulate theoretician who conceptualized Turkey's foreign policy in creative ways using concepts as "zero problems with neighbors", "strategic depth" and "Turkey as a centre country" that gained currency both domestically and abroad".³¹² Ultimately, Caleb Lauer accentuates that "for eight years he has had the enviable position of being a politically unaccountable politician with the job of turning his personal theory into his country's policy".³¹³

³⁰⁶ Hasan Kösebalan, *Turkish Foreign Policy: Islam, Nationalism and Globalisation*, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2011, p. 118.

³⁰⁷ **Ahmet Davutoğlu:** He holds a masters degree in Public Administration and a PhD degree in Political Science and International Relations from Boğaziçi University (Turkey). He became a full professor in 1999. Between 1995 and 1999 he has worked at Marmara University (Turkey), teaching at the Institute for Middle Eastern Studies, the Institute for Insurance and Banking, at the Doctoral Program on Local Administrations and Political Science Department. Between 1998 and 2002 he was a visiting lecturer at the Military Academy and the War Academy. He worked at Beykent University in Istanbul as a professor from 1995 to 2004, serving as Head of the Department of International Relations.

"Ahmet Davutoğlu", (source: www.mfa.gov.tr, <<http://www.mfa.gov.tr/ahmet-davutoglu.en.mfa>>, January 2012).

³⁰⁸ Ibidem.

³⁰⁹ Ibidem.

³¹⁰ Ibidem.

³¹¹ Utku A Alpaydın, *Softpower in Turkish Foreign Policy under the AKP Government: 2002-2009*, unpublished Master Thesis, Bilkent University, Ankara, p. 89.

³¹² Soli Özel, "The AKP's Foreign Policy in Context", *European Council on Foreign Relations*, London 2011, p. 69.

³¹³ Caleb Lauer, "The Man behind Turkey's Strategic Depth", (source: www.atimes.com, <http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/LB23Ak03.html>, 22 November 2010).

On that account, owing to the fact that “Turkey’s foreign policy under the AKP administration has been associated with the name of Davutoğlu”³¹⁴ it is imperative to focus his strategic vision to apprehend sophisticatedly general framework of Justice and Development Party’s foreign policy concept.

3.4.1. The Strategic Depth Doctrine

The main argument of “Strategic Depth”³¹⁵ doctrine presented by Davutoğlu structured on the axiom that “a nation’s value in world politics is predicated on its geostrategic location and historical depth”.³¹⁶ Correspondingly, Davutoğlu emphasizes “Turkey is uniquely endowed both because of its location in geopolitical areas of influence, particularly its control of the Bosphorus and Dardanelles, and its historical legacy as heir to the Ottoman Empire”³¹⁷ highlighting the powerful potential capability of Turkey which might return to a real power. Nevertheless, the theory proposes realistic approaches stressing the stable dates of Turkey, which is impossible to change at the present time like history, geography and culture which carry series risks notwithstanding to their advantageous.³¹⁸ Joshua W. Walker describes the policy implications of Strategic Depth doctrine as:

1) Refocusing Turkey’s Historic Alliances

- a. Traditional allies like the United States and Europe are important, but new emphasis needs to be paid to former estranged neighbors such as Russia and Iran.
- b. New alliances with emerging powers like the Chinese and India help to “balance” Turkey’s dependency on the West

2) Greater Identification with Turkey’s former Ottoman Space

- c. Renewed interest in engaging Muslim former colonies that might welcome Turkey’s “return” to the Middle East with particular focus on Syria and Iraq.
- d. Taking on greater responsibility for regional stability in the Balkans through working with new allies such as Serbia and Russia in addition to its NATO obligations.
- e. Resolving of historic differences with Armenia to enhance greater cooperation throughout the Caucas given Turkey’s “central” role.

³¹⁴ Ioannis N. Grigoriadis, “The Davutoğlu Doctrine and Turkish Foreign Policy”, *Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy*, 2010, p. 3.

³¹⁵ A. Davutoğlu, “Stratejik Derinlik; Türkiye’nin....”, op.cit., pp. 1-14.

³¹⁶ Joshua W. Walker, “Learning Strategic Depth: Implications of Turkey’s New Foreign Policy Doctrine”, *Insight Turkey*, Volume IX, No. 3, 2007, p. 33.

³¹⁷ Joshua W. Walker, op.cit., p. 33.

³¹⁸ A. Davutoğlu, “Stratejik Derinlik; Türkiye’nin....”, op.cit., pp. 65-90.

3) Reaching Beyond the Ottomans

f. Emphasizing Turkey's role in the Muslim world and historic relations with Afghanistan and Pakistan while building stronger connections with places as far away as Malaysia (Davutoğlu has a personal affinity given his tenure as a visiting professor here) and Indonesia.

g. Engaging Central Asia and offering an economic model of development through Turkish businesses, construction, education, and NGOs.³¹⁹

Strategic Depth doctrine defends the thesis that,³²⁰ the geographical depth of Turkey situates at the very heart of the world politics. Turkey as a country situated at a highly geostrategic location has close land connections with Balkans, Caucasus, Middle East, as well as sea connections with Aegean, Mediterranean, Black Sea, Turkish Straits, Black Sea, Basra, Caspian and Red Sea eventually continental connections with Europe, North Africa, Central and west Asia. Similar data of Republic of Turkey may be interpreted as it is situated at the center of the world. Additionally, she constitutes the heart of world. Consequently, taking into consideration all above-mentioned facts, not a single international phenomenon of Turkey will meet or intervene at this geography may not be understood from a one site dimensional depiction. Thereby, Professor Davutoğlu owing to all similar parameters suggests that Turkey's foreign policy outlook may not be constituted toward an international system having dimension upon a one site - one axis. On the contrary, it is obligatory for Turkey's foreign policy decision making process to estimate each separate basin both specifically taking into consideration multi dimensional analyze and interaction among the other basins. These very interaction spheres must be followed systematically in order to establish a stable foreign policy concept in accordance with Turkey's foreign policy interests.³²¹

The main foreign policy implication of Strategic Depth doctrine is the idea that, Turkey owing to its deep potential in terms of upcoming new conjecture of global politics may not be confined to a bridge or bulwark role by her Western allies. (USA & EU) As a country, Turkey bears many dialectical peculiarities as being a Muslim majority, secular and democratic, nation state that is capable of playing crucial role in Europe, Middle East, Caucasus, Balkans and Central Asia applying a versatile, multiregional foreign policy line

³¹⁹ Joshua W Walker, "Understanding Turkey's Foreign Policy Through Strategic Depth", (source: www.transatlanticacademy.com, <[http: www.transatlanticacademy.com](http://www.transatlanticacademy.com)>, May 2012).

³²⁰ Alexander Murinson, "The Strategic Depth Doctrine of Turkish Foreign Policy" *Middle Eastern Studies* Vol. 42, No. 6, November 2006, p. 945.

³²¹ A. Davutoğlu, "Stratejik Derinlik: Türkiye'nin.....", op.cit., pp. 501-557.

which may turn Turkey to be regional and gradually to be a global power.³²² While the Strategic Depth Doctrine suggests an active engagement with all regional systems in Turkish neighborhood, Justice and Development Party foreign policy architect also suggests being sensitive to American and European interests in the given regions. He as well argues that, Turkey needs to rediscover its historic and geographic identity and reassess its own position vis-à-vis for regional and global issues, while distancing it from solely being labeled a Western power. As a foreign policy doyenne, Davutoğlu has promoted Turkey's re-engagement with the Middle Eastern region, particularly with Iran and Syria, an effort that, has been facilitated by the American misadventure in Iraq and its subsequent aftermath. In view of the transatlantic rift evident in the wake of the American-led second Gulf War, the architect of Erdoğan's government foreign policy advises developing a balanced approach towards all global and regional actors, which has led to noticeably improved relations with Russia and Central Asia. Ahmet Davutoğlu has also emphasizes the importance of economic interdependency in the globalizing world and the need to build strong economic linkages with all regional states for Turkey regardless of former Cold War mentalities or hostile American policies towards these neighbors. In the final analysis, "Strategic Depth" envisions a Turkey that would transform itself into a global actor rather than a regional or junior partner to the United States.³²³

According to Professor Davutoğlu, it is mandatory for Turkey to use its historical and geographical parameters with a maximum efficiency merging them with cultural and population datum in maximizing its economic, political and military power in order to have a strategic understanding applying it as a tool at foreign policy making process. It is impossible for Turkey to follow an autistic foreign policy as a country strategically situates at the very heart of strategic zone of the world, moreover Turkey as a state inheriting Ottoman bequest - along with other countries with an imperial past- cannot isolate itself from the outside world surrounding its periphery. Turkey as a follower of Ottoman past may not adopt an ordinary nation state foreign policy neglecting its historical background. Furthermore, it cannot restrict itself solely to its borderlines. Ottoman Empire being among eight empires collapsed with the First World inherited many crises influencing Turkey in regional and local politics. On contrary to other empires like Great Britain for instance Turkey felt the disaster of the collapse closely, however according to Professor if Turkey may successfully achieve to settle

³²² Ibidem, pp. 501-557.

³²³ Ibidem, pp. 501-557.

this challenge she may turn this negative position to her advantage.³²⁴ Following the end of the Cold War, Republic of Turkey has been besieged with many frozen conflict areas like Karabagh, Bosnia, Kosovo and North Iraq which threatens Turkish security severely, besides although Turkey took part at the NATO site during the Cold War period it may not be argued that Ankara gained a lot of in terms of its support toward the West.³²⁵

Finally and more importantly, in order to summarize his general outlook on Turkey's foreign policy, he gives the ancient Turkish states examples. Ottomans and Seljuk Turks continuously realized their development thanks to their foreign balance between the West and East. Turkish Kissinger,³²⁶ at this moment use adroitly arch allegory;³²⁷ he explains that the more drawn back an arrow, the more go forward. Therefore, if Turkey would successfully apply constructive foreign policies with its Eastern neighbors (Arabic, Iran, Russian, Caucuses and Turkic world) its relations with the West would launch to a more positive direction meeting the benefits of all sides. Consequently, a country like Turkey situates at the very strategic point of international relations may not have a one sided and one dimensional foreign policy concept. He notifies that, it is a pity to reduce Turkey's foreign policy's final aim to enter the European Union. Turkey referring to its historical heritage and geographical position must produce multi dimensional and multi faceted foreign policy supporting its economical, political and military factors. It is an indispensable obligation for the foreign policy makers of Turkey to acquire a strategic depth mentality in order to create alternative paradigms in external politics instead of directing all potential power to a one-sided perspective.

A similar policy understanding would enforce Turkey during its stakes with the West, while Turkey would meet its natural periphery, as Turkey's isolation of regional politics would on the contrary cause deeper problems. As it has been mentioned above, the post Cold War period brought many serious challenges and security treats for Turkey's foreign policy. During the Cold War Turkey was a wing country under North Atlantic Treaty Organization; however Republic of Turkey during the post Cold War period re-described its position and became a more centralized power for its allies. Turkey plays an essential role at regional politics and plays a balance role between its strategic alliance and regional states. As a central country, it bears many dialectic features specific to itself. For instance, in Turkey now there

³²⁴ Ibidem, pp. 501-557.

³²⁵ Ibidem, pp. 501-557.

³²⁶ "US Magazine List Turkish FM as New Kissenger", (source: www.turkishweekly.net), <<http://www.turkishweekly.net/news/99162/us-magazine-lists-turkish-fm-as-39-new-kissinger-39-.html>>, 21 November 2010).

³²⁷ A. Davutoğlu, "Stratejik Derinlik: Türkiyenin.....", op.cit., pp. 533-539.

live more Bosnians than in Bosnia-Herzegovina or Albanians than in Kosovo, as natural consequent Turkish domestic and international politics turning Republic of Turkey a more centralized state with an obligation to product diverse and multi faceted policies toward region. Professor Davutoğlu describes the perspective of new Turkey's foreign policy outlook as follows:

Turkey's foreign policy objectives and its vision of how to achieve them are very clear. Turkey has multiple goals over the next decade: First, it aims to achieve all EU membership conditions and become an influential EU member state by 2023. Second, it will continue to strive for regional integration, in the form of security and economic cooperation. Third, it will seek to play an influential role in regional conflict resolution. Fourth, it will vigorously participate in all global arenas. Fifth, it will play a determining role in international organizations and become one of the top 10 largest economies in the world.³²⁸

3.4.2. Zero Problem Principle

Apart from the Strategic Depth doctrine, the “Zero Problem Principle”³²⁹ of Ahmet Davutoğlu constitutes the other trivet and theoretical backbone of Justice and Development Party's foreign policy outlook. The Zero Problem Principles with Turkish vicinity, basically, proposes a peaceful relationship perspective with its neighborhood intending to develop possible maximum economic relations with Turkish periphery as well as Turkey's involvement at region politics with entirely new perspectives instead of security-oriented paradigms of the Cold War era. As a continuation of his Zero Problem Principle, Davutoğlu separates the principle into three methodological and five operational principles directing Turkey's foreign policy today. He describes his Zero Problem Principle as following in an article written at Foreign Policy magazine as follows:

The First methodological principle is based on a “visionary” approach to the issues instead of the “crisis-oriented” attitudes that occupied foreign policy attitudes in the course of Cold War period. It is a wide vision that encompasses the whole Middle East region: Turkey's Middle East oriented policies cannot be reduced solely to the fight against Kurdistan Workers' Party. Turkey may use her unique understanding of the Middle East, and her assets, to operate more efficiently on the ground. Its good will attempts to mediate between Syria and Israel, plus achievements at Palestinian reconciliation, as well as her attempts to facilitate the participation of Iraqi Sunni groups in the 2005 parliamentary elections, finally her

³²⁸ Ibidem, pp. 533-539.

³²⁹ Ahmet Davutoğlu, “Turkey's Zero - Problems Foreign Policy”, (source: [www.foreignpolicy.com](http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/05/20/turkeys_zero_problems_foreign_policy?page=full), <http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/05/20/turkeys_zero_problems_foreign_policy?page=full>, November 2010).

constructive engagement in the Iranian nuclear crisis are integral parts of Turkey's foreign policy wide vision for the Middle East region.³³⁰

The second methodological principle is to base Turkey's foreign policy on a "consistent and systematic" framework around the world. Ankara's attitude and vision for the Middle East is not in opposition to its approach in Central Asia or in the Balkans; its approach to Africa is no different from its approach to Asia. Turkey is also actively trying to improve relations with nearby countries like Iraq, Greece and Russian Federation.³³¹ The third methodological principle is the adoption of a new discourse and diplomatic style, which has resulted in the spread of Turkish soft power in the region. In spite of the fact that Turkey obtains a powerful military due to its insecure nature of the region, Turkish diplomats and foreign policy decision makers have adopted a new language in regional and international politics that prioritizes Turkey's soft power.

In addition to these above mentioned three principles, five operational principles guide Turkey's foreign policy making process. Firstly, it is the equilibrium between security and democracy. The legitimacy of any political regime comes from its ability to provide security and freedom together to its citizens; this security should not be at the expense of freedoms and human rights in the country. Since 2002, Turkey has attempted to promote civil liberties without undermining security. This is an ambitious yet worthy aim -particularly in the post-September 11 environment, under the threat of terrorism, in which the general tendency has been to restrict liberties for the sake of security.³³² The second principle is zero problems towards neighbors, which has been practiced for the past seven years. Turkey's mutual relation perspectives with her neighborhood now follow a path mostly based on cooperation. The gradual increasing economic interdependence between Turkey and her neighborhood countries have favored the bilateral relations positively.³³³

The third operative principle is proactive and pre-emptive peace diplomacy, that goals to take measures before crises emerge. Ankara's regional policy is mostly established on security for all, high-level political dialogue, economic integration and interdependence, and multicultural coexistence. Consider Turkey's mediation between Israel and Syria, a role that was not assigned to Turkey by any outside actor. Other examples of pre-emptive diplomacy include Turkey's efforts to achieve Sunni-Shiite reconciliation in Iraq, reconciliation efforts in Lebanon and Palestine, the Serbia - Bosnia reconciliation in the Balkans, dialogue between

³³⁰ Ibidem, pp. 533-539.

³³¹ Ibidem, pp. 533-539.

³³² Ibidem, pp. 533-539.

³³³ Ibidem, pp. 540-550.

Afghanistan and Pakistan, and the reconstruction of Darfur and Somalia.³³⁴

The fourth principle is adherence to a multi-dimensional foreign policy. Turkey's relations with other global actors aim to be complementary. Similar policy orientation views Turkey's strategic relationship with the United States of America through the two countries' bilateral strategic ties and through North Atlantic Treaty Organization. This principle takes in to account its European Union membership process, her good neighborhood policy orientation with Moscow, as well as her synchronization policy in Eurasia. Similar approaches means that constructive relations with Russian Federation are not an alternative to relations with EU. Nor Turkey model partnership with the United States of America a rival partnership against Russia.³³⁵ The Fifth principle in this framework is rhythmic diplomacy, which aspires to provide Turkey with a more active role in international relations arena.

This final principle implies active engagement in all international organizations and on all issues of global and international importance. Turkey became a non-permanent member of the U.N. Security Council. It is also chairing three critical commissions concerning Afghanistan, North Korea, and the fight against terror. Turkey undertook the chairmanship-in-office of the South-East European Cooperation Process, a forum for dialogue among Balkan states and their immediate neighbors, for 2009 and 2010. Turkey is also a member of G-20, maintains observer status in the African Union, has a strategic dialogue mechanism with the Gulf Cooperation Council, and actively participates in the Arab League. Turkey has also launched new diplomatic initiatives by opening 15 new embassies in Africa and two in Latin America, and is a signatory to the Kyoto Protocol. These developments show a new perspective of Turkey, one that is based on vision, soft power, a universal language, and implementation of consistent foreign policies in different parts of the world.³³⁶

4. Conclusions

Justice and Development Party emerged as a reaction against the ideology of political Islamist National Vision Movement redefining its new political party identity as conservative democracy referring to Christian Democracy tradition in Western Europe. Shortly after its establishment, Justice and Development Party won a landslide victory and has become the ruling party in office for three terms successively. Dissimilar to political Islamist past of its founding members, the Party adopted a paradigmatic and rational foreign policy concept

³³⁴ Ibidem, pp. 540-550.

³³⁵ Ibidem, pp. 540-550.

³³⁶ Ibidem, pp. 540-550.

reconciled with orthodox foreign policy patterns of Turkey. Declaring itself as the inherit Özal and Menderes, AK Party barely indicated its eagerness to be the successor of central wing politics with liberal tendencies as a respond to its legitimacy problem. On contrary to the fact that, many high level administrative of AK Party are previous National Vision Movement members, their foreign policy preferences in terms of relations with the European Union, the U.S. and relations with Israel as well bear serious dissimilarities to other Islamist oriented National Vision Movement political parties.

Özalism, as a foreign policy understanding idealized a Western oriented direction that aimed possible maximum relations with the European Union and the United States of America, meantime it did not put the Westernization as the sole direction of Turkey's foreign policy. Hence, Özalism, as a foreign concept profoundly influenced the construction of AKP's foreign policy orientation. Foreign policy vision of Justice and Development Party influenced by Özalist doctrines also defend a versatile foreign policy orientation, stressing the Islamic and Turkic origins of Republic of Turkey. Similar to Özal, who preferred to call Turkey as a European Muslim country, JDP foreign policy decision makers also appreciate that the integration with Europe is inevitable for Turkey, while it is vital to keep tight relations with the United States of America in terms of strategic and military relations as regard to insecure nature of Turkish neighborhood. Apart from that, the doctrines of Professor Ahmet Davutoğlu, gathered in Strategic Depth and Zero Problem Principle mostly shaped and directed the foreign policy concept of Justice and Development Party during its rule period in 2002-2011.³³⁷ Strategic Depth theory briefly highlights the historical and geographical background of Turkey and propose the idea that Turkey's foreign policy may not engage a one-side dimension (EU membership or Turkey's cut role as the watchman of Europe), on the contrary Turkey as a central state needs to create multi-dimensional and multidirectional proactive foreign policy initials in order to strengthen its position so as to be a regional power momentum and gradually turn to a global power.³³⁸ Turkey, as a country situating at the very center of world politics should develop maximum positive relations at Turkish periphery to create a stable and secure region that would contribute regional and international stability.

³³⁷ Alexander Murinson, op.cit., p. 948.

³³⁸ Abdülhamit Bilici, "Davutoğlu Yeni Osmanlıcı mı?" ("Is Davutoğlu a Neo Ottomanist?"), *Zaman*, 28 November 2009.

Chapter III

The Eastern Direction

The chapter analyzes the Eastern direction of Turkey's foreign policy under Justice and Development Party governments in 2002–2011. The main objective of the chapter is to examine bilateral relations between Turkey and its Eastern neighbors from political, economic, military and diplomatic relations in a chronological order to study foreign policy practice of Turkey under the rule of Justice and Development Party governments during this period.

The chapter also vies to answer the questions like whether Turkey's foreign policy experienced a radical shift from its orthodox policy approach toward the Middle East in this period applying a comparative perspective taking into account relations with the West. The chapter is divided into seven sections. The first section of the chapter examines historical relation perspectives of Turkey toward the Middle East region. The second section focuses on Turkish - Iraqi relations, the third section explicates Turkish - Syrian relations and the fourth section analyzes Turkish - Israeli relations along with the Palestinian issue in the course of Justice and Development Party government periods under the light of historical perspective. The fifth section of the chapter focuses on Turkish - Iranian relations while the sixth section analyzes foreign policy approaches of Turkey towards the period called as Arab Spring that emerged in Tunisia in 17 December 2010 and gradually spread all around the Middle East-along with AK Party foreign policy decision makers' attitude and practices toward the developments. The final section of the chapter is conclusions.

1. The Middle East and Turkey

From international relations point of view, it is a widely shared assumption that, owing to its political structure and rich natural resources, the Middle East is acknowledged among the most problematic regions in the world.³³⁹ After the collapse of Ottoman Empire, the Middle

³³⁹ Edwards B Milton, *Contemporary Politics in Middle East*, Polity Press, Cambridge 2006, pp.1-5.

East region turned out to be a field of struggle for global powers;³⁴⁰ moreover continues clashes among region states aggravated the stability in the region at all.³⁴¹

In order to conceptualize elaborately the very complex structure of the Middle East, it is crucial to analyze the historical background of the regional politics in deep and its relation to external power centers seeking influence on the region. After the end of the World War I, the Middle East was divided among the winners of the War according to strategic importance and priorities of triumphant countries.³⁴² In this sense, the majority of contemporary problems like “Arab – Israel War”³⁴³ that turned out to be a chronic problem for decades related to region have emerged from the ignorance of self-determination of people habiting in the region and artificial borders dividing people regardless of their religious, sectarian, ethnic and historical identities prioritizing the imperial instincts of occupying powers. Besides, heavy traces of post-colonial legacies agitated the situation. In addition to above mentioned factors, the rich natural resources of the region continuously attracted the attention of imperialism, while historical, cultural and socio - political background of the geography as well negatively contributed to destabilization of the Middle East. “The effects of modernization, lack of political participation, poor economic growth, foreign indebtedness to the West, the competition for arms and increasing urbanization”³⁴⁴ are the other factors that negatively influenced to the development of the Middle East.

On the other hand, the internal dynamics of Middle East also challenged the regional stability and balance of regional parameters. El-Nasir,³⁴⁵ for instance, taking administration with a coup in Egypt, burned the Arab nationalism and turned it to a political tool with an anti-imperialist motto thanks to Soviet support. Throughout his rule period, Nasir reached huge masses with the idea gathering all Arab nations under a single Arab state.³⁴⁶ The other step of El-Nasir was to demolish Israel state, which caused to initial of Six day Wars. Because of humiliating results, the Arab nationalism wind had subsided while the Western Alliance in

³⁴⁰ Roger Owen, *State, Power and Politics in the Making of the Modern Middle East*, Routledge, London 1992, p. 8.

³⁴¹ Tayyar Arı, *Geçmişten Günümüze Orta Doğuda Siyaset Savaş ve Diplomasi (From History to Present Peace and War in Middle East)*, MKM Yayınları, İstanbul 2008. p. 13.

³⁴² William L Cleveland, *A History of the Modern Middle East*, Westview Press, San Francisco 1994, pp. 140-160.

³⁴³ Justyna Zajac, “Konflikt Arabsko - Izraelski w świetle teorii konfliktów” (“Arab - Israel Conflict under the Light of Conflict Theory”), *Stosunki Międzynarodowe- International Relations*, 2009, Vol. 39, No. 1-2, pp. 177-191.

³⁴⁴ Edwards B Milton, op.cit., pp. 1-7.

³⁴⁵ Said K Aburish, *Nasser, the Last Arab*, St. Martin's Press, New York 2004, p. 10.

³⁴⁶ Ibidem, p. 12.

order to balance Soviet treat at the Middle East initialized different blocks like Bagdad Pact or Central Treaty Organization.

However, with the unexpected Islamic revolution in Iran undertaken by Imam Humeyni, the dynamics of the Middle East one more time dramatically changed, the Shiite influence of Iran highly developed in the region, while Tehran started good relations' with Soviet Russia. The raise of Iran has toughly challenged region politics, as the Sunni - Shiite separation gained a more distinct feature in Middle East. Palestine question, nuclear weapons threat, increasing oil prices, water problems, democracy and human rights issues in the 21st century constitute the main topics of current international debates in the region.³⁴⁷ What is more, due to the initial of mass protests that commenced in Tunisia called as "Arab Spring", the Middle East entered to a new period where despotic regimes have been started to be overthrown by oppressed people.

Speaking of Republic of Turkey's relation to Middle East region; The Ottoman Empire's four century of sovereignty had ended with the First World War and many psychological barriers, stereotypes, and prejudgments emerged between Turks and people of the region. The fact that, the majority of Arab nations had realized their independence war against Turks and the nation building process established on an anti-Ottoman, anti-Turkish history writing which indicated the Turks as the sole reason of the underdevelopment of their lands.³⁴⁸ Henceforth, the antagonistic sentiments settled heavy subconscious barriers between Arabs and Turks in both social and administrative level. The Turks called Arabs as the "traitors" and "untrustworthy" helping "profane non-believers" during the First World War. Whereas, particularly in Syria, Saudi Arabia and Egypt, the newly emerged elites in order to create the fundamentals of nation state building blamed Ottomans to be an imperial state exploiting natural resources of Arab nations.³⁴⁹ The similar hostile approaches that were present between Turkey and neighbor Arab countries negatively influenced the structural factors of foreign policy decision making processes.³⁵⁰ With the establishment of Turkey, and the abolishment of Caliphate,³⁵¹ Ankara entirely minimized its relations with Middle East

³⁴⁷ Ramazan Gözen, „Ortadoğuda Güç Dengeleri” („Power Balances in Middle East”), in Idris Bal (ed.) *21. Yüzyılda Türk Dış Politikası (Foreign Policy of Turkey at 21th Century)*, Lalezar Kitabevi, Ankara 2006, p. 675.

³⁴⁸ İdris Bal, „Türk Dış Politikasının Ana Hatları” („The General Outlines of Turkish Foreign Policy”) in Idris Bal (ed.) *Değişen Dünyada Uluslararası İlişkiler (The International Relations in a Changing World)*, Lalezar Kitabevi, Ankara 2006, p. 663.

³⁴⁹ Ofra Bengio, Gencer Özcan, “Old Grievances New Fears: Arab Perceptions of Turkey and its Alignment with Israel”, *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol.XV, No. 2, 2000, p. 68.

³⁵⁰ Faik Sönmezoglu, *II. Dünya Savaşından Günümüze Türk Dış Politikası (Turkish Foreign Policy since the Second World War)*, Der Yayınları, İstanbul 2006, pp. 3-7.

³⁵¹ Ibid.

countries as it launched its foreign policy to Western axis. Yet, it initialized security pacts in order to secure Turkey's eastern borders.

In the course of inter war period, Turkey's relations with Middle East countries took place through mandate state level. Turkey lost Mosul against mandate Iraq, while gained Hatay through mandate Syria. Nevertheless, Mosul and Hatay issues caused to continue conflicts between Iraq and Syria particularly after the end of the Cold War. Furthermore, similar conflicts blocked the development of regional collaboration and reciprocal relations between the neighbors. Another breaking point of Turkey with Middle East region countries took place with the birth of Israeli state when at 28 March 1949 Turkey recognized Israel officially as the first country with the majority Muslim Population.³⁵²

In general, Turkey preferred to follow a sober foreign policy attitude toward the Middle East specially avoiding regional conflicts. In the course of the Cold War period, Ankara continued a similar policy understanding overlapping it with Western alliance against Soviet threat. Turkey participated at CENTO organization against Soviet economic dominance as continued to move together with its Western alliance during the Suez Channel crisis in spite of the reaction of the Middle East countries. After the emerge of Organization of Islam Conference in 1970, Turkey also attended the organization in order to follow developments in Middle East, while accented its distance toward region politics participating to the conference at Foreign Affairs Ministry level. Under the rule of Turgut Özal, Turkey initialized proactive policy toward Middle East initializing economic and political engagement,³⁵³ especially within the period following Saddam Hussein's occupation of Kuwait, by opening its land and air spaces to construct positive relations with USA. Particularly after the end of the Cold War, Turkey's foreign policy orientation toward the region has mostly engaged to Kurdish separatist terror. As a result, it has degraded the complete regional politics to national security dimension missing bilateral cooperation and economic relation perspectives with region countries. Simultaneously with Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) terror,³⁵⁴ Ankara experienced serious conflicts with Iraq, Iran and Syria during the post Cold War Period.

³⁵² Erhan Ç Kürkçüoğlu, „Arap Olmayan Devletler ile İlişkiler” („Relations with non Arab States”) in Baskın Oran (ed.), *Türk Dış Politikası: Kuruluş Savaşından Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar* (Turkish Foreign Policy: Interpretations, Documents, Phenomenons since the Independence War, Volume II), İletişim Yayınları, İstanbul 2004, p. 796.

³⁵³ Ayşegül Sever, “Turkey and the Syrian - Israeli Peace Talks in the 1990s”, *Middle East Review of International Affairs*, Vol. V, No.3, p. 88.

³⁵⁴ Erol Kurubaş, *Kürt Sorununun Uluslararası Boyutu ve Türkiye* (International Dimension of Kurdish Problem and Turkey), Nobel Yayın Dağıtım, Ankara 2004, p. 61.

Republic of Turkey configured its relation perspective to the Middle East without ignoring the fundamental principles of foreign policy concept of Turkey. In other words, the status quo principle of Turkey's foreign policy tried to be preserved in the application of region politics while it was developing joint policies with the West parallel to Westernization principle of foreign policy concept. On the other hand, the conjectural changes, characteristic features of leaders and foreign policy decision makers as well as their viewpoints also played a crucial role in the shape of Turkey's foreign policy outlook toward the Middle East region.

2. Iraq

Turkish - Iraqi relations date back to the conquest of Anatolian peninsula by Turks.³⁵⁵ With Seljuqs Empires,³⁵⁶ the current Iraqi region was ruled by Turks until Mongol occupation. Afterwards, the rule of Iraq was respectively undertaken through Aq Qoyunlu (White Sheep Turkmen),³⁵⁷ Safavid dynasty³⁵⁸ and finally Ottoman Empire until the end of the First World War. Following the First World War, Iraq became a mandate state under British rule. Following the birth of modern Turkey, mutual relations between two countries developed positively, as Sadabat pact signed in 1937 between the parts regulating border disputes, establishing mutual friendship. The signed pact created a common ground for struggle against Kurdish separatism.³⁵⁹ From this aspect, the initial of reciprocal relations between Turkey and Iraq from their early emerge level has developed under the frame of good neighborhood relations.³⁶⁰

³⁵⁵ Yılmaz Öztuna, *Başlangıcından Zamanımıza kadar Türkiye Tarihi (From Intial to Present Turkish History)*, Hayat Kitapları, İstanbul 1967, p. 57.

³⁵⁶ **Seljug**: also spelled Seljuk, ruling family of Oğuz Turkmen tribes that invaded southwestern Asia in the 11th century and eventually founded an empire that included Mesopotamia, Syria, Palestine and most of Iran. "Seljug" in Encyclopedia Britannica Online,

(source: www.britannica.com, <<http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/533602/Seljug>>, 20 July 2011).

³⁵⁷ **Ak Koyunlu**: also spelled Aq Qoyunlu (Turkish:"White Sheep"), Turkmen tribal federation that ruled northern Iraq, Azerbaijan, and eastern Anatolia from ad 1378 to 1508.

"Ak Koyunlu" in Encyclopedia Britannica Online,

(source: www.britannica.com, <<http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/11309/Ak-Koyunlu>>, June 2011).

³⁵⁸ **Safavid Dynasty**: (1502-1736), Iranian dynasty whose establishment of Shiite Islām as the state religion of Iran was a major factor in the emergence of a unified national consciousness among the various ethnic and linguistic elements of the country. The Safavids were descended from Sheykh Si od-Din (1253 - 1334) of Ardabil, head of the Sufi order of Safaviyeh (Safawiyah), but about 1399 exchanged their Sunni affiliation for Shiism. "Safavid Dynasty" in Encyclopedia Britannica Online, (source: www.britannica.com, <<http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/516019/Safavid-dynasty>>, June 2011).

³⁵⁹ "Sadabad Pact" in Encyclopedia Britannica Online, (source: www.britannica.com, <<http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/515765/Sadabad-Pact>>, June 2011).

³⁶⁰ Ramazan Gözen, "The Turkish - Iraqi Relations: From Cooperation to Uncertainty", *Foreign Policy*, Vol. XIX (3-4), 1995, pp. 49-98.

Withal, the positive relation perspectives commenced to alter toward the end of the Second World War as Baghdad gradually indicated tendencies to shift towards Soviet influence. All the same, thanks to signed Baghdad Pact Organization,³⁶¹ which then turned to Central Treaty Organization Turkish - Iraqi relations relatively healed. During the second half of 1950s, the mutual relations entered a new period with the coup d'états took place both in Iraq and Turkey.³⁶² In 1960, Ankara initialized GAP (South Eastern Project) project in order to utilize its water resources on Euphrates and Tigris rivers efficiently,³⁶³ the project was reactively met through Iraqi government blaming Turkey to cut Iraq's water resources and violating international water agreements.³⁶⁴ The petroleum crisis experienced in 1973 made Turkey search for alternative policies to secure its natural resource demand. With the support of Europe, U.S.A, Iraq and Turkish governments agreed to build Kirkuk - Ceyhan oil pipeline that meets 3/2 Turkey's petroleum demand, while constitutes an important pipeline assuring energy transit toward Europe, besides Kirkuk - Ceyhan oil pipeline constitutes Iraq's biggest crude oil export pipeline.³⁶⁵ Throughout Iran - Iraq war, Ankara followed a neutral policy continuing its economic and political relations between Tehran and Baghdad, while it played a peacemaker role in order to stop the war, which as well depreciated Turkish economy.

Saddam Hussein's occupation of Kuwait resulted in a drastic shift in terms of Turkey - Iraq relations. Ankara, during the period that coincided to the presidency of Özal, openly opposed the occupation of Kuwait and collaborated with Western alliance opening both its air and land bases for the use of American forces against Saddam.³⁶⁶ Because of authority gap in Baghdad, Kurds in Northern Iraq started a riot against Saddam Hussein and occupied Kirkuk, which resulted with the bloody suppression by Iraqi National Forces even using biological and chemical weapons against civilians that caused severe casualties. In order to escape mass massacre, Kurdish civilians immigrated to Turkey. A similar mass of Kurdish immigrating caused serious security weaknesses for Turkey, which caused a radical augmentation of

³⁶¹ Behçet K Yeşilbursa, *The Baghdad Pact: Anglo American Defense Policies in the Middle East, 1950-1959*, Frank Cass, Oxon 2005, p. 71.

³⁶² Fred Halliday, "Iraq and its Neighbors: The Cycles of Insecurity", *World Today*, Vol. 46, June 1990, pp. 104-106.

³⁶³ Süha Bölükbaşı, "Turkey Challenges Iraq and Syria: The Euphrates Dispute", *Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. XVI (4), 1993, pp. 9-32.

³⁶⁴ Cooper Gruen, *The Water Crisis: is the Next Middle East Conflict?*, Simon Wissenthal Center, 1992, pp. 8-14.

³⁶⁵ Lawrence Kumins, "Iraq Oil: Reserves, Production, and Potential Revenues". *Congressional Research Service*, The Library of Congress, 2003, pp.1-6.

³⁶⁶ Özlem Tür, „Türkiye ve Ortadoğu: Gerilimden İşbirliğine” („Turkey and Middle East: Tension to Cooperation”) in Zeynep Dağı (ed.) *AK Partili Yıllar: Doğudan Batıya Dış Politika (AK Party Years: Foreign Policy from East to West)*, Orion yayınevi, Ankara 2006, pp.77-95.

Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) attacks. The marital situation of Iraq made Turkey's foreign policy administrators find no addressee in Baghdad and communicate with Northern Iraq local representatives and leaders in order to take required persecutions to stop PKK terror directed against Turkey. Turkish - Iraqi relations of post Gulf war period mostly engaged to PKK terror and Turkey's endeavor to stop birth of an independent Kurdish state.

To sum up, after gaining their independence, mutual relations between Iraq and Turkey mostly followed a fluctuating line. While examining bilateral relations of both countries, it is vital to take into account the stakes and influence of imperial powers seeking their interest at region rich of natural resources. It would be a great visional shortcoming not to evaluate liaison of third countries influencing regional politics. Turkey mostly focused its attention on security issues and Kurdish problem. At the same time, Iraq blamed Turkey for interfering with its sovereignty, and for treating it as economic embargo and water cards.

The former agendas of Turkey's foreign policy like; PKK terror, a potential independent Kurdish state in Northern Iraq, Iraqi Turkmens, the status of Kirkuk, integrity of Iraq, security of oil lines occupied the top level of foreign policy agenda as regard to Iraq during the Justice and Development Party government periods in 2002-2011. Turkey - Iraq relations particularly in the course of post "Gulf War period"³⁶⁷ mostly engaged to separatist PKK terrorism issue and the situation did not evidence a radical change as well in the course of Justice and Development Party government periods. Nonetheless, with 2002, AK Party foreign policy decision makers dexterously achieved to hand issues related to terror and Iraq separately; For instance, foreign policy making process toward North Iraq and PKK problem tried to be approach as different matters, which resulted in a more effective policy implementation process toward Iraq. Furthermore, traditional foreign policy orientation of Turkey towards Iraq at this period was rescued from Northern Iraq obsession that handled with national security concerns. Henceforth, Ankara initialized to develop policies overlapping all ethnic and religious diversities of Iraq people. A similar policy approach as well was highly appreciated by the United States of America along with other region states. Professor Efeğil describes this very new situation as follows:

The policy of the Turkish governments on the northern Iraq focused on the PKK issue until 2002 when AK Party won the elections and formed the government. From that perspective, the Turkish policymakers viewed the PKK terrorism, the Kurdish issue and the developments in the Northern

³⁶⁷ Tayyar Arı, „Türkiye, Irak ve ABD: Körfez Savaşı sonrası Dönemde Basra Körfezinde Yeni Parametreler” („Turkey, Iraq and United States of America, New Parameters at Persian Gulf after the Gulf War”), in İdris Bal (ed.), *21. Yüzyılda Türk Dış Politikası (Turkish Foreign Policy at 21th Century)*, Lalezar Yayınevi, Ankara 2004, pp.695-729.

Iraq as completely independent and unconnected matters. In this respect, they did not need to formulate a comprehensive policy, covering all these issues into one basket. However, AK Party put aside this approach and attempted establishing a comprehensive policy on the issue.³⁶⁸

Justice and Development Party after the convincing victory in 2002 gave its first serious foreign policy examination with Iraq as Saddam Hussein commenced to be charged under the pretext supporting Al-Qaida militants and hiding chemical weapons potentially threatening regional and global security. Stressing the reality that Republic of Turkey had been among the states that were most affected through the First Gulf War and parallel to the new rhetoric of Justice and Development Party at foreign policy proposing minimum problem with Turkish neighborhood, AKP foreign policy decision makers barely indicated their position addressing UN framework as a resolution formula. What is more, in order to prevent upcoming war, AK Party commenced tense shuttle diplomacy traffic not only in regional countries but also in Europe as well as in the U.S. applying all possible diplomatic methods to persuade Saddam Hussein to open his country for international monitoring.

To persuade Saddam Hussein, former Foreign Trade Minister Kürsat Tüzmen undertook an official visit to Iraq with a huge delegation constituted of businesspersons eager to invest in Iraq hinting to international public view Turkey's intention to invest in Iraq even before the upcoming war.³⁶⁹ Additionally, former Foreign Affairs Minister of Turkey, Abdullah Gül meantime undertook an official visit tour to Egypt, Syria and Jordan aiming to create a pressure to Iraqi President to permit international monitoring. Besides, Turkish officials repeatedly announced the dangers of a prospective occupation, which would cause an authority gap in Iraq similar to Gulf War that would jeopardize regional stability and security. While it underlined the fact that a future occupation would give birth to tense sectarian clashes that hard to avoid after the occupation aiming to warn American Neo Conservatives who fiercely supported the declaring war against Iraq under the pretext war against global terrorism.

Since trying all possible diplomatic channels, Turkish diplomats soon realized that they have almost nothing to do with the occupation and Turkey's foreign policy makers commenced to develop alternative policies in accordance with the upcoming conjecture. On the pre - war period Ankara mostly focused on territorial integrity of Iraq, Iraqi Turkmens and future PKK infiltration to Turkey through Iraqi border, which is very hard to protect

³⁶⁸ Erhan Efeğil, "AK Party's Policies about the PKK Terrorism, Northern Iraq and Kurdish Issue", *Review of Social, Economic & Business Studies*, Vol. IX/X, p. 140.

³⁶⁹ "Saddam'dan 2 Saat 20 Dakika" ("2 Hours and 20 Minutes from Saddam"), *Hürriyet Daily Newspaper*, 13 January 2003.

regardless of huge capacity, human resources and technologic background of Turkish army, as well as the security of oil pipelines. After the expire of deadline introduced by United States to President Saddam Hussein in order to permit international observes to undertake required monitoring, the United States of America started air attack against Iraq.

However, to finish military operation quickly, efficiently and with the minimum casualty, USA required take advantage of strategic position of Turkey. U.S. military strategists had to open an additional front from the Eastern of Turkey to Northern Iraq deploying the U.S. forces to Turkey to make military operation short and with maximum efficiency. Moreover, the U.S. forces wanted to use Turkish air, sea and land area in order to undertake logistic back up for the troops that situating in Iraq. What is more, United States officials also asked Turkey to participate military operation in North of Iraq, which did not met positively; especially by Iraqi Kurds fearing Turkish military presence in Northern Iraq.³⁷⁰ According to Turkish constitution, all similar military permits needs to be voted by Turkish Parliament, thus Justice and Development Party Government asked Parliament to grant the U.S. military permission to use Turkish air and land spaces to open northern front against Iraq, nonetheless the permit failed in spite of all efforts of the government. As a result, Justice and Development Party experienced a bad assay on a serious foreign affairs issue, which may be commented as a badly managed process, thus it was written negatively to foreign affairs performance section of the government as regard to relations with Iraq.

Following that, 11 Turkish Special Forces members had been detained by American soldiers under the ground of misunderstanding upon an alleged assassination plot against governor of Kirkuk, furthermore Turkish soldiers were mocked for sacking their heads at Sulaymaniyah (Iraq) that tensed mutual relations completely. The reaction of America was widely criticized by not only Foreign Affairs Ministry but also all levels of government along with other platforms both political and civic. JDP government exposed a harsh wave of criticism particularly by opponent parties being incapable of managing foreign affairs of Turkey, loosing Turkey's advantageous position in Northern Iraq. In addition to that, the anti-Americanism on Turkish public view at this period experienced its highest level outpacing most Middle East countries.

On the other hand, the decision of Turkish Grand National Assembly parliament was highly appreciated by Iraqi Kurds while Northern Iraqi local administration provided all required positive strategic and logistic help during USA occupation, which then made them

³⁷⁰ Ümit Özdağ, "Türk - Amerikan İlişkilerinde Irak Krizi" ("Iraq Crisis at Turkish - USA Relations"), *Stratejik Analiz*, 2003, Vol. IV, No. 40, pp. 23-25.

the best ally of the United States in Iraq against Shiite's and Sunni Arab resistance against the occupation. The new conjecture making Iraqi Kurds best ally of USA in Iraq highly disturbed Ankara and pushed to develop more alternative policies in order to provide a power balance in Iraq. The period after the rejection of motion, Turkey lost its strategic position and control over Northern Iraq, thus Kurdistan Worker's Party militants augmented attacks against Turkey for taking advantage of the authority gap in the region leaking into Turkish territories. Meanwhile, the government faced harsh criticism of nationalist and right wing opponent platforms blaming Justice and Development Party asking permit of USA and Iraqi Kurds in order to provide Turkey's internal security and undertake actions guaranteed by international law. As a consequence of heavy casualties of similar attacks, the JDP was toughly pressed in order to undertake cross border military operations against PKK camps situated at Northern Iraq. However, both United States and Northern Iraqi regional Kurdish authorities severely opposed the idea of undertaking military attacks, under the pretext that it would damage the tactful situation in Iraq and America's struggle against the terrorism.

In the summer of 2006, Ankara, in order to defend itself against attacks directed from Northern Iraq, mobilized its army at Iraqi border to signal its determinant attitude which then was prevented by Washington. In 2007, the continuation of terror acts pushed Turkish Army to stack its troops at Iraqi border once again. But this time President Bush invited Turkish Prime Minister to White House and Turkey was urged not to release mass military operations against Northern Iraq while it was consolidated with wide usage of hot pursuit right as well as instant intelligence support from the United States of America.³⁷¹

During the reconstruction period of new Iraq after Saddam Hussein, Justice and Development Party government continued the Turkey's traditional policy of supporting Iraqi Turkmen. Ankara in all platforms supported the idea that Turkmen are situated among the constructive element of Iraq and should be mentioned as among the constructive elements and founding nation of Iraq in the new constitution. Turkey's foreign policy ruled by JDP as well holds the Turkish traditional paradigm of opposing the emergence of a potential Kurdish state's establishment. When it comes to destiny of Kirkuk, Ankara many times repeated its concerns about the demographic structure of Kirkuk and stressed its interest in undertaking a fair referendum in Kirkuk. Finally, Turkey -as it used to be previous government policies- insisted on the idea that all natural resources of Iraq should be monitored by the Iraqi central government as Ankara continuously feared Iraqi Kurds would capture priorities that might

³⁷¹ Caroll Migdalovitz, "Turkey: Selected Foreign Policy Issues and U.S. Views", *Congressional Research Service*, November 2010, pp. 6-10.

gain capitulations of Iraqi petrol's and gas particularly situating in Northern Iraq and abuse this advantage against Turkey.

When Justice and Development Party government increased its vote percentage and reached 47 percentages in 2007 general elections, it applied a more efficient policy toward Iraq applying diplomatic, economic and military methods in order to expose Turkey's policies particularly in terms of security issues. Ankara, at this period openly indicated tendencies that it would use its self-protection and hot pursuit right in accordance with international law in order to protect itself against terror attacks stem from North Iraq. While, simultaneously sent Foreign Affairs Minister Ali Babacan to neighbor countries and the European Union in order to inform about upcoming security policies of Turkey connected with Northern Iraq. Justice and Development Party also apply all diplomatic measures to constrain activities of Kurdistan Worker Party's in Iraq and other countries as well. AK Party initialized a reform package enforcing democratic rights of Kurds living in Turkey opening a state based channel broadcasting in Kurdish, which has happened first time at Turkish history aiming to reduce social support for PKK terror. Moreover, taking in to consideration geopolitical location of Turkey as the sole gate of Northern Iraqi Kurdish administration outside world, Turkey properly used its embargo card against Northern Iraqi Kurdish administration's support for PKK.

Ankara enforced this very policy implication with bilateral trade relations gaining auctions for Turkish enterprisers, particularly at the field of building during Northern Iraq's construction. Justice and Development Party launched positive relations after the permit crisis with the United States of America implementing security policies as well that gave fruitful outcomes due to the failure of USA in Iraq. Additionally, Turkey's compatible relations with Iran and Syria against a potential Kurdish state and the chaotic feature of Iraq made neighbor countries to follow a common policy in the region with Turkey. Ankara strengthen its hand at the region with the conference of Iraqi Neighborhood Countries held at 2007 explaining Turkish thesis while gained more active initiatives in Iraq. Prime Minister Erdoğan's visit to Washington had gained a new perspective for Turkey - Iraq relations connected with the United States of America, which came to a breaking point with 1 March permission crisis at 2003. Thanks to Erdoğan - Bush meeting the cooperation rhetoric's previously mentioned between USA and Turkey mostly turned to be an abstract project, additionally by virtue of the meeting Turkey guaranteed instant inelegancy assistance from the U.S. satellites against PKK

attacks, where George Walker Bush called PKK as the “common enemy”³⁷² of both states. It is imperative to accentuate that this ice-melting period on the other hand closely related with United State’s withdrawal plans from Iraq. Washington’s interest of using Turkey’s logistic position during this period as well its need for Ankara after withdrawal period as an alliance of USA in the region as the sole democratic country majority of population is Muslim.

On the other hand, though many times Turkey and the United States of America developed compatible politics in terms of Iraq, in some cases Ankara and Baghdad experienced serious conflicts with both Northern Iraq Kurdish Federation Administration and Iraqi Central Government. Turkey blamed Iraq for not to undertaking required cooperation against terror as Iraq accused Turkey to have imperialistic instincts planning to occupy Mosul and Kirkuk under the pretext of a cross border military operation. Here, one more essential footnote is that after Saddam Hussein’s collapse Kurdistan Democratic Party leader and Kurdish Regional Government leader Masoud Barzani, Iraqi President Djalal Talabani and former Iraqi Prime Minister Hosver Zebari were all Kurdish politicians who held the upmost critical posts in post Saddam Iraq. In addition, this fact directed deadlock Turkish - Iraqi relations in terms of Kurdish problem and emerge of an independent Kurdish state which may provoke Kurds in Turkey.

To illustrate the fact mentioned above, for instance, Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri Maliki paid an official visit to Ankara on third of August 2007, where both sites signed a Memorandum of Understanding against terrorism. Just the same, Prime Minister Maliki underlined that the signed Memorandum of Understanding needed the approval of Iraqi parliament to be valid. Otherwise, he could not implement it, as Barzani did not recognize PKK as a terrorist organization.³⁷³ 2008-2009 became the golden year of for frozen relations between Iraq and Turkey. In the March of 2008, Iraqi President Jalal Talabani visited Turkey due to the invitation of his counterpart Abdullah Gül. Following that, and after 18 years of break, Prime Minister and head of AKP Recep Tayyip Erdoğan undertook a high-level official visit to Iraq in 10 July 2008 bringing a broad vision to mutual relations locked to solely terror problems. During his official visit, Prime Minister met with high rank Iraqi officials, thus both states signed strategic cooperation agreement including points from security, economy, infrastructure, water, border security and trade issues. Under the frames of the signed agreements, Iraq and Turkey created strategic cooperation council planning to meet in Prime

³⁷² Ibidem, pp. 6-10.

³⁷³ Ibidem, pp. 6-10.

Ministers level once a year, while three times at Ministry level. Turkish Prime Minister at the press conference highlighted the necessity of regional cooperation particularly against PKK terror defining it as the mutual enemy of Iraq and Turkey, he as well stressed the necessity of unity of Iraq, and one specific feature of the meeting was Turkish Prime Minister did not meet with the representatives of Iraqi Kurds.³⁷⁴

Shortly after the visit of Turkish Prime Minister, the President of Turkey paid a historical visit to Baghdad in the March of 2009, as he became the first Turkish President to visit Iraq in 33 years. During his visit, President Gül met with Iraqi President Jalal Talabani, Kurdistan Regional Government Prime Minister Nechirvan Barzani and that was a serious step for Turkey's foreign policy attitude toward Northern Iraqi Kurds. Turkish parts high level visits to Iraq continued with the visit of Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu after which both states got ahead pretty much in terms of fight against terrorism.³⁷⁵

Ensuing, in the year of 2009, the head of Mahdi's armies, Muktade Al Sadr paid a visit to Ankara calling Turkey as an old friend of Iraq. During Islam Conference President Gül's met with Hosber Zebari and many other high level important Iraqi leaders who have recently visited Turkey due to Turkey's invitation. The top level Iraqi political figures including Prime Minister Maliki, President Jalal Talabani, Vice President Tariq Hashimi and Adeel Mahdi, Leader of the Iraqiyya List, Ayad Allawi, Muktada al-Sadr, Ammar al-Hakim, Mosul Governor Atheel Nujayfi, the National Security Chief, Shirwan al-Waili, and the Minister of Defense, Abdulkadir Muhammad Qasim were among the high level Iraqi politicians who visited Turkey at this period.³⁷⁶ Most of the mentioned leaders were invited to Turkey, not only as representatives of their own parties or the Iraqi Republic, but also as a representative of the different sects and ethnical groups along with the representatives of Turkmens both from Sunni and Shiite groups barely indicates the Justice and Development Party's new approach to Iraq embracing whole groups, ethnicities and religious minorities of Iraq under the Iraq's unity.³⁷⁷

Aftermaths, both countries accessed a compromise on the water issues, transfer of Iraqi petrol to the West via Turkey, license validation for Turkish companies in order to search oil in Northern Iraq, Turkish contractor's achievements in building, as well as Turkey's initiatives of establishing private universities at Northern Iraq. Finally, Ankara's

³⁷⁴ "Erdoğan'dan Iraka Tarihi Ziyaret" ("Historical Visit of Erdogan to Iraq"), (source: www.ntvmsnbc.com, < <http://arsiv.ntvmsnbc.com/news/452658.asp>>, December 2010).

³⁷⁵ "Turk FM Leaves for Iraq, Davutoğlu: Turkey - Iraq Relations Develop Around a New Partnership Model", *Anatolia*, August 11, 2009, Open Source Center Document GMP 20090811737001.

³⁷⁶ Veysel Ayhan, "An Analysis of Massoud Barzani's Visit to Turkey", *Today's Zaman*, 6 July 2010.

³⁷⁷ Ibid.

peacemaking role at the conflict between Iraq and Syria in terms of Iraq's accusation of Syria supporting terrorist groups realizing suicide bomb attacks in Iraq accelerated Turkey's active role in Iraq gained Turkey new perspectives. In the period immediately following the constructive relation perspectives, at 2010, Iraqi Kurdish Regional Administration Leader and Kurdistan Democratic Party leader Massoud Barzani -a highly controversial leader in Turkish public view- paid an official visit to Turkey after long terms of tense years and mutual fierce explanations between Turkey and Northern Iraqi administration.³⁷⁸ Even the realize of a similar visit the level of relations as Barkey states was "Unimaginable only a few years ago, showed how dramatically Turkey's policy toward Iraqi Kurds and Turkish strategy on Iraq had changed".³⁷⁹ During his official visit, Massoud Barzani undertook official meetings with Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Foreign Affairs Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu and Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources. Kurdish Democrat Party leader and the President of the Kurdistan Regional Government, Massoud Barzani had not been in Turkey for six years. The six years since this visit evidenced many tensions between Barzani and Turkey inciting provocative statements. Yet, this period also includes a positive turn in relations; this new track in reciprocal relations was the natural outcome of strengthening economic ties and the lack of a rooted hostility or rivalry between the parties.

Thence, along with the economic relations, other progressive steps were harbingers of a closer relationship. The opening of a Turkish consulate in Erbil especially is a landmark of the changing nature of relations.³⁸⁰ It is requisite to accent that, before Barzani's official visit, Turkey under the administration of Justice and Development of government sent a delegation of watchdogs in order to observe 2009 local and presidential elections in Northern Iraq. It was elucidated as the official recognition of Turkey's Iraqi Kurds autonomous structure and was criticized by opposition in Turkey; on the other hand, the watchdog delegation from Turkish site was invited by Iraqi central electoral commission and attributed highly positively to the development of mutual relations with Iraqi Kurds.

Turkey's foreign policy under Justice and Development Party administration continued its close relation and interest to Iraq during the general elections in Iraq which held in 7th of March 2010. Foreign Affairs Ministry declared the position of Turkey supporting the democratic elections in Iraq underlining that it would highly contribute to stability and

³⁷⁸ Ibid.

³⁷⁹ Henry Barkey as cited in Alex Yacley, "Iraqi Kurdish Leader in Turkey for Landmark Visit", *Reuters*, 3 June 2010.

³⁸⁰ Murat Yeğin, "Barzani in Ankara: Normalization of Relations, Distancing from PKK", *USAK*, December 2010.

security of Iraq. In order to contribute to government organization process and to follow the improvements closely, Turkish FM Ahmet Davutoğlu invited Ilyad Allawi the leader of Al-Arabia party and the winner of Iraq general elections to Ankara in April 2010. Under the frames of the visit, Davutoğlu met with Ilyad Allawi, Turkish Minister evaluated the meeting highly positive during the press conference after the meeting. He said, he congratulated Allawi as the winner of the election and stated that now the most important task for Iraq to construct an inclusive government representing the whole of Iraq with a high legitimacy. On his term, Allawi underlined Turkey's attitude toward Iraq and expressed his appreciation in terms of Turkey's contribution to stability and democracy process in Iraq without interfering Iraq's internal affairs appraised Turkey's regional and global power.

But then, the political deadlock emerged after the elections period highly concerned Ankara as the central government could not be organized for a long period. This time Turkish Foreign Affairs Minister Davutoğlu realized a visit to Iraqi capital aiming to follow latest developments and government organization process as two weeks before the meeting a delegation from Iraq met with Turkish Foreign Ministry without attracting attention of mass media. Davutoğlu firstly went to Northern Iraq and met with local Kurdish leader Massoud Barzani then flied to Baghdad where he realized high rank meetings with Prime Minister Nuri al Maliki and Allawi along with the representatives of other political groups. Ahmet Davutoğlu's active participation and endeavors among Iraqi groups in order to accelerate government-building organization was highly appreciated by both United States and Iraq. Turkish Foreign Affairs head repeated Ankara's position one more time underlining the necessity of a government representing all of Iraqi and stressed the functionality of the government as Bosnia and Herzegovina experience a similar problem. He also indicated that the developments in Iraq are very important for Turkey as it influences Turkey directly. That is why Turkey may not restrain apathy toward Iraq, it is crucial to stress that Turkish FM became the first foreign affairs representative visiting Iraq during the time course of political instabilities aggravated with terror attacks, which may indicate Ankara's new attitude toward its neighbor at this period.

3.Syria

Turkish - Syrian relations lean back to the times when Turks were brought to Damascus through Umayyad³⁸¹ caliphate as slaves at the beginning of 8th century.³⁸² After their achievements in the field of military, Turks gradually took higher ranks in Umayyad state as well as in the society. Subsequently, Turks initialized to settle at the region as masses on the territories today called "Syria".³⁸³ During the Seljuk Dynasty period, Turks captured Syria;³⁸⁴ aftermaths Turkish sovereignty in Syria replaced another Turkic originated state "Mamluks"³⁸⁵ because of destructive influence of Mongolian occupations. The Ottomans regained sovereignty at Syrian territories at 16th century and continued their rule till the end of the First World War.³⁸⁶

With the end of the First World War, Turkey - Syrian relations developed as mandate. Syrian - Turkish relations were mostly shaped by Paris as it was in search of protecting trade and economic benefits of France.³⁸⁷ On the other hand, the Hatay (Alexandretta) issue as a conflict affecting Turkey - Syria relations until present day mostly started at this very period.³⁸⁸ Hatay district, which was a part of Turkey according to National Pact left in mandate Syria in accordance to Ankara agreement, nonetheless when France recognized the independence of Syria at the year of 1936, henceforth Turkey commenced to undertake talks with Paris demanding Hatay's independence, yet France did not accept Turkey's demands stating it would jeopardize Syria's unity. After series of diplomatic note deliveries, Turkey brought the Hatay problem to Nation's League. Nation's League counsel accepted limited independence of Hatay county on condition that it should be completely sovereign in internal

³⁸¹ **Umayyad Dynasty:** First great Muslim dynasty to rule empire of the aliphate (AD 661 - 750) sometimes referred to as the Arab kingdom (reflecting traditional Muslim disapproval of the secular nature of the Umayyad state)

"Umayyad Dynasty" in Encyclopædia Britannica Online,
(source: www.britannica.com, <<http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/613719/Umayyad-dynasty>>, July 2011).

³⁸² Yılmaz Öztuna, op.cit., pp. 22-27.

³⁸³ For further reading on Syria see: Daniel Pipes, *Greater Syria: The History of an Ambition*, Oxford University Press, Oxford 1990.

³⁸⁴ John F Devlin, *Syria: Modern State in an Ancient Land*, Westview Press Inc, Colorado 1983, p. 10.

³⁸⁵ **Mamlūk:** also spelled Mameluke, slave soldier, a member of one of the armies of slaves that won political control of several Muslim states during the Middle Ages. Under the Ayyūbid sultanate, Mamlūk generals used their power to establish a dynasty that ruled Egypt and Syria from 1250 to 1517. The name is derived from an Arabic word for slave.

"Mamluk" in Encyclopædia Britannica Online,
(source: www.britannica.com, <<http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/360799/Mamluk>>, July 2011).

³⁸⁶ John F Devlin, op. cit., p. 11.

³⁸⁷ Ibidem.

³⁸⁸ Avedik Sanjan, *The Sanjak of Alexandretta (Hatay): It's Impact on Turkish-Syrian Relations, 1939-56*, Middle East Journal Publications, New York 1956, pp. 1-15.

affairs while depend to Syria in foreign issues, which may be called a status of entité distinct.³⁸⁹ Nation's League committed observer task trough the aid of France in order to prevent potential conflicts between the parts.³⁹⁰

In 1939, on the eve of the Second World War, France started to lose its dominant position in the region. Therefore, Hatay County was declared independent, besides it undertook a consensus where Hatay ceded to Turkey. The decision was as well recognized by France under the condition that Turkey would respect Syria's independence and territorial unity. Since Hatay's incorporation into Turkey, Hatay became an issue of debate between Republic of Turkey and Syria. Turkey blamed Syria for not recognizing its territorial unity -as Syrian state continuously indicated Hatay district as a part of Syrian even on official maps- and for not recognizing international law along with self-determination right of Hatay people and Syria accused Turkey for seizing Syrian territories through political tactics.³⁹¹ Apart from the Hatay problem, the water issue has another theme of debate between Turkey and Syria until today.³⁹² Republic of Turkey and Syria signed an agreement on water issue in the year of 1921 regulating water share between two states. Until the beginnings of 1950, there may not be mentioning of any tension between Syria and Turkey in terms of water, however when Syria and Turkey initialized to build water dams on Orontes, Tigris and Euphrates rivers, the neighbors this time opposed on water issue. When Turkish state initialized the GAP project (South - Eastern Anatolian Project) aiming to use its water resources efficiently concentrating the development of eastern Turkey -where Kurdish people live densely in order to stop social support for separatist Kurdish movements-. Yet, Damascus appreciated it as a treat against itself blaming Turkey to abuse its water card against Syria. Under the presidency of Turgut Özal, Turkey realized official meetings with Syria and signed protocols regulating water share between both countries, moreover water conflict between Turkey and Syria has been discussed in many international conference in search of engaging international water laws in order to find a mutual understanding between the parts.³⁹³

³⁸⁹ "Question of Alexandretta, Final Regulations for the First Elections in the Sanjak of Alexandretta", *League of Nations*, Geneva 1938.

³⁹⁰ David Kushner, „Conflict and Accommodation in Turkish - Syrian Relations”, in A. Yaniv Moozm (ed.), *Syria under Assad*, Croom Helmn, London 1986, pp. 85-104.

³⁹¹ Roberta Micallef, *Hatay Joins the Motherland in State Frontiers: Borders and Boundaries in the Middle East*, Brandell, I. I.B. Tauris & Co Ltd, London 2006, p. 141.

³⁹² Süha Bölükbaşı, op.cit.,pp. 9-32.

³⁹³ Veysel Toklu, „Türk Dış Politikasında Su Sorunu” („Water Problem at Turkish Foriegn Policy”) in İdris Bal (ed.) *21. Yüzyılda Türk Dış Politikası (Turkish Foriegn Policy at 21th Century)*, Lalezar Kitapevi, Ankara 2006, p. 819.

When it comes to security issues between Turkey and Syria, both countries situated at opposite sites during the Cold War, hence security concepts of both countries mostly shaped in accordance with the Cold War conjecture. The security concept of Syria to a degree was understandable as it was surrounded by enemy Israel, Iraq and Turkey, besides Syria is not an oil rich country and after the collapse of Soviet Union, it was without of any external support. Syria in order to balance negative situation degrading with water crisis against Turkey selected to use terror card. Firstly, Damascus gave asylum to Abdullah Öcalan -the founder and leader of PKK- and opened its territories many radical left terrorist groups along with Armenian nationalist terrorist group ASALA,³⁹⁴ which realized many fatal suicides against Turkish diplomats, then Damascus opened its territories to PKK militants providing them with all logistic and military support. Turkish official in different meetings warned Syria not to support PKK terror and urgently close PKK camps activating casual operations against Turkish military and civil target but Syria repeated the answer that it does not support any terrorist activities against neighbor countries.³⁹⁵

Increasing terrorism inflicted a deep pressure on Turkish government in 1998 and terror bargains between Turkey and Syria encountered a total new period bringing both states to a war level.³⁹⁶ Ankara asked Damascus to hand Abdullah Öcalan or to deport him on the grounds of accumulating a huge military power in Syrian border. The high tension between Syria and Turkey was calmed down, thanks to diplomatic attempts of Iran and Egypt. Both sides undertook a secret meeting in Adana -a southern Turkish city- which was then referred as Adana Protocol or “Adana Accord”.³⁹⁷ Thanks to it, “Damascus agreed to recognize PKK as a terrorist organization, pledged to cease all logistical and financial aid to terrorists and shut down all PKK camps in the country”³⁹⁸ as deported head of Kurdistan Workers’ Party,³⁹⁹ Abdullah Öcalan from Syria.

³⁹⁴ **ASALA**: Acronym for Armenian Secret Army to Liberate Armenia, Marxist-Leninist group formed in 1975 to force the Turkish government to acknowledge the Armenian massacres of 1915 and pay reparations. Its activities, which have included acts of terrorism, have been directed against Turkish government officials and institutions. Its founder, Hagop Hagopian, was killed in 1988; thereafter the group’s activities diminished. “ASALA” in Encyclopædia Britannica Online, (source: www.britannica.com, <<http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/1365040/ASALA>>, October 2011).

³⁹⁵ Erol Kurubaş, op.cit., p. 281.

³⁹⁶ Aykan M Bali: “The Turkish - Syrian Crisis of October 1998: A Turkish View”, Middle East Policy, Vol. VI, No. 4, 1999, p. 177.

³⁹⁷ Erik L Knudsen, *Syria, Turkey and Changing Power Configurations*, Ashgate Publishing Limited, Aldershot 2003, p. 185.

³⁹⁸ Ibidem, p. 186.

³⁹⁹ Melek Fırat, Ömer Kürkçüoğlu, „Arap Devletleriyle İlişkiler, 1990-2001 (*Relations with Arabic States*), in Baskın Oran, *Türk Dış Politikası, (Turkey’s Foreign Policy)*, İletişim Yayınları, İstanbul 2005, p. 565.

After⁴⁰⁰ JDP's landslide victory at general elections, the biggest change in terms of foreign policy attitude toward the Middle East was evidenced in Syrian - Turkish relations. A decade ago, before Justice and Development Party came to power; two states came to edge of war due to Syria's open support for separatist PKK terror that managed Turkish national security serious.⁴⁰¹ However, the changing of status quo and world conjecture, the instability increasing in the region post Iraqi occupation period, potential Kurdish state risk treating both country,⁴⁰² besides isolation policy exposed against Syria labeled by the United States of America situating at devil axis made Damascus under the Presidency of Assad seek more positive and constructive policies with Turkey. On the other hand, Syria's affiliation to Turkey coincided Justice and Development Party's new foreign policy concept aiming relatively active policy engagement in Middle East region under the frame of zero problem principle with Turkish periphery.⁴⁰³

Most notably Ahmet Necdet Sezer's official attendance to funeral of Hafız Assad melted mutual relations starting to develop after Adana Accord. Though Ankara was highly criticized by its allies like the United States of America that were urging it not to attend funeral of former President, the historic visit highly contributed to the initialization of constructive relations.⁴⁰⁴ The visit was highly slated ahead above all by the U.S. administration. The United States of America's ambassador, Eric Edelman said in reply to a query regarding to President Sezer's visit to Syria uttered that "the U.S., the EU countries and Egypt were in a consensus with putting restrictions on Syria and that they were anticipating Turkey to support the verdicts of the international community".⁴⁰⁵ He noted that, in case Turkey Sezer settled to Damascus, Turkey would be marginalized by the international community. Edelman added that "Of course it depends on Turkey whether to act in line with the international community or not".⁴⁰⁶ Ahmet Necdet Sezer's visit was explicitly significant for the reciprocal relations, chiefly for the Syria since the visit coincided with a stretch as Syria was growingly being dominated over the occurrences in Lebanon.⁴⁰⁷ It is noteworthy to

⁴⁰⁰ The sub-chapter refers mostly to Özlem Tür's "Turkish - Syrian Relations: Where We are Going ?", UNISCI Discussion Papers, May 2010, No. 23, pp. 163-177.

⁴⁰¹ Aykan M Bali, op.cit., p.177.

⁴⁰² Robert Olson, "The Kurdish Question in the Aftermath of the Gulf War: Geopolitical and Geostrategic Changes in the Middle East", *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. XIII (3), 1992, pp. 475-499.

⁴⁰³ Bülent Aras, Hasan Köni, "Turkish - Syrian Relations Revisted", *Arab Studies Quarterly*, Vol. XXIV, No. 4 (Fall 2002), p. 55.

⁴⁰⁴ Mohammed Harrub, "Sezer'in Ziyareti Suriye'nin Yararına" ("Sezer's Visit is for Syria's Benefis"), *Radikal*, 15 April 2004.

⁴⁰⁵ Özlem Tür, "Turkish - Syrian Relations...", op.cit., p. 164.

⁴⁰⁶ Ibidem, p. 165.

⁴⁰⁷ Ibidem, p. 165.

stress that following Turkish Presidents visit, Syria gradually, though not officially, eliminated the controversial themes between Turkey like Hatay and water issues from the political agenda.⁴⁰⁸

Ankara dispatched confident messages to Damascus and came to be a leading state that advocated the Damascus against the growing international pressure after the homicide of the Rafik Hariri as regard to the outlook of Syrian culpability in the act.⁴⁰⁹ President Sezer's visit was encountered highly favorably at the political rank and by the Syrian society, conveying the two nations further together. Owing to the fact that the conjecture had emerged recently and Syria had strategic position as a gate opening toward Middle East, there was an eagerness at both sides to bloom relations. Moreover, the post 9/11 developments created a favorable environment that drew the countries closer and the Iraq War deepened the relations between Turkey and Syria by creating common security perceptions. The common sensibilities upon the future Kurdish state that would emerge at the Northern of Iraq along with its implications on regional balance of the Middle East as well highly contributed to profounding of the mutual relations between Ankara and Damascus.⁴¹⁰ Damascus was indicating a positive tendency towards Turkey both in social and economic meaning as the most outstanding parameter was the increasing trade volume between Turkey and Syria. Although Ottoman past of mutual relations was a huge barrier in both Syrian elite and nation level, the current conjecture was an impetus to put history a way. When it came to Turkey, it was as well highly interested in developing constructive relations with its neighbor.

Nonetheless, the Hatay issue was a huge obstacle for the improvement of mutual relations. Turkish army in that time was highly dominant both in domestic and external politics, while at times of adopting a pragmatic approach to Syrian - Turkish relations, was stressing mutual cooperation on security issues and leaving water and border disagreements without an object of pressure on Hatay issue in 2001. Turkish Foreign Affairs as well shared a similar view parallel to Turkish Army. The Ministry underscored the vitality of resolving the current disputes between the states firstly and suggested to prepare a declaration of principles that would not exclude respect for the territorial integrity and sovereignty of each state as a precondition for the advancement of mutual relations. Yet, Damascus was extremely unenthusiastic to approve the Turkish side's declaration of principles, as a consequence of this very reluctance; Bashar Assad's scheduled official visit to Republic of Turkey was

⁴⁰⁸ Nuri Yeşilyurt, Atay Akdevelioğlu, "Turkey's Middle East Policy under the JDP Rule", *The Turkish Yearbook of International Relations*, Vol. XL, 2009, p. 45.

⁴⁰⁹ Özlem.Tür, "Turkish - Syrian Relations...", op.cit., p. 165.

⁴¹⁰ Ibid.

delayed.⁴¹¹ Ultimately, Damascus assured Ankara that it is willing to solve border and water problems quickly, but it was uttered that it would require some additional time to express it to the public view, henceforward Damascus held on to a discreet policy orientation to about take the border issue to the higher agenda. The request of Turkey's Eastern neighbor was approved by AKP's foreign policy decision makers.

Bashar Assad's visit to Turkey in 2004 was a milestone for the prospect of Turkish Syrian relations.⁴¹² Syrian President's visit was highly crucial not only as it was the first time official visit to Turkey ever realized by a Syrian President for 57 years but also as it was under the frame of this visit that "Syrian President put his signature on documents explicitly recognizing Turkey's current borders".⁴¹³ Henceforth, Syria officially affirmed Hatay region as an integral part of the Turkey as well as recognized Turkey's territorial integrity. The countries also "agreed to open a consulate in Gaziantep (Turkey) and border centers in several Turkish cities to facilitate trade opportunities in the border regions".⁴¹⁴ The mine cleaning of areas in Turkey - Syria border territories in order to open this area for organic agriculture was also among the issues that both sides agreed at this meeting.⁴¹⁵ Özlem Tür notifies as follows regarding historical visit of Syrian President:

During Bashar's visit, important regional security issues were brought to the agenda, one of which was the Kurdish question and how to deal with the effects of Kurdish autonomy in Northern Iraq. During his visit, Bashar underlined the existence of common views and threat perceptions within Syria and Turkey as related issue.⁴¹⁶ In reference to Turkey's previous announcements notifying that the establishment of a Kurdish state would be unacceptable, thus, it constituted a red line for Turkey, Bashar Assad stated, "a Kurdish state would violate our red line too".⁴¹⁷ In addition to Iran - Syria - Turkey trilateral meetings, Syria became part of the Iraq's Neighbors Initiative started by Turkey.⁴¹⁸ As it was mentioned above, Turkey - Syrian relations were intensifying pursuant to similar safety apprehensions in the region. While worries over Iraqi War was partaken as well, the solicitude over Israeli activities.⁴¹⁹

The relations procured to further degree with Turkish Prime Minister Erdoğan's official visit to Damascus in December 2004.⁴²⁰ "It was a significant as it inaugurated consultations over

⁴¹¹ Özlem.Tür, "Turkish - Syrian Relations...", op.cit., p. 165.

⁴¹² Bülent Aras, "Turkey between Syria and Israel: Turkey's Rising Soft Power", *SETA Policy Brief*, May 2008, No. 15, p.1.

⁴¹³ Banu Eligur, "Are Former Enemies Becoming Allies? Turkey's Changing Relations with Syria, Iran, and Israel Since the 2003 Iraqi War", *Middle East Brief Series*, August 2006, No. 6, p. 12.

⁴¹⁴ Özlem Tür, "Turkish - Syrian Relations...", op.cit., pp. 164 - 171.

⁴¹⁵ Ibidem, pp. 165.

⁴¹⁶ Ibidem, pp. 164 - 171.

⁴¹⁷ Ibidem, pp. 164 - 171.

⁴¹⁸ Ibidem, pp. 164 - 171.

⁴¹⁹ Ibidem, pp. 164 - 171.

⁴²⁰ Abdülhamit Bilici, "Erdogan's Syria Visit: We are Happy. Syria Will be EU's Neighbor", *Zaman*, 23 December 2004.

the water problem and lead to the signing of a Free Trade Agreement between Syria and Turkey. Since the visit came just after the decision to begin Turkey's European Union accession negotiations, one of the affairs on the program turned out to be Turkey's EU integration and membership".⁴²¹ "As regard to the water issue what was appealing to perceive that the inconvenience of sharing the waters of the rivers was left behind and commenced to be viewed as a technical detail between the parts".⁴²² Turkish Prime Minister aforementioned that Syria could utilize more water from the Tigris River for it had augmented requirement. Syrian Prime Minister Otri stated as regard to Turkish PM's statement good news for the citizens and to the query, "whether Turkey and Syria were leaving the traditional water problem back"⁴²³ during the press conference, Erdoğan responded, "from now on we have agreed. We are aiming development and cooperation. Other issues are forgotten".⁴²⁴ Turkey's engagement as a mediator in Israel - Syria conflict attained to the calendar of foreign affairs in 2004. According to Israeli authorities, it was Israel that awaited and that it took Israel three years to accept the offer.⁴²⁵ Even so, by 2007, the public opinion matured and the ground for circuitous conversations was set.

During this period, the decreasing significance of the reciprocal relations was obvious. "There was a tension in the political scene of Tel Aviv"⁴²⁶ due to Erdoğan's remarks of "state terror" and the primacy of the Palestinian issue on the Turkey's foreign policy program.⁴²⁷ Nonetheless, Ankara was still seen as an intermediary in peace talks. Regardless of the crisis, the proposal that unlike 90's, Turkey of the 21 century, under the Justice and Development Party having close relations with both Israel and Syria could play such a mediation function was accented. Negotiations began and prolonged under Turkish mediation; however, they were halted after Israel's attack to Gaza district. Turkey's attempt is notably important in exhibiting the degree of custody between Damascus and Ankara. There has been the reluctance on the Syrian side to reconvene the dialogues, but the Israeli side has been unwilling to jerk the talks since the Turkey's harsh opposition against Gaza attacks of Israel. What is foremost at this point is that Syria has given messages of full support to Turkey's mediation role. Whether negotiations are to resume, Syria comprehends Turkey as a trusty

⁴²¹ Ibid.

⁴²² Özlem Tür, "Turkish - Syrian Relations....", op.cit., pp. 164-171.

⁴²³ Ibidem, p. 170.

⁴²⁴ Tuna Yılmaz, "Ekonomik Partner Olduk ('We Became Economic Partners')", *Hürriyet*, 23 December 2004.

⁴²⁵ Alon Liel as cited in Özlem.Tür, "Turkish - Syrian Relations...", p. 164.

⁴²⁶ Özlem Tür, "Turkish - Syrian Relations.....", op.cit., pp. 164-171.

⁴²⁷ Ibid.

⁴²⁷ Ofra Bengio as cited in Özlem Tür, "Turkish - Syrian Relations...", p. 164.

accomplice in the process. Turkey also displayed her willingness for such a role despite no progression in the issue.⁴²⁸

Turkey also engaged to an intermediary role in Syria's dismayed relations with Iraq afterwards a serial of bombs were blasted in the Green Zone of Baghdad in August 2009. The Iraqi government had charged the Syrian government for the attacks and held Damascus responsible for backing terrorist pursuits and intending at sabotaging the stability of Iraq. In addition to that, Baghdad called back its ambassador in Damascus as a result. At the same time as the tension rose, Turkish FM Davutoğlu journeyed to Baghdad and Damascus to discover the perceptions of two sides over the advancements and to pass along Ankara's posture within this contextual relationship. Turkish Minister suggested to Maliki government, "Tell us every message you like to be transferred to Syria and give us all the verification and information, and we will transport it to the Syrian side".⁴²⁹ In the period that followed, Turkey brought the Foreign Ministers of Iraq and Syria in İstanbul. In the meeting, Turkey not only arbitrated the crisis but also suggested both states to found a three-party border safekeeping appliance. This mechanism will aim at combating PKK and Al Qaida in Iraq. The tension was eased in the following period pursuant to these attempts.

The commercial and business aspects of the relationship have been consequential since the very commencement of the normalization of relations after the endorsing of the accords. As touched above, the economy advanced under the shadow of the political progressions. For Syria, Turkey's economic sovereignty has notably been influential. The deepening of the relations with Turkey reached at such a vital timing for the Syrian regime, like in other aspects of the relationship, when it was feeling economically stuck. Because of its obligation to perform selective reform suitable with the expanding of the ruling coalition in the country plus the relapse of the peace speeches in the Arab - Israeli conflict, turkey's accession negotiation process with the European Union augmented the economic merit of the closeness further. Turkey is regarded by Syria both as an important market and as a model in terms of economic progress. Turkey as well depicts itself as an example for Syria in this aspect. Regarding the blooming economic relations between Syria and Turkey Özlem Tür accentuates that:

Tayyip Erdoğan, during a visit to Syria in April 2007 attended the Syrian - Turkish Business Council gathering after the entering into force of the Free Trade Agreement in 1 January 2007. In the meeting, Erdoğan called the Syrians to pursue the Turkish reform process. Turkish Prime

⁴²⁸ Ibid.

⁴²⁹ Ibid.

Minister said, “Our exports were at \$36 billion and then reached \$114 billion over a period of five years. This can easily be done in Syria. All you need is will power and then you will be able to extract milk even from a male goat! We are willing to put our hand in yours”. In 2000, trade volume between the two countries was \$ 724 million; it reached \$1.8 billion in 2008 and the target is set for \$5 billion for 2012. Erdoğan said that he was not satisfied with the current volume and aiming to bring the figure to \$5 billion in three-four years. “We talked about this with my brother Otri” Erdoğan said, “There is a political will for this. We will succeed in this, willing”.⁴³⁰

In this period, additionally, Ankara and Damascus agreed to create a “Turkish - Syrian Regional Cooperation Program that became operational in 2006, intending to develop technical, economic, cultural and scientific cooperation”.⁴³¹ The main motivation of the program was to facilitate “a regional development by promoting projects that will create employment as a priority. The program encourages integration of the two countries' economies and aims at a joint development of the region at large”.⁴³² Following “the enactment of the Free Trade Agreement, not only the level of trade have bounded between the neighbors, but also there has been evidenced a substantial investment from Turkish companies -particularly in Aleppo- and numerous joint infrastructural projects have been initialized. Bilateral relations between Turkey and Syria turned to an entire new phase with the removal of the visa requirements between the countries”.⁴³³ Özlem Tür evaluates the removal of visa requirement as follow:

The decision to lift the visa requirements were taken during the meeting in September 2009. This meeting became very significant for the relations as it carried the cooperation between the two countries to a level of economic integration. It was also during this very gathering that the decision to form a High Level Strategic Cooperation Council was taken. As regard to the lifting of visa, Foreign Affairs Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu said, “I would like to address to Syrian people. Turkey is your second country and Turkish people are waiting for you with open arms without a visa”.⁴³⁴ In addition to that, Davutoğlu notified, “We are lifting the borders which were artificially put and becoming the people of one hinterland. We are turning the economic cooperation to an economic unity. We are hoping that this will be a model for all our neighbors.”⁴³⁵ Erdoğan in a speech he made to the Turkish - Syrian Business Council in Syria underlined some important points on the issue as well. He said that the separation of nation with a border was artificial and abnormal and that they were “building the communication and cooperation that should exist between brothers and relatives”.⁴³⁶ Parallel to that, a unified visa idea, and to “create a free trade zone”⁴³⁷ similar to Shengen visa called as “Shamgen”⁴³⁸ among Iran, Turkey, Syria and Iraq initialized to be discussed at the highest level of states.⁴³⁹

⁴³⁰ Özlem Tür, “Turkish - Syrian Relations...”, p. 167.

⁴³¹ Ibidem, p. 167.

⁴³² Ibidem, p. 168.

⁴³³ Ibid.

⁴³⁴ “Türkiye ile Suriye Arasında Vize Kalktı” (“Turkey and Syria canceled Visas”), *Zaman*, 17 September, 2010.

⁴³⁵ Zeynep Gürçanlı, “Türkiye - Suriye için Fransız - Alman Modeli” (“French - German Model for Syria – Turkey”), *Hürriyet*, 13 October 2009.

⁴³⁶ Özlem Tür, “Turkish - Syrian Relations...”, op.cit., p. 164.

⁴³⁷ Kemal Kirişçi, “The Politics of Trade and Turkish Foreign Policy”, *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol.XLVII, Issue 5, 2011, p. 705.

Regarding the economic integration Tür notes as follow:

Steps for economic integration were being materialized, so were initiatives for closer political and military relations. During the same meeting that decision on the lifting of the visa was taken, the decision to form High Level Strategic Council between the two countries was also put into effect. Within the context of this mechanism, at least once in a year the Prime Ministers will host together a meeting composed of important ministers of each state.⁴⁴⁰ Accordingly, the ministers responsible for Foreign Affairs, Energy, Trade, Public Works, Defense, Interior Affairs and Transportation will meet at least twice every year to build a common action plan. This action plan will then be discussed in details in the Ministerial Council and then will be executed under the joint leadership of the two Prime Ministers. This Council is indicative of the extent and depth of the relationship.⁴⁴¹

When it comes to military affiliations in this period, Özlem Tür states that there were notable improvements at this period. Turkish and Syrian armies hold a military exercise in the April 2009, she continues as follow referring the military relations of Turkey and Syria:

The three-day long land exercises between border forces involved an exchange of units to enhance joint training and enhance operability and are expected to be followed by similar exercises in the future. On the same day, the two countries signed a technical military cooperation agreement to deepen collaboration between their defense industries. On the other hand, the military exercise attracted concerns from Israel primarily due to the possibility of technology transfer that Turkey received from Israel into Syria while there was no such sign of leakage, but anyway Israeli concern endured on the issue.⁴⁴²

However, all the positive affiliations in terms of Turkey - Syria relations in term were seriously challenged with the social unrests and mass protest against the Baas regime upon the emergence of so-called Arab Spring.⁴⁴³ Both countries recently turned out to be close allies gave a tough examine although the representatives tried not to voice their concerns publicly initially. Ankara from the very early phase of events commenced in Tunisia warned Ashad to undertake required democratic reforms to prevent similar incidents in Syria.⁴⁴⁴ Justice and Development Party government as regard to incidents in Syria notified that they appreciate the incidents as if it is internal affair of Turkey and followed the developments cautiously. Turkey's foreign policy decision makers realized high level talks with Damascus to stop violence, but allowed Syrian opposition leaders held a meeting in Antalya aiming to Turkey's position toward the incidents, the result of which de facto finished of all positive relations

⁴³⁸ "Iran, Iraq, Turkey & Syria to Issue Shamgen Visa", *GlobalBoss News*, 02 April 2011.

⁴³⁹ Özlem Tür, "Turkish - Syrian Relations...", op.cit., p. 166.

⁴⁴⁰ Ibidem, p. 167.

⁴⁴¹ Ibidem, p.168.

⁴⁴² Özlem Tür, "Turkish - Syrian Relations...", op.cit., p. 166

⁴⁴³ Karol Kujawa, "Turcja wobec kryzysu w Syrii" ("Turkey on Syria Crisis"), *Biuletyn Polish Institute for International Affairs*, No 81 (830), 9 September, 2011, p. 2506.

⁴⁴⁴ Veysel Ayhan, "Suriye'de Krizinin Türkiye'ye Yansıması: Mülteci Akını", ("The Reflection of Syrian Crisis to Turkey : Immigration Flow"), *Caspian Weekly*, 10 June 2011.

built. Ankara initially caring to use a soft language toward its ally increased the tone of criticism publicly when Syrian people residing in Turkish border cities started to immigrate to Turkey as masses in fear of Syrian armies operations. Within a week, the amounts of refugees hit the figure of 10.000 as the matter turned out to be an international and humanitarian issue. The government on one hand tried to hospitalize refugees directing as masses to Turkey and on the other hand put a heavy pressure to Damascus in order to stop violence against civilians. The incidents that took place in Syria affected Turkey - Syria relations very negatively. Moreover, it made the situation harder for Justice and Development Party as it was the eve of general elections and party administration did not want to get any initiatives prior to elections. However, circles close to AK Party it was rumored that after the elections AK Party would increase its voice and get more actively engaged in Syrian incidents.

4. Iran

In spite of the fact that the initial contacts between Turks and Persians grasped previously both nations' conversion to Islam,⁴⁴⁵ the tense junctions commenced after their acceptance of Islamic faith.⁴⁴⁶ Turks performed crucial roles in state construction period and military organization in Iran,⁴⁴⁷ whereas Turkish language and culture was deeply influenced by Persian language and traditions. Although, both Persians and Turks have converted to Islam,⁴⁴⁸ as an outcome of sectarian distinctions,⁴⁴⁹ throughout the history a close affinity did not take place between Iran and Turkey in terms of politics.⁴⁵⁰

The lands currently is noted as Iran became a province of Seljuk Turks while Persians continued to live in their culture and sects with a broad freedom,⁴⁵¹ nevertheless the relations entered a more complex period with the rise Ottoman Empires in the region. Notwithstanding to the fact that Safeties and Ottoman empires were established by Turkish origin tribes,⁴⁵²

⁴⁴⁵ Percy Sykes, *History of Persia*, Routledge Curzon, London, 1921, p. 523.

⁴⁴⁶ Mustafa Saray, *Türk - İran İlişkileri (Turkish - Iranian Relations)*, Atatürk Araştırmalar Merkezi, Ankara 2006, p.1.

⁴⁴⁷ İbrahim Kafesoğlu, *Türk Milli Kültürü (Turkish National Culture)*, Ötüken Neşriyat, İstanbul 1984, p.83.

⁴⁴⁸ Carl Brockelman, *History of Islamic People*, Routledge, London 2000, p. 43.

⁴⁴⁹ Dwight M Donaldson, *The Shi'ite, Religion, A History of Islam in Persia and Iraq*, Gordon Press Publishers, New York, 1976, p. 283.

⁴⁵⁰ Mustafa Saray, op.cit., p.5.

⁴⁵¹ Vasili V Bartold, *Turkistan: Down to the Mongol Invasion*, Luzac&Co.Ltd, London 1968, p. 475.

⁴⁵² Faruk Sümer, *Safevi Devleti'nin Kuruluşu ve Gelişmesinde Anadolu Türklerinin Rolü (Role of Anatolian Turks in Establishment and Development of Safevites)*, Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, Ankara 1976, p. 43.

Shiite orientation of Safeties brought Ottomans versus Safeties at odds.⁴⁵³ Yavuz Sultan Selim and Shah Ishmael encountered in Chaldiran plate,⁴⁵⁴ which ended with Ottoman victory.⁴⁵⁵ Two states had met many times in order to capture Baghdad, Tabriz, and Karbala.⁴⁵⁶ Toward the declining period of Ottomans, clashes over Iraq continued between the states, but as it has been underlined, a clear result for both sides did not achieved. Ottomans and Safeties signed at 1639 the agreement of “Kasr-i Shirin”⁴⁵⁷ which has not changed since today.⁴⁵⁸ The agreement barely indicates Sunni and Shiite separation of population and natural borders between Turkey and Iran, while it is highly significant owing to the fact that it displays the peaceful relation between Iran and Turkey since 17th century.

After the collapse of Ottoman Empire, Turkish - Iranian relations started to develop not on religious or sectarian axis but as two secular neighbors. Although Iran used to be a monarch country and Turkey was a republic, the secularity emphasize of both states pulled Mustafa Kemal and “Reza Shah Pahlavi”⁴⁵⁹ together.⁴⁶⁰ Additionally, the Kurdish population settling both in Iran and Turkey too caused both countries adopts similar policies toward Kurdish question.⁴⁶¹ In addition to that, the Soviet imperialism treating both states pushed Turkey and Iran develop co-operative security policies. Henceforth, Iran and Turkey signed Turkish - Iranian Friendship and Security Treaty emphasizing neighbor states good will and respect recognizing mutual borders along with sovereignty.⁴⁶² Following that, in parallel to Mustafa Kemal’s foreign policy principles,⁴⁶³ Turkey and Iran along with participation of Afghanistan and Iraq signed Sadabat Pact to create a non-aggression pact among states.⁴⁶⁴

During the Cold War period, Turkey and Iran became the United States of America’s most trusted allies in the Middle East along with Israel. Turkish - Iranian relations have advanced both economically and strategically as both states became members of CENTO

⁴⁵³ Aşıkpaşazade Tarihi, *Otoman History*, nd, İstanbul 1949, p. 250.

⁴⁵⁴ Ghulam Sarwar, *History of Shah Isma’il Safawi*, AMS Press, New York 1975, p.51.

⁴⁵⁵ Mustafa Saray, op.cit., p.28.

⁴⁵⁶ Mustafa Saray, op.cit., p.91.

⁴⁵⁷ The oldest fixed boundary in the Middle East, the Turco - Persian border, was established in 1639 by the Treaty of Kasr-i Shirin, it is also called as the Treaty of Zuhab.

⁴⁵⁸ Maurice Harari, “The Turco - Persian Boundary Question: A Case Study in Boundary Making in the Near and Middle East”, unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, Columbia University, 1958.

⁴⁵⁹ George Lenczowski, *Iran under Pahlavis*, Hoover Institute Publication, California 1978, p. 60.

⁴⁶⁰ Wojciech Skalmowski, *Atatürk, Reza Shah and Piłsudski: Paralelism and Differences in Cultural Horizons a Festschrift in Honor of Talat S. Halman*, Syracuse University Press, New York 2001, p. 144.

⁴⁶¹ Abdülhaluk Çay, *Her Yönüyle Kürt Dosyası (Kurdish Case with all Aspects)*, Turan Yayıncılık, Ankara 1993, p. 404.

⁴⁶² İsmail Sosyal, *Türkiye’nin Siyasal Anlaşmaları (Political Agreements of Turkey)*, Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, Ankara 1983 pp. 276 - 278.

⁴⁶³ Apdülhat Akşin, *Atatürk’ün Dış Politika İlkeleri ve Diplomasi (Ataturk’s Foreign Policy Principles and Diplomacy)*, Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, Ankara 1991, p. 196.

⁴⁶⁴ Mustafa Saray, op.cit., p. 122.

(Central Treaty Organization) against increasing Soviet threat and Soviet centered alliance blocs irritating both Turkey and Iran regimes.⁴⁶⁵

Mutual relations between Iran and Turkey entered a complete new phase upon Islamic revolution headed by Imam Khomeini.⁴⁶⁶ Republic of Turkey approached to Islamic revolution highly cautious suspecting Iranian endeavors of regime exportation intention to Turkish Islamist, however on contrary to international disposition isolating new Iran regime, Ankara approached Iran closely in order not to cause Tehran entirely slide to Soviet Axis.⁴⁶⁷ Ankara performed a neutral policy during Iran - Iraq war trying to foster its mediator role in Middle East focusing attention to economic and natural resource aspect of the war. Turkish - Iranian relations followed a fluctuating line in the course of history. Particularly, because of the newly emerged regional and global conjecture following the end of the Cold War, Tehran and Ankara became opponents searching for influence in Central Asia and South Caucasus as well as in Muslim world. Turkish governments from the highest level continuously stated its anxiety on PKK settlements on Iranian borders as well as connections between Turkish radical Islamist and Iran. As for Iran, there appeared distrust towards Turkey due to suspicions on support Iranian opposition with a stress on Azeri population. Tehran approached to Turkey highly cautiously in terms security perceptions,⁴⁶⁸ due to Ankara's tight relations with Israel, NATO membership and the West. Henceforth, the nature reciprocal relations between Iran and Turkey may be "characterized by both conflict and collaboration"⁴⁶⁹ called as "essential friends and natural enemies".⁴⁷⁰

Justice and Development Party governments basing its foreign policy concept on "zero problem"⁴⁷¹ principle vis -à- vis with Turkish neighborhood, embarked a cooperation orientated assertive foreign policy to obtain maximum regional collaboration in terms of economics, trade, energy, security and struggle against terror,⁴⁷² toward Islamic Republic of Iran.⁴⁷³ Over and above, "the U.S. invasion of Iraq and a mutual concern about possible

⁴⁶⁵ Mehmed Gönülöbol, Ömer Kürkçüoğlu, *Olaylarla Türk Dış Politikası (Turkish Foreign Policy with Events)*, Siyasal Kitapevi, Ankara 1987, p. 56.

⁴⁶⁶ Robin Wright, *In the Name of God: The Khomeini Decade*, Simon&Shulster, London 1989, p. 60.

⁴⁶⁷ Faik Armağanoglu, *20. Yüzyıl Siyasi Tarihi*, Türkiye İş Bankası Yayınları, Ankara 1993, p. 755.

⁴⁶⁸ Atay Akdevelioğlu, Ömer Kürkçüoğlu, „İran’la İlişkiler, 1990-2001” („Relations with Iran, 1990-2001”), in Baskın Oran (ed.) *Türk Dış Politikası*, İstanbul, İletişim Yayınları, 2005, pp. 580.

⁴⁶⁹ Gökhan Çetinkaya, "Essential Friends and Natural Enemies: the Historic Roots of Turkish - Iranian Relations", *Middle East Review of International Affairs*, Vol. VII, No. 3, September 2003, p. 116.

⁴⁷⁰ Ibidem, p. 117.

⁴⁷¹ Hasan T Kösebalaban, "Review of Strategic Depth: Turkey's International Position" *Middle East Journal*, Vol. LV, No. 4, Autumn 2001, pp. 693-694.

⁴⁷² Şaban Kardeş, "Turkey: Redrawing the Middle East Map or Building Sandcastles?", *Middle East Policy*, Volume XVII, No.1, Spring 2010, p.115.

⁴⁷³ "Party Program of Justice and Development Party",

instability in their region accelerated the rapprochement”,⁴⁷⁴ besides Kurdish question, Ankara’s relatively independent policies from the United States of America against Iraq’s occupation, common concerns on Syria’s isolation as well highly contributed to the affiliation process between Ankara and Tehran.⁴⁷⁵ Ultimately, Turkey’s support for Iran along with Brazil in nuclear enrichment issue along with Turkey’s insistence of utilizing diplomatic methods instead of applying heavy embargos isolating Iran from international community brought two neighbors closer. Justice and Development Party foreign policy decision makers, on contrary to previous experiences followed a cautious policy toward avoiding putting a special priority on Iran.⁴⁷⁶ It may be argued that during the government periods of Justice and Development Party from 2002 to 2011, Turkey - Iran relations experienced a stable direction.

Following AK Party’s formation of the government, the first time high-level visit took place between neighbors at 17-18 June 2002.⁴⁷⁷ Turkish President Ahmet Necdet Sezer paid a visit to Islamic Republic of Iran.⁴⁷⁸ Before his departure, Sezer underlined the importance and goal of the visit saying “after 9/11 incidents, international environment pressed region countries to develop more strict co-operations, thus I will envoy my ideas to my counterparts in Iran”.⁴⁷⁹ Turkish part was intending to indicate its solidarity and support to Khatemi as regard to its political reforms, to persuade realize coordinated operations against Kurdistan Workers Party Camps and to obtain trade balance with Iran. The visit was also significant for Tehran, to highlight its constructive approach toward its Western neighbor, thus Sezer was met by his counterpart Khatemi.⁴⁸⁰ The place of ceremony was also highly significant as it realized in Sadabat Palace where Turkey and Iran signed historical Sadabat Pact.⁴⁸¹

Taking into consideration that Ahmet Necdet Sezer had refused his counterpart’s invitation to attend Economic Co-operation Organization meeting took place 10th of June 2000.⁴⁸², as a consequence of “the revelations by Turkish media”⁴⁸³ as regard to Iran’s

(source: www.akparti.org.tr, <<http://eng.akparti.org.tr/english/partyprogramme.html>>, Noveber 2011).

⁴⁷⁴ C. Migdalovitz, “Turkey: Selected Foriegn.....”, op.cit., p. 16.

⁴⁷⁵ Ali Balci, Murat Yeşiltaş, “Turkey’s New Middle East Policy: The Case of the Meeting of the Foreign Ministers of Iraq’s Neighboring Countries”, *Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. XXIX, No. 4, Summer 2006, pp. 18-38.

⁴⁷⁶ Hasret D Bilici, “Foriegn Policy Orientation of Turkey’s pro-Islamist Parties: A Comparative Study of AKP and Refah”, *Turkish Studies*, Vol. IX, Issue 3, 2008, p. 407.

⁴⁷⁷ Robert W Olson, *Turkey - Iran Relations, 1974 - 2004: Revolution, Ideology, War, Coupe and Geopolitics*, Mazda Publishers, California, 2004, p. 147.

⁴⁷⁸ “Turkey’s Sezer Seeks to Settle Complicated Ties in Groundbreaking Visit to Iran”, *Associated Press Worldstream*, 17 June, 2002.

⁴⁷⁹ “Sezer İran’da” (“Sezer in Iran”), *Hürriyet*, 17 June 2002.

⁴⁸⁰ “Sezer’den İrana Rötarlı Ziyaret” (“A Retard Visit of Sezer to Iran”), *Radikal*, 17 June 2002.

⁴⁸¹ “Khatemi’s Four Warm Messages for Sezer”, *Zaman*, 18 June 2002.

⁴⁸² Özden Z Oktay, “Changing Security Perceptions in Turkish - Iranian Relations”, *Perceptions*, Summer 2004, p. 113.

involvements in assassination of secularist journalists in Turkey. Turkish President's visit to Iran was highly crucial as it barely indicates Ankara's intention toward Iran upon the current developments took place in Middle East. Besides, during his visit, Turkish President settled to Tabriz -a province majority of which densely populated with Azeri Turks- that symbolically indicates level of intention in current bilateral relations.⁴⁸⁴

Henceforth, under the frame of the visit, Ankara and Tehran signed important protocols in order to strengthen regional cooperation between the countries. In the course of visit topics like; the rebuilding of Afghanistan, Iraqi occupation and future policies develop toward the problems would arise, eventually war against PKK and Kurdish question brought to the agenda. Furthermore, trade and commerce issues between two countries came to agenda as 120 businessperson and 20 delegations accompanied to the Presidents delegation.⁴⁸⁵ Economic and financial relations between Turkey and Iran at this period also accelerated gradually. Oil, gas and energy sectors constitute a huge portion of this mutual trade relation. While Iran was seeking a way out from the United States of America and United Nations sanctions,⁴⁸⁶ Turkey was seeking alternative energy resources and enforcing its role of being a hub between East and the West.⁴⁸⁷ The economic affiliation between Turkey and Iran in terms of energy even planning a future pipeline project as well supported by the European Union as in future terms it would be possible to export Iranian oil and gas to the West thanks to which the European Union would discard of Russian energy monopoly. On the other hand, during this period AK Party government tried to develop trade relations with Iran at non-energy sector although it was highly narrowed due to sanctions.⁴⁸⁸ After President Ahmet Necdet Sezer's visit to Tehran, Turkish - Iranian trade capacity highly increased and at the year of 2007 trade between both countries hit Seven and Half billion.⁴⁸⁹

Ankara and Tehran agreed to sign a memorandum of understanding to transfer Iran gas to Europe via Turkey up to 35 billion cubic meters,⁴⁹⁰ while Iran and Turkey compromised to

⁴⁸³ Meir Litwak, "Iran", *Middle East Contemporary Survey*, Volume XXIV, 2000, p. 230.

⁴⁸⁴ Robert W Olson, op.cit., p. 147.

⁴⁸⁵ "Sezer: No One Prevents Improvement of Turkish - Iranian Ties", *Turkish Daily News*, 19 June 2002.

⁴⁸⁶ Emrullah Uslu, "Turkey - Iran Relations: A Trade Partnership or a Gateway For Iran To Escape International Sanctions", *Eurasia Daily Monitor*, Volume 6, Issue 41, 3 March 2009.

⁴⁸⁷ Emrullah Uslu, "Pipeline Construction Scoreboard: Projects Planned and Under Construction", *Pipeline and Gas Journal*, September 2008, p. 45.

⁴⁸⁸ Sedat Laçiner, "Mistrust Problem In Turkey - Iran Relations", *Journal of Turkish Weekly*, 21 February 2008, p. 35.

⁴⁸⁹ "Data and Statistics", *International Monetary Fund* (source: www.imfstatistics.org, May 2011).

⁴⁹⁰ Joe Parkinson, "Iran Sets Turkish Pipeline Project", *Wall Street Journal*, 24 July 2010

create a venture in order to build a natural gas pipeline between Turkey and Iran.⁴⁹¹ Furthermore, when gas crisis appeared between Russia and Europe, Russia decreased the gas amount to Turkey; Iran suggested supplying Turkey with more gas in order to compensate Turkey's gas demand. As a natural consequence of positive relations developed with Iran in terms of energy, Islamic Republic of Iran became the second largest gas supplier of Turkey after Russian Federation.⁴⁹² In the spring of 2009, Turkey, Iran and Syria signed a memorandum of understanding in order to raise regional trade among countries, because of which Turkey became Iran's most close trade partners.⁴⁹³ Moreover, Turkish investments at this period directed to Tabriz region where the population mostly constitutes of Azerbaijan Turks.⁴⁹⁴

Parallel to economic and trade relations, Turkish - Iranian relations also experienced an improvement period in terms of politics in the course of AKP governments. The historical visit of Turkish President became a landmark for many political and security issues between two neighbors.⁴⁹⁵ As respond to Turkish side's visit, Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmedinejad paid a "working visit"⁴⁹⁶ to İstanbul in 2008 where he met with Turkish President and Prime Minister. Iran and Turkey under the frames of this meeting signed mutual understanding agreements in the fields of economy, security, and education. As regard to Iranian President's official visit to Turkey, his reluctance to visit Ankara (Due to Presidents antipathy against secularism principle, he deliberately did not visit the mausoleum of Mustafa Kemal) attracted heavy critics over Justice and Development Party through the Turkish seculars.⁴⁹⁷

Following that, at the year of 2009, Iranian Parliamentary speaker paid an official visit to Turkish President Abdullah Gül,⁴⁹⁸ while in March of the same year Abdullah Gül attended the Economic Cooperation Organization summit which held in Iran capital Tehran.⁴⁹⁹ Under

⁴⁹¹ "Iran Says It Plans Gas Pipeline Venture With Turkey", *Reuters*, 17 December 2008.

⁴⁹² "Iran Offers More Gas To Turkey", *Associated Press*, 6 January 2009.

⁴⁹³ Şaban Kardaş, "Turkish - Iranian Economic Ties Flourish", *Eurasia Daily Monitor*, Vol. VIII, Issue 35, 18 February 2011.

⁴⁹⁴ İltir Turan, "Turkey's Iran Policy: Moving Away from Tradition," *GMF Brief On Turkey*, 25 June 2010.

⁴⁹⁵ Yoel Guzansky, Gallia Lindenstrauss, "Turkey and Iran", *Strategic Assessment*, Vol. XIV, No.1, April 2011, p. 104.

⁴⁹⁶ C. Migdalovitz, "Turkey: Selected Foreign Policy.....", op. cit., p. 16.

⁴⁹⁷ Ibidem, p. 17.

⁴⁹⁸ Ibidem, p.18.

⁴⁹⁹ Piotr Kwiatkiewicz, "Turcja a kwestia importu Kaspijskiej ropy i gazu do Europy.wieloaspektowy zarys problemu" ("Turkey and Import of Caspian Oil and Gas to Europe Issue. Multifaceted Outline of Problem"), *Polityka Energetyczna*, Vol.XII, No. 2, 2009, p. 330.

the frame of his visit,⁵⁰⁰ Turkish President met his counterpart Ahmedinejad as well as the religious leader Khamane.⁵⁰¹ Correspondingly all similar constructive development experienced between the neighbors at this period, both countries declared the 2009 as the “Iran - Turkey Culture Year” stressing the advancement of cultural aspect of bilateral agreement. As a reflection of similar positive developments, Iran declared its full support for Turkey’s membership to the European Union,⁵⁰² while Turkey supported Iranian arguments in international arena to soften economic sanctions applied against Tehran. On the other hand, Iran and Turkey co-operated many regional issues like Iraqi neighborhood countries conference and the meeting of Friends of Democratic Pakistan focusing the methods of reaching stability in Pakistan. Iran and Turkey hold similar positions in many regional issues like Iraq, as both countries advocated the unity of Iraq while the instability at Afghanistan and Pakistan were the common concerns of both states against jeopardizing regional stability.⁵⁰³

During the controversial Presidential elections hold in Iran in 2009, Turkey continued its pragmatist - realist approach toward Tehran. On contrary to its Western allies, Ankara did not direct a harsh criticism against Iran related to election fault claims that resulted in heavy protests in Iran. Turkish President and Prime Minister were among the world leaders who congratulated Mahmoud Ahmedinejad for his re-election.⁵⁰⁴ Turkish Foreign Minister referred the event as ‘the domestic issue of Iran’⁵⁰⁵ while Prime Minister Erdoğan called Iran as a “friend” of Turkey and underlined that Turkey will act in accordance to this principle.⁵⁰⁶

In the autumn of 2009, Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan settled to Tehran to discuss various regional issues with Iranian officials.⁵⁰⁷ Owing to the fact that the timing of the visit coincided with a period of Turkey’s turmoil relations with Israel,⁵⁰⁸ high rank officials of Islamic Republic like Parliamentary speaker Ali Larijani expressed his full support toward Turkey calling for close cooperation in Islamic world.⁵⁰⁹ In November 2009, Ahmadinejad visited Turkey to take part in the Organization of the Islamic Conference Economic Summit in İstanbul. Besides, the military forces of both countries reached a

⁵⁰⁰ Bülent Aras, Rabiya Karakaya Polat, “From Conflict to Cooperation: Desecuritization of Turkey’s Relations with Syria and Iran”, *Security Dialogue*, Vol. XXXIX, No. 5, October 2008, p. 538.

⁵⁰¹ Ibidem, p. 539.

⁵⁰² “Iran Advocates Turkey’s Membership at EU”, *IRNA*, 11 June 2009.

⁵⁰³ Henri J Barker, “Iran and Turkey”, *USIP*, Washington 2010.

⁵⁰⁴ C. Migdalovitz, “Turkey: Selected Foriegn.....”, op. cit., p. 18.

⁵⁰⁵ “FM Urges Iranians to Accept Election”, *Hürriyet Daily News*, 23 June 2009.

⁵⁰⁶ Robert Tait, “Iran is our Friend, Says Turkish PM Alongside Swipe at Disdainful EU”, *The Guardian*, 26 October 2009.

⁵⁰⁷ Stephen Larrabee, “Turkey Rediscovered the Middle East”, *Foreign Affairs*, July/August 2007.

⁵⁰⁸ “PM Visits Iran, Receives Praise over Nuke Row, Israel”, *Hürriyet Daily News*, 27 October 2009.

⁵⁰⁹ “Larijani Says Iran - Turkey Cooperation Can Strengthen Regional Security”, *Payvand Iran News*, 28 October 2009.

consensus to fight against separatists PKK militants at Turkish border Iran and Iraq border in 2009.⁵¹⁰

The political affiliation between Iran and Turkey highly consolidated as the international pressure against Iran augmented in terms of Iran's nuclear enrichment program. Republic of Turkey stated that it officially recognizes the right of Iran, a member of the Treaty on the Non Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, to develop nuclear technology, if it remains on a peaceful track and allows for the application of full-scope safeguard inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency.⁵¹¹ In addition to that, "Turkish officials state that Iran has the right to develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and has called on Iran to cooperate with the International Atomic Energy Agency to demonstrate that its nuclear program has peaceful intentions".⁵¹² As regard to Iran's nuclear issues, Turkish PM reckoned in an interview "States have the right to possess nuclear energy to utilize for peaceful purposes". He also emphasized that Turkey has good neighborly relations with Iran and that the two countries have developed mechanisms for the purpose of cooperation on security issues".⁵¹³

After Turkey's initials of being a mediator between Israel and Syria, this time Turkey was determined to be a peace builder between Iran and the United States of America in terms of nuclear enrichment program.⁵¹⁴ Turkey tried to push Iran into cooperate with International Atomic Energy Agency [to agree on an incentive package offered by the five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council and Germany (P5+1)]⁵¹⁵ to freeze Iran's enrichment program in the course of Iran President's visit to Turkey. But Ahmedinejad rejected Turkey's initiatives under the pretext that the enrichment program was bearing peaceful purposes. Justice and Development Party government foreign policy decision makers applied all possible diplomatic ways not to isolate Iran from international community. However, Ankara's endeavors highly disturbed Washington and Brussels that searched methods to urge Turkey to stop its open support for Tehran (e.g. at this period, the U.S. officials hold the

⁵¹⁰ "Iran, Turkey Fight PKK Militants", *UPI*, 11 December 2009.

⁵¹¹ Mustafa Kibaroglu, Barış Çağlar, "Implications of a Nuclear Iran for Turkey". *Middle East Policy*, Vol. XV, No. 4, Winter 2008, p. 64.

⁵¹² C. Migdalovitz, "Turkey: Selected Foreign.....", op. cit., p. 18.

⁵¹³ "Gül'den Sonra Erdoğan'dan da İran'a Güvence" ("Assurances to Iran from Erdogan after Gul"), *Milliyet*, 12 March 2007.

⁵¹⁴ Jonny Dymond, "Turkey FM Davutoglu Embraces Mediation Role", *BBC News*, 3 December 2009.

⁵¹⁵ C.Migdalovitz, "Turkey: Selected Foreign.....", op. cit., p. 18.

position that the planned pipeline between Turkey and Iran would violate United Nation sanctions applied versus Iran).⁵¹⁶

While United Nation member countries were discussing sanction plans against Iran, Turkey and Brazil took an unexpected initiative to Iran's uranium enrichment program.⁵¹⁷ In accordance with the achieved agreement among parts that called as "Nuclear Fuel-Swap Deal",⁵¹⁸ Iran would inform the uranium barter suggestion to International Atomic Energy Commission.⁵¹⁹ If Iran's suggestion would be approved by Wien group -which is constitutes of countries like: the United States of America, Russia, France- Iran will transfer 1.200 kg low degree enriched uranium to Turkey. During this period, this item would be accepted at Iranian property and both Tehran and International Atomic Energy Commission would have right to send a delegation to Turkey to examine security of uranium.⁵²⁰ Over against, the Wien group would provide Iran with 120 kg enriched Uranium, but Iran would not have any opportunity to produce a nuclear weapon with it.⁵²¹ Turkey and Brazil's last minute diplomatic attack caused a sober reaction in global scale. United Nations and Russia found the agreement positive with strong reservations while the European Union declared that there are still questions to answer adding that the agreement will not be a complete satisfaction.⁵²² Along with Brazil, Turkey refused to accept United Nations Security Council sanctions against Iran,⁵²³ which was accepted unanimously. Turkey's behavior at United Nations caused tough criticism of United States⁵²⁴ and the European Union while Turkey's foreign policy decision makers advocated applying all diplomatic methods in nuclear program issue.⁵²⁵

⁵¹⁶ Andrew Barker, Alex Ward, "US in Warning to Turkey over Terms of Energy Deal with Iran", *Financial Times*, 14 August 2008.

⁵¹⁷ Graham Fuller, "Brazil and Turkey Shift Global Politics", *New Perspectives Quarterly*, Vol. XXVII, No 3, Summer 2010, p.24.

⁵¹⁸ "Iran Signs Nuclear Fuel-Swap Deal with Turkey and Brasil", *The Telegraph*, 17 May 2010.

⁵¹⁹ "Iran Signs Nuclear Fuel-Swap Deal with Turkey", *BBC News*, 17 May 2010.

⁵²⁰ Julian Borger, "Text of the Iran - Brazil Deal", *The Guardian*, 17 May 2010.

⁵²¹ "Iran Nuclear Fuel Swap to Take Place in Turkey, Ambiguity Prevails", *Today's Zaman*, 18 May 2010.

⁵²² Mehmet Özkan, "Turkey - Brazil Involvement in Iranian Nuclear Issue: What is the Big Deal?", *Strategic Analysis*, Vol.XXXV, Issue 1, 2010, p. 26.

⁵²³ C.Migdalovitz, "Turkey: Selected Foriegn.....", op. cit., p. 18.

⁵²⁴ James Canter, "U.S. 'Disappointed' in Turkish Vote on Sanctions", *International Herald Tribune*, 12 June 2010.

⁵²⁵ Carol Migdalovitz, "AKP's Domestically Driven Foreign Policy", *Turkish Policy Quarterly*, Vol.IX, No. 4, p.44.

5. Israel and Palestinian Issue

First time contacts between Turks and Jews took place upon the conquest of Anatolia and Constantinople.⁵²⁶ Relation prospects between Turks and Jews gained acceleration within 1491,⁵²⁷ when Jews were starting to be expelled with inquisitions in Iberia peninsula.⁵²⁸ Ottoman Sultan introduced asylum to Jews sending Ottoman navels whose number were approximately hitting 200.000.⁵²⁹ The “Sephardim”⁵³⁰ Jews were allowed to settle in “Constantinople”⁵³¹ and Thessaloniki.⁵³² Afterwards, The Jews of Ottoman found a vast independence under the multi cultural ambience of the Empire exercising their religious belief in a complete freedom. Moreover, they were also provided with high rank position both in state and military levels as well as they gained priorities arts and trade market of Ottoman Empire.⁵³³

Following the establishment of Israel State, first time diplomatic relations between Turkey and Israel commenced when Turkey became the first country as a state the population of which was constituted of majority Muslims recognized the Israel shortly after its establishment.⁵³⁴ The mutual relations between Israel and Turkey gained acceleration during the government periods of Adnan Menderes and Ben Gurion,⁵³⁵ as both states initialized close affiliations in the fields of military,⁵³⁶ intelligence and industry cooperation.⁵³⁷ The Cold War played a determinative role of the convergence of both states.⁵³⁸ As it has been observed by Dunkar Rustow:

⁵²⁶ Ahmet H Eroğlu, *Osmanlı Devletinde Yahudiler: XIX Yüzyılın Sonuna Kadar (Jews in Ottoman Empire: Till the end of XIX Century)*, Alperen, Ankara 2000, p. 110.

⁵²⁷ Avigdor Levy, *The Jews of the Ottoman Empire*, Darwin Press, Michigan 1994, p. 14.

⁵²⁸ Edward Peters, *Inquisition*, University of California Press, California 1989, p. 75.

⁵²⁹ Walter F Weiker, Merkaz H Yerushalmi, *Ottomans, Turks and the Jewish Polity: A History of Jews of Turkey*, University Press of America, Michigan 1992, p. 29.

⁵³⁰ Avigdor Levy, *The Sephardim in the Ottoman Empire*, Darwin Press, Michigan 1992, p. 60.

⁵³¹ Albert Löwy, *The Jews of Constantinople: a Study of their Communal and Educational Status*, Wertheimer, Lea & Co, London 1890, p. 3.

⁵³² Joseph R Hacker, *Ottoman Policies towards the Jews and Jewish Attitudes towards Ottomans during the Fifteenth Century in Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire*, Holmes and Meier Publisher, New York 1982, p. 117.

⁵³³ Bernard Lewis, *The Jews of Islam*, Princeton University Press, New Jersey 1984, pp. 2-10.

⁵³⁴ Ofra Bengio, *The Turkish - Israeli Relationship: Ties of Middle Eastern Outsiders*, Palgrave Macmillian, New York 2009, p. 2.

⁵³⁵ Michael B Zohar, *Ben Gurion: A Biography*, Wiedenfeld and Nicolson, London 1977, p. 264.

⁵³⁶ Philip Robbins, *Suits and Uniforms: Turkish Foreign Policy since the Cold War*. C. Hurst & Co Publishers Ltd., London 2003, p. 242.

⁵³⁷ Gruen George, “Turkey’s Relations with Israel: From Ambivalence to Open Cooperation”, *Studies on Turkish Jewish History*, 1993, p. 115.

⁵³⁸ Amikam Nachmani, “The Remarkable Turkish - Israeli Tie”, *Middle East Quarterly*, Vol. II, No.2, June 1998, p. 23.

It is Turkey's firm alliance with the West that make possible Moscow's recurrent setbacks in Cairo, Baghdad, and other Arab Capitals...Only behind that same barrier can Israel maintain its status as a regional power and cope with continuing Arab hostilities without risking facing in Golan heights not just Soviet arms supplied to Syria, but the full force of the Red Army.⁵³⁹

When Israel and Arab nations confronted at Six-Day War, Turkey abstained to sign a declaration condemning Israel as an aggressor state, furthermore Turkey refused the proposal of Islamic Conference conclusion declaration to call Muslim nations to break diplomatic relations with Israel state.⁵⁴⁰ Diplomatic relations between Ankara and Tel Aviv entered a recession period when Turkey downgraded its diplomatic mission in Tel Aviv to a symbolic level, as a reaction to Israeli aggressive politics closing peace-building process in Middle East conflict. Meanwhile, Turkey announced that it recognizes the existence of a Palestinian state,⁵⁴¹ thus became the first nation holding diplomatic relations with Israel recognizing the existence of Palestine state, however, it did not grant a full diplomatic status to representatives of Palestine. Nonetheless, "In the 1990s, relations between Israel and Turkey greatly expanded and reached an unprecedented degree of closeness. Thence, Israel - Turkey entente has become an important element in the politics of the Middle East and Eastern Mediterranean areas".⁵⁴² Turkey's struggle with Kurdish separatist terror pushed Ankara to develop new coalitions and cooperation perspectives with Israel. Furthermore, problems with Greece, Iraq, Syria and Iran in terms of Kurdish questions along with spoiling relations with the European Union highly contributed this affiliation process.⁵⁴³

Turkey and Israel in this period signed many strategic and military agreements.⁵⁴⁴ Turkish army undertook a complete renovation and modernization thanks to technology bought from Israel that was used in Turkish tanks and planes.⁵⁴⁵ Israel shared intelligence with Turkey, which Republic of Turkey used against PKK.⁵⁴⁶ Both states signed many trade, tourism and cultural agreements that caused an affiliation between Ankara and Tel Aviv,

⁵³⁹ Dunkar A Rustow, *Turkey: America's Forgotten Ally*, Council on Foreign Relations, New York 1987, pp. 109 -110.

⁵⁴⁰ Dov Waxman, "Turkey and Israel: A New Balance of Power in the Middle East", *Washington Quarterly*, Vol. XXII, No. 1 (Winter 1999), p. 31.

⁵⁴¹ Kamer Kasım, *Türkiye - İsrail İlişkileri: İki Bölgesel Gücün Stratejik Ortaklığı (Turkish - Israel Relations: Cooperation of Two Regional Powers)*, Alfa, İstanbul 2001,p. 554.

⁵⁴² Efraim Inbar, "Regional Implications of Israeli - Turkish Strategic Partnership", *Middle East Review of International Affairs*, Vol. V, No. 2, June 2001.

⁵⁴³ Eli Bar Nevi, "The EU: Policies towards Israel and Turkey" in (ed.) Bruce M Weitzman, Asher Susser, *Turkish - Israeli Relations in a Trans Atlantic Context*, Wider Europe and the Greater Middle East Conference Proceedings, The Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies, Tel Aviv University, 2005, p. 97.

⁵⁴⁴ Yılmaz Türel, "Türkiye - İsrail İlişkileri: Tarihten Günümüze", ("Turkish - Israel Relations: Past and Present"), *Akademik Ortadoğu*, 2010, Vol. V, No. 1, pp. 17-18.

⁵⁴⁵ B. Oran, "TDP'nin Kuramsal", op.cit., p. 643.

⁵⁴⁶ Ibid.

while at this period Turkish and Israel high level officials -both civil and military- visited each other as the armies undertook common military exercises.⁵⁴⁷ Moreover, Jewish lobby in the United States of America assisted Turkey to stop Armenian genocide claims in United States House of Representatives.⁵⁴⁸

Yet, the mutual relations entered a degradation process with Ariel Sharon government when Tel Aviv initialized rigorous policies towards Palestinians. As a reaction to unbalanced power usage of Israel giving birth to heavy civilian causality, Turkish Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit fiercely criticized Israel blaming it for committing genocides against Palestinians.⁵⁴⁹ Nevertheless, a similar severe criticism did not harm reciprocal relation as Turkey signed a 668 million United State Dollar protocol with Israel to upgrade Turkish tanks following that, what is more both states signed an agreement at value of 800 million U.S. Dollars importing fresh water from Turkish Manavgat to Israel.⁵⁵⁰

The complex nature of Turkish - Israeli relations was characterized by former Prime Minister of Israel, Ben Gurion, in a complaining manner as follows: "The Turks have always treated us as one treats mistress, and not as a partner in an openly avowed marriage".⁵⁵¹ Besides, Ofra Bengio observes "Turkish - Israeli relations have intrigued observers and scholars. To some they looked special, to others they appeared abnormal".⁵⁵² Henceforth, the characteristic feature of reciprocal relations between Ankara and Israel based on pragmatic factors that shaped through the interdependency along with mutual interests of states. Ankara favored close relations with Israel to gain intelligence, technology and military support of Israel, while Tel Aviv enjoyed Turkish cooperation as a balance in Muslim world and many strategic issues including water issues. Besides, the cooperation prospect between the parts was supported by the United States of America as well to keep its balance in the Middle East.⁵⁵³

It may be argued that since the establishment of reciprocal relations with Israel, Republic of Turkey experienced the worst period with Tel Aviv during the government

⁵⁴⁷ Amikam Nachmani, *Israeli - Turkish Relations*, The Laying of Foundation, Friedrich - Naumann Foundation, Ankara 1992, p. 10.

⁵⁴⁸ Dietrich Jung, Wolfgang Piccoli, op.cit. p.169.

⁵⁴⁹ "Turkey Accuses Israel of Genocide", *BBC News*, 4 April 2002.

⁵⁵⁰ Oktay Ekşi, "Manavgat Still Tests Turkish - Israeli Relations", *Turkish Probe*, 10 November 2002.

⁵⁵¹ Amikam Nachmani, *Israel Turkey and Greece: Uneasy Relations in the East Mediterranean*, Frank Cass, London 1987, p. 77.

⁵⁵² Ofra Belgio, "The Historical Evolution of the Israeli - Turkish Relationship", in Bruce Maddy-Weitzman and Asher Susser (eds.) *Turkish-Israeli Relations in a TransAtlantic Context: Wider Europe and the Greater Middle East*. Conference Proceedings, The Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies, Tel Aviv University 2005, p. 51.

⁵⁵³ Hillel Kuttler, "US Backs Israeli - Turkish Co-operations", *Jerusalem Post*, 11 May 2007.

periods of Justice and Development Party. Yet, one may observe that, during the beginning of new millennium Turkish - Israeli relations were not following a similar trend as it used to be in 90's. Previous to establishment of AK Party government, the aggressive attitude of Sharon government was exploited a harsh criticism by Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit, which is highly important to trace clues in order to comprehend level of reciprocal relations.

Justice and Development Party's landslide victory in general elections initially did not disturb the nature of bilateral agreements;⁵⁵⁴ the mutual relations at the first stage did not experience a sudden change. On the other hand, notably on Israel's side concerns on Justice and Development Party's Islamic roots and alleged secret Islamic agenda caused deep concerns in dread that might seriously harm strategic relations.⁵⁵⁵ Nevertheless, the tension accelerated with changing regional politics and power balances. First disputes between Israel and Turkey rose when Turkish media claimed Israeli intelligence activities in Northern Iraq.⁵⁵⁶ As regard to news appearing at Turkish media, Turkish officials conveyed their concerns⁵⁵⁷ over the claims proposing Israeli professional forces and training⁵⁵⁸ "Mossad"⁵⁵⁹ in Northern Iraq. As Kibaroglu stresses "Turkey has always been uneasy about the aspirations of Iraqi Kurds; any prospect of Iraq coming apart and the emergence of an independent Kurdish entity in Northern Iraq produces wariness among Turkish statesmen and the military alike".⁵⁶⁰

The claims were immediately refused by Israeli authorities urging Turkey that Israel informs all its activities as regard to Northern Iraq as a condition of being good ally and strategic partner.⁵⁶¹ While the tension between the parts was gradually calming, the controversial article of Jewish origin New Yorker columnist Seymour Hersh ignited the discussion again. According to column, Israel state was undertaking certain activities not excluding military trainee of Iraqi Kurds to guarantee itself and constitute a balance against a potential Shiite danger or Shiite state that might come to existence between Iraq and Iran. The

⁵⁵⁴ C. Migdalovitz, "Turkey: Selected Foreign.....", op.cit., p. 10.

⁵⁵⁵ "A Strategic Friendship Cools", *The Economist*, 24 June 2004.

⁵⁵⁶ "Mossad Kuzey Irak'ta Cirit Atıyor" ("Mossad is in Northern Iraq") *Sabah*, 22 June 2004.

⁵⁵⁷ "Gül Gerekli Uyarıları Yapıyoruz" ("We Do All Required Movements") *Sabah*, 24 June 2004.

⁵⁵⁸ "Kürtleri Mossad Eğitti" ("Kurds were Trained by Mossad") *Bugün*, 24 November 2009.

⁵⁵⁹ Şalom Nakdimon, *Irak ve Ortadoğu'da Mossad (Mossad in Iraq and Middle East)*, Elips Yayınları, Ankara 2008, p. 17.

⁵⁶⁰ Mustafa Kibaroglu, "Clash of Interest Over Northern Iraq Drives Turkish - Israeli Alliance to a Crossroads", *Middle East Journal*, Vol.LIX, No. 2, Spring 2000, p. 247.

⁵⁶¹ Mustafa Kibaroglu, "Turkey and Israel Strategize", *Middle East Quarterly*, Vol. IX, No. 1, Winter 2002, p. 61.

mutual relations was soften previously became worse one more time due to the publication of the article.⁵⁶²

In 2004, when Israeli army assassinated Sheikh Ahmed Yassin,⁵⁶³ Ankara under the Justice and Development Party government took a highly critical position against Tel Aviv. Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan called Israel's action as a "terrorist act".⁵⁶⁴ Additionally, Turkish PM compared Israel's attitude toward Palestinian like the way Jews exposed by Spanish Inquisition and he commented, "Latest Israeli aggressive actions give rise to anti-Semitism in the world".⁵⁶⁵

Yet, Prime Minister Erdoğan sent his top foreign policy decision makers to Tel Aviv in order to express Ankara's position properly upon rising tension between the parts. A delegation headed by Justice and Development Party Foreign Affairs Council director Şaban Dişli and Prime Minister Erdoğan's former foreign policy advisor Egemen Bağış settled to Israel.⁵⁶⁶ After the commission's visit, Abdullah Gül as the Foreign Minister of Republic of Turkey paid the following visit to Israel to calm the tension between Ankara and Tel Aviv.⁵⁶⁷ Eventually, Turkish Prime Minister undertook an official visit to Israel at 2005.⁵⁶⁸ During his two days visit Primer Erdoğan met Israeli high rank officials along with Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, President Moshe Katsav and opposition leaders. He also met with Turkish origin Jews living in Israel. Erdoğan, during his trip, as well visited Palestinian territories. Turkish Prime Minister's visit was highly crucial for mutual relations for the initial perspectives of Justice and Development Party's Middle East politics and Israeli relations.⁵⁶⁹ Following the

⁵⁶² Seymour M Hersh, "Plan B", *The New Yorker*, 28 June 2004.

⁵⁶³ **Sheikh Ahmed Yassin**: Palestinian Islamist leader (b. mid-1930s?, Tor, Palestine [now in Israel]—d. March 22, 2004, Gaza City, Israel), cofounded and provided spiritual inspiration for the militant Palestinian organization Hamas. Yassin grew up in Palestinian refugee camps in Gaza, then part of Egypt. A boyhood sporting accident injured his spine and left him crippled. He became affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood as a young man, eventually becoming leader of the local chapter in Gaza, from which he extended his influence to the West Bank branch of the organization. With the founding of a centre that provided social services to Palestinians, his more religiously oriented organization was seen by Israel as less threatening than the Palestine Liberation Organization. With the start of the 1987 intifadah, however, Yassin helped found Hamas, which undertook suicide bombings and other terrorist attacks against Israel and Palestinians who cooperated with Israel. Yassin was imprisoned in 1989 but was released in a prisoner exchange in 1997. When the second intifadah began in 2000, Yassin's stature increased still further. He was killed in a targeted Israeli strike.

"Sheikh Ahmed Yassin".in Encyclopædia Britannica Online, (source:www.britannica.com,<<http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/755175/Shaykh-Ahmad-Yasin>>, April 2010).

⁵⁶⁴ "Turkish PM Condemns Killing of Yassin as 'Terrorist Act'", *Xinhua News Agency*, 24 March 2004.

⁵⁶⁵ Ibid.

⁵⁶⁶ "AKP'den İsrail Çıkarması" ("AKP in Israel"), *Birgün*, 30 August 2004.

⁵⁶⁷ "A Strategic Friendship Cools", *The Economist*, 24 June 2004.

⁵⁶⁸ Efraim Inbar "Erdoğan Arrives", *The Journal of Turkish Weekly*, 2 May 2005.

⁵⁶⁹ "Turkish PM Erdoğan to Visit Israel, Palestine", *The Journal of Turkish Weekly*, 30 April 2005.

PM's visit, an Israeli council paid a visit to Turkey in order to materialize the agreement made during Erdoğan's visit to Israel.⁵⁷⁰

Turkish - Israeli relations encountered a new challenge as the peace process became more complicated after the legislative elections held in Palestine National Authority when Hamas⁵⁷¹ announced its victory at Gaza strip in 2006.⁵⁷² Due to aggressive activities of military wing of Hamas (Izzeddin al Qassam Brigades) the European Union, the United States of America and Israel classify Hamas as a terrorist organization,⁵⁷³ while Russia, Turkey and United Nation do not, hence due to status of Hamas as an organization and outcome of elections reciprocal relations between Ankara and Tel Aviv tensed repeatedly.

Upon the Hamas victory, Turkish Prime Minister mentioned that international community should respect free will of Palestinian, underlying "The choice of the people must be respected, whether one likes it or not",⁵⁷⁴ moreover Justice and Democrat Party invited a delegation of Hamas headed by⁵⁷⁵ "Khaleed Meashal"⁵⁷⁶ to Ankara.⁵⁷⁷ It was firstly announced that Hamas politburo head would be hosted by Prime Minister Erdoğan but due to severe criticism,⁵⁷⁸ Turkish Prime Minister announced that he would not meet with Khaleed Meashal while Hamas leader undertook a meeting with former Turkish FM Abdullah Gül.⁵⁷⁹ In order not to increase criticism they did not conduct public meeting in government buildings and hosted Hamas delegation in the AKP headquarters.⁵⁸⁰ High rank Israeli officials expressed their deep concerns underlining that it might harm historical Turkish - Israeli relations that might cause uncorrectable consequences in future respective. What is more,

⁵⁷⁰ Giray Burcu, *Turkish Policy Toward the Israeli - Palestinian Conflict in Muslim Attitudes to Jews and Israel: The Ambivalences of Rejection, Antagonism, Tolerance and Cooperation*, Sussex Academic Press, Sussex 2010, p. 169.

⁵⁷¹ **Hamas:** The militant Palestinian group Hamas is dedicated to the creation of an Islamic state in Palestine. The name Hamas is an acronym that stands for Harakat al-Muqawamah al-Islamiyyah (in English, Islamic Resistance Movement). It was founded in 1987 by Sheikh Ahmad Yasin, a Muslim religious leader. "Hamas" in Encyclopædia Britannica Online, (source: www.britannica.com, <<http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/253202/Hamas>>, July 2011).

⁵⁷² Wilson Scott, "Hamas Sweeps Palestinian Elections, Complicating Peace Efforts in Middle East", *Washington Post*, 27 January 2007.

⁵⁷³ Anton L Guardia, "Hamas is Added to EU's Blacklist of Terror", *The Telegraph*, 12 September 2003.

⁵⁷⁴ Soner Çagatay, "Hamas Visits Ankara: The AKP Shifts Turkey's Role in the Middle East", *The Washington Institute for Near East Policy*, 16 February 2006.

⁵⁷⁵ **Khaleed Mashaal:** He is among the founders of the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas) and the head of its politbureau since 1996, he has been the recognized head of the movement since the assassination of Sheikh Ahmad Yassin in spring 2004.

⁵⁷⁶ William M Hale, Ergun Özbudun, op.cit., 147.

⁵⁷⁷ Amanda Akçakoca, "Turkish Foreign Policy between East and West?", *European Policy Centre*, Policy Brief, October 2009, p.3.

⁵⁷⁸ Gareth Jenkin, "Opportunities Gained or Lost?", *Al Ahram*, 23 February 2006.

⁵⁷⁹ "Erdoğan Görüşmedi" ("Erdoğan did not Meet"), *Milliyet*, 16 February 2006.

⁵⁸⁰ Mustafa Kibaroglu, Ayşe Kibaroglu, *Global Security Watch - Turkey: A Reference Book*, Greenwood Publishing Group, Westport 2009, p. 157.

some Israeli authorities like spokesperson Ranaan Gissin notified that “I wonder what the Turkish authorities would think if we were to invite [PKK leader] Abdullah Öcalan for talks in Israel?”⁵⁸¹ While Turkish side declared that a similar comparison would be “groundless and wrong”,⁵⁸² according to PKK - Hamas comparison that would occupy top agenda in Turkish - Israeli relation at this period.⁵⁸³

The U.S. officials also stated their anxiety on Hamas visit,⁵⁸⁴ and underlined that it is a futile effort of Ankara to make talks with Hamas politburo head, as they firstly should stop the violence against Israeli state.⁵⁸⁵ On the other hand, Turkish seculars directed their criticism towards JDP government accusing it to turn Turkey’s foreign policy toward Middle East and Justice and Development Party to advance tight relations with other Islamic oriented Middle East regimes and parties as Hasan Koni evaluated the meeting as “a premature and ill-calculated move”.⁵⁸⁶ As for the AK Party, foreign policy decision makers stand on the point that it required a meeting emphasizing on Turkey’s new initiatives on the Middle East. It was also underlined that Khaleed Mashaal’s visit was highly fruitful in terms of peace process between Israel and Palestinian. Foreign Ministry of Turkey issued a statement after the Hamas visit underlining “The Hamas delegation was reminded of the expectations of the international community and of the importance of adopting a judicious, pragmatic and conciliatory approach.”⁵⁸⁷ Besides, Turkish Foreign Minister supported Turkey’s policy and acceptance of Hamas leader advocating Turkey’s role as a mediator in Middle East and as an agent who may urge to stick to democracy in order to provide a peace prospect between Israelis and Palestinians underling the democratic victory of Hamas during elections.

As it is mentioned above Turkish - Israeli relations experienced a fluctuating line in this time period. The economic and strategic relations particularly during the first period of JDP government did not harm as “Israel and Turkey have agreed an extraordinary “water for arms” deal which will sees millions of gallons of fresh water being shipped in giant tankers across the eastern Mediterranean and into Israeli ports”.⁵⁸⁸ Following that, AKP government

⁵⁸¹ “Turkey Rejects Israeli Critics”, *BBC News*, 17 February 2006.

⁵⁸² Ibid.

⁵⁸³ Pemra Hazbay, “Political Relations between Turkey and Israel. Implications of Booming Bilateral Trade for the Two Countries and the Middle East”, *Washington Institute for Near East Policy*, Washington 26 May 2006, p. 459.

⁵⁸⁴ Graham Fuller, *The New Turkish Republic: Turkey as a Pivotal State in the Muslim World*, United States Institute of Peace, Washington 2008, p. 122.

⁵⁸⁵ “ABD’nin Ankara Büyükelçilişi Wilson: Görüşmelerde Net bir Cevap Verilmeli” (“USA Embassy Wilson: There Should be Clear Answers during the Meetings”), *Milliyet*, 16 February 2006.

⁵⁸⁶ “Turkey Allows Hamas Visit”, *Los Angeles Times*, 17 February 2006.

⁵⁸⁷ Ibid.

⁵⁸⁸ John Vidal, “Israeli Water for Arm Deal with Turkey”, *The Guardian*, 14 April 2006.

increased its peacemaking role in Israel - Palestine conflict and to boost Turkey's engagement in the Middle gathered Israel and Palestine Presidents together in Ankara.⁵⁸⁹ After the meetings took place between Simon Peres and Mahmoud Abbas both leaders addressed in Turkish National Assembly with optimism upon upcoming peace conference that would take place in New York,⁵⁹⁰ and hoped for the peace.⁵⁹¹ With his address in Turkish Parliament, Israeli leader became the first President of Israel speak before the legislature of a Muslim predominant country,⁵⁹² where he notified "We may be saying different prayers, but our eyes are turned toward the same sky and toward the same vision for the Middle East".⁵⁹³

In the December of 2008, Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert paid a high level visit to Ankara,⁵⁹⁴ in order to discuss themes like Israel - Syrian conflict, Palestine problem, Hamas, along with economic and strategic relation prospects between the countries. During his visit, the Prime Ministers of both countries talked for five hours, and then Olmert met with Turkish President. The main agenda of the meeting was peace talks between Israel and Syria, as Israeli Prime Minister said before his visit to Turkey that "a peace with Syria is achievable".⁵⁹⁵ Ankara prior to Olmert's visit achieved to settle another indirect talk between Israel and Syria, which was an essential step for the initials of direct talks; furthermore due to Turkey's contributions the sides almost finish a common text to settle talks.⁵⁹⁶

Nevertheless, shortly after Israeli Prime Ministers return to home, Israel initiated a huge military operation called "Operation Cast Lead",⁵⁹⁷ which soured the relations with a tone of harsh criticism wave by Justice and Development Government headed by Turkish PM Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. Turkish PM, increasing the dosage of criticism, accused Israel for being an "aggressive state"⁵⁹⁸ while international community as well reacted Israeli attacks calling Gaza strict as "a sort of open air prison".⁵⁹⁹ On the other hand, Turkish FM Babacan expressed his frustration with Israel's attack saying "it is not possible to battle in Israel - Palestine front while there is a negotiate peace in Israel - Syrian front".⁶⁰⁰

⁵⁸⁹ "Ankara'da Tarihi Buluşma" ("Historical Meeting in Ankara"), *Sabah*, 13 November 2007.

⁵⁹⁰ C. Migdalovitz, "Turkey: Selected Foreign.....", op.cit., p.18.

⁵⁹¹ William M. Hale, Ergun Özbudun, op.cit., p.143.

⁵⁹² "Israeli President Addresses Turkish Parliament", *The New York Times*, 13 November 2007.

⁵⁹³ Ibid.

⁵⁹⁴ "Israel's Olmert Visits Turkey to Discuss Talks with Syria", *Today's Zaman*, 23 December 2008.

⁵⁹⁵ "A Peace with Syria is Achievable Says Israel's Olmert", *Reuters*, 18 December 2008.

⁵⁹⁶ Meliha B Altunışık, "The Role of Turkey in Middle East", *Mediterranean Politics*, 2009, pp. 210-213.

⁵⁹⁷ Marie Colvin, "Israeli Tanks Roll into Gaza to Crush Hamas", *The Times*, 03 January 2009.

⁵⁹⁸ Serpil Açıklan, "Gaza Attacks: The US, Its Arab Allies and Turkey", *USAK Year Book*, Vol.2, 2009, p.428.

⁵⁹⁹ "Gaza is a Prison Camp, says David Cameron", *The Telegraph*, 27 July, 2010.

⁶⁰⁰ "Dışişleri Bakanı Babacan: Operasyonlar Durdurulsun" ("Turkish Foreign Minister Babacan, Operation should be Stopped"), *Milliyet*, 30 December 2008.

According to Carol Migdalovitz, the main reason for Justice and Development Party government's reactive attitude toward Israel was commented as a betrayal by Israel. Turkey's foreign policy was trying to gather active participation of other countries against Israeli attacks in the Middle East. It felt disrespected during peace building process between Israel and Syria.⁶⁰¹ Additionally, AKP government also lost its trust to Israel government as Gaza attack took place five days after Olmert's visit to Turkey believing in that Prime Minister of Israel had the information about the upcoming attacks and he did not share it with AK Party during the visit. On the other hand, Israel reacted against Turkish PM's "inflammatory condemnations of Israel became unrelenting and he did not mention Hamas's indiscriminate rocket attacks against southern Israel, which Israel cited as the reason for its campaign".⁶⁰²

Turkey not only criticized Israel but also motioned action in international arena calling United Nations to dismiss Israel for its brutal attacks in Gaza strict. Turkey's open challenge against to Israel increased Turkey's and in person Prime minister's popularity in Arab world as other Arab states contented with denouncing Israeli attacks. When it comes to Israel's side, as a reply to Turkey's severe criticism and tough attitude toward Israel, Tel Aviv defended itself underling its right to protect itself. Turkish policies against Israel were adamantly criticized as PKK - Hamas comparison one time came into agenda.⁶⁰³ Besides, the alleged claims proposing Turkey's "axis shift"⁶⁰⁴ from Western orbit to Islamic line under the Justice and Development Party government coincides at this period. In a period when reciprocal relations between Tel Aviv and Ankara were still tense, Turkish Prime Minister and Israel President attended together a panel discussion in Davos / Switzerland at World Economic Forum. The theme of the session was "Gaza: A New Peace Model in Middle East".⁶⁰⁵ Along with Turkish PM and Israel President, United Nation general secretary Ban Ki Moon and General Secretary of Arab League Amr Mousa attended to panel while the moderator of the discussion was Washington Post columnist David Ignatius. The panel, which initially started highly calm, turned to be tense debate as on his row Turkish Prime Minister criticized Israel to use measureless power against Hamas and to turn Gaza into "an open prison".⁶⁰⁶ Israeli President Shimon Peres during his speech accused Hamas to be the real reason for the war; he increased his voice nodding his finger and asked Erdoğan "what would Turkey do if every

⁶⁰¹ Carol Migdalovitz, "Turkey: Selected Foreign.....", op.cit., p.11.

⁶⁰² Ibidem, p.12.

⁶⁰³ İdris Bal, "Is PKK Turkey's Hamas?", *The Journal of Turkish Weekly*, 6 May 2010.

⁶⁰⁴ Mensur Akgün, "Turkey: What Axis Shift?", *Le Monde Diplomatique English*, July 2010.

⁶⁰⁵ Atilla Sandıklı, "Turkey - Israeli Relations Have Hit Rock Bottom", *Wise Man Center for Strategic Studies*, (source: www.bilgesam.org, <www.bilgesam.org/en/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=381:turkey-israel-relations-have-hit-rock-bottom&catid=77:ortadogu-analizler&Itemid=147>, February 2012).

⁶⁰⁶ Zeyno Baran, op.cit., p.173.

night İstanbul would be targeted by missiles”?⁶⁰⁷

Turkish Prime Minister tried to respond Peres’s question, however, the moderator of the panel discussion tried to cut him to reply, as a reaction Prime Minister Erdoğan outburst the behavior of the moderator “One minute... one minute... one minute... Don’t interrupt me. You are not allowing me to speak”.⁶⁰⁸ To take voice he stormed out “Mr. Peres, you are older than me”⁶⁰⁹ Turkish Prime Minister said. “Your voice comes out in a very loud tone. And the loudness of your voice has to do with a guilty conscience. My voice, however, will not come out in the same tone”.⁶¹⁰ Accusing Israeli government killing innocent civilians, Turkish Prime Minister added, “When it comes to killing, you know well how to kill”.⁶¹¹ Ultimately, he gathered up his papers and departed the panel with a burst of anger saying, “And so Davos is over for me from now on”.⁶¹²

Upon Turkish Prime Minister’s arrival to İstanbul, he “was greeted to a hero’s welcome back in Istanbul a few hours later as thousands of supporters, angry not only at Israel’s 22-day Gaza offensive against fellow Muslims but also at years of being snubbed by Europeans”⁶¹³ along with Palestinian and Turkish flags, as well as posters calling him the “Conqueror of Davos”.⁶¹⁴ During the press conference after his arrival, Prime Minister of Turkey particularly underlined that his reaction was against to Israeli government not against Israeli people. Turkish Prime Minister also stressed that as punishment for its war crimes, the Israeli government should be denounced and it should be ousted from United Nations.⁶¹⁵ Turkish media repeatedly broadcasted the outburst of Erdoğan, while many analysis and articles were written on Turkish press examining Turkish Israeli relation for future prospects. Justice and Development Party strictly supported the output of Tayyip Erdoğan and blamed the moderator of the forum for being incapable of managing forum while being impartial.

The diplomatic crisis in Davos also attracted the attention of many foreign press agencies. The incident was analyzed broadly from all respects establishing a consensus that the Turkish - Israeli relations damaged severely after Davos forum, while the severe criticism directed to Erdoğan from Israeli Jerusalem Post newspaper accused Turkish PM for

⁶⁰⁷ Daniel Steinvoh, “A Turkey - Israel Clash at Davos”, *Spiegel International*, 30 January 2009.

⁶⁰⁸ Fatma Dişli, “Erdoğan’s ‘One Minute’ in Davos Leads to Frenzy in Turkey”, *Today’s Zaman*, 22 February 2009.

⁶⁰⁹ Katrin Bennhold, “Leaders of Turkey and Israel Clash at Davos”, *The New York Times*, January 29 2009.

⁶¹⁰ Ibid.

⁶¹¹ Ibid.

⁶¹² Ibid.

⁶¹³ Aslı Aydıntaşbaş, “Erdoğan’s Davos Outburst is Nothing New”, *Forbes*, 30 January 2009.

⁶¹⁴ Diana Mukkaled, “The Conqueror of Davos”, *Asharq Alasswat*, 6 February 2009.

⁶¹⁵ “Davos’ta Rest” (“Stake at Davos”), *Star*, 30 January 2009.

deliberately undertaking actions in order to win support for Turkish domestic politics. On the other hand, when Israel Commander of Land Forces, Avi Mizrahi stated “Erdoğan should look at mirror”⁶¹⁶ referring to Kurdish resurgence in Turkey, Ankara issued a diplomatic note which aggravated the tense relations. The American Jewish Committee, that for a long time lobbied Turkey, particularly against so-called Armenian genocide claims as well declared its reaction against Erdoğan, although they had awarded him with a courage medal in 2004. The director of committee revealed his disappointment through an open letter address to the Turkish Prime Minister that published in Jerusalem Post.⁶¹⁷

The soured Turkish - Israeli relations experienced another crisis during Justice and Development Party in the field of diplomacy. Due to a T.V. serial, broadcasted on Turkish state channel about Israel - Palestinian conflict, Israel government delivered its concern under the pretext that it emits anti-Israeli feelings. Additionally, when Turkey’s most popular T.V. serial “Valley of Wolves” (Kurtlar Vadisi) “portrayed Israeli intelligence agents holding a woman and her baby hostage”,⁶¹⁸ Israel’s Vice Foreign Affairs Minister Danny Ayalon invited Turkish ambassador Oğuz Çelikol to Foreign Ministry. All of sudden, he changed the date and place of meeting and invited Turkish embassy to Knesset in order to express Israel’s position and precision as regard to the issue through diplomatic methods.⁶¹⁹ However, when Turkish ambassador came to meeting, he was waiting at the door, while he was being recorded by Israeli press who were invited to Ministry by Vice Minister Ayalon. After this sort of undiplomatic fine-tuning, Turkish ambassador was invited to a room and was not welcomed on contrary to insistence of press members. During the meeting, Vice Minister voiced the Israeli anxiety about the serial. On response, the Ambassador said he had no idea about the serial while he is not able to realize any persecution as it was shown on a private channel. The most attracting part of the meeting was Turkish ambassador was seated on a smaller chair in comparison to Ayalon, additionally Israeli vice Minister in Hebrew said to press members that “we wanted him to be seen seating lower than us”⁶²⁰ while there was only an Israel flag on the table where meeting took place.⁶²¹

After the meeting, when the violation of diplomatic manner case found a wide reflection on Turkish media, the diplomatic outburst arose one more time between Turkey and

⁶¹⁶ “Erdoğan Aynaya Baksın” (“Erdogan Should Look at Mirror”), *Habertürk*, 14 February 2009.

⁶¹⁷ David Harris, “Dear Prime Minister”, *Jerusalem Post*, 1 February 2009.

⁶¹⁸ Yigal Schleifer, “Why Israel Humiliated Turkey in Response to a TV Show”, *The Christian Science Monitor*, 12 January 2010.

⁶¹⁹ Fatih Er, “Alçak Koltuk Krizi” (“Lower Armchair Crisis”), *Hürriyet*, 13 January 2010.

⁶²⁰ “İsrail’le Alçak Koltuk Krizi” (“Lower Armchair Crisis with Israel”), *Milliyet*, 13 January 2010.

⁶²¹ Şaban Kardaş, “Understanding the Israel - Turkish Row”, *Today’s Zaman*, 24 October 2011.

Israel. Ankara called Israel ambassador to Foreign Minister, the Minister stressed that if Israel will not issue and excuse it will call back its embassy back, and stated that it will continue diplomatic relation through the lowest level.⁶²² The “lower armchair crisis” shared Israeli public view and politicians, the hawk wing Israeli politicians made the harshest explanation stating that Turks are the last people who would teach them how to behave reminding Turkish Prime Minister’s former statements adding Israel’s intention of continuation positive relations with Turkey. As for the opposition, they put the blame on Foreign Affairs Minister Liberman under the pretext to spoil strategic relations between Turkey through methods far from being diplomatic politeness and humiliating Israeli image.

In order to repair relations between Ankara, Israel Prime Minister and President Peres got engaged into crisis and the “hero” of “lower armchair crisis” sent an apology letter to his counterpart stating that “humiliation of Turkish envoy does not reflect Israel’s diplomacy”.⁶²³ Ankara shortly after receiving the apology letter officially stated that it has accepted the apology. Following the diplomatic crisis, Israel Defense Minister Ehud Barack paid an official visit to Ankara to repair spoiled relations where he met Turkish FM and National Defense Minister as Turkish Prime Minister and President were out of Ankara.⁶²⁴

Among all diplomatic crisis and tensions experienced between Turkey and Israel not only during Justice and Development Party government periods but also since the establishment of reciprocal relations,⁶²⁵ not a single incident had not caused a deep affect as similar to “Israel Gaza Flotilla”⁶²⁶ raid.⁶²⁷ Along with the participation of many other pro Palestine international civil society foundations, a huge coalition group consisting six ships with 650 passenger initialized “Free Gaza Movement”⁶²⁸ to break Israel’s blockade that started in 2009 after the Cast Lead Operation. Many popular activist including Desmond Tutu (South African Archbishop) and Nobel Prize laureate “Corrigan Maguire”⁶²⁹ along with many volunteer activists all around the world supported the campaign and collected tones of

⁶²² Mehmet Şahin, “Turkey - Israel Relations: The Unwilling Alliance Collapsed”, *Today’s Zaman*, 20 September 2011.

⁶²³ Barak David, “Peres: Humiliation of Turkish Envoy Does not Reflect Israel’s Diplomacy”, *Haaretz*, 13 January 2010.

⁶²⁴ “Israel’s Barak in Turkey for Talks after ‘Low Chair’ Crisis”, *World Bulletin*, 17 January 2010.

⁶²⁵ Türel Yılmaz, “Türkiye - İsrail İlişkileri: Tarihten Günümüze” (“Turkish - Israel Relations: Past and Present”) *Akademik Ortadoğu*, 2010, Vol. V, No. 1, p. 20.

⁶²⁶ “Israel Attacks Gaza Flotilla”, *The Guardian*, 31 May 2010.

⁶²⁷ Hasan Kösebalaban, “The Crisis in Turkish - Israeli Relations: What is its Strategic Significance?”, *Middle East Policy*, Vol. XVII, No. 3, Fall 2010, p.36.

⁶²⁸ “Profile: Free Gaza Movement”, *BBC News, Middle East*, 1 June 2010.

⁶²⁹ Ibidem.

humanitarian and medical aid to Gaza. Humanitarian Relief Foundation of Turkey (IHH),⁶³⁰ which is aftermath the incident was put the list of terrorist organizations both in EU and USA,⁶³¹ also arranged a huge campaign to be delivered to Gaza via Mavi Marmara (Blue Marmara) ship that led the “Free Gaza Movement” which was bought through the organization.⁶³²

In Turkey, the debate on the Mavi Marmara vessel, which was planned to carry humanitarian aid to Gaza, started since the campaign and was still on preparation level. Israeli government organs warned Ankara that they would not let the ships to enter Israeli waters, suggesting instead of conveying help materials to Hamas proposed to hand them Israeli authorization as Israel was applying embargo to supplies which may be used during terror acts against itself. Besides, Israeli Mossad released its intelligence connecting actions with radical terrorist groups as Israel Deputy Foreign Minister Daniel Ayalon dubbed “The organizers are well known for their ties with Global Jihad, Al-Qaeda and Hamas. They have a history of arms smuggling and deadly terror”.⁶³³ On response to Israeli statements, Turkish government remarked that they have nothing to do with the case, as it was the initiative of a non-governmental civic organization.⁶³⁴ Turkish FM, aftermaths the incidents, dubbed that “the government had tried to convince the non-governmental organizations in charge of the flotilla to take the aid to Israeli ports, but it was not successful”.⁶³⁵

When the Free Gaza Movement ships set off from Turkish shores, Foreign Affairs Minister of Israel stated “If you ignore this order and enter the blockaded area, the Israeli navy will be forced to take all the necessary measures in order to enforce this blockade”,⁶³⁶ calling the initiative as a propaganda of violence.⁶³⁷ As the fleet was approaching toward Israel territorial waters, Israeli military ships cut the route of humanitarian aid fleet enforcing them to change their direction. However, the captains of ships did not accept commands as they were on international water. Israeli naval special trained commandos in order not to

⁶³⁰ Evan F Kohlman, “The Role of Islamic Charities in International Terrorist Recruitment and Financing”, *Danish Institute for International Studies Working Paper*, 2006/2007, p.10.

⁶³¹ Benjamin Wienthal, “Dutch Government Places IHH on Terrorist List”, *Jerusalem Post*, 05 January 2011.

⁶³² “Israel Attacks Gaza Aid Fleet”, *Al Jazeera*, 31 May 2010.

⁶³³ “Press Conference with Israel’s Deputy Foreign Minister Danny Ayalon”, (source: www.israelpolitik.org, <<http://www.israelpolitik.org/tag/al-qaeda/>>, February 2012)

⁶³⁴ Marc Champion, “Confrontation at Sea: Turkish Aid Organization Draws Controversy”, *Wall Street Journal*, 2 June 2010.

⁶³⁵ Peter Spiegel, “Confrontation at Sea: Turkey Seeks U.S. Solidarity”, *Wall Street Journal* (Europe), 2 June 2010.

⁶³⁶ “Israel Attacks Gaza Aid Fleet”, *Al Jazeera*, 31 May 2010.

⁶³⁷ “Press Conference with Israel’s Deputy Foreign Minister Danny Ayalon”, (source: www.israelpolitik.org, <<http://www.israelpolitik.org/tag/al-qaeda/>>, February 2012).

permit ships enter Israel waters intercepted the convoy realizing a military operation via helicopters to Mavi Marmara.⁶³⁸ When the activists resisted to commandos, they fired to activist causing 9 deaths while injuring 20 passengers and 10 commandos.⁶³⁹ After the raid, along with Mavi Marmara, Israel detained all ships carrying help materials to Gaza and imprisoned all activists.⁶⁴⁰

Henceforth, the bloody raid of Israel special troops, caused harsh outburst of Turkish government that called back Turkish embassy to Ankara issuing a denounce note blaming Israel to attack civilians on international waters, while Turkish Foreign Affairs stated that Israel will pay for its behaviors heavily. Ankara called its Israel Embassy to Foreign Affairs in order to convey Turkish concerns of Israel acts. Turkish Prime Minister and many other ministers of JDP government called Israel as “terrorist state” and “pirate” stressing Tel Aviv Turkish - Israeli relations never will be same again.⁶⁴¹ Additionally, Turkey called Israel to release activist and ships back as soon as possible as there was no legal reason to detain them. Carol Migdalovitz summarizes Turkey’s view as regard to issue as follows:

The Turkish government, all political parties, and people were outraged by the Israeli attack. After the raid, mass demonstrations occurred in Ankara and Istanbul, and officials made repeated, dramatic, if not hyperbolic, statements about Israel’s actions. The Turkish Foreign Ministry first protested Israel’s use of force “in the strongest terms,” charging that “Israel has once again clearly demonstrated that it does not value human lives and peaceful initiatives through targeting innocent civilians”.⁶⁴²

Justice and Development Party government faced severe critics not to get necessary initiative to prevent the incident. For instance, the United States of America “caught between two long-time allies”⁶⁴³ expressed its sorrow while reminding that they are examining under which conditions it took place hinting that Israel’s right of self-protection. Besides, opposition parties accused AKP government for not being able to foresee upcoming results of the humanitarian aid project and for not applying proper measures to stop fleet before sailing to Gaza strict. Furthermore, AKP parliamentarians who initially publicly expressed that they are also going to join humanitarian aid campaign than changed their ideas and did not entered to ship, which made the attacks much more controversial that turned JDP administrative staff to ignore the potential risks for civilian and to use the case for political benefits. As for the Israel

⁶³⁸ Carol Migdalovitz, “Israel's Blockade of Gaza, the Mavi Marmara Incident, and Its Aftermath”, *Congressional Research Service*, 2010, p. 3.

⁶³⁹ Ibidem, p. 4.

⁶⁴⁰ “Q&A: Israeli Deadly Raid on Aid Flotilla”, *BBC News*, Middle East, 2 August 2010.

⁶⁴¹ “Korsan Israil” (“Pirate Israel”), *Milliyet*, 2 June 2010.

⁶⁴² Carol Migdalovitz, “Israel's Blockade of Gaza”, op.cit., p. 5.

⁶⁴³ Ibidem, p. 5.

side, though there appeared diverse views upon the raid and Gaza blockade, it was believed that the main purpose of the convoy was to break blockade instead of bringing goods.⁶⁴⁴ Prime Minister Netanyahu, for instance, stated, “Had the blockade been breached, this flotilla would have been followed by dozens, by hundreds of ships. The amount of weapons that can be transported aboard a ship is very different from what we saw get through the tunnels (beneath the Gaza - Egypt border). Hundreds of missiles and rockets, and an innumerable number of weapons can be smuggled aboard a ship”.⁶⁴⁵

Turkey after the attacks brought the case to United Nations, Arab League and Islamic Conference as well applied a shuttle diplomacy in order to take condemnatory decision against Israel, and it applied all diplomatic methods against the raid. Turkish diplomats also pressed United Nations to open an international investigation in order to examine the case, while Israel only accepted to charge a local commission in order to investigate the Mavi Mara raid. Moreover, Ankara proposed the prerequisite of abolishing Gaza blockade, paying compensation for the families of death and injuries, while ask Israel to excuse activities that have not been accepted by Israel government. To some extent, strategic cooperation with Israeli and Turkish army continued as Ankara bought Heron planes of Israel, on the other hand when Justice and Development Party government canceled Turkish - Israeli joint air military exercise and called Syria instead to “hold defense drills”,⁶⁴⁶ openly indicating its new attitude toward Israel after the attacks.

The following diplomatic reaction took place against Israel after the Gaza Flotilla attacks took place when during Ramadan (the holy month of Muslims) JDP did not invite Israel Embassy to participate at dinner that was organized by the Party where all diplomatic mission representatives met.⁶⁴⁷ Ankara’s critical attitude towards Turkey continued as it officially protest to attend OECD’s tourism conference which held in Jerusalem. Besides, AKP government also denounced Israel’s decision to open settlements in Eastern Jerusalem blaming Israel for provoking peace talks. After the Flotilla attacks the first detente between Israel - Turkish frozen relations came when Turkey sent its fire exhausting planes to the help Israel during the wood fire in which many Israel citizen died.⁶⁴⁸ Israel replied Turkish gesture trough the highest level as Netanyahu publicly thanked Turkish pilots. Thanks to closure

⁶⁴⁴ Ibidem, p. 6.

⁶⁴⁵ Ibid.

⁶⁴⁶ “After Snubbing Israel, Turkey to Hold Defense Drills with Syria”, *Haaretz*, 14 November 2010.

⁶⁴⁷ “İsrail’li Büyükelçi AKP İftarında Yok” (“Israeli Embassy is Absent at AKP Iftar”), *Radikal*, 13 August 2010.

⁶⁴⁸ “Turkey Offers Israel Help in Controlling Fire Despite Tense Relations”, *Haaretz*, 2 December 2010.

initiated due to fire between Ankara and Tel Aviv the high rank diplomats of both sites came together for the first time since the attacks thanks to so-called “Disaster Diplomacy” in order to talk about the future of relations.⁶⁴⁹ On contrary to fact that, the details of the meeting were not transmitted to public the theme of excuse and compensation issues discussed between the diplomats although Turkish FM Ahmet Davutoğlu denied the similar claims. Turkey at this period supported the negotiation perspectives with Israel while Prime Minister Erdoğan once more repeated that the condition of normalization with Israel is Turkey’s request for an excuse and payment of compensation for the deaths and injured activist. The period coinciding these debates Israel government declared that they eased Gaza embargo and blockage. While both Israel and Turkish public view were discussing the method of excuse and amount of the money to be paid for activists, Israel Prime Minister announced that Israel would not excuse for the events in Flotilla raid, hence in spite of the closure between Israel and Turkey the required steps could not moved in order to normalize mutual relations. On the other hand, Israel after freezing of relations with Turkey initiated tight strategic cooperation with Greece and Cyprus. Israel and Greek part of Cyprus signed a border determination agreement at Eastern Mediterranean where it found rich natural gas resources yet Ankara strictly opposed the signed agreement on the pretext that similar initiatives might negatively influence stabilization of the Cyprus problem and stressing his rights in the area.⁶⁵⁰

6. The Arab Spring and AK Party Government

Likewise to many other states,⁶⁵¹ Ankara under the rule of JDP government was highly unprepared for the events that commenced to emerge in Tunisia which is called as the “Arab Spring”.⁶⁵² In general, it may be observed that Turkey’s foreign policy decision makers under the AKP rule indicated a rational-behavior toward the uprisings as regard to Turkey’s economic, strategic, business and population interest with the given state. When Turkey was mentioned as regard to the Arab Spring, there appeared two views: “1. Turkey is a great model for Arab countries as a secular democracy with a majority Muslim population. 2.

⁶⁴⁹ “Will Turkey's Aid to Israel in Carmel Fire Revive Foundering Ties?”, *Haaretz*, 5 December 2010.

⁶⁵⁰ “Greek Cyprus, Israel Sign Deal Demarcating Sea Borders”, *Hürriyet Daily News*, 17 December 2010.

⁶⁵¹ Krzysztof Zdulski, “W obronie status quo ante? polityka Turcji wobec wojny domowej w Libii i kryzsu politycznego w Syrii” (“To Defend Status Quo Ante? Turkey’s Policy toward the Civil War in Libya and Political Crisis in Syria”), The text presented at expert seminar on Arab Spring of Nations in 16.06.2011 at Tichner European University under the frames of Peace and Development Studies.

⁶⁵² Gideon Rose, “The New Arab Revolt: What Happened, What It Means, and What Comes Next?”, *Council on Foreign Affairs*, New York 2011, p. xiii.

Turkey is not a good model since it has its own problems with minority rights, freedom of speech/press and human rights, and recently Turkey has become more conservative moving away from Western values”.⁶⁵³ As regard to AKP government, it put forward AKP model as a “Muslim Democrat”,⁶⁵⁴ “pro-free market, and fully obedient to the secular constitution”⁶⁵⁵ party to the opposition parties after the despotic regimes. Foreign Policy decision makers of Turkey under the AKP rule in some cases like Tunisia applied a wait and see policy and hesitated to be engaged in incidents,⁶⁵⁶ while in Egypt case they followed a more decisive foreign policy orientation. Turkish Prime Minister called Hosni Mubarek to “to bow his nation’s will”,⁶⁵⁷ likewise in Libya insurgence Turkish PM asked Kaddafi to leave country.⁶⁵⁸

Ankara preferred to keep quite on the protests commenced in Tunisia initially, though Turkey closely observed all developments. When President of Tunisia, as a result of street protest, was forced to leave the country, Foreign Ministry stated that Turkey is ready to support Tunisia as regard to its transition to democracy. After Zin al-Abidin, the former President of Tunisia left the country, the foremost exile opponent of the regime Rashid Ghannusi returned to home. Upon his arrival to country, as regard to his future political orientation he stressed that the best model coinciding to Tunisia is Turkey and Justice and Development Party as a sample coinciding democracy within an Islam majority population.⁶⁵⁹

In comparison to insurgences in Tunisia, Justice and Development Party followed a more determined foreign policy towards Egypt. Turkish Prime Minister was among the first world leader who called Hosni Mubarak to take steps in order to meet demands of Egyptian people. “Mubarak should act immediately and prevent “exploiters, groups with dirty aims, [and] those sections that have dark designs over Egypt to take the initiative”⁶⁶⁰ said Recep Tayyip Erdoğan as regard to protests spread all around the Egypt. In spite of the fact that, there exist tight economic and trade relations between Ankara and Cairo, AK Party risked to take part along with the rows of opponents due to historical rivalry⁶⁶¹ between Egypt and Turkey in Middle East as well as Sunni Islam world politics the roots of which date back to Ottoman Empire.

⁶⁵³ Ercan Balcı, “Turkey and the Arab Spring”, *Global*, (source:www.global-ejournal.org, <<http://global-ejournal.org/2012/02/08/turkey-and-the-arab-spring/>>, February 2012).

⁶⁵⁴ Gwynne Dyer, “Arab Spring: Signs are Still Positive”, *Al Arabiya*, 29 November 2011.

⁶⁵⁵ Ibid.

⁶⁵⁶ Karol Kujawa, “The Turkish Reaction to Events in North Africa”, *The Polish Institute of International Affairs Bulletin*, No. 57 (274), , 2 June 2011, p. 514.

⁶⁵⁷ “Erdoğan Urges Mubarak to Heed People's Call for Change”, *Sunday's Zaman*, 2 February 2011.

⁶⁵⁸ “Turkish PM Urges Gaddafi to Leave Libya”, *Al Jazeera*, 5 March 2011.

⁶⁵⁹ İhsan Dağı, “Post Islamizm ve AK Parti” (“Post Islamism and AK Party”), *Zaman*, 1 February 2011.

⁶⁶⁰ “Erdoğan Calls on Mubarak to Heed Calls for Change”, *Jerusalem Post*, 2 January 2011.

⁶⁶¹ K. Kujawa, “The Turkish Reaction....”, op. cit., p. 5.

As for the Libya, the incidents were bearing completely different peculiarities in comparison to Tunisia and Egypt for Turkey's foreign policy decision makers. At the initial levels of insurgency, Ankara applied an attentive posture toward the issue preferring to stay neutral toward Kaddafi and Rebels. When, the international community started to discuss a common NATO operation against Kaddafi, Turkish PM stressed that a NATO military intervention to Libya would be futile,⁶⁶² noting "what would NATO do in Libya"?⁶⁶³ However, due to the developments arose in Libya, Turkey on one hand supported United Nations decision to employ sanctions against Kaddafi regime, while on the other hand opposed to apply a no fly zone against Kaddafi forces to prevent air attacks against rebellions.⁶⁶⁴ Ankara as a reaction to France's attempts to taking a leading role in Libya operations entirely changed its previous position and strictly emphasized the necessity of NATO's role in the coordination of the military operations against Kaddafi forces. Besides, Turkey engaged its naval forces in order to observe arm embargo against Kaddafi thanks to a bill approved by Turkish parliamentary.⁶⁶⁵ Turkish FM Davutoğlu stressed that Turkey stance as regard to NATO operation was supported by his government.

Due to Turkey's close economic affiliation with Libya, the contracts of Turkish building sector hit 15 Billion USD⁶⁶⁶. At the very early stages of events Ankara, vehemently oppose an international intervention against Kaddafi regime and applied a decisive policy. In addition to that, the presence of Turkish population in Libya as well their safety was highly influential at the policy prospects of Justice and Development Party. Finally, the general election schedule in Turkey made Erdoğan government to follow a conservative policy orientation with a Muslim base.

7. Conclusions

In comparison to traditional foreign policy concept of Turkey that preferred not to intervene complex balance power and intrigue structure of Middle East, Justice and Development Party government seemed took tight initiatives in regional politics and attempted to increase Turkey's role in the Middle East region. Nevertheless, it is essential to note that upon the newly emerged demands of regional and international conjecture that emerged with the end of the Cold War, following 90s Ankara indicated a close tendency toward the region. Thus, it

⁶⁶² "Libya: Turkey's Troubles with Nato and no - Fly Zone", *BBC News Africa*, 25 Marh 2011.

⁶⁶³ "Nato'nun Ne İşi Var Libya'da" ("What would NATO do in Libya"), *Hürriyet*, 1 March 2011.

⁶⁶⁴ K. Kujawa, "The Turkish Reaction....", op. cit., p. 5.

⁶⁶⁵ "Libya: Turkey's Troubles with NATO and no-fly Zone", *BBC News Africa*, 25 March 2011.

⁶⁶⁶ K. Kujawa, "The Turkish Reaction....", op. cit., p. 5.

may be argued that AKP continued this very policy towards the Middle East region. During its office period, JDP governments engaged itself in both bilateral relations between the countries and developed unorthodox initiatives in Turkey's engagement to the Middle East. Nevertheless, Ankara, at this period, in some exceptional cases like 1 March permits cases, moved highly attentive not to come at odds with its Western allies.

In this period, as reference to relations with Iraq, Ankara under the rule of AKP diversified its traditional policy prospects toward Baghdad that used to be solely engaged security issues, whereas it developed policies embracing all ethnic, sectarian and religious groups in Iraq not excluding the Kurds. Besides, AKP foreign policy decision makers enriched relation prospects with Iraq diverting its economic and trade based relations. Turkey's foreign policy, during the office period of AK Party initialized a close affiliation with Syria. Ankara instead of applying an isolation policy against Assad regime and preferred to develop an economic, diplomatic and even a military association in order to prevent marginalization of Damascus. On the other hand, conversely to Ankara's attempts, Assad regime's unbalanced violence against protesters inspired by Arab Spring. It brought highly tensed Turkish - Syrian relations to a deadlock.

Turkish - Iranian relations did not experience a radical shift since Iran nuclear crisis appeared. In this period since Turkey along with Brazil engaged to process and urged Tehran to realize barter in Turkish territory. Parallel to these initiatives of Ankara, Erdoğan government was blamed to shift Turkey's Western axis, however the Shiite - Sunni rivalry continued to be a determinant factor shaping bilateral relations in the Middle East. On the other hand, Ankara developed constructive relations against PKK terror with Tehran though following that due to ballistic missile system that planned to be launched in Turkey.

The most radical shift in comparison to orthodox Turkey's foreign policy, as regard to Middle East took places in terms of relations with Israel. In spite of the fact that, at first government period of AK Party bilateral relations did not indicate a shift, after Israel's military operations in Gaza, mutual relations highly worsen. In addition to that, when Israel army attacked Gaza Flotilla in international waters bilateral agreements between Ankara and Tel Aviv almost come to a breaking point.

When it comes to Ankara's attitude toward the so-called Arab spring revolutions, it may be argued that Justice and Development Party government applied a pragmatist-realist foreign policy far from being ideological. AK Party government promoted its unique case in Islam world with the support of the United States of America and the European Union as a

model coinciding Islam and democracy for the future regimes of Tunisia, Libya, Syria and Egypt to prevent radical Islamist movements.

As it was mentioned, during its government periods, Justice and Development Party developed more decisive foreign policy orientation toward Turkey's eastern direction in comparison to past. In spite of the fact that, similar policy orientation of AK Party was commented as Ankara's break from its Western orientation, the nature of Turkey's foreign policy toward its Eastern dimension may not be interpreted as a radical change or as an axis shift. Besides, like in Iran and Syria cases Turkey's foreign policy decision makers successfully achieved to express their points to Western allies and played a bridge role between the West and East prioritizing dialogue and diplomacy.

Chapter IV

The Western Direction

The chapter analyzes Turkey's foreign policy during Justice and Development Party government periods in 2002-2011 towards the West. The main objective of the chapter is to examine bilateral relations between Turkey and its Western allies and neighbors from political, economic, military and diplomatic perspectives in order to study foreign policy of Turkey during the tenure of Justice and Development Party government periods. The chapter seeks answers whether Turkey's foreign policy in AKP rule experienced a "breaking away from its traditional role as a reliable ally in the Western defense system and a modern country in search of membership in the European Union as part of its broader policy of constituting an integral part of the West"? ⁶⁶⁷ Or the West still constitutes the utmost agenda for Turkey's foreign policy decision makers?

The first section of the chapter analyzes Turkey - USA relations, while the second section focuses on Turkey - EU relations. The third section will dwell on Turkey's relation with Balkan region states along with Turkey - Greece relationship with a specific stress on Cyprus issue in Justice and Development Party government periods in 2002-2011.

1. The West and Turkey

As it has been repeatedly mentioned previously,⁶⁶⁸ since the establishment of the Republic, the West had been uniform and fundamental dynamic part of Turkey's foreign policy, the roots of which date back to late 19th century Ottoman Empire.⁶⁶⁹ Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, as the founder and mastermind of Republic of Turkey identified the modern civilization ideal with the West, thus integration with the West became the top agenda of Turkey's foreign policy since the establishment of modern Turkey. After the end of the Second World War, Turkey's place became mostly definite within the West. During the Cold War, Turkey reinforced its position among the rows of democratic and liberal regimes of the West. From this perspective, Turkey affiliated with the United States of America in terms of strategic,

⁶⁶⁷ İlter Turan, "Turkish Foreign Policy: Challenges to Turkey's Western Calling", *Wise Man Center for Strategic Studies*, (source: www.bilgesam.org, <http://www.bilgesam.org/en/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=305:turkish-foreign-policy-challenges-to-turkeys-western-calling&catid=70:ab-analizler&Itemid=131>, June 2011).

⁶⁶⁸ O. Sander, "Türkiye'nin Dış Politikasında....", op.cit., p. 109.

⁶⁶⁹ B. Oran, "TDP'nin Kuramsal Çerçevesi.....", op.cit., p. 47.

military as well as economic relations becoming a North Atlantic Treaty Organization. While Turkey at this period either participated or willed to participate European institution to reinforce its economic and cultural association with European norms and values applying for the European Union membership (its former version).

In spite of the fact that, in some strategic cases jeopardizing Turkish lebensraum, Turkey experienced some road accidents with the West, nonetheless, Turkey arranged its security, economy, military and foreign policies in accordance with the West. Henceforth, not taking the Western connection of Turkey's foreign policy into consideration it would be highly misleading to examine foreign policy decision making process of Turkey.

2. The United States of America

Diplomatic interaction with the U.S. "dates back to the days when Turkey was known as the Ottoman Empire".⁶⁷⁰ The relations "first developed during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries on the basis of activities of merchants and missionaries in Northern Africa".⁶⁷¹ In accordance with trade agreement signed between the states at 1830, United States navels obtained wide trade priorities, (capitulations)⁶⁷² enabling them to move freely in Mediterranean without the treats of pirates as well as opening an access to Black Sea.⁶⁷³ Another dimension of the relations was religious activities of "Protestant"⁶⁷⁴ American missionaries in Ottoman territories.⁶⁷⁵ The United States of America implemented first diplomatic mission in 1831 while Ottoman Empire opened its embassy in Washington at 1867.⁶⁷⁶

⁶⁷⁰ "US Diplomatic Relations with Turkey", (source: www.turkeyusembassy.gov.us, < http://turkey.usembassy.gov/us_diplomatic_interaction_turkey.html>, March 2012).

⁶⁷¹ Mustafa Gün, "The History and Theory of Turkish American Relations", *Wise Men Center for Strategic Studies*, (source: www.bilgesam.org.tr, <http://www.bilgesam.org/en/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=222:the-history-and-theory-of-turkish-american-relations&catid=98:analizler-abd&Itemid=132>, March 2012).

⁶⁷² Thayer Lucius, "The Capitulations of the Ottoman Empire and the Question of Their Abrogation as it Affects the USA", *American Journal of International Law*, Vol. XVII, April 1923, p. 207.

⁶⁷³ Erhan Çağrı, *Türk - Amerikan İlişkilerinin Tarihsel Kökenleri (Historical Roots of Turkish - American Relations)*, Imge Yayınları, Ankara 2001, p. 25.

⁶⁷⁴ Joseph Grabill, *Protestant Diplomacy and the Near East: Missionary Influence on American Policy 1810-1927*, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis 1971, p. 5.

⁶⁷⁵ "Turkish - USA Relations", (source: www.mfa.gov.tr, <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkish-u_s_-political-relations.en.mfa>, May 2011).

⁶⁷⁶ Erhan Çağrı, „Türkiye - ABD İlişkilerinin Mantıksal Çerçevesi” („The Logical Framework of Turkish-USA Relations”) in Idris Bal (ed.) *21. Yüzyılda Dis Politikasi (Turkish Foreign Policy at 21 Century)*, Lalezar Yayınevi, Ankara 2006, p. 139.

Turkey - USA relations experienced a term of recession in the course of WWI⁶⁷⁷ until the birth of the Republic in 1927 because of the isolation policy of Washington and economic crisis in North America.⁶⁷⁸ Nevertheless, following the Second World War, Turkish - American relations went through a revolutionary transformation and the current structure of mutual relations mostly shaped after this period.⁶⁷⁹ Ankara's main motivation for the alliance was its security concerns against Soviet Union and economic interest in order to regulate depreciated Turkish economy after the World War II, besides American military aid was an important factor for the modernization of Turkish army. As for USA, Turkey's geopolitical and strategic position was crucial for Middle East, Mediterranean, Bosphorus and Black Sea interests.⁶⁸⁰

The Cold War period became a bloom for bilateral relations between both states; because of threat from Moscow, Ankara developed close relations with the United States of America, while Washington in accordance with Truman Doctrine and Marshall Plan supported Turkey due to its strategic and geopolitical position⁶⁸¹ in the course of struggle against Soviet expansion.⁶⁸² Relationship between the United States of America and Turkey experienced a problematic period between 1960 and 1980 period. First serious breaking point took place due to President Johnson's letter⁶⁸³ addressed to his counterpart putted down on paper with an undiplomatic style so as to prevent Turkey's military intervention toward Cyprus.⁶⁸⁴ The letter deeply insulted Turkey and threatened strictly not to start a military operation in Cyprus. Turkey's foreign policy from the Second World War since Johnson letter

⁶⁷⁷ For further analysis on Turkey - US relations during the First World War and aftermaths see: "Peace Terms with Turkey", *Current History*, Vol. XIX, 1923, pp. 89-9; "The Turco - American Treaty", *Current History*, Vol. XIX, 1923, pp. 100-110; Laurence Evans, *US Policy and the Partition of Turkey, 1914 - 1924*, Johns Hopkins University, Studies in Historical and Political Science Series 82, No. 2, Johns Hopkins Press, Baltimore 1965; Samuel J Raphaelides, "The United States and the Question of the Greco - Turkish War, 1919 - 1922", *Byzantine and Modern Greek Studies*, Vol. VIII, 1982-83.

⁶⁷⁸ Haluk Ulman, *Türk - Amerikan Diplomatik Münasebetleri (1939-1947)*, (Turkey - American Diplomatic Relations 1939-1947), AUSB, Ankara 1961, p. 123.

⁶⁷⁹ Nasuh Uslu, *The Turkish - American Relationship between 1947 and 2003: the History of Distinctive Alliance*, Nova Science Publishers, New York 2003, p.13

⁶⁸⁰ Ian Lesser, "Turkey, the U.S. and the Delusion of Geopolitics", *Survival*, Vol. XLVIII, No 3, Autumn 2006, p. 83.

⁶⁸¹ Ian Lesser, *Bridge or Barrier? Turkey and the West after the Cold War*, CA: RAND, Santa Monica 1992, p. 40.

⁶⁸² Barış Ertem, "Türkiye - ABD İlişkilerinde Truman Doktrini ve Marshall Planı" ("Truman Doctrine and Marshall Plan in Turkey-USA Relations"), *Balıkesir University Social Sciences Magazine*, June 2009, Vol. XII, No 21, p. 339.

⁶⁸³ Süha Bölükbaşı, "The Johnson Letter Revisted", *Middle Eastern Studies*, July 1993, Vol. XXIX, No.3, p. 505.

⁶⁸⁴ Faruk Sönmezoğlu, *ABD'nin Türkiye Politikası: 1964 - 1980 (USA's Turkey Policy, 1964 - 1980)*, Der Publication, Ankara 1981. p.52.

that developed through an American sided monotonous line gained a multi dimensional character.

In this period, Turkey - USA relations experienced a fluctuation because of so-called Opium Crisis,⁶⁸⁵ in which USA tried to limit Turkey's opium production⁶⁸⁶ that hit Turkish economy heavily.⁶⁸⁷ On the other hand, the United States of America opened "İncirlik"⁶⁸⁸ air base, which is a strategic military base for USA military, enabling to operate direct flights to many Middle East countries. Finally, when the United States applied a weapon embargo against Turkey due to the military operation Turkey released in Cyprus,⁶⁸⁹ Turkey responded to cancel Common Defense Agreement and closed of the U.S. bases in its territory except for NATO, hence mutual relations between both countries experienced a serious challenge.⁶⁹⁰ Additionally, United State's attitude toward so-called Armenian genocide claims, economic aid policies to Turkey and eventually USA tariffs applied against Turkish products deteriorated mutual relations. However, due to invasion of Afghanistan through USSR in 1979 and Iran revolution endangering USA interests in Middle East pushed America to consider Turkey sensibly.⁶⁹¹ Relations between Turkey and the U.S. entered to a new period after the Cold War. The Post Cold War world, leaded by USA in order to secure its military, economic and 'energy interests' developed a milder way, win - win oriented relations with Turkey as Ankara tried not to lose its strategic point after the collapse of iron curtain. Republic of Turkey indicated its readiness to help the U.S. at Gulf War opening air bases during operations,⁶⁹² while the United States of America supported Turkey's European Union membership and provided technical support during Turkey's war against PKK.⁶⁹³

Notwithstanding to the fact that in general terms there exist tight relations between USA and Turkey on security level, the trade volume between the states constituted the weak ring of the mutual relations and a paradoxical situation in comparison to retrospective that

⁶⁸⁵ Philip Robins, "The Opium Crisis and Iraq War: Historical Parallels in Turkey - US Relations", *Mediterranean Politics*, March Vol.XII, No. 1, 2007, p. 17.

⁶⁸⁶ Joseph Zetner, "The 1972 Turkish Opium Ban: Needle in the Haystack Diplomacy", *World Affairs*, 1973 No. 136, pp. 36-47.

⁶⁸⁷ Richard B Craig, Michael A Turner, "A Failure of the Turkish Opium Ban: Toward an Explanation", *Orient (Opladen)*, Vol. XIX (1), 1978, pp. 53 - 69.

⁶⁸⁸ Selin N Bölme, "The Politics of Incirlik Airbase", *Insight Turkey*, Vol. IX, No. 3, 2007, p. 82.

⁶⁸⁹ Richard C Campany, *Turkey and the United States the Arm Embargo Period*. Prager, New York 1982, p. 5.

⁶⁹⁰ Morton Abramowitz, "The Complexities of American Policy Making on Turkey" in Morton Abromowitz, (ed.) *Turkey's Transformation and American Policy*, The Century Foundation, New York 2000, p. 155.

⁶⁹¹ Feroz Ahmad, "The Historical Background of Turkey's Foreign Policy" in Martin Lenore G, Keridis, Dimitris (ed.) *The Future of Turkish Foreign Policy*, MIT Press, London 2004, p. 30.

⁶⁹² Cameroon S Brown, "Turkey in the Gulf Wars of 1991 and 2003", *Turkish Studies*, p. 85.

⁶⁹³ Robert I Pullock, "The Sick Man of Europe Again", *Wall Street Journal*, 16 February 2005.

first contacts between USA and Ottoman Empire initialized through trade.⁶⁹⁴ On the other hand, between 1993 and 2000, the United States signed agreements to sell Turkey arms worth \$5.17 billion, making Turkey the top two ranked European purchaser each year in that period”.⁶⁹⁵ Relations with the United States of America have unique place for Turkey’s foreign policy decision makers. Since the end of the Second World War, USA became the most crucial strategic alliance and partner for Turkey. Thanks to its pivotal position, Turkey has been an essential friend for USA to have access to Israel in Middle East, Caucasus, Central Asia, Black Sea, Balkans and North Africa geographies. In spite of the disputes and contemporary crisis over Cyprus, so-called Armenian genocide, PKK and future of Iraq, it may be suggested that the USA is among the most important countries for Turkey’s foreign policy.

It has been claimed commonly that along with the AKP rule in Turkey, a paradigm shift took place in terms of Turkey’s foreign policy concept, particularly regarding the relations toward the United States of America and the European Union. Nevertheless, the interpretation of the shift and the role of Justice and Development Party in this very process is an essential matter of debate in both the academic literature and Turkish public opinion.⁶⁹⁶ USA foreign policy mostly focused on fight against terrorism after the 9/11 terror attacks under Bush administration to construct a new foreign policy outlook mostly based on the rhetoric of struggle against terrorism. President Bush during his popular speech to American nation barely gave the signals of this new period warning not only enemies but also allies of the United States of America urging them to select either to pose along with USA or with terrorists.⁶⁹⁷ From this perspective in the post 9/11 period, Turkey - America relations re-formed in the line with struggle against terror issue.⁶⁹⁸

Ankara openly supported the U.S. fight against terror after the 9/11 attacks. It explicitly declared that Turkey would support its alliance in accordance with the N.A.T.O. decree.⁶⁹⁹ Thus, it allowed USA forces to use air and land spaces during Washington’s military operation in Afghanistan. In addition to that, Ankara sent 90 high rank military anti-

⁶⁹⁴ Eugene Schuyler, *American Diplomacy and the Furtherance of Trade*, Charles Scribner's Sons, New York 1886, p. 3.

⁶⁹⁵ C. Migdalovitz, “Turkey: Issues for ...”, op.cit., p. 17.

⁶⁹⁶ Nuri Yeşilyurt, Atay Akdevelioğlu, “Turkey’s Middle East Policy under the JDP Rule”, *The Turkish Yearbook of International Relations*, 2009, Vol. XL, p. 40.

⁶⁹⁷ Mel Gurtov, *Superpower on Crusade: The Bush Doctrine in US Foreign Policy*, Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder 2006, p.37.

⁶⁹⁸ Tom Rockmore, *Before and After 9/11: A Philosophical Examination of Globalization, Terror and History*, The Continuum International Publishing Group, New York 2011, p. 196.

⁶⁹⁹ Füsun Türkmen, “Turkish - American Relations: A Challenging Transition”, *Turkish Studies*, Vol.X, No.1, 2009, p.109.

terror specialists to Afghanistan in order to aid USA. Eventually, Turkey took over commandship of International Security Assistance Forces in Afghanistan, while the United States of America highly appreciated Ankara's support particularly due to Turkey's exceptional position being the sole Moslem country taking part at Afghanistan operation.⁷⁰⁰ However, when the scope of the U.S. fight against terrorism expanded to Iraq the relation took a hit. The United States of America upon George Bush's identification of Iran, North Korea and Iraq as "evil axis",⁷⁰¹ followed by public discussion on military operation due to the allegedly claimed Al-Qaida connection of Saddam Hussein and his hidden chemical weapons, the nature of Turkey - USA relations commenced to follow an entire dissimilar line in comparison to Afghanistan cooperation.⁷⁰² Washington to finish operation against Saddam Hussein effectively and to reduce casualties to minimum level developed strategy to open a front from Northern Iraq thus asked Ankara to permit usage of its bases and Turkish territory.⁷⁰³ Additionally, the U.S. demanded military staff from Turkey to support the U.S. forces during the operations.⁷⁰⁴

As it has been mentioned in terms of relations with Iraq, Justice and Development Party government gave its first serious foreign policy exam against Turkey's most important alliance in the course of occupation of Iraq by United States. AK Party, on one hand, tried to realize the necessities of a strategic partnership⁷⁰⁵ and on the other hand vied to secure stability in the region as well as to avoid emergence of a potential Kurdish state in Northern Iraq.⁷⁰⁶ Ankara from the very beginning of USA's demand, explicitly hinted that it would support the U.S. if Washington act in accordance with United Nation's decision. In this respect, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan to discuss Turkey's reservations and explain the position of AK Party settled to White House.⁷⁰⁷ The meeting was highly remarkable as Washington invited Erdoğan as the leader of governing party, owing to the fact that Erdoğan could not

⁷⁰⁰ Ole R Holsti, *To See Ourselves as Others See Us: How Publics Abroad View the United States after 9/11*, The University of Michigan Press, Michigan 2011, p. 116.

⁷⁰¹ Meltem M Bac, "Turkey and the USA at Crossroads: The Impact of Iraq War", *International Journal*, Winter 2006, p. 62.

⁷⁰² Soner Cagaptay, *Turkey at a Crossroads: Preserving Ankara's Western Orientation*, Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Washington 2005, p.15.

⁷⁰³ Cengiz Çandar, "Turkish Foreign Policy and the War on Iraq" in Martin G. Leonore, Dmitris Kredis (eds.) *The Future of Turkish Foreign Policy*, MIT Press, London 2004, p. 47.

⁷⁰⁴ Banu Eligur, "Turkish - American Relations since the 2003 Iraqi War: A Trouble Partnership", *Brandeis University Crown Center for Middle East Studies*, No.6, May 2006, p. 2.

⁷⁰⁵ Nur B Cross, "Parameters of Turkish Foreign Policy Under the AKP Governments", *UNISCI Discussion Papers*, No. 23, pp. 9-25.

⁷⁰⁶ Henri J Barkey, *Under the Gun: Turkish Foreign Policy and the Kurdish Question* in (ed.) Olson Robert *The Kurdish Movement in 1990s: Its Impacts on Turkey and Middle East*, The University of Kentucky Press, Kentucky 1996, p. 64.

⁷⁰⁷ David Sanger, "Threats and Responses: Allies; Turk Offers Partial Support on Iraq in Meeting With Bush", *The New York Times*, 11 December 2002.

perform Prime Ministry assignment due to his political ban. During the meeting with President Bush, Erdoğan publicly announced Turkish position and conditional support to Washington on condition that America should act in accordance with United Nation's decision while warning Saddam Hussein to collaborate with international organs in order to open Iraq for monitoring.

The meeting was perceived by Bush administration as a partial support for the demands and the negotiations continued further. Besides, FM Abdullah Gül's telephone diplomacy calling regional leaders and the regional visit containing Egypt, Iran, Syria, Saudi Arabia and Jordan in order to push neighborhood states press Saddam Hussein to cooperate with International Atomic Energy Agency appreciated by the media organs close to Bush administration perceiving it as an endeavor of postponing Iraq war.⁷⁰⁸ In addition to that, the U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz visited Turkey to urge AKP with an economic aid packet.⁷⁰⁹ The upcoming Iraqi war and Washington's demand of the U.S. troops to use Turkish territories against Saddam Hussein caused deep dissidence not only in Justice and Development Party parliamentarians but also among opposition parties, militaries, civil bureaucrats, intellectuals, academicians and media members.⁷¹⁰ Those opposing the bill propose the idea that Turkey's acceptance of the bill would seriously harm Turkish image in Arab world and cause troubles for Turkey in future prospective, the occupation plan of USA would be the second Vietnam for Washington, thus Turkey should not take part in a similar action. Distrust against USA and media debates introducing Turkish soldiers as mercenaries of America constituted the negative arguments of opposition rows, besides it was proposed that the U.S. could not attack against Iraq without the opening of Northern front. As for pros, favoring Turkey's close alliance with America stressed repeatedly the risk of a potential Kurdish state, Iraqi Turkmen's situation, post-war conjecture that might cause Turkey to lose all gains in Iraq and economic dimension in sense of International Monetary Fund supportive credits, USA help and oil-construction tenders would arise after war period.⁷¹¹

After long discussions that took place in Turkey, Justice and Development Party government applied to Turkish Grand General Assembly in accordance with Turkish constitution Article 92 in order to receive authorization for the motion opening Northern front

⁷⁰⁸ William M Hale, *Turkey, The U.S. and Iraq*, Saqi & London Middle East Institute, London, 2007, p.22.

⁷⁰⁹ Stephen F Hayes, "Wolfowitz Talks Turkey, The Serious War Planning is under Way", *Weekly Standard*, December 16 2002.

⁷¹⁰ Robert Olson, "Views from Turkey: Reasons for the United States War against Iraq", *Journal of Third World Studies*, Fall 2005, p. 143.

⁷¹¹ Şaban Kardaş, „Turkey and the Iraq Crisis: JDP Between Identity and Interest”, in Hakan Yavuz (ed.), *Emergency of New Turkey*, The University of Utah Press, Salt Lake City 2006, p. 310.

through Turkish territories in 01.03.2003. Justice and Development Party administration neither got a binding group decision nor a directing method nor pressed AK Party parliamentarians in order pass the bill.⁷¹² The bill brought by Justice and Development Party to the assembly to be voted according to ninety second closure of Turkish constitution was briefly as follows: To permit Turkish Armed Forces to be sent foreign countries and the use of forces in accordance with determined necessary guidance.⁷¹³ Within the framework of international laws, to deploy temporary, no more than six months, foreign soldiers, no more than 62.000, along with 255 aircrafts and 65 helicopters in the places where would be determined by Turkish government. To undertake all necessary regulations in order to provide foreign air and land forces to release an action and to perform all required tasks during the preparation period along with determination of status that upcoming forces would subject during their stay in Turkey.⁷¹⁴

During the closed session held in Turkish Grand National Assembly, the bill one more time discussed in all details between ruling and opposition parties. Justice and Development Party's bill putted to vote that was attended by 553 deputies. After the secret ballot voting 261 deputy voted in favor of USA troops deployment in Turkish territories, while 250 deputies opposed the demand and 19 deputies abstained noncommittal, thus the majority in order to pass the bill did not obtained and the permit authority demand of AK Party did not pass through Turkish Grand General Assembly. Nevertheless, Turkish Grand National Assembly ratified a decision permitting the U.S. troops to use Turkish airspace in order to provide logistic assistance to American forces situated in Iraq.⁷¹⁵

The rejection of the bill at Turkish Grand Assembly caused the United States - Turkey relations to experience the second break after the 'Johnson Letter' case.⁷¹⁶ It obliged Washington completely change its plan to overthrow Saddam Hussein and directed a reaction wave mixed with disappointment and anger against Justice and Development Party government.⁷¹⁷ The United States of America evaluated the consequences of the rejection

⁷¹² James E Kapsis, "The Failure of U.S. Turkish pre-War Negotiations: An Overconfident United States Political Management and Conflicted Military", *Middle East Review of International Affairs*, Vol. X, No, 3, September 2006, (source: [www.meria.idc.ac.il](http://meria.idc.ac.il/journal/2006/issue3/jv10no3a3.html), <<http://meria.idc.ac.il/journal/2006/issue3/jv10no3a3.html>>, March 2012).

⁷¹³ "1 March Bill", (source: www.belgenet.com, <http://www.belgenet.com/2003/sav_010303.html>, March 2012).

⁷¹⁴ Murat Yeşiltaş, "Soft Balancing in Turkish Foreign Policy: The Case of the 2003 Iraqi War", *Perceptions*, Spring Summer 2009, p. 38.

⁷¹⁵ "Tarihi Teskere Reddedildi" ("Historical Bill has been Rejected"), *Hürriyet*, 1 March 2003.

⁷¹⁶ Glenn Kessler, Phillip P Pan. "Missteps with Turkey Prove Costly, Diplomatic Debacle Denied a Strong Northern Thrust in Iraq", *Washington Post*, 28 March 2003.

⁷¹⁷ J. E. Kapsis, op.cit., n.d.

while some high rank USA officials like Wolfowitz accused Turkish military members for not undertaking required activities in order to pass the bill as some others blamed Turkey for not fulfilling the requirements of strategic partnership.⁷¹⁸ As for Justice and Development Party administration staff, they responded the criticism calling Pentagon and Washington officials to respect democracy process and convey the Ankara's inconvenience not to approach case with indulgency in Turkey. The experts, academicians, specialist or media members realizing the evaluation of bill crisis took place among Turkey and USA criticized American foreign policy decision makers and high rank army members not to approach case seriously. Idris Bal, for instance, criticizing the U.S. officials not to undertake lobby activities to express USA views at public and official level in order to remove Turkish anxieties and blame Pentagon to look the case almost certain and not to seriously approach the deal.⁷¹⁹ Aftermaths the rejection of the bill, "the Turkish Parliament agreed later in March to give the United States access to their airspace, and the United States provided Turkey with a \$1 billion package in exchange"⁷²⁰ though the tensed relation between the parts did not calm down.⁷²¹

The Hood Event

The Turkey - U.S. relations that tensed due to the rejection of motion experienced the second breaking at this period in the case, which is called as Hood Event. After the Gulf War, due to authority gap arose in Northern Iraq, Turkey, in accordance with the agreement provided among Iraq central government, the United States of America and Kurdish local administrative, and deployed its special forces at the strategic points situated in Northern Iraq in order to prevent P.K.K. leaks against Turkey.⁷²² In the course of time, Turkish special units continued their anti-terror and intelligence activities at this frame against terror acts directed to Turkey from Northern Iraq.

In 4 July 2003, Turkish headquarters office situated in Northern Iraq city Sulaymaniyah was raided by the U.S. troops and Kurdish local forces. Along with Turkmen and Kurdish civilians,⁷²³ 11 high level (These were trained elite soldiers constituting of 3 officials and 8 junior officials who were subjected to anti-terror trainee) officials were detained by the U.S. troops incumbent in the discreet. After the raid, Turkish soldiers and

⁷¹⁸ Derya Sazak, "Wolfowitz and the United States", *Turks US*, 3 March 2003.

⁷¹⁹ İ. Bal, "Türkiye - ABD ...", pp. 151-185.

⁷²⁰ Ibidem, pp. 151-185.

⁷²¹ Deniz Bölükbaşı, *1 Mart Vakası Irak Tezkeresi ve Sonrası (The Case of 1st March, Iraq Motion and Its Aftermath)*, Doğan Kitap, İstanbul 2008, p.39.

⁷²² "Çuval Olayı'nın Perde Arkası" ("The Backstage of Hood Incident"), *Radikal*, 4 April 2011.

⁷²³ "Özkök: Çuval Olayı Asla Unutulmaz" ("Hood Incident can not be Forgotten"), *Yeni Safak*, 03 October, 2007.

civilians were detained for 60 hours in American airbase situated in Northern Iraq. This made the situation more insulting as they were forced to wear hood on their heads, which portrayed them as terrorist through allies with whom they allied for years.⁷²⁴ According to Turkish sources, it was a completely sudden, unexpected attack, which was not foreseen through the Turkish forces both in Northern Iraq as well in Ankara, as Turkish forces since the Gulf War were cooperating with the United States of America. Some media organs in Turkey even claimed that, the commander heading the detainment operation visited Turkish headquarter previously in order to drink coffee and that is why Turkish units did not realize that it was an attack against them.⁷²⁵ After the attack, Ankara both via diplomatic and military channels tried to reach USA officials, however due to the public holiday of 4th July Independence Day celebrations Turkish officials could not contact with American counterparts, which prolonged the period of arrest period.⁷²⁶

After the incident Ankara at all levels contacted to Pentagon and Washington, former Foreign Affairs Minister Gül made a telephone call with his counterpart Collin Powell warning him that the incident might affect Turkey - U.S. relations very negatively. During the press conference held after the hood event, former Minister Abdullah Gül on a respond to a question directed by a journalist stressed that the strategic cooperation between the U.S. and Turkey continue and commented the case as a local event, which took place without the previous information of Pentagon high rank soldiers.⁷²⁷ High rank Turkish civil and military official came together in Prime Minister's office so as to evaluate latest developments related to the case. The most adamant statement related to detainments came from Turkish Prime Minister who interpreted the case as a nasty case, which must not take place in alliance relations and harshly criticized the responsible⁷²⁸. In addition to that, as a quick reaction to the detainments Ankara closed her border to Iraq while some high rank Turkish generals canceled their programs in the U.S.⁷²⁹ As for the United States, after the first minutes of the case it claimed that they were informed that Turkish forces were in the course of an assassination against a Kurdish local administrator.

⁷²⁴ Aylin Güney, "An Anatomy of the Transformation of the US - Turkish Alliance: From 'Cold War' to 'War on Iraq'", *Turkish Studies*, Vol. VI, No. 3, September 2005, p. 343.

⁷²⁵ "Çuvaldan Tapu Çıktı" ("Land Registration Came up from the Hood"), *Takvim*, 27 December 2010.

⁷²⁶ "A Partnership at Risk?", *Economist*, 10 July 2003.

⁷²⁷ Helin S Ertem, "Partners in Conflict: The PKK Issue in Turkish-American Relations", *Turkish Review of Middle East Studies*, Vol. XVII, 2006, p. 60.

⁷²⁸ Soner Çağatay, "An Accident on the Road to US - Turkish Cooperation in Iraq: Implications for Turkey", *The Washington Institute Report* 3 March 2003.

⁷²⁹ Carol Migdalovitz, "Turkey's 2007 Elections: Crisis of Identity and Power", *CRS Report for Congress*, Updated 10 September 2007, Order Code RL3403, p.19.

Then, Pentagon evaluated the incident as a misunderstanding rooted to the fact that Turkish special units were not wearing uniforms and were not carrying identification cards, which gave way to such mistake. Thanks to initiatives of Ankara, Turkish soldiers were released, however due to the incident Turkish - USA relations experienced the worst period both in official and public level. The anti-Americanism in Turkish public view hit its record at this period. Scholars, columnists and critics approached the case United States' and Kurdish administrative attempt to liquidation from the Northern Iraq. The coincidence to event to Fourth of the July commented as a hidden message conveyed to Ankara hinting that the new sheriff is at work. As an argument supporting this hypothesis there appeared news in Turkish media claiming⁷³⁰ that Iraqi Kurdish administration pushed heavy press on the U.S. in order to withdraw Turkish special units from Northern Iraq in return for their support against USA fight against terror in Iraq. The future of relation with Washington and Iraqi Kurds along with the future of Iraq and P.K.K. threat against Turkey was discussed with all its aspects after the incident.⁷³¹

The most reliving part of the hood event was Turkish soldiers did not resisted the raid which could resulted in heavy casualties, henceforth it could cause wound in Turkey - USA and Turkey - Northern Iraq local Kurdish administration relation both in diplomatic, military and economic sense. Till now the real motivation and backstage of the incident is not clear, even after 7 years, but there appeared some news⁷³² in Turkish media claiming that the real reason of the incident was the land registrations and demographic structure of the Northern Iraq. Kurdish "Peshmergas",⁷³³ who were trying to loot the land offices in order to change demographic structure against Turkmen's as well as Arabs, however Turkish special units situated in Sulaymaniyah learned the plan beforehand thanks to inelegancy, thus they copied all the original land registration to micro film and at digital context and sent it to Ankara. According to claims, Kurds manipulated and provoked the U.S. troops against Turkish units, which caused the raid. It is also remarkable that during the raid the U.S. forces cluttered Turkish headquarter which gave the impression that they were searching something on purpose.⁷³⁴

⁷³⁰ "A.B.D. Askerleri K. Irakta Türk Gücü İstemiyor" ("U.S.A. Soldiers do not Want Turkish Soldiers in Northern Iraq"), (source: www.ntvmsnbc.com, <<http://arsiv.ntvmsnbc.com/news/223213.asp>>, March 2011).

⁷³¹ William Hale, "Turkey, the US and Iraq", *SOAS Middle East Studies*, London 2007, p. 50.

⁷³² Ibidem, p. 51.

⁷³³ Peshmerga is a Kurdish word which means those who encounter face Heath, however the term in general meaning use for Kurdish armed forces in Northern Iraq.

⁷³⁴ "Çuvaldan Tapu Çıktı" ("Land Registration Came up from the Hood"), *Takvim*, 27 December 2010.

Turkish - United States Relations, which got highly tensed, due to the rejection of motion and hood event, entered a more positive direction thanks to the meeting took place between Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and President George W. Bush.⁷³⁵ The main topic of the meeting was “global war on terrorism”⁷³⁶ and was related to the future of Iraq and PKK terror.⁷³⁷ The high-level meeting of Turkish delegation headed by Prime Minister Erdoğan indicated the importance of Turkey in the eye of the U.S. regardless of crisis that took place shortly before the meeting.⁷³⁸ In addition to that, in the course of the visit,⁷³⁹ many influential U.S. newspapers touched on the critical visit stressing crucial strategic position of Turkey for Washington’s Middle East interests evaluating Turkish P.M. as a successful partner.⁷⁴⁰

The topics of the meeting was mostly focused Cyprus issue, trade and economic relations related to create more investment prospects and naturally to Iraq. Turkish P.M., during the meeting, expressed security anxieties of Turkey directed through Northern Iraq along with the status of Kirkuk and risks of potential Kurdish state and territorial integrity of Iraq. Washington meeting Turkey’s concerns perspicuously declared that they added new version of PKK as a terrorist organization stressing that they would prohibit all activities of the organization in Northern Iraq.⁷⁴¹ The U.S. officials as related to the meeting underlined the unique status of Turkey in the Muslim world as a democratic-secular state that has a predominant Muslim population. Apart from that, Washington from the highest level repeated its open support for Turkey’s membership to the European Union while as well encouraged Turkish thesis in terms of Cyprus during the negotiations with Greek part. Turkish Prime Minister, at this context realized visits to the United States of America in order to strengthen Turkey - U.S. relations that made a road accident during Iraq war at the period of Bush administration.⁷⁴²

After the high level meeting, American President paid his first visit to Turkey due to NATO summit which held in Istanbul at 28th - 29th June 2004.⁷⁴³ In spite of the fact that there had been blasts in Istanbul killing civilians and around the hotel where would American

⁷³⁵ Mahendra Gaur, *Foreign Policy Annual, 2004*, Kalpaz Publication, Delhi 2005, p.62.

⁷³⁶ Ibidem, p.63.

⁷³⁷ Alexander H McDannald, *2005 Americana Annual*, Americana Corporation, New York 2005, p. 376.

⁷³⁸ N. Yeşilyurt, A. Akdevelioğlu, op.cit. p.57.

⁷³⁹ Mark Berniker, “US’s Kurdish Ban Risks Backfiring”, *Asia Times*, 31 January 2004.

⁷⁴⁰ “Erdoğan Urges Bush: Find the Murderers, Destroy PKK Base in Iraq”, *The Journal of Turkish Weekly*, 22 December 2004.

⁷⁴¹ “Irak’ta Kontragele Sert Önlemler” (“Harsh Persucations againt Kontragel in Iraq”), *Hürriyet*, 24 June, 2004

⁷⁴² İlknur Çevik, “PM Erdogan Back in White House”, *Hürriyet Daily News*, 01 January 2004.

⁷⁴³ “George Bush Addresses the NATO Summit in Turkey”, *The Guardian*, 29 June 2004.

President stayed, White House did not cancel Bush's historic visit to Turkey calling them as actions aiming to shade NATO meeting.⁷⁴⁴ Before his departure for Turkey for the summit, American President appraised Turkey role in the region calling Turkish Prime Minister as his friend, gave positive messages to Turkish public view.⁷⁴⁵ George W. Bush repeated Washington's support against the separatist Kurdish terrorism and support Turkish thesis and economic aid to Cyprus.⁷⁴⁶ Before the Summit, President Bush paid an official visit to Ankara where he met with President Erdoğan and Foreign Affairs Minister Gül along with his high rank officials Condoleezza Rice and Collin Powell. The main issues discussed during the meeting -as it has been in previous meeting held in Washington- Iraq and Afghanistan question, PKK existence and terror threat against Turkey directed from Northern Iraq, Turkmens in Iraq, Middle East questions and relations between Turkey and the United States of America. Turkish Prime Minister, participating on a T.V. program shortly after the meeting with Bush, voiced his appreciation and content with the visit, and stated Turkey's open support for the United States of America during their fight against Al-Qaida while in turn expected understanding Turkey's fight against Kurdish separatist terror.

Following the fruitful meeting between Bush and Erdoğan due to NATO summit, the mutual relations gained a deeper aspect after the G-8 summit that took place in Sea Island, the United States of America. The main topic of the G-8 summit was the United State's attempts to gain support of other global and regional actors related to its Middle East policies, thus the United States of America commenced to promote democratization, economic and social development of region under the frames of Great Middle East. But, due to reservation of France it was noted to the official documents as Broader Middle East and North Africa - including North Africa and Central Asia region states- while Washington endeavored to engage the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to Group of Eight.

Turkey was invited to the summit first time and was accepted as the co-leader of the Democracy Assistance Dialogue. Turkey's invitation to the meeting was highly important for putting Ankara as protagonist due to its geostrategic and geopolitical position in the region, as an ally of the West and as a unique country merging Western and Islamic values under the roof of democratic and secular frame. Thus, the foreign policy decision makers of AK Party highly appreciated the invitation and supported the Great Middle East Project. During the summit, Turkey was represented at the highest level by Prime Minister Recep Tayyip

⁷⁴⁴ "Bomb Explode in Turkey before Bush, NATO Summit", *China Daily*, 25 June 2004.

⁷⁴⁵ Steven A Cook and Elizabeth Sherwood-Randall, *Generating Momentum for a New Era in U.S.-Turkey Relations*, Council on Foreign Relations, New York 2006, p. 19.

⁷⁴⁶ *Ibidem*, p. 20.

Erdoğan. His words “As a society predominantly consist of Muslims, Turkey will continue to make contributions towards disseminating and developing universal values in this region. Turkey feels this responsibility as a result of its democratic structure rich historical legacy and identity, economic potential, and its membership in Western institutions” clearly indicates Turkey’s full support regarding the project.⁷⁴⁷ However, in the summit Turkish PM declared Turkey’s reservations against top to bottom decision making mechanism and the necessity of including the demands of region states, considering particularities of every region country. Prime Minister Erdoğan added that the other member states of G8 and NATO as well should be engaged in the decision making process of the project in order to prevent it from seeming as an United State project.⁷⁴⁸

High-level contacts at this period continued at the Foreign Affairs Ministries level; within the framework of her state visit to Europe including main European capitals along with Tel Aviv, the U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice visited Ankara. During the visit, the talks continued in the context of Iraq, terrorism, strategic relations between Turkey and USA.⁷⁴⁹ In reply to his counterparts visit, former Turkish Foreign Affairs Minister Gül paid official visits to the U.S. in 2006 and 2007. In contrast to initial period of Iraq war, the United States of America at this period commenced to follow a consultative policy toward Iraq in accordance with Turkey. Thus, Ankara and Washington decided to share their visions and continue consultations in a regular line. The high level meeting of leaders and Foreign Affairs Ministries, diplomatic contacts as well highly contributed to this project, while developments (terror attacks and political instabilities) affected the U.S. decisions. Hence, in Fifth of July 2006, Turkish Foreign Affairs Minister Abdullah Gül and USA Secretary Condoleezza Rice agreed on signature “Shared Vision and Structured Dialogue to Advanced the Strategic Partnership”. The original text of the mutual understanding in general terms is as bellow:

The relationship between Turkey and the United States is characterized by strong bonds of friendship, alliance, mutual trust, and a unity of vision. We share the same set of values and ideals in our regional and global objectives: the promotion of peace, democracy, freedom and prosperity. Thus, Turkey and the United States face common challenges and opportunities that demand our concerted efforts. These challenges and opportunities form the specific items of our common agenda for consultation and cooperation. We agree to translate our shared vision into common efforts through effective cooperation and structured dialogue. Turkey and the United States pledge themselves to work together on all issues of common concern, including promoting peace and stability in the broader Middle East through democracy; supporting international efforts towards a

⁷⁴⁷ Hüseyin Bağcı, „The Greater Middle East Initiative and Turkey: The AKP’s Perspective” in N. Goren Nimrod, Amikam Nachmani, *The Importance of Being European: Turkey, the EU, and the Middle East*, Jerusalem, The European Forum at the Hebrew University, 2007, pp.165-177.

⁷⁴⁸ Ibidem, pp.165-177.

⁷⁴⁹ Esra Duyar, “Rice Visit to Turkey”, *Turkish Weekly*, 29 December 2005.

permanent settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict, including international efforts to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict on the basis of a two-state solution; fostering stability, democracy and prosperity in a unified Iraq; supporting diplomatic efforts regarding Iran's nuclear program including the recent P5+1 initiative; contributing to stability, democracy and prosperity in the Black Sea region, the Caucasus, Central Asia and Afghanistan; supporting the achievement of a just and lasting, comprehensive and mutually acceptable settlement of the Cyprus question under the auspices of the UN and in this context ending the isolation of the Turkish Cypriots; enhancing energy security, through diversification of routes and sources including from the Caspian basin; strengthening transatlantic relations and the transformation of NATO; countering terrorism, including the fight against the PKK and its affiliates; preventing WMD proliferation; combating illegal trafficking of persons, drugs and weapons; increasing understanding, respect and tolerance between and among religions and cultures; and promoting together effective multilateral action to find solutions to international challenges and crises of common concern. The United States strongly supports Turkey's accession to the European Union and the accession process now underway. Our consultation and cooperation will also include enhanced bilateral relations with particular emphasis on economic and commercial relations and investments; defense/military cooperation; science and technology and public diplomacy efforts and exchanges.⁷⁵⁰

The memorandum of understanding was highly crucial for the future perspectives of mutual relations as in the course of history it was the first time that bilateral relations was clearly defined by a road map while it was proposed that both parties should gather regularly. As required by the scopes of the Shared Vision and Structured Dialogue to Advanced the Strategic Partnership, an action plan was agreed defining the development line of mutual relations in the issues like economy, trade, technology and science. The agreed plan was bearing essential peculiarities as it was including specific points related to energy, economy, trade and commerce issues particularly referring to transit of Caspian resources to the West.

On the eve of Prime Minister Erdoğan's long waited visit to Washington, so-called Armenian Genocide claims one more time shook Turkey - USA relations. United States House Committee on Foreign Affairs headed by Nancy Pelosi passed a genocide resolution with a measure 27-21.⁷⁵¹ In respond, Minister for the European Union Affairs and Chief Negotiator Eğemen Bağış -also a well known, influential figure in USA politics and media circles- warned Washington to withdraw resolution giving French example as Turkey prohibited France to use Turkish airspace. Since the acceptance of so-called genocide, as like did Turkish Prime Minister hinting that it might jeopardize strategic relations existing between the parts, while President Abdullah Gül stated his disturbance there might be serious problems in relation prospects, besides, as a reaction to the resolution Ankara recalled its ambassador back, in order to prevent resolution to the U.S. congress. Bush administration Defense Secretary Robert Gater, taking the situation seriously publicly declared that the resolution might endanger USA policies in Iraq as 70 percent air cargo realizes trough flights

⁷⁵⁰ "Turkish - U.S. Political Relations", (source: www.mfa.gov.tr, <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkish-u_s_-political-relations.en.mfa>, March, 2012).

⁷⁵¹ "Turkey Recalls Ambassador over Genocide Resolution", *The Guardian*, 5 March, 2010.

on Turkey,⁷⁵² while State Secretary Rice conveyed her regret to her counterpart Ali Babacan. In spite of speaker Pelosi's attempts to bring the issue to full vote, pressures from Ankara and Bush administrations concerns on Iraq and Afghanistan postponed the resolution come to agenda for a while at this period.

With the increasing terror attacks, Justice and Development Party exploded a heavy pressure in order to realize a cross border operation against P.K.K. camps situated in Northern Iraq; however Kurdish local administration and United States harshly opposed the intended operation under the pretext that it may harm sensitive balances and stability in Iraq. Besides, Turkish Grand National Assembly with a unanimous form accepted a 'cross border operation' motion in spite of heavy U.S. opposition and critics. So under the shadow of terror -the ambiance of Turkish publish view was so tense that in the media it was even discussed the possible clash with the U.S. troops during cross border operation to Northern Iraq-.

At the November of 2007, Turkish Prime Minister paid a Four day official visit to the United States of America. At the fifth of November, the following high-level meeting took place between Erdoğan and Bush. Thus, the main topic of the meeting, as it used to be, was Iraq and terror threat directed to Turkey, moreover the Turkish delegation accompanying to PM was consisting of Ministry of Defense and Second Chief of General Staff barely indicated the military and defense dimension of the talks. Turkish Prime Minister declared that Turkey has the right to protect itself against the terror directed from the Northern Iraq camp; he added that the Turkish army is ready to realize similar operations. Turkish government from the top level asked the United States of America to close terrorist camps in Northern Iraq, cut logistic support to camps, and arrest of leader staff of Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK). While USA President opposed the idea of cross border operation trying Turkey to persuade collaborate in terms of intelligence cooperation aid, which means that instead of realizing any sort of attacks to Iraq, USA was offering to give information of terrorist groups leaking to Turkey, thence Turkey could counteract it with local attacks instead of mass operations. President Bush's offer in terms of intelligence was highly important in order to conceptualize Washington's position toward Ankara as USA was providing a similar strategic intelligence solely to Israel in the world and the permission of the congress was required.

Both Presidents evaluated the current situation of the relations during the press conference. President Bush underlined the necessity of collaboration. In addition, when he

⁷⁵² Ibidem.

was asked about Turkey's possible Northern Iraq operation he hinted Washington's dislike but he defined Kurdistan Workers Party as the common enemy of Turkey and Iraq.⁷⁵³ On the other hand, Prime Minister revealing that he is repeating his previous statements during the closed meeting underlying that Ankara is ready for an air operation against terror camps situated in Northern Iraq, plus he tried to remove concerns on civilian casualties.⁷⁵⁴ High level visits at this context during the Presidency of George W. Bush continued at a regular line. Former Minister of Foreign Affairs and new President Abdullah Gül in 7th - 11th January of 2008 met with his counterpart Bush along with State Secretary Rice and Defense Minister. In return, The Vice President of the United States of America visited Turkey in March 4, 2008 in order to exchange views on strategic, military and economic issues gathering with President, Prime Minister and previous Chief of Turkish General Staff.

The election of Barack Hussein Obama as the 44th President of the United States of America like all around the world created a positive ambiance in Turkey as well, both in public and official level.⁷⁵⁵ His father's Muslim roots, lexicon of change created a hope in Turkey in terms of Turkish - USA relations exercising a though period during two terms of Bush administration.⁷⁵⁶ After the Obama's announcement as the new President, in Turkey it was appreciated as a fresh breathe not only bilateral Turkish - U.S. relations but also in Middle East, Afghanistan and the world.⁷⁵⁷ On the other hand, Obama's approach to so-called Armenian genocide claims and open support along with the election promise to recognize 1915 events as genocide,⁷⁵⁸ gravely irritated Turkish administration although diplomatic circles and Justice and Development Party foreign policy decision makers evaluated it as an election propaganda in order to gain Armenian support referring to strategic relationship between the United States of America and Turkey.⁷⁵⁹

⁷⁵³ Stephen F Larrabee, "Troubled Partnership: US - Turkish Relations in an Era of Global Geopolitical Change", *RAND Corporation*, 2010, pp. 48 - 49.

⁷⁵⁴ "Anında İstihbarat Ananda Vur" ("Simultaneous Intelligence Simultaneous Attack"), *Hürriyet*, 15 March 2007.

⁷⁵⁵ Cenap Çakmak, "Turkish - American Relations during the Obama Era: Unfulfilled Expectations", *Turkish Review*, 01 January 2011.

⁷⁵⁶ Cüneyt Ülsever, "Turkish - American Relations in the Obama Period", *Hürriyet Daily News*, 01 February 2008.

⁷⁵⁷ Ahmet K Han, "From Strategic Partnership to Model Partnership: AKP, Turkish - USA Relations and Prospects under Obama", *UNISCI Discussion Papers*, May 2010, No 23, pp.77 - 112.

⁷⁵⁸ In a speech delivered on 19 January 2008 he said; "I shared with Secretary Rice my firmly held conviction that the Armenian Genocide is not an allegation, a personal opinion, or a point of view, but rather a widely documented fact supported by an overwhelming body of historical evidence. The facts are undeniable. An official policy that calls on diplomats to distort the historical facts is an untenable policy.... and as President I will recognize the Armenian genocide." Obama, B. as cited in Han, K.A. "From Strategic Partnership..." p. 77- 112.

⁷⁵⁹ Bülent Aras, "A Golden Era for US - Turkey Relations ?", *The Guardian*, 04 April 2009.

The first high-level contact after Obama's settlement to White House took place in Presidents level when he paid his first visit to a Muslim nation during a two day official visit to Ankara.⁷⁶⁰ Under the frame of his visit,⁷⁶¹ American President met with President Abdullah Gül, Prime Minister Erdoğan and with the general secretaries of opposition parties, and Turkish religious leaders.⁷⁶² He also voiced to Turkish National Grand Assembly being the second U.S. President making a speech at Turkish Parliamentary after President Clinton, during his visit, Obama was accompanied as well by State Secretary Hilary Clinton.⁷⁶³

Starting his 25 minute speech, Obama noted that "Turkey is not where East and the West divide, it is where they come together",⁷⁶⁴ to hint Washington's open support to Turkey for its entrance to the European Union. He mentioned about historical ties between the U.S. and Turkey, in his speech at the Parliamentary.⁷⁶⁵ President Obama underlined the future partnership prospects between Turkey and the United States of America calling it as "Model Partnership" thanks to which Turkish – U.S. relations gained a deeper level in terms of strategic alliance in terms of war against terrorism and partnership at Afghan and Iraq wars.⁷⁶⁶ He also underscored great strategic importance of Turkey for the United States of America in terms of fight against terrorism as well highlighted the affiliations in terms of economic, cultural and politics with Ankara.⁷⁶⁷ During his historical speech which was followed many journalist and broadcasted live including many Arab media he underscored as follows:

The United States and Turkey have not always agreed on every issue, and that's to be expected - no two nations do. But we have stood together through many challenges over the last 60 years. And because of the strength of our alliance and the endurance of our friendship, both America and Turkey are stronger and the world is more secure.⁷⁶⁸

⁷⁶⁰ Ramazan Gözen, "Turkey - American Relations in 2009", *Perceptions*, Vol. XV, No. 3-4, Autumn - Winter 2010, p. 55.

⁷⁶¹ Ariel Cohen, Owen Graham, "Obama in Ankara: Turkey's Dangerous Drift", *Heritage Foundation Web Memo*, No. 23, 6 April 2009.

⁷⁶² Nathan C Funk, "Peace Making between America and the Muslim World", *Insight Turkey*, Vol. XI, No.4, 2009, p. 131.

⁷⁶³ "Obama Reaches out to Muslim World", *BBC News*, 6 April 2009.

⁷⁶⁴ Stephen M Walt, "Talking Turkey", *Foreign Policy*, 6 April 2009.

⁷⁶⁵ Sally Mcnamara, Ariel Cohen, "Countering Turkey's Strategic Rift", *Backgrounders*, No. 2442, July 2010, p. 3.

⁷⁶⁶ Helene Cooper, "America Seeks Bonds to Islam, Obama Insists", *The New York Times*, 6 April 2009.

⁷⁶⁷ "Remarks by President Obama to the Turkish Parliament", source: www.whitehouse.gov, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-By-President-Obama-To-The-Turkish-Parliament>, April 2009).

⁷⁶⁸ Ibid.

President Obama voiced Washington's support for Turkey's European Union membership referring to Turkish model saying, "This is a country that has been often said lies at the crossroads between East and the West. It's a country that possesses an extraordinarily rich heritage, but also represents a blend of those ancient traditions with a modern nation state that respects democracy, respects rule of law and is striving towards a modern economy".⁷⁶⁹ He added that "It is a member of NATO and it is also a majority Muslim nation, unique in that position, and so, as a consequence, has insights into a whole host of regional and strategic challenges that we may face"⁷⁷⁰ while encouraged Turkey to actively contribute to peace building process at Israel - Palestine conflict.

In his keynote speech, Barack Obama also dwelled on the new paradigm of the U.S. relations with Muslim world under his rule, the new American President emphasized that "America's relationship with the Muslims cannot and will not be based on opposition to Al Qaeda", I'm sure that played better than "you're either with us, or with the terrorists".⁷⁷¹ As regard to 'America's relationship with the Muslim community' Obama said, "Cannot and will not just be based upon opposition to terrorism. We seek broader engagement based on mutual interest and mutual respect". The U.S. President added "Let me say this as clearly as I can, The United States is not and will never be at war with Islam. In fact, our partnership with the Muslim world is critical [...] in rolling back the violent ideologies that people of all faiths reject."⁷⁷² In order to indicate new approach to Muslim world and in search of reconciliation, Obama appraised Islamic civilizations contribution to the world saying, "We will convey our deep appreciation for the Islam faith, which has done so much over the centuries to shape the world, including in my own country".⁷⁷³ Ultimately, as refer to developments arose in terms of Iran's nuclear enrichment program and Turkey's engagement to the issue the U.S. President highlighted that "the peace of the region will also be advanced if Iran forgoes any nuclear weapons ambitions", he added, "Iran's leaders must choose whether they will build a weapon or build a better future for their people".⁷⁷⁴

Following his historical speech at Turkish Grand National Assembly, the U.S. President met with President Gül and Prime Minister.⁷⁷⁵ Upon a question directed by press members during the press conference with Abdullah Gül reminding his election promises,

⁷⁶⁹ "Obama says U.S., Turkey can be Model for World", *CNN*, 6 April 2009.

⁷⁷⁰ *Ibid.*

⁷⁷¹ *Ibid.*

⁷⁷² *Ibid.*

⁷⁷³ Helene Cooper, "America Seeks Bonds to Islam, Obama Insists", *New York Times*, 6 April 2009.

⁷⁷⁴ Tom Raum, Jennefir Loden, "Obama in Turkey, Meets with Leaders, Addresses Parliament", *The Huffington Post*, 6 April 2009.

⁷⁷⁵ Gregor P Schimitz, "Turkey Trip Offers Pitfalls and Opportunities", *Der Spiegel*, 6 April 2009.

Obama replied he is supporting his words referring to records but he particularly evade from using the word of “genocide”.⁷⁷⁶ On the other hand, Obama in his speech to Parliament said, “He called for the opening of Turkey - Armenian border and suggested that each country should work through its past.”⁷⁷⁷ The best way forward for the Turkish and Armenian people is a process that works through the past in a way that is honest, open and constructive”.⁷⁷⁸ Moreover, under the frame of the second part of his visit in Istanbul, USA President met the Turkish and Armenian foreign ministers to discuss further developments in the Turkish - Armenian rapprochement”.⁷⁷⁹ Barack Obama's historical visit to Turkey shows that the United States of America appreciates Turkey as a pivotal country and strategic partner in its vision to re-establish Washington's associations with the Islam world. As Emrullah Uslu underscores “Obama wants Turkey to take further initiatives towards its democratization, believing that a fully democratic Turkey would help USA build diplomatic bridges between East and the West. Turkey might become a crucial part of Washington's efforts to implement the parallel policies of reaching out to the wider Islamic World while serving U.S. foreign policy interests in the Middle East”.⁷⁸⁰

Ensuite President Obama's visit, Turkey - U.S. relations highly tensed owing to “the approval of the Armenian “genocide” resolution that labels 1915 ethnic clashes between Armenians and Turkish communities as “genocide” by the U.S. House Foreign Relations Committee”.⁷⁸¹ The so-called Armenian genocide claims bill that has constituted an obstacle for USA - Turkey relation for a long time was positively voted at the U.S. House of Foreign Relations Committee despite President Obama's call to drop the bill.⁷⁸² State Secretary Hilary Clinton's attempts to persuade senators that pass of bill may endanger the rapprochement process developing between Turkey and Armenia.⁷⁸³ Ankara as a reaction recalled its ambassador to Washington for consultation shortly after the voting.⁷⁸⁴ Turkish President

⁷⁷⁶ Emil Sanamyan, “President Obama, in Turkey, Raises Armenian Issues Avoids the Word Genocide Asks Turkey to Open Armenia Border”, *The Armenian Reporter*, 10 April 2009.

⁷⁷⁷ “Obama Encourages Armenian Dialogue, Seeks a Model with Turkey”, *Hürriyet Daily News*, 7 April 2009.

⁷⁷⁸ Emrullah Uslu, “Obama's Ankara Visit Highlights Rapprochement Strategy Toward the Middle East”, *Eurasia Daily Monitor*, Vol. VI Issue: 66.

⁷⁷⁹ Ibid.

⁷⁸⁰ Ibid.

⁷⁸¹ “Armenian “genocide” Bill Shake Turkey - American Relations”, *Today's Zaman*, 5 March 2010.

⁷⁸² Robert Tait, Ewen MacAskil, “Turkey Threatens ‘Serious Consequences’ after US Vote on Armenian Genocide”, *The Guardian*, 5 March 2010.

⁷⁸³ “Ermeni Tasarasi Kabul Edildi” (“Armenian Bill in U.S.A Accepted”), *Sabah*, 4 March 2010.

⁷⁸⁴ Daniel Nasaw, “Turkey Recalls US Ambassador over Armenia Genocide Resolution”, *The Guardian*, 5 March 2010.

called the resolution “an injustice to history and to the science of history”,⁷⁸⁵ while Prime Minister notified that “his country had been accused of a crime it did not commit, adding that the resolution would hamper efforts by Turkey and Armenia to end a century of hostility”.⁷⁸⁶ FM, Ahmet Davutoğlu soon after the genocide voting “underlined once again that Turkey is determined to continue efforts to normalize ties with Armenia”.⁷⁸⁷

USA - Turkey relations, following the bill crisis, one more time tensed due to so-called Armenian genocide, issue due to 94th anniversary of alleged Armenian genocide. The U.S. President Obama on contrary to his election promises did not evaluate the 1915 events as genocide but used Armenian term “Meds Yeghern”⁷⁸⁸ which translates as great tragedy during the Armenian Remembrance Day Speech 24 of April 2009.⁷⁸⁹ Justice and Development Party government headed by Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan appreciated Obama’s rhetoric positive, as he reckoned that “our sensitivities were taken into consideration”.⁷⁹⁰ Davutoğlu evaluated the U.S. President’s speech as “one sided” and “reading the history through a single perspective”.⁷⁹¹ In addition to that, Turkey’s Washington ambassador commented on Obama’s speech as the “incorrect, and one sided evaluation of the history”⁷⁹² reflecting his regret. On the other hand, upon the statements of Obama that did not content neither Turkish nor Armenian side and as regard to harsh criticism of Armenian lobby in the U.S., President Obama declared that his personal opinion did not change toward the events.

Aftermaths, “On September 9th, the United States announced that it was planning a multi-billion dollar sale of 3 Patriot fire units, 72 PAC -3 missiles and a range of related hardware for ground based air defense”.⁷⁹³ It was perceived that Turkey would be an alternative for the U.S. new Missile Defense System base that was planned to be launched in Central Europe (in Poland and Czech Republic).⁷⁹⁴ Ankara as a request of so-called model

⁷⁸⁵ Daniel Nasaw, “Armenian ‘Genocide’ Vote Unjust, Says Turkey”, *The Guardian*, 5 March 2010.

⁷⁸⁶ Ibid.

⁷⁸⁷ Bülent Aras. “A Diplomatic Mistake over Armenia”, *The Guardian*, 5 March 2010.

⁷⁸⁸ “Obama: Meds Yeghern to jedna z największych okropności XX wieku” (“Obama: Meds Yeghern is one of the Horrors of XX. Century”), (source: [www.wiadomosci.gazeta.pl](http://wiadomosci.gazeta.pl), <http://wiadomosci.gazeta.pl/wiadomosci/1,114873,7810166,Obama__Meds_Yeghern_to_jedna_z_najwiekszych_okropnosci.html>, March 2011).

⁷⁸⁹ Bill Park, „Turkey and U.S”, in Andrew M. Dorman, Joyce P. Kaufman (ed.) *The Future of Transatlantic Relations: Perceptions, Policy and Practice* Stanford University Press, Stanford California 2011, p. 151.

⁷⁹⁰ “Obama Büyük Felaket Dedi” (“Obama Said Big Catastrophe”), *Hürriyet*, 24 April 2011.

⁷⁹¹ “23 Nisan Felaketi” (“23 April Catastrophe”), *Radikal*, 25 April 2011.

⁷⁹² “Namik Tan: Derin Uzüntü Duyduk” (“Namik Tan: We Regret Deeply”), *Hürriyet*, 24 April 2011.

⁷⁹³ Piotr Zalewski, “Missile Defense: A View from Turkey”, *Center For European Policy Studies*, 2009, p. 2.

⁷⁹⁴ Marcin Bosacki, “Poland without Missile Defense”, *Gazeta Wyborcza*, 27 August, 2009.

partnership under Justice and Development Party government rule approached to deal positively. On the other hand, “Turkish officials were careful in their comments to avoid identifying Iran as the specific threat motivating their decision to join NATO’s American-designed missile shield”.⁷⁹⁵ Ankara tried to protect its long term zero principle policy rhetoric and good neighborhood relations developed with Iran, Syria and Russia. Nonetheless, it deeply spoiled constructive relations particularly with Tehran and Moscow that established in the course of AKP government periods. Parallel to issue, Tehran warned Ankara that “that deploying the radar at the military installation will escalate regional tensions”⁷⁹⁶ tough Turkish side insisted that the shield does not target a specific country, and the ministry statement did not mention Iran. However, despite of Turkey’s warranty a prominent Iranian MP “Hossein Ebrahimi, Vice-Chairman of the Iranian Parliament’s National Security and Foreign Policy Commission, said in an interview with the Iranian Sharq newspaper that an Iranian strike on NATO targets in Turkey is a “natural right”.⁷⁹⁷

Upon the “release of thousands of sensitive diplomatic cables”,⁷⁹⁸ in whistle blowing website of Wikileaks, Turkish - U.S. relations encountered a serious challenge at Barack Obama’s period. Among revealed cast cables -constitute the largest block of cables- that the U.S. diplomats sent to Washington, the most controversial alleged claims sent via cable were as follows: Turkish PM has several secret accounts in Switzerland,⁷⁹⁹ Turkey under Islamist AKP is no more a reliable ally of United States,⁸⁰⁰ and Turkey helped Al-Qaida in Iraq.⁸⁰¹ Apart from that, many cables summarizing personal characters as regard to Prime Minister Erdoğan, AK Party as well as many speculations in domestic Turkish politics scale revealed, along with internal reports calling Davutoğlu as a “Neo Ottomanist”. Regarding the scandal, the U.S. secretary Hilary Clinton apologized. The so-called claims of American diplomat occupied Turkish media as well as the claimed cable found its reflection in world media. Though it was not announced publicly, the former U.S. embassy Eric Edelman was on the target of fervent critics of Justice and Development Party administration.⁸⁰² Nevertheless, on contrary to expectations, at the initial period of wiki scandal, Turkish - USA relations did not

⁷⁹⁵ Thom Shaker, “U.S. Hails Deal with Turkey on Missile Shield”, *The New York Times*, 15 September 2011.

⁷⁹⁶ “Turkey Joins NATO Missile Defense System”, *The Washington Post*, 14 September 2011.

⁷⁹⁷ “Iran will Strike Turkey’s NATO Shield if Attacked”, *Al Akhbar English*, 13 December 2011.

⁷⁹⁸ Jonathan Fildes, “What is Wikileaks?”, *BBC News*, 7 December 2010.

⁷⁹⁹ “Erdoğan Denies Wikileaks Claim of Swiss Bank Account”, *Jerusalem Post*, 12 January 2010.

⁸⁰⁰ “Wikileaks: U.S. ‘Doubted’ Turkey’s Reliability”, *The Telegraph*, 29 November 2010.

⁸⁰¹ “Wikileaks Documents Show Turkey Helped Al Qaida”, *Jerusalem Post*, 25 November 2010.

⁸⁰² Amberin Zaman, “WikiLeaks: The Impact on Turkish - U.S. Relations and Turkey’s Domestic Politics”, *Today’s Zaman*, 17 December 2010.

harm that much as Turkey's Foreign Ministry workers and Justice and Development Party administrators called the cables as subjective, personal perception of diplomats that do not reflect official position of Washington.

3. The European Union and Cyprus Issue

As it has been mentioned previously, traces of Westernization in Turkish case date back to 19th century, which is clear due to series of defeats against Europe that found its reflection in military, economic and social aspect at Ottoman Empire. After gaining its independence struggle and proclaiming the Republic, the founder of modern Turkey Mustafa Kemal Atatürk selected the West as the sole model of development for modern Turkey.⁸⁰³ Kemal highlighted that "our aim is to overcome contemporary civilization".⁸⁰⁴ He took into consideration Europe as the contemporary civilization that modern Turkey should integrate.⁸⁰⁵ The founder of the Republic, realizing radical reforms like abolishment of monarchy and caliphate, while adopting European borrowed constitution with civil law practiced his upper mentioned rhetoric.⁸⁰⁶

After the Second World War, as parallel to foreign policy aim of modern Turkey, it took part with Western alliance; hence, in 1949 it signed full membership agreement with the Council of Europe. In 1951 Turkey joined to North Atlantic Treaty Organization, in the course of time Turkey became member to Organization for Economic Cooperation, and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development.⁸⁰⁷ 1959 is the beginning of modern "Turkish - EU"⁸⁰⁸ relations when Turkey along with Greece applied for membership to

⁸⁰³ Kemal Karpat, "The Personality of Atatürk", *The American Historical Review*, Vol. XC, No. 4., October 1985, p. 896.

⁸⁰⁴ Nimet Arsan, *Atatürk'ün Söylev ve Demeçleri (Atatürk's Discourses and Interview)*, Türk Inkilap Tarihi Enstitüsü Yayınları, Ankara 1964, p. 187.

⁸⁰⁵ Ahmad Feroz, *The Making of Modern Turkey*, Routledge, London; New York 1993, p. 5.

⁸⁰⁶ Eric J Zürcher, *Turkey: A Modern History*, I.B. Tauris, London 1993, p.3.

⁸⁰⁷ "Turkey - EU Relations", Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, (source: www.mfa.gov.tr, <<http://www.mfa.gov.tr/reactions-between-turkey-and-the-european-union.en.mfa>>, March 2012).

⁸⁰⁸ For detailed literature on Turkey - EU relations in Polish see: *Franciszek Golebski, Droga Turcji do Unii Europejskiej: Stan i Perspektywy (Turkey's Way to European Union: State and Perspectives)*, Polski Instytut Spraw Międzynarodowych, Warszawa 1994, Adam Szymański "Argumenty przeciwko przyjęciu Turcji do Unii Europejskiej - Krytyczny Punkt Widzenia" ("Arguments against the Adaptation of Turkey to European Union: A Critical Point of View"), *Rocznik Instytutu Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej*, 5/2007, pp. 81-94; Adam Balcer, *Turcja po rozpoczęciu negocjacji z Unią Europejską- relacje zagraniczne i sytuacja wewnętrzna (Turkey after the Start of Negotiations with European Union: Foreign Relations and Internal Situation)*, Ośrodek Studiów Wschodnich, Warsaw 2008; Adam Szymański, "Turkey's Potential Added Value to the EU: Resolution of Regional Conflicts", *Turkish Policy Quarterly*, Fall 2009, pp. 125-138; Adam Szymański, *Turcja i Europa: wyzwania i szanse (Turkey and Europe: Challenges and Chances)*, Polski Instytut Spraw Międzynarodowych,

former European Economic Community.⁸⁰⁹ After the negotiations, which prolonged due to military coup of 1960 Turkey signed an association agreement, that is known as the Ankara Agreement, with the European Economic Community,⁸¹⁰ henceforth Republic of Turkey became an associate member for European Economic Community.⁸¹¹ The agreement signed between the parts shortly based on three pillars: customs union, free movement of labor and financial issues,⁸¹² besides Turkey's accession to the community was planned to time in three periods like preparatory, transitory and decision to access period.⁸¹³ Since 1963, European Union has constantly occupied a main theme in both domestic and foreign policy agenda of Ankara, hence the European Union membership of Turkey was perceived as the modernity and Westernization process of Turkey.⁸¹⁴ In 1987, Ankara applied for membership to European Community while the Community accepted application with reservations due to political (human right violations, minority rights, low democracy standards)⁸¹⁵ and economic (inflation, social security etc.) reasons.⁸¹⁶

Following the collapse of Soviet Union,⁸¹⁷ the relations between Turkey and the European Union entered to a new period due to changing status quo and increasing strategic importance of Turkey for Europe.⁸¹⁸ As a consequence of acceleration of mutual relations and after series of talks, in 1995, Ankara and Brussels agreed to sign a Customs Union establishment agreement which realized economic integration of Ankara with the European

Warszawa 2011; Aleksandra Zięba, *Rola Niemiec w Rozszerzaniu Unii Europejskiej (Germany's Role in the EU Enlargement)*, Poltext, Warsaw 2010.

⁸⁰⁹ Turkey - EU Relations", Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, (source: www.mfa.gov.tr, <<http://www.mfa.gov.tr/relations-between-turkey-and-the-european-union.en.mfa>>, March 2012).

⁸¹⁰ Ibidem.

⁸¹¹ Thomas Silberhorn, Tertium Datur, *Turkey's Application for EU Membership*, in Constantine Arvanitopoulos, Nikolaos Tzifakis (eds) *Turkey's Accession to the European Union: an Unusual Candidacy*, Springer - Verlag, (ed.) Heidelberg 2009, p. 45.

⁸¹² Bahri Yılmaz, "The Relations of Turkey with the European Union: Candidate Forever?", *Center for European Studies Working Paper*, 2008, Series No.167, pp. 1-5.

⁸¹³ John Redmond, Glenda G Rosenthal, *The Expanding European Union: Past, Present, Future*, Lynne Rienner Publishers, London 1998, pp. 1-15.

⁸¹⁴ Ziya Öniş, "Luxembourg, Helsinki and Beyond: Towards an Interpretation of Recent Turkey - EU Relations", *Government and Opposition*, Vol. XXXV, Issue 4, October 2000, p. 463.

⁸¹⁵ Chris Rumford, "Human Rights and Democratization in Turkey in the Context of EU Candidature", *Journal of European Area Studies*, Vol.IX, Issue 1, 2001, p. 93.

⁸¹⁶ Harry Flam, "Turkey and EU: Politics and Economics of Accession", *CES Info Economic Studies*, 50 (1), 2004, p. 171.

⁸¹⁷ Atila Eralp, *Turkey and the European Union in the post-Cold War Climate* in Hüseyin Bağcı, James Janes, Ludler Kühnhardt, (eds.) *Parameters of Partnership: the U.S. - Turkey - Europe*, Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, Baden-Baden 2003 p. 80.

⁸¹⁸ Gülnur Aybet, Meltem Müftüler, "Transformations in Security and Identity after the Cold War: Turkey's Problematic Relationship with Europe", *International Journal*, Vol. LV, No. 4, Autumn 2000, p. 567.

Union.⁸¹⁹ The 1997, Luxemburg summit was bearing highly significant clues for the future enlargement perspectives of the European Union as it was proposing the post Soviet development of the Union opening the doors for Central and Eastern Europe overlapping:⁸²⁰ Wojciech Sadurski asserts that, the Central and Eastern Europe were supported in terms of democratic consolidation and human rights issue for the future EU membership.⁸²¹

On the other hand, Turkey that applied for the union in 1963 was warned to develop human rights and minority problems categorized to entirely different place in contrast to future candidate states formerly depend to communist bloc.⁸²² The decision of the European Union caused a deep reaction in Turkey,⁸²³ Turkish politics blamed EU for biased behavior against Turkey while in public level future of Turkey - EU relations caused harsh discussion between pros and cons.⁸²⁴ In 1998, the European Union officially announced that it would launch a process to enlarge the Union stating that “Enlargement is one of the most important opportunities for the European Union at the beginning of the 21st century. It is a unique, historic task to further the integration of the continent by peaceful means, extending a zone of stability and prosperity to new members”.⁸²⁵ Therefore it took into agenda further negotiations with the following applicant countries: Bulgaria, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Romania, the Slovak Republic, Slovenia and Turkey.⁸²⁶ Yet, as a consequence of Cyprus issue Turkey’s relations with the European Union was highly intertwined. In spite of the Union’s previous decision on the Island stating “The Community considers Cyprus as eligible for membership as soon as the prospect of a settlement is surer”,⁸²⁷ in following years the Union put Cyprus on the list for the following enlargement on condition that “Cyprus problem that would bring territorial unity and integrity of the country in accordance with the relevant UN resolutions”.⁸²⁸ What made the situation

⁸¹⁹ Ali Çarkoglu, Barry Rubin, *Turkey and the European Union, Domestic Politics, Economic Integration and International Dynamics*, Frank Cass, London 2003, p. 171.

⁸²⁰ Marcin Zaborowski, “External Influences in the Transition Politics of Central and Eastern Europe”, *Perspectives- The Central European Review of International Affairs*, Vol .XIX, 2002 – 2003, p. 12.

⁸²¹ Wojciech Sadurski, “Accession’s Democracy Dividend: The Impact of the EU Enlargement upon Democracy in the New Member States of Central and Ekstern Europe”, *European Law Journal*, July 2004 Vol. X (4), pp. 371- 401.

⁸²² Şaban Kardas, “Human Rights and Democracy Promotion: the Case of Turkey - EU Relations”, *Alternatives: Turkish Journal of International Relations*, Vol. I, No. 33, 2002, p.151.

⁸²³ Gilles Dorransoro, „The EU and Turkey” in Roland Dannreuther (ed.) *European Union Foreign and Security Policy*, Routledge, London 2004, p. 50.

⁸²⁴ Meltem M Baç, *Turkey’s Relation with a Changing Europe*, Manchester University Press, New York 1997, p. 80.

⁸²⁵ “European Union EU Enlargement: A Historic Opportunity”, *European Comission*, (source: www.ec.europa.eu, <http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/intro/index_en.htm>, April 2012).

⁸²⁶ Ayse Keşler, op. cit., p. 61.

⁸²⁷ Ibidem, p. 62..

⁸²⁸ Ibidem, p. 63.

completely complicated in terms of enlargement was, in 1997 Luxemburg summit Cyprus was given a date for begin the accession negotiations whereas it was denied to obtain a candidate state status.⁸²⁹

Following that, Turkish - European Union relations in terms of enlargement came almost to a deadlock. Yet at Helsinki summit, mutual relations between Turkey and EU entered to an entire new direction, thus Helsinki summit became a milestone for Turkish - European Union relations and for the future perspectives of EU's enlargement.⁸³⁰ Ankara gained a candidate status, and this very status was recognized as equal with other candidate member countries although it was not given a date for the opening of negotiations and the meeting of Copenhagen criteria was the sole condition in order to initiate membership negotiations.⁸³¹ Although it may be proposed that there was a pragmatic and conciliatory attitude toward Turkey in Helsinki Summit, as it was argued by Jan Zielonka "there was no unanimous attitude on Turkey, bargaining on the EU table among the member states could result in contradictory even controversial foreign policy decisions".⁸³²

As for the future enlargement prospects regarding the Cyprus issue it was noted by the Union that "If no settlement has been reached by the completion of accession negotiations, the Council's decision on accession will be made without the above being a precondition".⁸³³ Eralp and Beriker appreciate EU enlargement issue regarding the Cyprus issue and Turkey's position as follows:

While the Republic of Cyprus had been making rapid progress in the accession negotiations, the conflict-settlement efforts were not moving forward. The European Union responded negatively to Turkish-Cypriot demands and requests, such as recognition by the international community and the removal of the trade embargo on the TRNC. The European Union promised to respond with incentives, including a small amount of annual financial aid, in return for a settlement that was favorable to the European Union's enlargement project. In the UN-sponsored process, Turkish-Cypriot leader Rauf Denktaş twice walked away from the negotiations. On November 2001, Turkey threatened to annex the TRNC if the RoC joined the member states of the EU.⁸³⁴

⁸²⁹ The Presidency Conclusions of Luxembourg European Council is Obtainable from http://ue.eu.int/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/032a0008.htm

⁸³⁰ Gamze Avcı, *Turkish Political Parties and the EU Discourse in the post-Helsinki Period: a Case of Europeanization* in Nergis Canefe (ed.), *Turkey and European Integration: Accession Prospects and Issues*, Routledge, London & New York 2004, p. 194.

⁸³¹ Sanem Baykal, "Turkey - EU Relations in the aftermath of Helsinki Summit: An Analysis of Copenhagen Political Criteria in Light of the Accession Partnership, National Program and Regular Reports", *Ankara Review of European Studies*, Vol, II No.3, Fall 2002, p. 15.

⁸³² Jan Zielonka, *Paradoxes of European Foreign Policy*, The Hague and London: Kluwer Law, International 1998, p. 29.

⁸³³ The Presidency Conclusions on Helsinki European Council 10-11 December 1999. Obtainable from http://ue.eu.int/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/ACFA4C.htm

⁸³⁴ Doğa U Eralp, Nimet Beriker, "Assessing the Conflict Resolution Potential of the EU: The Cyprus Conflict and Accession Negotiations", *Security Dialogue*. Vol. XXXVI No 2, June 2005, p. 184.

Due to Islamist background of Justice and Development Party, and regarding the negative tendency of National Vision Movement toward the European Union, after the 2002 general elections both in Turkey and international level it was commenced to be worried that Ankara under the JDP government would slow down Turkey's relations with the European Union. On contrary to general assumptions, AK Party before the elections in different platforms declared that if elected it would support Turkey's full European Union membership.⁸³⁵ As opposed to National Vision Movement, Justice and Development Party "reassured Turkish elites and their Western partners that the AKP remained committed to Turkey's Euro - Atlantic ties".⁸³⁶ In this sense it is notified in the party program of AKP that "Turkey, is a part of European value system"⁸³⁷ to indicate Party's approach toward relations with EU.

In spite of the fact that, the 2001 party program of Justice and Development Party did not contain a specific chapter for the relations with the European Union, it had some characteristics to help the relations. Subchapters called as fundamental rights and freedoms, or economy, public policy, social and foreign policy chapters included many policy views compatible to the European Union and explicitly gave clues for the future policy understanding of Party in terms of relations with Brussels.⁸³⁸ For instance, the statements like "Turkey is a part of civil world" or "freedoms constitute the basic of democracy" in fundamental rights and freedoms subchapter,⁸³⁹ reflects democratic orientation of the party. Other statements like "It is believed that our relations with the European Union, World Bank, IMF and other international institutions must be maintained along the lines of the requirements of our economy and our national interest" statement in economy chapter or the statement depicts the Turkish desire to be the part of global society. On contrary to party program, there appeared more explicit expresses in 59th government program of Justice and Development Party related to EU. The expressions in the government program of AK Party related to foreign affairs in terms of relations with the European Union like:

Turkey's full European Union membership is among main objectives of our government. For this purpose, guarantying Turkey's candidacy as an attribute irrevocable in the course of enlargement propose, it will be served to open accession negotiations. Our government is determined to fulfill Copenhagen criteria completely. In addition to acquisitions that

⁸³⁵ Nathalie Tocci, *EU Accession Dynamics and Conflict Resolution*, Ashgate, Hampshire 2004, p. 111.

⁸³⁶ Morgan L Roach, Sally McNamara, "How the EU's Prevarication Advances the AKP's Agenda in Turkey", *Webmemo*, No. 3131, 2 February 2011, pp.1-2.

⁸³⁷ AK Party Party Policy", (source: www.akparti.org.tr, <<http://eng.akparti.org.tr/english/partyprogramme.html#6>>, March, 2012).

⁸³⁸ Ibidem.

⁸³⁹ Ibidem.

will bring to both sides due to Turkey's taking place in European Union family, Turkey's membership will bring positive aspects like peace, security and stability.⁸⁴⁰

Justice and Development Party, shortly after coming to rule initiated to practice party and government program regarding the European Union,⁸⁴¹ plus it continued to practice huge reform program that was launched by 57th coalition government. Parallel to that, In January 2002, the newly amended Turkish Civil law came into force realizing fundamental changes in terms of freedom of thought and expression, prevention of torture, personal liberty, security accommodation and travel freedom as well as gender equality.⁸⁴² The adjustment packages initiated through the 57th coalition government as well continued by Justice and Development Party, thus in 13th of January put into effect 3rd adjustment package to the European Union. The package contained changes like Political Parties Law, the Press Law, the Law of Association and Law of petition. In addition to that, the new package introduced changes in terms non-Muslim and minority community foundations' laws -which has been a controversial theme since the establishment of the Republic. It also was a theme of discussion during EU full accession negotiations- enabling them to obtain immovable and move freely in accordance with their properties in order to meet their religious, sociable, charitable cultural field related needs.⁸⁴³ The package as well eased the activities of foreign association in Turkey on condition that they should get permission of Turkish Foreign Affairs Ministry.⁸⁴⁴

Shortly after coming into affect of 3rd adjustment package, Justice and Development Party worked on the 4th adjustment package and Fourth of February, 2002 enacted the following package in order to realize required changes envisaged in Copenhagen criteria proposing fundamental changes in Turkish Law system.⁸⁴⁵ Justice and Development Party kept the reform process stable and from 13 January 2002 to 14 July 2004 enacted Five-adjustment package including remarkable reforms as regard to fight against terror, adopting changes in accordance with the demands of European Court of Human Rights, appointment a civic member to National Security Council of Turkey and laws obstructing political party

⁸⁴⁰ "Katılım Ortaklığı Belgesi" ("Accession Partnership Document"), (source: www.belgenet.com, <http://www.belgenet.com/yasa/ab_uyum-1.html>, March 2012).

⁸⁴¹ "7 Years of AKP Rule", *The Majalla*, 26 November 2010.

⁸⁴² "4.Uyum Yasaları" ("4th Harmonization Laws"), (source: www.belgenet.com, <<http://www.belgenet.com/yasa/k4778.html>>, March 2012).

⁸⁴³ "3.Uyum Yasaları" ("3th Adjustment Laws"), (source: www.belgenet.com, <http://www.belgenet.com/arsiv/ab/kob_2003-1.html>, March 2012).

⁸⁴⁴ "AB ile Uyum Paketi Yürürlüğe Girdi" ("EU Adjustment Package Came into Force") *Hürriyet*, 1 December 2003.

⁸⁴⁵ Murat N Akman, *Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi Hükümetleri Döneminde Türkiye - Avrupa Birliği İlişkileri (Turkey - EU Relations during Justice and Development Party Government Period)*, Kitap Atelyesi Yayınları, Ankara 2010, p.3.

closing.⁸⁴⁶ In the Meantime, in order to strengthen Turkey's accession strategy to the European Union, in June of 2003, the European Union commission prepared and accepted the Revised "Accession Partnership Document".⁸⁴⁷ The revised Accession Partnership Document advised Turkey to contribute Annan Peace Plan in order to solve Cyprus problem, and proposed political dialogue with Turkish neighborhood hinting relations with Armenia. It also suggested the adaptation of the position of Turkish army in politics to a similar level as in other EU countries and subject to minorities, removal of legal barriers in order to broadcast and publications except for official language, press independence, cultural rights, development of religious and faith freedom etc.⁸⁴⁸ Thanks to similar adjustment reforms, Turkey approached to Copenhagen criteria while majority of Turkish society supported the reforms in a consensus mode.⁸⁴⁹

AK Party government, taking into consideration recommendations and reservations of the European Union commissions, issued Revised Accession Partnership Document, reviewed the Second National Program (Turkey's National Program for the Adoption of the Acquisition of the European Union and the Adaptation of Acquisition of Turkey's National Program Implementation, Coordination and Decision on the Surveillance) and put the priorities of Turkey parallel to the Revised Accession Partnership Document, dividing them to short, middle and long term accepting it at Council of Minister was enacted.⁸⁵⁰ AKP, on contrary to rest of other Turkish governments, first time in the history,⁸⁵¹ admitted explicitly the presence of "Cyprus Questions"⁸⁵² and supported UN General Secretary Annan Plan in accordance with Helsinki Summit decisions.⁸⁵³ Cyprus Island after gaining its independence from Britain in 1960 set up a joint republic with Greek and Turkish Cypriots, which was guaranteed by Britain, Turkey and Greece. In the year of 1963, when Greek Cypriots commenced to isolate

⁸⁴⁶ Murat N Akman, op.cit. p. 4.

⁸⁴⁷ "Katılım Ortaklığı Belgesi", ("Accession Partnership Document"), (source: [www.belgenet.com](http://www.belgenet.com/yasa/ab_uyum-1.html), <http://www.belgenet.com/yasa/ab_uyum-1.html>, March 2012).

⁸⁴⁸ Ibidem.

⁸⁴⁹ Ali R Aghsan, "Turkey's EU Quest and Political Cleavages under AKP", *Review of European Studies* Vol. III, No. 1, June 2011, p. 45.

⁸⁵⁰ Murat N Akman, op.cit. p. 4.

⁸⁵¹ Emre Uslu, "AKP Government Plans to Change its Cyprus Policy", *Today's Zaman*, 17 August, 2010.

⁸⁵² Cyprus has been divided since 1974. Greek Cypriots, 76% of the population, live in the southern two-thirds of the island. Turkish Cypriots, 19% of the populace, live in the "Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus" (TRNC), recognized only by Turkey, with about 36,000 Turkish troops providing security. United Nations peacekeeping forces (UNFICYP) maintain a buffer zone between the two. Since the late 1970s, the U.N., with U.S. support, has promoted negotiations aimed at reuniting the island as a federal, bicomunal, bizonal republic. Carol Migdalovitz, "Cyprus: Status of U.N. Negotiations and Related Issues", CRS Report for Congress, 20 July 2010, p. 1.

⁸⁵³ Gamze Avci, "The Justice and Development Party and the EU: Political Pragmatism in a Changing Environment", *South European Society and Politics*, Vol.XVI, Issue 3, 2011, p. 410.

Turkish community, the joint republic collapsed, following that as Greek junta regime attempt to annex Cyprus to Greece. Turkey, in 1974, referring to its guarantor right to protect Turkish Cypriots in the island realized a military operation. The operation is referred as a peace operation by Turkish side while it is called as an invasion by Greeks, henceforth Cyprus question became a crucial topic for Turkey's foreign policy affecting relations between Greece, the United States of America and the European Union.⁸⁵⁴ The so-called Annan Plan was a "basis for agreement on a comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus problem"⁸⁵⁵ developed by United Nations devised by Kofi Annan as the General Secretary of United Nations in order to resolve Cyprus question.⁸⁵⁶ The plan, after five times of editions and revisions, shortly was proposing to unify the Cyprus Island under a roof but as a federal state and then to be a full European Union member.⁸⁵⁷ Parallel to that, the plan was proposing the abolishment of Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, reducing Turkish Army entity in the Island, while Turkey would preserve its guarantor right in the island, a presidential system allowing both parties to run in equal terms.⁸⁵⁸ Thanks to plan, Ankara was going to change her Cyprus policy applied since 1974 and paling to open negotiation talks ending the occupier state status.

Thus, Justice and Development Party parallel to the European Union's demands fully supported the plan; while additionally participate to process in both Turkey and Northern Cyprus in order to persuade Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus to accept the plan and to create a public opinion.⁸⁵⁹ In 2002, both representatives of Greek and Turkish side sat to start negotiations.⁸⁶⁰ After many repeats of refusal of further talks, ultimately in 2004, Annan Plan as a chance proposing the reunification of Island put into referendum in both parts of Cyprus.⁸⁶¹ Greek Cypriots voted negatively against the plan with a 75.83 %, while Turkish

⁸⁵⁴ Carol Migdalovitz, "Cyprus: Status of U.N. Negotiations and Related Issues", *CRS Report for Congress*, 20 July 2010, p. 2.

⁸⁵⁵ "Basis for Agreement on a Comprehensive Settlement of the Cyprus Problem", Original text (source: www.ilef.ankara.edu.tr, <ilef.ankara.edu.tr/akildefteri/gorsel/dosya/1077921700kibris_annan_en.doc>, April 2011).

⁸⁵⁶ For the whole text of Annan Plan see: http://www.hri.org/docs/annan/Annan_Plan_Text.html

⁸⁵⁷ Andrekos Varvana, Hubert Faustmann, *Reunifying Cyprus: The Annan Plan and beyond*, I.B. Tauris & Co Ltd, London 2009, p.11.

⁸⁵⁸ Frank Hoffmeister, *Legal Aspects of Cyprus Problem: Annan Plan and EU Accession*, Martinus Nijhof Publishers, Leiden 2006, p. 116.

⁸⁵⁹ Ayşe A Celenk, "The Restructuring of Turkey's Policy towards Cyprus: The Justice and Development Party's Struggle for Power", *Turkish Studies*, Vol.VIII, Issue 3, 2007, p. 349.

⁸⁶⁰ Craig Webster, "Division or Unification in Cyprus? The Role of Demographics, Attitudes and Party Inclination on Greek Cypriot Preferences for a Solution to the Cyprus Problem", *Ethnopolitics*, Vol. 4, No. 3, 2005, 300.

⁸⁶¹ Viola Drath, "The Cyprus Referendum: an Island Divided by Mutual Mistrust", *American Foreign Policy Interests*, 26, 2004, p. 341.

Cypriots voted in favor of plan with 64.90 % support of the residences. Therefore, the unification suggestion of the Island did not realize.⁸⁶²

In spite of Turkish Cypriots' major support for the Plan, shortly after Southern Cypriots entrance to the European Union, it blocked direct trade regulation which was promised in the course of negotiations to Turkey and Turkish Cypriots. The European Union's acceptance of Greek Cypriots to the European Union as the sole representative to the Union and unsuccessful performance to remove embargoes against Turkish Cypriots along with violation of Union's principle of giving membership to the countries having conflicts with neighborhood caused Justice and Development Party lose its hand in the public view. Opposition parties blamed AK Party to threat against Cyprus question, while increased the Euro-skeptic tendencies in Turkish public view as well associate it as a Christian club, besides the decision negatively affected JDP's future performance and the grass roots supporting the membership process.⁸⁶³ On the other hand, AKP was heavily criticized for adopting foreign policy issues like Cyprus to gain more advantage to consolidate its domestic power and not to realize required further steps to contribute resolution of the problem. Carol Migdalovitz reckons as follows:

Since their laudatory and proactive support for the unsuccessful 2004 Annan Plan for a settlement on Cyprus, AKP officials have abandoned the issue – even though the EU considers the lack of a solution to the Cyprus issue to be a major obstacle to Turkey's accession and the AKP claims not to have abandoned Turkey's ambition to join the EU. The Foreign Minister and his ministerial cohort express pro forma support for a settlement, but appear unengaged in the ongoing UN negotiations. Cyprus has long been viewed as a Turkish national issue and the AKP refuses to compromise on opening Turkish ports and airports for Cypriot transport, on Turkey's troop presence on the island, on the prerogatives accorded Turkey in the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee, or on support for the Turkish Cypriots that now equates to support for Turkish Cypriot President Derviş Eroğlu's hard line positions. Given that the political right would exploit any AKP initiative that might facilitate a settlement in order to weaken AKP domestically, AKP has chosen to pursue its short term domestic interests rather than longer term EU ones.⁸⁶⁴

Nonetheless, Justice and Development Party governments positive attitude during the negotiations and full support for the EU supported Annan Plan played a highly positive role in 2004 Brussels summit.

⁸⁶² "Cyprus Spurn Historic Chance", *BBC News*, 25 April, 2004.

⁸⁶³ Özlem Terzi, *The Influence of European Union on Turkish Foreign Policy*, Ashgate Publishing Limited, Surrey 2010, p. 99.

⁸⁶⁴ C. Migdalovitz, "AKP's Domestically Driven...", op. cit., p.47.

2004 Brussels Summit

“The latest enlargement, from 15 to 25, is the biggest in Union history. It has its roots in the collapse of communism, symbolized in the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, which offered an unexpected and unprecedented opportunity to extend European integration into Central and Eastern Europe”.⁸⁶⁵ The 2004 enlargement was also highly significant for Turkey since Greek part of Cyprus became a full member, hence the enlargement impacted Turkey’s foreign policy attitude toward Cyprus conflict.⁸⁶⁶

Immediately after the collapse of communism around 1990, the European Union supported the democratization process in the former communist countries and provided technical and financial assistance as they introduced market economies. By the mid-1990s, trade agreements were in place, giving central and Eastern Europeans preferential access to EU markets for most of their exports. Similar agreements with Cyprus and Malta date from the 1970s. The actual entry negotiations to agree the terms whereby the new EU countries assume the rights and responsibilities of membership took place between 1998 and 2002. The entry date was set for 1 May 2004.⁸⁶⁷

Prior to the European Union summit in Brussels which was going to take place in 17th of December 2004, the progress report of European Council was highly crucial for Turkey’s prospects for the EU accession. The progress report as a record of candidate states status toward the accession evaluates the progress level on annual basis, declaring advices and attitude of the Union for the candidate states. Thus, the 2004 progress report was highly significant as it was hinting clues for Turkey regarding upcoming Brussels summit as it would shape future direction of accession negotiations. Moreover, the decision that was taken in Copenhagen summit, the Union encouraged Turkey to pursue energetically its reform process. If the European Council in December 2004, on the basis of a report and a recommendation from the Commission, decides that Turkey fulfils the Copenhagen political criteria, the European Union will open accession negotiations with Turkey without delay”⁸⁶⁸ was an additional stimulus for Ankara.

Turkish Prime Minister, as he did often between 2002 and 2004 settled to Strasbourg in order to follow actualities and explain Turkey’s position from the highest level. The first impression related to coming progress reports leaked to media organs and it seemed highly positive, however there were some expressions regarding disturbed Turkish diplomacy like

⁸⁶⁵ Ayşe Keşler, op. cit., p.107.

⁸⁶⁶ Ibidem p.108.

⁸⁶⁷ “Europe on the move: More Unity and More Diversity”, The European Union’s Biggest Enlargement. Directorate - General for Press and Communication Manuscript completed in November 2003, p.1

⁸⁶⁸ “Presidency Conclusion, Copenhagen, 12 and 13 December 2002”, Council of European Union, 29 January 2009, p.5.

the indefinite expression of the aim of negotiations, or the expressions like “open ended” and “if during the negotiation process the promised commitments is not realized, the membership will not provided”.⁸⁶⁹ Turkish Prime Minister initiated a shuttle diplomacy in order to soften similar vague expressions, which in future might harden Turkey’s full membership and contacted Italian, Belgium and German Presidents via telephone.⁸⁷⁰ In 6 October 2004, European Commission commissary publicized three documents related to Turkey in order to be voted in Brussels summit among member states. The documents were Progress Report, Recommendation Report and Effect Report to be finalized in 17 December 2004 at Brussels Summit of the Union. In the 18th page of recommendation report, the reform progress in Turkey was highlighted and the intention to commence accession talk was declared. But it strictly mentioned that violation in democracy and human right affairs might cause the suspension of talks and on contrary to all attempts of diplomats. And Turkish PM could not remove the expressions like “it is an open ended progress and the result is not guaranteed”.⁸⁷¹

Turkish side settled to historic Brussels meeting with a big delegation constituted by Ministers and deputies headed by Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan along with former Foreign Affairs Minister Abdullah Gül. The clues of Brussels meeting were released at the report, and it was hinted that the full membership negotiations seems to start in 2005. However, Turkish diplomats and Justice and Development Party foreign policy decision makers, before coming to summit defined indispensable policy principles of Turkey as bellow, estimated the fact that the summit will be tougher on contrary to positive ambience present at Brussels before the meeting:

- An exact date should be given for the negotiations and this date should not be open-ended.
- Before the start of the negotiations, Turkey cannot take any more steps in Cyprus Issue.
- The aim of the negotiations should be full membership. The alternatives, which will distort the full membership, such as, “privileged partnership” or ‘B Plan’ can never, be accepted.

⁸⁶⁹ Yalçın Akdoğan, *Tarihe Düşen Notlar, 17 Aralık AB Zirvesinin Perde Arkası (Notes Taken to History, The Backstage of 17 December European Summit)* Alfa Yayınları, İstanbul 2010, p. 22.

⁸⁷⁰ Ibidem, p. 23.

⁸⁷¹ “AB Komisyonu Türkiye Raporu” (“EU Commission Report on Turkey”), *Belgenet*, (source: www.belgenet.com, <<http://www.belgenet.com/arsiv/ab/rapor2004-01.html>>, March 2012).

- Permanent derogations (limitations) can never be accepted by Turkey.⁸⁷²

At the first day of the summit, the European Union decided to start full membership negotiations in 3 October 2005, nevertheless the decision proposing to start of full membership negotiations with Turkey due to the rejection of Greek Cypriot administration and support of Greece, France and Austria was not accepted. Greek Cypriots proposed to connect start of full membership negotiations with Turkey on the condition that Ankara should sign the extension of Custom Union agreement with the new ten member states of the European Union in accordance with the additional protocol of Ankara agreement. In addition to that, Turkey was asked to sign the protocol prior to the end of summit.⁸⁷³ The signing of additional protocol of Ankara agreement in order to expand it for new ten member states would mean that Ankara would officially recognize South Cyprus part and accept Nicosia as the sole representative of Cyprus Island at international arena. Justice and Development Party decision makers harshly rejected the signing of the additional protocol, which brought the summit to a deadlock. The situation gained a more dramatic character when Turkish Prime Minister Erdoğan attempted to walk out of the summit as a reaction to Union's last minute precondition for the start of full membership negotiations with Turkey.⁸⁷⁴

European leaders including Blair, Schroder, and Berlusconi in order to persuade Turkey not to leave summit, came together to a mini non-official meeting and urged JDP decision makers headed by Erdoğan to continue talks with Union and sign the protocols in order to start negotiations removing Turkey's concern on Cyprus.⁸⁷⁵ Thus, after stressful hours, it was agreed that Turkey will not sign the additional protocols to the end of summit, while promise to sign it before the start of full membership negotiations at 3 October 2005 in the framework of the paragraph 23 of the Presidency Conclusion and Ankara's undertaking reflected at the conclusion statement of the summit.⁸⁷⁶

The previous red lines proposed before the summit were mostly not recognized as it was stated by the European Union that it is an open ended which means that the negotiations between the parts may continue forever. And opposed to the statement 'the sole aim of the talks is full membership', it was stated that if Turkey would not assume the obligations of

⁸⁷² Sedat Laçiner, "EU Summit of December 17: a Victory or A Defeat for Turkey", *Usak Gundem*, 30 December 2008.

⁸⁷³ Kemal Kirişçi, "The December 2004 European Council Decision on Turkey: Is it an Historic Turning Point ?", *The Middle East Review of International Affairs*, Volume 8, No. 4, December 2004, p. 87.

⁸⁷⁴ Yalçın Akdoğan, "Tarihe Düşen Notlar.....", op.cit., p. 326.

⁸⁷⁵ Ibidem, p. 327.

⁸⁷⁶ Kristy Hughes, "Turkey and the European Union: Just another Enlargement?", *Friends of Europe*, June 2004, p. 5.

talks it may continue tight relations with union and German - French proposed privileged partnership offer left current for Ankara.⁸⁷⁷ Worst of all, on contrary to all attempts of Ankara under AK Party government, Greek Cyprus joined to the European Union, while Turkey was pledge to open its customs for the new member states, besides the derogation limitations issues did not concluded as regard to Turkey's previous desires.⁸⁷⁸ On the other side, the Greek - Southern Cyprus site harshly criticized the acceptance of full membership negotiations with Turkey.

Notwithstanding to all these negative features, relations between Turkey and the European Union entered totally to a different path after the Brussels summit which took place at 17th of December, 2004 as it was decided by the EU to start full membership negotiations with Turkey.⁸⁷⁹ As a consequence of attempts, endeavors, positive and negative emotions between Turkey and Union for 42 years and along with the reform process accelerated during the Justice and Development Party's determined the EU policies since its rise to power. In the Brussels summit of the European Union it was decided that the full membership negotiations would start at 2005.⁸⁸⁰ Turkish delegation was met by a huge crowd calling Turkish Prime Minister as "conqueror of the Europe".⁸⁸¹ In spite of the all negative features of the conditions restricting Turkish policies, the Brussels summit was positively met in Turkish public view, while AK Party government was harshly criticized trough central right and left opposition to compromise crucial foreign affair strategies of traditional foreign policies of Republic of Turkey's.

As it was decided at Brussels summit, on October 3rd of 2005, accession negotiations with Turkey has been started.⁸⁸² In July, the controversial additional protocol extending the Ankara Agreement to the new members of the European Union was agreed thanks to explicit statement put into declaration that Turkey does not recognize the Republic of Cyprus. Although, initially it was claimed by the Union that it was not possible to put a similar expression Turkish diplomats reminded Greek reservation during the EU agreements stating

⁸⁷⁷ John Redmond, "Turkey and the European Union: troubled European or European trouble?", *International Affairs*, Vol.LXXXIII, Issue 2, March 2007, p. 305.

⁸⁷⁸ Aylin Guney, "The Future of Turkey in European Union", *Future*, Vol.XXXVII, Issue 4, May 2005, p. 310.

⁸⁷⁹ "Chronology of Turkish - EU Relations (1959 - 2009)", Republic of Turkey Ministry for EU Affairs, (source: www.abgs.gov.tr, < <http://www.abgs.gov.tr/index.php?p=112&l=2>>, March 2012).

⁸⁸⁰ Nuria Font, "Why the European Union Gave Turkey the Green Light", *Journal of Contemporary European Studies*, Vol.XIV, Issue 2, 2006, p. 197.

⁸⁸¹ Ingmar Karlsson, "Turkey in Europe but not of Europe", Conference paper presented at an international conference on 27 May 2009 at Lund University, Tesev Publication, Istanbul, p.14.

⁸⁸² "AB Katılım Müzakereleri" ("EU Accession Negotiations"), (source: www.mfa.gov.tr, < <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/ab-katilim-muzakereleri.tr.mfa>>, March 2012).

“The subjected country is not recognized as Macedonia” referring to Greek - Macedonian name crisis thus; the European Union had to accept Turkey’s reservation and put the statement parallel to Ankara’s demand. On 20 October 2005, the first phase of the accession negotiations called as “scan process” commenced under the topic of “introductory scan” meeting and the 2005 progress report of the Union which was highly similar to previous issues released at 2003 and 2004

As a consequence of lessons drawn from the EU’s 2004 enlargement, the implications and consequences of post-compliance of the new members have caused vital shifts in the course of the further enlargement prospects.⁸⁸³ Consequently, the European Union preferred to follow a stricter and complicated procedure as new mechanisms introduced towards new candidate states.⁸⁸⁴ Thus, following 2005, Turkey - EU relations hit the lowest.⁸⁸⁵ Particularly, following the election of Angela Merkel in Germany and Nicolas Sarkozy in France,⁸⁸⁶ relations prospects between Ankara and Brussels deteriorated completely. New chancellor of Germany stated that a next EU enlargement will be possible after strict fulfillment by candidates states all membership criteria and must be accepted by EU citizens.⁸⁸⁷ Besides, Her French colleague initiated the establishment of Union for Mediterranean, which was perceived in Europe as an alternative to Turkey’s membership in the EU.

Many observers commenced to assume that, Justice and Development Party after 2005 gave a lower priority to the European Union issues at foreign policy agenda and the reform process that hit its top has lost its momentum at this period while the debates over “axis shift” commenced to be voiced following similar developments.⁸⁸⁸ It may be suggested that “The policy environment for the EU political conditionality has become less enthusiastic for further enlargement and more complicated over accession and its decision making process”. Besides, “The enlargement fatigue and the rejection of the Lisbon Treaty, which is

⁸⁸³ Melek Kırmacı, *Croatia and Turkey: Is EU Enlargement Policy beyond the Principle of Conditionality?*, Unpublished MA Thesis, Bilken University, Ankara 2008, p. 103.

⁸⁸⁴ Ibidem, p. 104.

⁸⁸⁵ Marcie J Patton, “AKP Reform Fatigue in Turkey: What has Happened to the EU Process?”, *Mediterranean Politics*, Volume 12, Issue 3, 2007, p. 33.

⁸⁸⁶ Şaban Kardaş, “Merkel and Sarkozy Call for Privileged Partnership Angers Turkey”, *Eurasia Daily Monitor*, Vol. VI Issue 92.

⁸⁸⁷ Aleksandra Zięba, op. cit., p. 201.

⁸⁸⁸ Joost Lagendik, “Is the EU Still Important to the AKP?”, *Hürriyet Daily News.com*, June 16, 2010.

to succeed the failed Constitutional Treaty, in Ireland referendum in June 2008 has made the policy environment in the EU much less-friendly".⁸⁸⁹

Parallel to that, Turkey's accession to the European Union constituted the most challenging case in this period in terms of further enlargement of the Union. Many problematic issues not excluding the Cyprus issue "always threatens to 'flare up' and religious and cultural concerns in the member states to the Turkish accession to the EU".⁸⁹⁰ In this sense, the borders of Europe continent, European identity of Turkey became a vivid debate, moreover Ankara was suggested a privileged partnership instead of a full membership. The further enlargement of the European Union due to institutional problems, retrograding economic situation in Euro zone along with the fears on Turkey's full membership found its reflection in Ireland when the majority of people voiced negative response towards the Lisbon treaty. In addition to that, upon the debates in this period asserting that Turkey and Europe are belong to different civilizations with so-called arising Islamization of Turkey under AKP rule.⁸⁹¹ Furthermore, the continues discussions suggesting that Turkey and the West are entirely different the cultural and religious values are considered and the historical and religious identity problems between the EU and Turkey constitutes an obstacle in front of Turkey for its full EU membership. AKP regarding similar debates hold the point that the EU must accept Turkey's full membership to prove how pointless similar claims are.⁸⁹²

In 2006, under the shadow of fierce debates, United Nations suggested the new resolution plan of Cyprus question and Turkey was asked to abolish embargo against Cyprus opening its ports to Nicosia. Although at the inter government conference the Science and Research chapter opened and closed contemporarily, in the 2006 Progress report, Turkey was asked to open ports and airspace toward Cyprus Republic but against to demand of Union as Ankara did not confirm, thus the European Union declared that the Eight chapter of accession negotiations will not open and were contemporarily closed.⁸⁹³ In 2007, the Industrial and Entrepreneurship Policy chapter provisionally opened and Turkey declared its adjustment

⁸⁸⁹ Melek Kirmacı, op.cit., p. 104.

⁸⁹⁰ Nugent Niell, "The EU's Response to Turkey's Membership Application", *European Integration*, September 2007. Vol.XXIX (4), p. 499.

⁸⁹¹ For further reading on Religion and Identity Issues in EU, see: Krzysztof Michalski, *Religion in the New Europe*, CEU Press, Hungary 1996; Wojciech Slomski, "The Philosophy of Culture and European Identity", Speech presented at Forum Philosophicum Ignatianum, (Cracovia-Krakow: August 2003), p. 13.

⁸⁹² "Erdoğan: AB Hristiyan Kulübü değilse..." ("Erdoğan: If EU is not a Christian Club..."), *NTVMSNBC*, 12 June 2010.

⁸⁹³ Vincent Morelli, "European Union Enlargement: A Status Report on Turkey's Accession Negotiations", *CRS Report for Congress*, 9 September 2011, p.3.

program with the European Union 2007 - 2013 on 17 April 2007 and the program was appraised by the EU for the close of rest of 33 chapters. In addition to that, the Trans European Network and Consumer and Health Protections as well opened in 2007. In 2008, the Company and Intellectual Property Law chapter along with Free Movement chapters were opened.⁸⁹⁴

Among the 35 chapters of the EU laws and regulations, Turkey during Justice and Development Party government achieved to open 13 *acquis communautaire* (body of the EU laws and regulations).⁸⁹⁵ Due to Ankara's refusal to open its ports toward the EU member Cyprus, Brussels, suspended eight chapters. Aside from that, Cyprus put a hold on five additional chapters,⁸⁹⁶ while France as well put a hold on five chapters blocking full membership of Turkey. Apart from Cyprus issue, the European Union asks Turkey to make reforms in justice, freedom of speech as well as minority rights.⁸⁹⁷ In addition to that, the European Union put heavy pressure on Ankara to vitalize essential reforms as regard to realize constitutional changes restricting independent law, freedom of speech, rights of ethnic and religious minorities. Justice and Development Party, mostly was criticized after 2005 period to slow down relations with the European Union,⁸⁹⁸ as a reaction in order to accelerate the European Union accession negotiations and to coordinate the process properly deploy Egemen Bağış as the chief negotiator in the course of negotiations. Aside from that, AKP amended Turkish constitution that prepared by junta regime at 12 September, 2010 which was highly welcomed by the European Union that opened civic monitoring on military which was praised but not found sufficient by Brussels.

4. Balkans

Owing to the fact that five percentage of Turkish territory situates at Balkan Peninsula,⁸⁹⁹ since its establishment Republic of Turkey preferred to stress its Balkan and Mediterranean identity, henceforth Balkan Peninsula has been an important strategic, geopolitical and

⁸⁹⁴ "Turkey's Progress Towards Accession", Committee on Foreign Affairs, European Parliament, September 2006, (source: www.europarl.eu, <<http://www.europarl.europa.eu>>, March 2012).

⁸⁹⁵ C. Migdalovitz, "AKP's Domestically Driven...", *op.cit.*, p.25.

⁸⁹⁶ "Cyprus FM: No More EU Chapters for Turkey Before Progress Report," Cyprus Embassy, September 2006.

⁸⁹⁷ Alexander Burgin, "Ongoing Opposition in the West, New Options in the East: Is Turkey's EU Accession Process Reversible?", *Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies*, Vol.XII, Issue 4, 2010, p. 420.

⁸⁹⁸ Marcie J Patton, *op.cit.*, pp. 339-358.

⁸⁹⁹ B. Oran, "TDP'nin Kuramsal Çerçevesi.....", *op.cit.*, p.167.

cultural region for Turkey's foreign policy priorities.⁹⁰⁰ Ottoman Empire, being a Balkan state, initiated the relations with Balkan Peninsula in 14th century and since the collapse of Empire, it became a power momentum in Balkans geography as "500 years of Ottoman sovereignty have undoubtedly left significant imprints on the Balkans".⁹⁰¹ The Ottoman system and inheritance that called as "Pax Ottomanica"⁹⁰² in Balkans have bequeathed many deterministic influences in religious, ethnic,⁹⁰³ cultural life of the region the affects of which continue since present times.⁹⁰⁴

Owning to the fact that many Balkan states -similar to Middle East- had their independence struggle against Ottoman Empire the image of Turkey and Turks in terms of politics, economics and religious issues negatively influenced relation prospects with Balkan nations.⁹⁰⁵ The emergence of the first national liberation movements among the Christian subjects⁹⁰⁶ was commenced against Ottomans, and it too had some impacts on this negative perspectives. Due to Ottoman heritage as well as ethno-religious minorities in Balkan Peninsula, Ankara has tight relations with Balkan states. Apart from that, another issue highly deterministic in terms of Turkish - Balkan relation is the Balkan origin population that dwells on Turkey who immigrated in the course of the Balkan Wars. The number of people hits 5-7 million who have active contacts with their relatives residing in the region.⁹⁰⁷ As a natural consequence of Western connection of Turkey's foreign policy, Balkans is the opening door of Turkey to the West. Taking into the fact that, the Republic realizes half of its foreign trade activities with Western Europe, the stability and security of region is an essential issue for Turkey.⁹⁰⁸ During the Cold War, Turkey and most Balkan states situated in opposite poles, yet particularly after the collapse of Yugoslavia the mutual perspectives between Turkey and Balkans gained a positive acceleration.⁹⁰⁹ Ankara at the initial moments of crack downs emerging in Yugoslavia advocated policy initiatives supporting the territorial integrity of Yugoslavia Federation, however after the United States of Americas along with many

⁹⁰⁰ Karol Bienek, *Polityka zagraniczna Turcji wobec państw Bałkańskich (Turkey's Foreign Policy towards Balkan States)*, Wydawnictwo Adam Marszałek, Toruń 2008, pp. 1-10.

⁹⁰¹ Gisela Spreitzhofer, *The Ottoman Legacy in Balkans*, Grin Verlag, Norderstedt 2007, p. 2.

⁹⁰² Pope, Hugh, "Pax Ottomana?", *Foreign Affairs*, Vol.LXXXIX, Issue 6, p. 161.

⁹⁰³ Leften Stavros, *The Balkans since 1453*, C. Hurst & Co., London 2000, p. 112.

⁹⁰⁴ Donald Quataert, *The Ottoman Empire: 1700 - 1922*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2005, p. 20.

⁹⁰⁵ İlhan Uzgel, *The Balkans: Turkey's Stabilizing Role*, in Barry Rubin, Kemal Kirişçi (Ed.), *World Politics and Emerging Multiregional Power*, Boğaziçi University Press, Istanbul 2002, p. 25.

⁹⁰⁶ Craig Nation, *War in the Balkans, 1991 - 2002*, Strategic Studies Institute, Carlisle 2003, pp.1-12.

⁹⁰⁷ B. Oran, "TDP'nin Kuramsal Çerçevesi.....", op.cit., p. 168.

⁹⁰⁸ "Relations with the Balkan Region", Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, (source: www.mfa.gov.tr, <<http://www.mfa.gov.tr/relations-with-the-balkan-region.en.mfa>>, March 2012).

⁹⁰⁹ N. Uslu, op.cit., p. 86.

European countries recognized Slovenia and Croatia, it shifted previous policy concept, regardless of national, ethnic or religious identity recognized all newly independent former Yugoslavian Balkan states.⁹¹⁰

Because of the newly emerged international parameters arose after the Cold War, Turkey developed compatible foreign policy perspectives with its Western allies and took part in NATO interventions during Bosnia and Kosovo crisis,⁹¹¹ while tried to protect “Muslim”⁹¹² and Turkish minority rights in the course of ethnic based conflicts.⁹¹³ At the power vacuum arose, tough Turkey’s foreign policy decision makers explored a heavy pressure in domestic scale particularly during the Bosnia War not to intervene situation, Ankara preferred to follow a cautious policy line parallel to its allies.⁹¹⁴ Henceforth, Turkey actively participate to stop ethnic conflicts between the Balkan nations took part at Kosovo Force NATO led peace keeping force in Bosnia and Herzegovina as regard to Dayton Peace Agreement.⁹¹⁵ According to Ahmet Davutoğlu Balkan region constituted an indispensable part of Turkey’s close land basin, therefore he appreciates Balkans as a region that has a strategic depth for Turkey’s foreign policy.⁹¹⁶ Besides, According to the Program of the 58th Government,⁹¹⁷ Justice and Development Party made the following commitments concerning foreign policy issues regarding relations with Balkan regions: “Policy on Balkans to be developed and reshaped if necessary in the light of historical, cultural and economic relations. Developing economy based projects for decreasing tensions and sustaining peace in the region”,⁹¹⁸ and following “Leaving Cold War paradigms behind, making efforts to contribute to the link of Caucasia with Middle East and Balkans in economic terms”.⁹¹⁹ Therefore, relations with Balkan region states continued to be a top-level agenda for Justice and Development Party foreign policy decision makers as it used to be previous Turkish governments. After coming into power, AKP continued Turkey’s traditional policies toward Balkan Peninsula, while as regard to

⁹¹⁰ Baskın Oran, “Türkiye’nin Balkan ve Kafkas Politikası” (“Turkey’s Balkan Politics”), *Ankara Üniversitesi Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Journal*, Vol. L, No.1, p. 273.

⁹¹¹ Dana Allin, *NATO’s Balkan Intervention*, Oxford University Press, New York 2002, p. 4.

⁹¹² Sylvie Gangloff, “The Weight of Islam in the Turkish Foreign Policy in the Balkans”, *Turkish Review of Balkan Studies*, Vol.V, 2000-2001, p. 91.

⁹¹³ Enika Abazi, “Kosovo/a Conflict and Post - Cold War Order: Russia and Turkey Policies”, *Turkish Review of Balkan Studies*, Vol.VII, 2002, p. 217.

⁹¹⁴ Ali Askeroğlu, “The Bosnia - Herzegovina Question in Turkish Foreign Policy: 1992 - 1995. Has it been Successful?”, *Journal of Qafqaz University*, Vol.II, No.2, 1999, pp. 99-106.

⁹¹⁵ Sabri Sayarı, “Turkish Foreign Policy in the Post - Cold War Era: The Challenges of Multi-regionalism”, *Journal of International Affairs*, Autumn, Vol.LIV, No:1, p.178.

⁹¹⁶ A. Davutoğlu, “Stratejik Derinlik; Türkiye...”, op.cit., p.120.

⁹¹⁷ “Program of 58th Government”, (source: www.belgenet.com/hukumet/program/58-3.html), March 2012).

⁹¹⁸ A. Keşler, op.cit., p. 85.

⁹¹⁹ Ibidem, p. 86.

active diplomacy approach endeavored to develop economic and political connection between Balkan states in order to prevent future conflicts as it was referred in the government programs.⁹²⁰

Turkey's foreign policy under AKP rule preserved traditional Turkish position toward the Balkan region proposing maximum international cooperation to protect regional stability of the Region.⁹²¹ Parallel to that, AK Party also advocated region states accession to the European Union and North Atlantic Treaty Organization membership. What is more, to achieve an economic balance among the Balkan states to access a long-term regional stability, JDP governments also supported initiatives like "Southeast European Cooperation Process"⁹²² in the region. To highlight importance of similar initiatives for the peace perspectives of the region, it is indicated in the official website of Turkish Foreign Affairs Ministry. It reads as, "South East European Cooperation Process is a symbol of common will of countries of the region to improve among them and to bring lasting stability in South East Europe".⁹²³ Within the government period of Justice and Development Party, bilateral visits at all levels not excluding politics, business people, NGOs' remarkably increased.⁹²⁴ In addition to that, high level visit including Turkish President, Prime Minister and Foreign Affairs Minister took place in this period along with participation of crowded business delegations to gain a momentum economic development of reciprocal relations.⁹²⁵

In terms of international politics, Ankara in this period initiated tripartite consultation mechanisms with Serbia - Bosnia Herzegovina and Croatia - Bosnia Herzegovina to contribute regional peace.⁹²⁶ Turkey, under the frame of tripartite consultation mechanism gathered Foreign Affairs Ministers of Serbia - Bosnia Herzegovina and Croatia several times, what is more in 24th of April, 2010 it brought first time Serbia and Bosnia Herzegovina

⁹²⁰ Ibidem, p. 87.

⁹²¹ Melis Tuncay, *AKP Döneminde Türk Dış Politikası: Süreklilikler ve Değişiklikler (Turkish Foreign Policy under AKP Rule: Continuity and Change)*, Unpublished M.A. Thesis, Muğla University, Social Sciences Faculty, April 2011, p. 155.

⁹²² **The South-East European Cooperation Process:** is a forum for diplomatic and political dialogue reaffirming the political will and readiness of the countries from South East Europe to work together and to follow a common agenda thus meeting the region's needs of stability, security, democratization and economic prosperity. "The South-East European Cooperation Process", (source: www.rspcsee.org, <<http://rspcsee.org/en/pages/read/the-south-east-european-cooperation-process>>, March 2012).

⁹²³ "South East European Cooperation Process", Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, (source: www.mfa.gov.tr, <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/south-east-european-countries-cooperation-process-seecp_en.mfa#>, March 2012).

⁹²⁴ Muzaffer Vatansever, "Türkiye'nin Balkanlar Stratejisi: Türk Dış Politikasında Değişen Dinamikler" ("Turkey's Balkan Strategy: Changing Dynamics of Turkey's Foreign Policy"), *USAK Stratejik Gündem*, 21 September 2010.

⁹²⁵ Ibidem.

⁹²⁶ "Relations with the Balkan Region", Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, (source: www.mfa.gov.tr, <<http://www.mfa.gov.tr/relations-with-the-balkan-region.en.mfa>>, March 2012).

Presidents around the same table since the war declaring Istanbul declaration.⁹²⁷ Following that, similar tripartite consultation mechanism meetings at Foreign Affairs Ministry level took place en suite.

4.1. Greece

Relations with Greece commenced after Athens gained independence from Ottoman Empire in 1821.⁹²⁸ With the eruption of the First World War, Greece and Ottoman Empire took part at opposite sides though in the course of war there appeared almost no direct fights.⁹²⁹ At the end of the War, in accordance with the Sevres Treaty, Greece occupied some parts of Western Anatolia including Izmir.⁹³⁰ As a result of Turkish War of Independence commenced by Mustafa Kemal defeated Greek armies and pushed Athens to sign Lausanne treaty in Switzerland.⁹³¹ In the signature period of Lausanne treaty, the theme of population exchange became a hot theme between parts containing social, political, juridical and economic aspects.⁹³² As it was agreed between Athens and Ankara, half million Greek population residing in Turkey and vice versa was decided to change their residence with the exception of Greek residing in Istanbul and Turks in Thrace.⁹³³ The Ecumenical Patriarchate,⁹³⁴ the assets of Greek Orthodox minorities and religious freedom of Turkish Muslims in “Western Thrace”⁹³⁵ among the issues waiting resolution between the parts.⁹³⁶ Moreover, “Greek lobby in the United States of America”⁹³⁷ and its anti Turkey activities and tension as regard to similar issue cause a multi - dimensional questions between N.A.TO, U.S.

⁹²⁷ Ibidem.

⁹²⁸ Mustafa Aydın, Kostas Ifantis, *Turkish - Greek Relations: The Security Dilemma in Aegean*, Routledge, New York 2004, p. 2.

⁹²⁹ Jonathan Alford, *Greece and Turkey: Adversity in Alliance*, Gover Publishing, Guildford 1984, p. 41.

⁹³⁰ Dimitris Keridis, Dimitris Triantafyllou *Greek - Turkish Relations in the Era of Globalization*, DC: Brassey's, Washington 2001, p. 6.

⁹³¹ M. Gönlübol, op. cit., 220.

⁹³² Panayotis Tsakonas, “Understanding Greece’s Strategy vis-à-vis Turkey: From Discord, to Détente, to Resolution?”, *Mesogeios*, Summer 2004, pp. 22-23.

⁹³³ Ataöv Türkaya, “The Ethnic Turkish Minority in Western Thrace, Greece”, *The Turkish Yearbook*, Vol. XXII, 1992, p. 90.

⁹³⁴ Demetriusz Kiminas, *The Ecumenical Patriarchate*, Wild Side Press, United States of America 2009, p. 23.

⁹³⁵ “Western Thrace Turks Issue in Turkish - Greek Relations”, *International Affairs Agency*, Istanbul 1992, p. 27.

⁹³⁶ Erik Siegl, “Greek - Turkish Relations: Continuity or Change?”, *Perspectives: Central European Review of International Affairs*, No. 18, 2002, p. 45.

⁹³⁷ Jacob M Landau, “Johnson's 1964 Letter to İnönü and the Greek Lobbying at the White House”, *Jerusalem Papers on Peace Problems*, 28, Leonard Davis Institute for International Relations, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Jerusalem 1979, p. 45.

Turkey and Greece.⁹³⁸

In spite of the fact that Greece and Turkey were situated in the same camps during the Cold War, mutual relations did not experience a radical change in this period.⁹³⁹ In 1955, due to false news spreading in Istanbul with claim that Greek terrorist burnt Mustafa Kemal's house in Salonika huge Turkish crowds lynched, arson and mob Greek minority ending with 16 Greeks death at the consequence of which many Greeks left Istanbul while worsening the relations in international relations and social meaning.⁹⁴⁰

Apart from all above-mentioned conflicts, Cyprus question since 1950s constituted the main problematic issue between Ankara and Athens.⁹⁴¹ After Cyprus gain of independence, some Greek Cypriots nationalists claimed Cyprus to union with Greece and the idea was as well supported by some Greek politicians. After the collapse of federative state that built with consensus between Turks and Greeks residing in the Cyprus Island, relations worsened and clashes between the parts increased gradually. In 1974, members of junta advocating enosis⁹⁴² idea took the control in Greece and Turkey referring the guarantor right released a military operation to Cyprus Island.⁹⁴³ Thus, Turkish community of the Island gathered under an organized state with heavy mechanical Turkish troops in under the pretext protecting Turkish Cypriots, since then Cyprus issue occupied the top agenda between Greece and Turkey.⁹⁴⁴ Another hot theme causing harsh disputes between the neighbors is Aegean Sea question.⁹⁴⁵ The Aegean Islands controversial issues related to theme occupied a busy agenda following this period, as the status of Aegean sea in terms of delimitation of air space and sea water, economic zones and continental shelf and status of Imia / Kardak island negatively affected Turkish - Greece relations.⁹⁴⁶

⁹³⁸ Fotios Moustakis, *Greek -Turkish Relationship and NATO*, Frank Cass Publishers, New York 2003, p. 5.

⁹³⁹ Gilles Bertrand, "Greek - Turkish Relations: From Cold War to Rapprochement", *Observatory of European Foreign Policy*, p.3.

⁹⁴⁰ Alexis Alexandris, *The Greek Minority of Istanbul and Greek-Turkish Relations 1918-1974*, University of South Carolina, Columbia 1994, p. 25.

⁹⁴¹ Glen D Camp, "Greek - Turkish Conflict over Cyprus", *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. XCV, No.1, Spring 1980, p. 43.

⁹⁴² It is a political idea the roots of which date back to Greece independence. The main goal of the *enosis* idea is to annex Cyprus land to Greece.

⁹⁴³ Suat Bilge, *Büyük Düş: Türk - Yunan Siyasi İlişkileri: 1919-2000*, (Big Dream: Political Relations between Turkey and Greece: 1919-2000), 21. Yüzyıl Yayınları, Ankara 2000, p. 120.

⁹⁴⁴ Panayotis J Tsakonas, Yallourides Christodoulos, *Greece and Turkey After the End of the Cold War*, Melissa, New York and Athens 2001, p. 5.

⁹⁴⁵ Yanniis A Stivachtis, "The Demilitarisation of the Greek Eastern Aegean Islands; The Case of the Central Aegean and Dodecanese Islands", *The Turkish Year Book*, Vol. XXI, p. 100.

⁹⁴⁶ Mustafa Aydın, "Cacophony in the Aegean; Contemporary Turkish - Greek Relations", *Turkish Yearbook of International Relations*, No. 27, 1997, p. 109.

In 1999, when the head of Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), Abdullah Öcalan detained by Turkish Special Forces in Kenya, with Cyprus passport mutual relations one more time experienced tough times.⁹⁴⁷ Greece was continuously blamed by Turkish authorities to support separatist Kurdistan Workers Party militants' activities and Kenya case constituted an abstract proof for the similar accusations. As a reaction to the case, Foreign Affairs, Interior Minister and Public Order Ministers of Greece government resigned due to charge to attempt hide and seek asylum of terrorist leader in Greek diplomatic missions in Nairobi.⁹⁴⁸ The highly tensed mutual relations between Athens and Ankara experienced a détente period in 1999 due to earthquake hit western Turkey with heavy casualties.⁹⁴⁹ The support provided through Greece in very hot moments of earthquake caused a close rapprochement, which was then called "Disaster diplomacy"⁹⁵⁰ as a date stressing the initial of good relations that even reached to a level as Greece dropped its opposition against Turkey's EU candidacy.⁹⁵¹

Justice and Development Party, under the frames of its new rhetoric of foreign policy understating, aimed to bring an end to long-lasting disputes⁹⁵² as well as to reach minimum problem and maximum cooperation with Turkish neighborhood put a special emphasis to the relations with Greece and Cyprus. Erdoğan during his historic balcony speech at the night of 2002 elections as the leader of winning party gave the future signals of his party's future European Union political orientation declaring his support on Kofi Annan plan and readiness of his party to talk with Greece in order to find a mutual solution at Cyprus question.⁹⁵³ Yet, Athens approached toward AKP's landslide victory cautiously due to Justice and Development Party's Islamist roots. Former Foreign Minister Papandreou stated, "Greece sees the new Turkish government, with its Islamist roots, as a possible prototype for emulation in the wider Islamic world".⁹⁵⁴

AK Party, shortly after coming to power, in order to practice its rhetoric, related to relations with the European Union started an active agenda concreting it with Greece and

⁹⁴⁷ Sedat Laçiner, "The PKK: A Privileged Terrorist Organization", *Journal of Turkish Weekly*, 30 October 2008.

⁹⁴⁸ Amikam Nachmani, „What Says the Neighbor West? On Turkish - Greek Relations" in Barry M Rubin, Kemal Kirişçi ((ed.), *Turkey in the World Politics: An Emerging Multiregional Power*, Lynne Reiner Publishers, Colorado 2001, p. 80.

⁹⁴⁹ Nicholaos Zahariadis, "A Framework for Improving Greek - Turkish Relations", *Mediterranean Quarterly*, Fall 2000, p.98.

⁹⁵⁰ James K Lindsay, *Crisis and Conciliation: A year of Rapprochement between Greece and Turkey*, I. B. Tauris, London 2007, p. 57.

⁹⁵¹ J. K Lindsay, op.cit., 15.

⁹⁵² Ehud Tolenado, "The AKP's New Turkey", *Current Trends in Islamist Ideology*, (source:www.currenttrends.org,<<http://www.currenttrends.org/research/detail/the-akps-new-turkey>>,June 2012).

⁹⁵³ C. Migdalovitz "Turkey: Selected Foreign...", op.cit., p. 29.

⁹⁵⁴ "Chronology January 1 - December 31, 2002", *The Turkish Year Book*, Vol. XXXIII, p. 344.

Cyprus.⁹⁵⁵ Thus, two weeks after the general elections, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan paid his first visit in 2002 -although it was an unofficial visit due to his political ban- to Greece as the leader of ruling party in Turkey.⁹⁵⁶ During his visit, Erdoğan as the head of Justice and Development Party met with former Greek Prime Minister Kostas Smitis.⁹⁵⁷ During the press conference held after the meeting between leaders, Greek Prime Minister stressed the necessity of continuation of good relations following a positive line in recent years. Kostas Smitis declared his pleasure related to the activities of common commission studying on Aegean question, while underlined the presence of dissidence between parts related to the Aegean issue. He also mentioned the Cyprus question as a theme continuously affecting Turkish - Greece relations and necessity of resolving problem in accordance with international law. In addition to that, Greek Prime Minister underlined Greece support for Turkey during the European Union process on condition that solving continental problem with Turkey and implementation of Copenhagen criteria through Turkey. As for Erdoğan, he declared his gratitude to be invited and asked Greek part to be a strategic part leaving historic problems away.

One additional important feature of the meeting was the wish of putting a way of Cyprus question in the course of Turkey's accession to negotiations with the European Union and full membership period, however in spite of public rhetoric Cyprus issue constituted the main agenda during the EU talks between Athens and Ankara. On his row, Erdoğan explained his party's program related to Greek community residing in Turkey, easing the activities of religious foundations, providing religious minorities to acquiring property, and promised more freedom for Greek minority in Turkey.⁹⁵⁸ The meeting was highly important in order to indicate Justice and Development Party's intention of accelerating relations with the European Union and Greek parts positive attitude supporting the reconciliation process with Turkey.⁹⁵⁹ Another point reflecting improvement in relations between the parties at this period is the unsuccessful attempt to co-host EURO 2008 which was won by Austria and Switzerland.

In 2003, former Foreign Affairs Minister Abdullah Gül paid an official visit to Athens under the frame of which both parties discussed the details of previous meeting that took

⁹⁵⁵ Ziya Öniş, Şuhnaz Yılmaz, "Between Europeanization and Euro - Asianism: Foreign Policy Activism in Turkey during the AKP Era", *Turkish Studies*, Vol. X, No.1, March 2009, p. 3.

⁹⁵⁶ "Relations between Turkey and Greece". Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, (source: www.mfa.gov.tr <<http://www.mfa.gov.tr/relations-between-turkey-and-greece.en.mfa>> March 2012).

⁹⁵⁷ "Erdoğan - Smitis Agree on Cooperation" Macedonian Press Agency, News in English, (source: www.hri.org, <<http://www.hri.org/news/greek/mpab/2002/02-11-18.mpab.html#01>>, March 2012).

⁹⁵⁸ "Erdoğan Atina'da" ("Erdoğan in Athens"), *Hürriyet*, 6 May 2002.

⁹⁵⁹ Ibidem.

place in 2002.⁹⁶⁰ Apart from that, the hot themes like “Greco - Turkish relations, Turkey - EU rapprochement, the Cyprus issue, and the problem of violations of Greek national airspace by Turkish Air Forces jets” came to agenda.⁹⁶¹ Under the frame of Turkish FM’s visit, Turkish Finance Minister, the governor of Turkey’s Central Bank, and the Presidents of the Greek and Turkish Chambers of Commerce met with Greek Foreign Affairs Minister, National Economy and Finance Minister, Central Bank governor to review economic situation in both countries and to discuss new ways for growth and cooperation on both sides of the Aegean”.⁹⁶²

Next high-level visit took place between Turkey and Greece when Recep Tayyip Erdoğan paid his official visit as the Prime Minister of Turkey on 6-8 May 2004 due to invitation from his counterpart Karamanis. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan became the first Turkish Prime Minister for 16 years to visit Greece. Thus, though symbolically, it was a crucial meeting at least so as to indicate new JDP government’s intent to reach a consensus at problems with Greece and Cyprus on Turkey’s way to the European Union, plus before upcoming Cyprus referendum where sites would vote the future of the Island. At Prime Minister’s visit, he met with Greek Prime Minister and both Prime Minister talked about the future of Greece - Turkish dialogue process aiming the solution of many historic questions between the parts, along with Balkan issue, Cyprus, and Turkey’s EU candidate. At the second part of his visit, Turkish Prime Minister moved to Western Thrace coming together Turkish local authorities residing at the region.⁹⁶³

High-level contacts in the course of the following years continued regularly between the neighbors. As mutual visits in different occasions took place between the parts, for instance former Minister of Foreign Affairs Ali Babacan paid an official visit in 2007 to Greece where latest issues came to agenda between the parts. Under the frames of the visit, Turkish FM Babacan also visited Komini where Turkish Muslim minority resides in Greece, that recently became a tradition in official visit on contrary to past.⁹⁶⁴ In addition to political relations catching a positive acceleration in this period, Turkish - Greek - Italian Gas Pipeline

⁹⁶⁰ “Turkish FM Gul Winds up Athens by Meeting Simitis”, Hellenic Republic Embassy of Grece, (source: www.greekembassy.org, <<http://www.greekembassy.org/embassy/content/en/Article.aspx?office=2&folder=363&article=12186>>, March 2012,).

⁹⁶¹ Ibidem.

⁹⁶² Ibidem.

⁹⁶³ Bahar Rumelili, “The European Union’s Impact on the Greek - Turkish Conflict” in “EU Border Conflicts Studies”, University of Birmingham, *Occasional Paper* 6, (2004), p. 5.

⁹⁶⁴ “25 November Press Release Regarding Visit of Ali Babacan, The Minister of Foreign Affairs, to Greece”, Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, (source: www.mfa.gov.tr, <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/_p_no_171--_25-november-2007_-press-release-regarding-visit-of-ali-babacan_-the-minister-of-foreign-affairs_-to-greece__unofficial-translation-p_.en.mfa>, March 2012).

Project (ITGI), which was started in 2005, was completed in 19th of November 2007 thanks to intergovernmental agreement among Turkey, Greece and Italy.⁹⁶⁵ The project that is known as The Southern Europe Gas Ring Project “transport natural gas supplied from sources located in the Caspian Basin, Russian Federation, the Middle East, Southern Mediterranean countries, and other international sources through Turkey and Greece within scope of the European Union”.⁹⁶⁶ The 178 km pipeline project was highly crucial as it was planned in future terms to bring more quantity of natural resource to the European Union. The construction of \$300 million pipeline project also deeply contributed to solidify “improved ties between Greece and Turkey, linking the longtime Aegean rivals through a project that will give Caspian gas its first direct Western outlet and help ease Russia’s energy dominance as oil and gas prices soar”.⁹⁶⁷ The inauguration ceremony of Karacabey - Komtini natural gas hosted all high-level representatives like Turkish and Greek Prime Ministers along with Azerbaijan President Ilham Aliyev and Ministers responsible for energy issues.⁹⁶⁸

Another unexpected development was evidenced between old rivals in terms of finance sector as “in 2006, the National Bank of Greece purchased Turkey’s fifth-largest bank for \$2 billion”,⁹⁶⁹ as a signal indicating future affiliations in terms of politics,⁹⁷⁰ on the other hand AKP government exposed critics through nationalist wing to sell Turkey’s strategic institutions to enemies. In 2008, Kostas Karamanlis became the first Prime Minister in 49 years to visit Turkey. Greece and Turkish Prime Minister met tête-à-tête during a meeting initially planned to last 30 minutes but endured 95 minutes and between the delegations discussing economic, trade and cultural issues along with the status of Aegean Sea, Cyprus, Greek minorities and Turkey’s European Union process.⁹⁷¹ During the press conference, Turkish Prime Minister underlined the importance of historic visit expressing his gratitude and referred to Atatürk - Venizelos talks that regulated the historical background of Turkish - Greece relations after the First World War. Erdoğan, touching to the historic antagonism between the states stressed his good will converting the Aegean Sea to a peace sea hinting his

⁹⁶⁵ Çigdem Üstun, “Energy Cooperation between Import Dependent Countries: Cases of Italy and Turkey”, *Perceptions*, Spring 2011, Vol. XVI, No. 1, p. 81.

⁹⁶⁶ “Turkish - Greek - Italian Gas Pipeline Project (ITGI)”, The Turkish Petroleum Cooperation, (source: www.botas.gov.tr, <<http://www.botas.gov.tr/icerik/eng/projeler/yurtdisi.asp>>, March 2012).

⁹⁶⁷ Anthee Carassava, “Greece and Turkey to Open Gas Pipeline”, *The New York Times*, 19 November 2007.

⁹⁶⁸ John C Daly, “New Gas Pipeline to Link Azerbaijan and Italy via Turkey”, *Eurasia Daily Monitor*, Vol. IV, Issue 151, August 3, 2007.

⁹⁶⁹ Carol Migdalovitz, “Greece Update”, *CRS Report for Congress*, Congressional Research Service, December 2009, p. 7.

⁹⁷⁰ “An Unprecedented Alliance between Greeks and Turks”, *The Economist*, 6 April 2006.

⁹⁷¹ Sabine Tavernise, Anthee Carasava, “In 49 Year First, Greek Leader Visits Turkey”, *The New York Times*, 24 January 2008.

government's intention to seek good relations with Greece. He also added that during their government period Turkish and Greek parts met 38 times in order to solve continental shelf problem present in Aegean Sea.⁹⁷²

The Heybeliada Theological School was closed by Turkey due to unification of education law put into effect at early period of the Republic. The school run by Greek minorities provided their religious functionaries along with the ecumenism question related to status of Greek Patriarch and Greek Orthodox Church, which used to be a controversial issue between Turkish and Greece since Lausanne. This along with other issues related with Greek minorities came to agenda during the meeting and at the press conference of Prime Ministers. Responding the question of press members upon above mentioned issues Erdoğan evaluated the ecumenism question as a problem related to Christian world, while underlined the existence of a general consensus in terms of Christian minorities and Patriarchate issue without touching details calling them as technical issues. In the course of his speech, Turkish PM stressed the acceleration of positive relations with Greece during his government, while thanked Greek Prime Minister for their support for Turkey during the accession of negotiations for full membership to the European Union. To a respond of a question, Turkish PM declared his government's expectations on Cyprus after the form of government in order to continue peace talks between the parts.⁹⁷³

Another unorthodox development of the meeting was Greek Prime Minister's historic visit to memorial tomb of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk who is accepted as the main leader of Greek defeat in Anatolia, which called in Greek tradition as Small Asia Catastrophe referring to Greco - Turkish war after the First World War and turned a taboo between Greek - Turkish relations.⁹⁷⁴ In 2009, after the general elections, newly elected Prime Minister Jeorios Andreas Papandreu paid his first abroad visit to Istanbul in order to attend South East European Cooperation Meeting and following that incumbent Foreign Affairs Minister of Greece Dimitris Droutsas paid an official visit meeting to his counterpart Davutoğlu in order to talk various actual themes between Turkey and Greece.

Thanks to acceleration process between the parts since 1999, the gradual rapprochement process turned to partnership. Thus, Ankara and Athens in order to coordinate mutual relations more fruitfully created a High Level Cooperation Council under the guidance

⁹⁷² Eda Kuşku, "The Shadow of Past Rivalry: Limits of post-1999 Dynamism in Greco - Turkish Relations", *Caucasian Review of International Affairs*, Vol. II (3) - Summer 2008, pp. 156-165.

⁹⁷³ C. Migdalovitz, "Greece Update...", op.cit., p. 8.

⁹⁷⁴ "Turkey Hosts Greek PM Costas Karamanlis", *The Journal of Turkish Weekly*, 24 January 2008.

and observation by Prime Ministers and Foreign Affairs Ministers of the states.⁹⁷⁵ The aim of the HLCC model was to gather Greek and Turkish ministers together in yearly meetings once a year alternatively in Turkey and Greece in order to talk on the highest level under the frames of an institutional council.⁹⁷⁶ During Turkish Prime Minister's visit to Athens which took place in 14-15 May 2010, the first meeting of High Level Cooperation Council took place between the parts where the various documents agreed and signed including many hot topics lately became a theme of discussion between neighbors.⁹⁷⁷ Another important feature of the Turkish Prime Minister's visit was the delegation accompanying him during his visit, which was constituted of 10 minister and 300 business as the visit coincided to a period when Greece was struggling with the heaviest economic crisis of its history.⁹⁷⁸

Shortly after the official meeting that took place in May, Prime Minister Erdoğan one more time settled to Greek capital on 21st of October 2010 in order to attend "Mediterranean Climate Change Initiative" conference.⁹⁷⁹ Before his scheduled visit to Athens, Turkish Prime Minister evaluated Turkey - Greek relations under the frames of current issues on a Greece Skai TV. Replying a question on Turkey's gas and oil exploration in Mediterranean, which has been interpreted in Greek side as a provocative action, PM Erdoğan said that on the contrary to be provocative it might be a joint project between Greece and Turkey, which may develop relations.⁹⁸⁰ Turkish Prime Minister touched the military fights issue as a theme tensing the relations in spite of developing relations between parts, underlying that because of recovering relations the jet flights of Turkey and Greece decreased, nevertheless he notified that he wishes to both sites end the flights under NATO observation.⁹⁸¹ The 12 miles problem related to continental shelf question Erdoğan stressed that due to dialogue undertaken between the parts reconciliation is close and underlined the necessity of mutual understanding and leaving part previous problematic issues.⁹⁸² Ultimately, Turkey under the rule of AKP Ankara

⁹⁷⁵ "Relations between Turkey and Greece", Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, (source: www.mfa.gov.tr, <<http://www.mfa.gov.tr/relations-between-turkey-and-greece.en.mfa>>, March 2012).

⁹⁷⁶ Ibidem.

⁹⁷⁷ "Turkish PM Visit to Greece Set to Boost Rapprochement", Hellenic Republic Embassy of Greece, (source: www.greekembassy.org, <<http://www.greekembassy.org/Embassy/Content/en/Article.aspx?office=9&folder=1030&article=25079>>, March 2012).

⁹⁷⁸ Nicholas Paphitis, "Turkish PM Makes Historic Visit to Greece: Backs Arm Cuts", *Arab News*, 14 May 2010.

⁹⁷⁹ "Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Prime Minister of the Republic of Turkey has Confirmed Attendance", Mediterranean Climate Change Initiative, (source: [www. http://www.medclimatechangeinitiative.org](http://www.medclimatechangeinitiative.org), <<http://www.medclimatechangeinitiative.org/content/recep-tayyip-erdo%C4%9F-prime-minister-republic-turkey-has-confirmed-attendance>>, March 2012).

⁹⁸⁰ "Erdoğan Proposes Turkish - Greek Oil Exploration in Aegean", *Today's Zaman*, 21 October 2010.

⁹⁸¹ Ibidem.

⁹⁸² Ibidem.

revised its defense philosophy parallel to zero problem principle with Turkish neighborhood in National Defense Document and excluded Greece as an external threat, furthermore Ankara redefined Greece as a cooperative partner played a crucial role in mutual relations.⁹⁸³ Still, Greece continued to define Turkey as the biggest threat directed from East against its sovereignty.⁹⁸⁴

5. Conclusions

Republic of Turkey's foreign relation prospects with the West constitutes an irrevocable part of its external policy concept. The Western connection of Turkey's foreign policy continued to be the highest agenda of Justice and Development Party governments in 2002 – 2011 periods as well. As similar to all other previous Turkish governments, relations with the United States of America and the European Union constituted the spine of Turkey's foreign policy agenda at this period. Aside from the mutual relations with Washington and the EU capitals, relations with Turkish neighborhood, as well as regional and global issues as regard to foreign policy determined parallel to USA - EU interests, thus during foreign policy decision making processes, Washington and Brussels views taken into consideration as many issues counseled reciprocally.

Due to the occupation of Iraq, Turkey - USA relations experienced the toughest challenge of its history and both countries lived a conflict of interests particularly due to Ankara's security perceptions and anxieties on destiny of Northern Iraq. Aftermath harsh critics and hood event that brought reciprocal relations to a deadlock soon healed as USA - Turkey relations turned to its traditional line where states signed agreements against terrorism. The election of Barack Obama as the 44th President of the United States of America helped healing of Turkey - U.S. relation to gain a more positive direction, as Obama paid an important visit to Turkey shortly after his election to office. On contrary to pessimistic expectations and hard endeavors of Armenian lobby, President Obama did not mentioned so-called Armenian genocide during his speeches though Armenian issue constituted an obstacle for reciprocal relations at this period.

⁹⁸³ Ayşe Aslıhan Çelenk, "Democratization of the National Security Discourse and the Political Parties in Turkey", *Erciyes Üniversitesi İktisadi ve İdari Bilimler Fakültesi Magazine*, No. 33, July - December 2009, p. 120.

⁹⁸⁴ "Revised National Security Document Approved by Turkish Cabinet". *Hürriyet Daily News*, 23 November 2010.

As for relations with the European Union, Cyprus and Greece, particularly shortly after AKP's coming to power, the party prioritized Turkey's EU agenda and continued radical reforms that initialized previously. Under the Justice and Development Party government, Turkey obtained a candidate status with harsh expressions like 'it may continue forever'. Turkey, under AK Party rule portrayed its good will in the resolution of Cyprus question. In addition to that, historical Turkish - Greek antagonism experienced some healing at this period though Cyprus question acted as an obstacle in both Turkey - Greece and Turkey - EU relations. Due to internal problems and emerging economic crisis in the EU zone, Turkey's full membership became a domestic theme particularly in France and Germany under the Sarkozy and Merkel Presidency on contrary to positive acceleration experienced in Schröder - Chirac Presidency. What is more, the negative result of Lisbon Treaty as an obstacle for the future of the Union and Turkey's controversial position in the issue highly agitated the situation. Additionally, Turkey's disappointment in Cyprus issue and close affiliation with its Eastern periphery pushed away relations with the EU with a bare slow down in the EU reforms. Yet, Turkey's full EU membership continued to be the top level agenda of Turkey's foreign policy decision makers under the AKP rule in 2002-2011 periods. In brief, as a continuation of its Westernization principle, Turkey's foreign policy in AKP rule kept its fundamental character regarding the relations with the West. Regardless of the fact that, Turkey experienced some road accidents with USA; or especially following the second term of AKP in the office, Turkey - EU relations undertook a recession it may not be interpreted as an axis shift. Moreover, in the course of reciprocal relations Turkey's foreign policy makers in different occasions confronted similar challenges still similar incidents did not influence Turkey's Western oriented foreign policy concept.

Chapter V

The Northern Direction

The chapter analyzes Turkey's connection with its Northern direction during Justice and Development Party's government tenure between 2002 and 2011. The main objective of the chapter is to examine bilateral relations between Turkey and its northern neighbors. The scopes under the frame of this chapter are Turkey's relation with Russian Federation, Southern Caucasus as well as the newly independent Republics in Central Asian in terms of political, economical, military and diplomatic sectors. The contents are studied chronologically in order to figure out foreign policy practice of Turkey during Justice and Development Party's regime.

The chapter seeks answers whether Turkey's foreign policy in the course of Justice and Development Party government periods experienced an unorthodox affiliation with Russia, South Caucasus and Central Asian States that might be interpreted as an alternative model for Turkey's Western alliance or Justice and Development Party continued the traditional Turkish foreign policy orientation toward regional countries. The first section of the chapter analyzes Turkey - Russia relations, while the second section analyzes Turkey's relations with Southern Caucasus states. The third section of the chapter analyzes Turkey's relations with Central Asian Republics in Justice and Development Party's tenure. As for the final section it dwells on conclusions of the chapter.

1. Russian Federation

According to mainstream foreign policy analysts like Oral Sander⁹⁸⁵ and Faik Armağanoglu,⁹⁸⁶ Turkey - Russia (in terms of Russian Empire, Soviet Union as well as Russian Federation) relations bear a contradictory nature that is based on mutual rivalry. Due to the lack of trust between the countries from security and military perspectives along with the legacies of the past, the nature of mutual relations have many disagreements that are hard to recover. Historical background of the mutual relations between Turks and Russians carry many evidences proving similar arguments. Ottoman Empire and Russian Empire many times

⁹⁸⁵ Oral Sander, *Türkiye'nin Dış Politikası (Foreign Policy of Turkey)*, İmge Kitapevi, Ankara 1998, p. 245.

⁹⁸⁶ Faik Armağanoglu, *Siyasi Tarih: 1789-1960 (Political History: 1789-1960)*, Sevinç Matbaası, Ankara 1964, p.756.

encountered each other due to the struggle to hold power in Balkans, Caucasus, Black Sea region, and Crimea since 16th century.⁹⁸⁷ In spite of the fact that the bilateral relations had indicated a positive development after the First World War,⁹⁸⁸ the end of the Second World War, and the emerge of the Cold War caused both countries to face one another again.⁹⁸⁹ Russia's continuous imperialist desires and territorial demands at the Eastern part of Turkey as well as historical aim to capture Turkish Straits always agitated Turkey's foreign policy decision makers that caused a security threat perception and feeling of danger from the north of Turkey.⁹⁹⁰ Thus, Republic of Turkey to convert this very negative situation searched alternative alliances or blocks against Russian threat. Russian Federation perceived Turkey as an agent or tool of North Atlantic Treaty Organization and West that locates aside.⁹⁹¹

Nonetheless, according to Suat Bilge the establishment of good will relations between Ankara and Moscow would be beneficial for the national interest of Ankara.⁹⁹² Particularly, after the collapse of Soviet Union, though the nature of mutual relations did not radically change, cooperation prospects in terms of energy, tourism, trade and commerce issues positively influenced the Russian - Turkish relations. Although, Russian Federation continued to be the biggest opponent of Turkey in Central Asia, Caucasus, Black Sea and Balkans the conflictual nature of relations diverted; thanks to collaborations in terms of energy, economics and commerce issues.

The diplomatic relations between Turkey and Russia (their predecessor states) date back to 15th century.⁹⁹³ Between Ottoman and Russian Empires, there were both peaceful times, collaborations as well historic wars.⁹⁹⁴ Turkish - Russian Wars accelerated the collapse process of Ottoman Empire,⁹⁹⁵ while it also negatively influenced Russian Empire. The core point of Russian - Ottoman relations was Russia's endeavors to reach warm waters and control Turkish straits in order to be a global empire as Ottomans resisted to Russia using

⁹⁸⁷ Dmitri Trenin, "Russia and Turkey: A Cure from Schizophrenia", *Perceptions*, Vol. II (2), June - August 1997, p. 60.

⁹⁸⁸ Vitali Alexandrov, "Soviet - Turkish Cooperation", *International Affairs* (Moscow), No. 12, December 1986, p. 33.

⁹⁸⁹ Alvin Z Rubeinstein, Oles M Smolansky, *Regional Power Rivalries in the New Eurasia: Russia, Turkey and Iran*, M.E.S. Sharpe Inc, New York 1995, p. 5.

⁹⁹⁰ Vadim Markushin, "Russia - Turkey: Doomed to Eternal Neighbourhood", *Perceptions*, Vol. II (1), March - May 1997, p. 95.

⁹⁹¹ Kamuran Gürün, *Türk - Rus İlişkilerinde 500 Yıl 1491-1992, (500 Years in Russo - Turkish Relations, 1491-1992)*, TTK Yayınları, Ankara 1999, p.117.

⁹⁹² Suat Bilge, *Güç Komşuluk: Türkiye - Sovyetler Birliği İlişkileri 1920 - 1964 (Hard Neighbourhood: Turkish - Soviet Union Relations 1920 - 1964)*, Ofset Repromat, Ankara 1991, p. 355.

⁹⁹³ D. Quataret, op. cit., p. 84.

⁹⁹⁴ Virginia H Aksan, *Ottoman Wars 1700 - 1870: An Empire Besieged*, Pearson, Harlow 2007, p. 5.

⁹⁹⁵ Alexander Lebedev, "Russia and Turkey at 21st Century: What is behind Us and What is ahead?", *Insight Turkey*, April - June 2002, Vol. IV, No. 2, p.5.

different alliance and taking advantage of power balance system of the international environment in order to keep its territorial integrity.⁹⁹⁶ In addition to that, both Empires many times confronted in order to establish dominance in Balkans, Caucasus and Crimea.⁹⁹⁷

While Russia was emerging as an empire and experiencing a radical reform period adopting European technologies in order to expand Russian empire under the rule of Peter the Great,⁹⁹⁸ Ottoman foreign policy decision makers did underestimate the Russian expansionism and were deadly mistaken not to consider Russia as a threat against the Empire.⁹⁹⁹ During the reign of Catharine II, it was barely understood that Ottoman Empire was not superior to Russia but Ottomans were the great enemy of Russian empire.¹⁰⁰⁰ Russian expansion continued on expanse of Ottoman at this period while at 1774,¹⁰⁰¹ because of Küçük Kaynarca agreement Ottoman Empire lost Crimea, which opened gates of Black Sea to Russian Empire.¹⁰⁰² In the nineteenth century, in spite of the hostilities between Ottoman and Russian Empires in some periods both sites realized alliances against third states that endangered their interests. During Ottoman Empires' adoption of constitutional system, it applied for the alliance of England and other European forces in order to take an advantageous position against Russia. Towards the end of 19th century, Ottomans and Russian fought over Balkans that resulted in absolute Ottoman defeat and opened independence gate for many Balkan states.

20th century weakened both Russian and Ottoman Empires, therefore both empires collapsed as a consequence of the First World War. Relations between old enemies experienced a very positive trend in post First World War period. Moscow appreciated Turkish Independence War as a struggle against Western imperialism and aimed to impose Communist ideology on Turkey to evade it from entering to Western block.¹⁰⁰³ Parallel to this approach, USSR became the first great power recognizing Ankara government, and supported

⁹⁹⁶ Christos Rozakis, Petros L Stagos, *The Turkish Straits*, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht 1987 p.16.

⁹⁹⁷ Alan W Fisher, *The Russian Annexation of Crimea 1772-1783*, Cambridge University Press, London 1970, p. 23.

⁹⁹⁸ Stephen J Lee, *Peter the Great*, Routledge, London 1993, p. 29.

⁹⁹⁹ W. Hale, op. cit., p. 20..

¹⁰⁰⁰ Suraiya Faroqhi, *The Ottoman Empire and the World around It*, I.B. Tauris and CO Ltd., London 2006, p. 68.

¹⁰⁰¹ Roderic H Davison, "Russian Skill and Turkish Imbecility: The Treaty of Kuchuk Kainardji Reconsidered", *Slavic Review*, Vol. XXXV, No.3, September 1976, p. 443.

¹⁰⁰² W. Hale, op. cit., p. 21.

¹⁰⁰³ Halil I Karal, *Turkish Relations with Soviet Russia during the National Liberation War of Turkey, 1918-1922: A Study in the Diplomacy of the Kemalist Revolution*, University of California Press, Los Angeles 1967, p.

the Turkish Independence War financially.¹⁰⁰⁴ Ankara government under the administration of Mustafa Kemal favored material and logistic support from Soviet Union, thus both countries signed “Soviet - Turkish Friendship Agreement”.¹⁰⁰⁵

Booming relations between Soviet Russia and Turkey faded after the Second World War.¹⁰⁰⁶ On the eve of the Cold War, Soviet Union’s demand on Turkish straits and Stalin’s reservations on Moscow agreement cooled the relations; as a result, Ankara and Moscow one more time were situated in different fronts.¹⁰⁰⁷ After the end of the Cold War, Turkish - Russian relations experienced a positive change. Ankara recognized Russian Federation as the successor of USSR and Turkish Foreign Affairs Minister visited Moscow in 1992; Russian Foreign Affairs Minister visited Turkey the same year.¹⁰⁰⁸ From the initial level of mutual relations, the terrorism issue¹⁰⁰⁹ (The Chechen war in Russia and Kurdish separatists in Turkey) occupied the political agenda of both countries in the course of high-level meetings of official representatives.¹⁰¹⁰ Besides, the peripheries of both countries like Caucasus, Balkans and Central Asia issues in some cases intensified mutual relations at post Cold War Period;¹⁰¹¹ Moscow was afraid of Islamist and Pan-Turanist policies of Turkey,¹⁰¹² as Ankara searched economic and cultural influence at these regions referring its religious and ethnic relations.. Under the frame of Turkish Prime Minister Süleyman Demirel’s official visit to Moscow, Turkey and Russia signed a Friendship and Cooperation Agreement at 25 May 1992.¹⁰¹³ The signed treaty between the countries proposed the future mutual relation prospective based on respect to sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of states.

¹⁰⁰⁴ Vitali Alexandrov, “Soviet - Turkish Cooperation”, International Affairs (Moscow), No. 12, December 1986, p. 35.

¹⁰⁰⁵ Mesut H Casin, *Rus İmparatorluk Stratejisi (Russian Imperial Strategy)*, Okumus Adam, Istanbul 2006, p. 657.

¹⁰⁰⁶ Ahmet Şükrü Esmer, Oral Sander, *İkinci Dünya Savaşında Türk Dış Politikası, Olaylarla Türk Dış Politikası) (Foreign Policy of Turkey with Incidents)*, Siyasal Kitabevi, Ankara 1996, pp.140-141.

¹⁰⁰⁷ Jamil Hasanli, *Stalin and the Turkish Crisis of the Cold War, 1945 - 1953*, Lexington Books, Plymouth, 2011, pp. 65-123.

¹⁰⁰⁸ “Turkey’s Political Relations with Russian Federation”, Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, (source: www.mfa.gov.tr, <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkey_s-political-relations-with-russian-federation.en.mfa>, March 2012).

¹⁰⁰⁹ Michael Reynolds, “Russian - Turkish Relations and Chechnya”, *Insight Turkey*, April - June 2002, Vol. IV, No. 2, p. 260.

¹⁰¹⁰ Robert Olson, “The Kurdish Question and Chechnya: Turkish and Russian Foreign Policies since the Gulf War”, *Middle East Policy*, Vol. IV (3), March 1996, p. 106.

¹⁰¹¹ Alvin Z Rubinstein, Oles M. Smolansky, op. cit., p.6.

¹⁰¹² George G Arnakis, “Turanism: an Aspect of Turkish Nationalism”, *Balkan Studies*, Vol. I, 1960, p. 20.

¹⁰¹³ “Turkey’s Political Relations with Russian Federation”, Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, (source: www.mfa.gov.tr, <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkey_s-political-relations-with-russian-federation.en.mfa>, March 2012).

As a respond to Turkish PM's visit, Russian Prime Minister visited Ankara in 1997 as Turkish Bülent Ecevit paid a visit back to Russian capital. In 2001, Turkey and Russia signed understanding of "Joint Action Plan for Cooperation in Eurasia".¹⁰¹⁴ The aim of the agreement was to shape mutual relations in accordance with the demands of multi-polar international relations system, respect for territorial integrity and noninterference in internal affairs. Within the framework of the Joint Action Plan, the principles like intention of development economic dialogue, creating solutions toward regional problems too were well stressed.¹⁰¹⁵ The economic relations between these countries became the driving force of multi dimensional relations. After the collapse of Soviet Union, in order to augment regional cooperation, Turkey initialized Black sea Economic Cooperation and along with most other post-Soviet region states, Russian Federation as well signed the declaration of Black Sea Economic Cooperation.¹⁰¹⁶

Turkey's revision of its strait regime toward Russia also highly contributed a lot to the development of close relations within this period. The shuttle trade between Russia and Turkey, tourism, Turkish companies' activities in building sector in Russia constituted the core of economic relations between Moscow and Ankara. Within 2000, mutual relation was enriched with energy aspect because of signed Blue Stream Pipeline Project. Turkey fulfilled its natural resources demand via Russia, and it turned out to be a strategic energy transit for transfer of Russian gas to Europe. By 2010, the trade volume between Turkey and Russia exceed 25 billion United States Dollars, hence Russian Federation became the second largest trade partner of Turkey after Germany.¹⁰¹⁷

After Justice and Development Party took power after the 2002 general elections, first time high-level visit between Ankara and Moscow took place when former Turkish Foreign Affairs's Minister Abdullah Gül paid an official visit to Russian Federation between 23 and 26 February 2004.¹⁰¹⁸ The visit was very important, as it was the first official visit since 1996 between Russia and Turkey at the level of Foreign Affairs Ministry. Under the frames of official visit, Turkey and Russian Federation undertook consultations on the issues like

¹⁰¹⁴ Ibidem.

¹⁰¹⁵ Bülent Aras, "Türkiye ve Rusya Federasyonu: Çok Boyutlu Ortaklık" ("Turkey and Russia: Multi-Dimensional Cooperation"), *SETA Analiz*, August 2009, p.7.

¹⁰¹⁶ Nicholas Dima, "The Black Sea Region: New Economic Cooperation and Old Geopolitics", *The Journal of Social, Political and Economic Studies*, Vol. XXVIII, No. 1, 2003, p. 81.

¹⁰¹⁷ "Turkey's Commercial and Economic Relations with Russian Federation", Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, (source: www.mfa.gov.tr <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkey_s-commercial-and-economic-relations-with-russian-federation.en.mfa>, March 2012).

¹⁰¹⁸ "Turkey's Political Relations with Russian Federation", Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, (source: www.mfa.gov.tr, <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkey_s-political-relations-with-russian-federation.en.mfa>, March 2012).

economical cooperation, security issues, terrorism, along with regional problems.¹⁰¹⁹ The economic and commerce based aspects of the visit was highly remarkable as the business people of both sites met in Russian - Turkish Business Council aiming to develop commercial relations between the countries.¹⁰²⁰ In addition to that, both parties signed 2004 - 2005 Consultation Programs in order to advance future consultation prospects between parties¹⁰²¹. Former Turkish FM Abdullah Gül met with his counterpart Igor Ivanov and former Russian President Vladimir Putin, and invited President Putin to Turkey on the name of Turkish President Sezer. During the visit, Visa issue between the countries came to agenda as Moscow restricted visa requirements for Turkish nationals under the pretext of Chechen war.¹⁰²²

Ankara's refusal of 1 March bill under the Justice and Development Party government rule highly contributed advancement of bilateral relations at this period,¹⁰²³ hence it gave birth to a mutual trust atmosphere between partners. Furthermore, Turkey's open critical attitude toward Iraqi occupation was also appreciated by Moscow, while Russian policy makers changed their outlook toward Turkey as a neighbor applying more independent foreign policies from West in comparison to past. The affiliation between Moscow and Ankara in terms of politics gave it fruitful results in economical and energy fields. Therefore, Russian Gasprom and Turkish state owned petroleum company Botaş met in order to discuss latest disagreements present between the states, at the end of meeting, both parties officially declared that they agreed on price and export amounts. Besides, it was also announced that the tax issues too were resolved during the meeting.¹⁰²⁴

Shortly after Turkish Foreign Affairs Minister's visit, Russian Federation President Vladimir Putin paid an official visit to Turkey between 5 and 6 December 2004.¹⁰²⁵ The fact that, apart from Russian President, Foreign Affairs Minister Sergey Lavrov, Defense Minister,

¹⁰¹⁹ "Rusya Federasyonu'nun Türkiye Büyükelçiliği Basın Açıklaması", ("Russian Federation Turkey Embassy Press Release"), Russian Federation Turkey Embassy, (source: www.turkey.mid.ru, <http://www.turkey.mid.ru/text_t18.html>, March 2012).

¹⁰²⁰ Russian Federation Minister of Foreign Affairs of the I.S.İvanov's Statement to the Press and the Descriptions after Talks with Turkish Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Affairs Minister at Moscow 25.02. 2004, (source: www.mid.ru, <http://www.turkey.mid.ru/text_t27.html>, December 2010).

¹⁰²¹ "Turkey's Political Relations with Russian Federation", Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, (source: www.mfa.gov.tr, <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkey_s-political-relations-with-russian-federation.en.mfa>, March 2012).

¹⁰²² Duygu Güvenç, "Gül'ün Moskova ziyareti Rusya ile Buzları Eritecek" ("Gül's Visit to Moscow will Melt Ices with Russia"), *Yenişafak*, 23 February 2004.

¹⁰²³ Bülent Aras, "Türkiye ve Rusya Federasyonu: Çok Boyutlu Ortaklık" ("Turkey and Russian Federation: Multi-dimentional Cooperation"), *SETA Analiz*, August 2009, p.7.

¹⁰²⁴ "Gazprom ve Botaş Doğal Gazının Türkiye'ye Sevkiyatına İlişkin Görüşmeleri Tamamladılar" ("Gazprom and Botaş has Finalized Meetings Regarding Russian Gas Transportation to Turkey"), Russian Federation Turkey Embassy, (source: www.turkey.mid.ru, <http://www.turkey.mid.ru/text_t6.html>, March 2012)

¹⁰²⁵ "Putin first Russian Chief to Visit Turkey", *China Daily*, 5 December 2004.

Chief of General Staff, President of Tatarstan and high-level officials from Gasprom attendance to the program indicated the importance of visit in terms of economic, commerce, and energy based issues.¹⁰²⁶ In fact, it was a postponed visit as Russian leaders were scheduled to visit Turkey in August, however due to terror acts in Northern Ossetia; Vladimir Putin had to postpone all his abroad journeys.¹⁰²⁷ President Putin's historic visit to Ankara was highly significant, as he was the first Russian President to visit Turkey since the initiation of Russian - Turkish diplomatic relations. During the visit, Vladimir Putin met with Turkish former President Ahmet Necdet Sezer, Turkish Prime Minister Erdoğan and Turkish Foreign Affairs Minister in Ankara. After the meetings, Erdoğan and Putin moved to Izmir in order to attend Izmir International Fair and both leader met with Turkish - Russian businessmen. During the visit, Russian and Turkish Presidents signed a "Joint Declaration of Multidimensional Partnership and Friendship Intensification" at the press conference after which both Presidents expressed their satisfaction over the agreement and present level of relations between the countries.¹⁰²⁸

Yet, the signed declaration was not the sole document agreed between the parts during the historical visit of Russian President, both parties agreed to sign military deals, educational cooperation and energy issues. The improvement between Moscow and Ankara was notable for conceptualization of the present level of mutual relations in comparison to past that used to engage terror, security and rivalry on Balkans, Caucasus and Central Asia. After the Russian Presidents historical visit to Turkey, Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan visited Russian Federation officially on 10 - 12 January 2005, to attend the inauguration ceremony of Turkish Trade Center in Russian capital.¹⁰²⁹ Apart from Turkish PM, a crowded delegation consisting of business people, politicians and bureaucrats participated in delegation, which barely indicated the commercial aspect of the visit. In spite of the fact that, the main goal of Turkish PM's visit was to increase commercial relations with Turkey's Northern neighbor, Russia and Turkey discussed energy issues. At the press conference held after the inauguration ceremony, where both chief of states took the center stage, Vladimir

¹⁰²⁶ "Natural Gas Projects Dominate Putin's Economic Agenda in Turkey", *The Journal of Turkish Weekly*, 6 December 2004.

¹⁰²⁷ "Putin Ankara Ziyaretini Erteledi" ("Putin Postponed his Ankara Visit"), *Radikal*, 2 September 2004.

¹⁰²⁸ "Joint Declaration of Multidimensional Partnership and Friendship Intensification between Russian Federation and Republic of Turkey", Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs", (source: www.mfa.gov.tr, <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkey_s-political-relations-with-russian-federation.en.mfa, March 2012).

¹⁰²⁹ "Erdoğan's Moscow Visit: Turkey's Return to Russia", *The Journal of Turkish Weekly*, 12 January 2005.

Putin announced Russian Federation's support for the Annan Plan in Cyprus issue,¹⁰³⁰ the result of which caused a relative acceleration between mutual relations of Russian and Turkey in terms of regional and international relations.

Apart from the Cyprus issue, the Turkish - Armenian relations was also discussed during the meetings of commissions. Russian President one more time digressing traditional Russian foreign policy stated that Russia would support the normalization process between Turkey and Armenia. He continued his words as "we know that, there are heavy historical problems between both countries, we are aware of Turkey's attitude and we also know that Armenia is look for solution, thus Russia is ready to play a peacemaker's role and undertake guarantor task in the relations".¹⁰³¹ On respond to Putin's explanations, Erdoğan reminded Turkish efforts for the resolution of conflict stressing the zero problem principle of Turkey during Justice and Development Party government.¹⁰³²

The opening ceremony of Blue Stream Natural Gas Pipeline brought high rank officials of both countries on 17 November 2005. Thanks to complication of Blue Stream Pipeline, Republic of Turkey became the second largest gas partner of Russian Federation after Germany.¹⁰³³ In spite of the critics that Turkey became highly dependent to Russia in terms of energy the pipeline project, contribute to Russian - Turkish relations in many other spheres. On 25 June 2005, in order to attend 15th anniversary summit of Black Sea Economic Cooperation, President Putin and an official delegation came to Turkey. Russia and Turkey, during the meetings under the frame of Black Sea Economic Cooperation and Balkan Energy summit, signed agreements related to energy themes related to issues between Turkey and Russia. Besides, the members of Black Sea Cooperation made decision to adopt summit a strong mechanism in international arena.¹⁰³⁴ Henceforth "from a bilateral political perspective, 2005 was an annus mirabilis as President Putin and Prime Minister Erdogan met four times, including a seven-hour private meeting on the Black Sea. Putin's visit in December 2004 marked a monumental event in itself as he was the first Russian head of state to visit Turkey in 32 years".¹⁰³⁵

¹⁰³⁰ Nazif Oflazoğlu, "Rusya Gündemi Kıbrıs'la Açıldı" ("Russian Agenda Opened with Cyprus"), *Radikal*, 11 January 2012.

¹⁰³¹ "Rusyadan Kıbrıs Jesti" ("Cyprus Gesture of Russia"), *Star*, 12 January 2005.

¹⁰³² Ibidem.

¹⁰³³ Igor Tobakov, "Making Sense of Current Phase of Turkish - Russian Relations", *The Jamestown Foundation, Washington D.C., Occasional Paper*, October 2007, pp. 5-18.

¹⁰³⁴ James W Warhola, William A Mitchell, "The Warming of Turkish - Russian Relations: Motives and Implications", *Demokratizasiya*, Vol. XIV, Issue 1, Winter 2006, p.130.

¹⁰³⁵ Suat Kınıkoğlu, "The Anatomy of Turkish - Russian Relations", Sakıp Sabancı International Research Award, The Brookings Institution, (source www.brookings.edu.pl: , <http://www.brookings.edu/comm/events/20060523sabanci_3a.pdf, March 2012)

Mutual relations continued at a stable line in the course of years. In 2008, former Turkish Foreign Affairs Minister Ali Babacan visited Moscow in order to discuss political and economic issues. Along with bilateral issues, at this meeting Russia and Turkey initiated multidimensional cooperation prospects both in regional and global affairs. Under the frames of talks on energy issues, Turkish FM underlined the importance of energy cooperation between Russia and Turkey; while he stated that Turkey's quest for alternative energy does not bear rivalry character. In this period, the ties between Moscow and Ankara gained a multidimensional character in terms of culture as the events held in 2007 when the "Year of Russian Culture" was celebrated in Turkey and in 2008 "Year of Turkish Culture" was celebrated in Russia.¹⁰³⁶ In the July of 2008, Russian FM Sergei Lavrov visited Ankara to discuss latest developments between the neighbors.¹⁰³⁷ Under the frame of his visit the themes like "wide spectrum of the Russian-Turkish cooperation, regional and international issues including Iraqi and Middle East settlement, the situation around the Iranian nuclear issue, the situation in Kosovo, the Transcaucasus and Central Asia, the state of affairs in Cyprus settlement, interaction in the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC) and Operation Black Sea Harmony"¹⁰³⁸ were discussed between the parts. On contrary to all similar constructive developments between Moscow and Ankara, Turkey's relations with Russia experienced a serious fluctuation because of erupted war between Russia and Georgia in August 2008. Igor Torbakov's statement regarding the negative implications of the war is as follows:

The war put the Turkish-Russian relationship under additional strain. It also revealed a number of key factors and trends that are likely to affect the interaction between Russia and Turkey in the short to medium term. Among these trends are Moscow's growing assertiveness in what it chooses to call the areas of "privileged interests," including in the region where Russia's and Turkey's strategic neighborhoods effectively overlap; the vulnerability of Turkey's geopolitical position following the collapse of the Caucasus status quo; Moscow's increased leverage with Ankara due to Russia's hefty surplus in bilateral trade; and Turkey's growing energy dependence on Russia.¹⁰³⁹

Turkish Prime Minister Erdoğan flew to Moscow so as to assess latest actualities that arose after the war. Prime Minister Erdoğan and Turkish Foreign Affairs Minister came together

¹⁰³⁶ Gürkan Ateş, "Relations between Turkey and Russia", (source: www.serkanates.com, < http://www.gurkanates.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=12:relations-between-turkey-a-russia-&catid=8:uluslararası-İkİler&Itemid=24>, March, 2012)

¹⁰³⁷ "Russia's Lavrov Visiting Ankara to Discuss Array of Collaborative Activities", *Today's Zaman*, 1 July 2008.

¹⁰³⁸ Ibidem.

¹⁰³⁹ Igor Torbakov, "The Georgia Crisis and Russia - Turkey Relations", *The Jamestown Foundation*, Washington D.C., 2008, p. 6.

with Russian President Dmitri Medvediev in a meeting closed to press.¹⁰⁴⁰ After the Moscow visit, Turkish Prime Minister went to Tbilisi to evaluate situation in Northern Caucasus with Georgian President Michail Saakashvili.¹⁰⁴¹ As it has been urged by Nona Mikhelidze, “The Georgia - Russia crisis placed Turkey in a difficult position, not only between neighboring partner-countries but also in the wider confrontation between the US and Russia”.¹⁰⁴² She described sensitive structure of Russo - Turkish relations under the latest war as below:

Ankara stayed out of the conflict, neither defending its regional partner Georgia nor making official statements on the matter. Erdogan admitted that it would not be right for Turkey to be pushed towards any side. Certain circles want to push Turkey into a corner either with the United States or Russia after the Georgian incident. One of the sides is our closest ally, the United States. The other side is Russia, with which we have an important trade volume. We would act in line with what Turkey’s national interests require.¹⁰⁴³ Despite Turkey’s participation in BTC, two-thirds of its gas comes from Russia. Hence, Ankara’s careful juggling between Moscow and the US and its Caucasian partners.¹⁰⁴⁴

In the aftermath of Russia - Georgia War, Ankara under the rule of AKP declared its intention of launching a conflict resolution initiative in South Caucasus called as Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Platform (CSCP).¹⁰⁴⁵ Turkey barely indicated the necessity that Russian Federation as well should attend to the future planned Platform. Another high-level visit between Ankara and Moscow was held in June 2009, as newly assigned Turkish Foreign Affairs Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu paid an official visit to Russian Federation.¹⁰⁴⁶ At the press conference held after the meeting of delegations Turkish FM declared due to a question related to current situation of relations between Russia and Turkey as follows:

We do not recognize any obstacle to cooperation between Turkey and Russia does not recognize any border. Various projects related to energy alternatives, including the handling of each issue in a spirit of full cooperation and are determined to continue. Therefore, the southern corridor and all the other alternatives very clearly

¹⁰⁴⁰ “Erdoğan Medvedev ile Görüşüyor” (“Erdoğan Meets with Medvedev”), *Yenişafak*, 13 August 2008.

¹⁰⁴¹ “Erdoğan: Gürcüstan'ın Toprak Bütünlüğü Korunmalı” (“Erdoğan: Territorial Integrity of Georgia Should be Preserved”), *Radikal*, 14 August 2008.

¹⁰⁴² Nona Mikhelidze, “After the 2008 Russia - Georgia War: Implications for the Wider Caucasus and Prospects for Western Involvement in Conflict Resolution”, *Istituto Affari Internazionali, Documenti IAI*, Rome, 6-7 February 2009, p. 11.

¹⁰⁴³ “Turkey and the Crisis in the Caucasus”, *Commentary*, Center for Strategic & International Studies, Washington DC, 9 September 2008.

¹⁰⁴⁴ N. Mikhelidze, op.cit., p. 11.

¹⁰⁴⁵ “Responding to Georgia Crisis: Turkey Seeks New Caucasus Security Initiative”, *Eurasia Daily Monitor*, Vol. V, Issue 161, 22 August 2008.

¹⁰⁴⁶ Şaban Kardaş, “Ankara Approves Nabucco Following High-level Visit to Moscow”, *Eurasia Daily Monitor*, Vol. VI, Issue: 128, 6 July 2009.

with the Russian side of the interview and any co-operation in making available a common understanding.¹⁰⁴⁷

Turkish FM appraised Russian initiatives in the course of resolution process of Azeri - Armenian conflict and noticed that the Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Platform project was maturing gradually. At his row, Russian Foreign Affairs Minister appreciated the current level of Russia -Turkey relations and stressed affinity of both countries in UN, Middle East, Iran and Iraq along with Southern Caucasus issues. In addition to that, along with diplomatic and economic issues, the theme of problems arose toward Turkish goods in Russian customs and Turkish trucks' issue occupied the agenda of both ministers. Due to a question directed to Lavrov related to custom issue, he replied that it is a technical problem however the Foreign Affairs of both sites endeavors to resolve it as soon as possible.¹⁰⁴⁸ Additionally, Turkish Foreign Affairs Minister invited Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin to Turkey on behalf of Turkish Prime Minister.

Due to Turkish PM's invitation Vladimir Putin, this time visited Turkey as Russian Prime Minister. Under the frames of the official visit, along with Russian President, Italian Berlusconi took part in the meetings. The top agenda of visit was energy issues between the countries, while many other cooperation issues as well negotiated in the course of sessions held between Joint Economic Commissions. Russia, in order to create alternative energy routes to West Europe provided permit for Turkey so as to initiate feasibility works in Black Sea for so called South Stream Project. Besides, it has been decided that Italian Energy Company "Eni" would also participate to the project, therefore Italian President Berlusconi also put signature to the protocols signed between Turkey and Russia.¹⁰⁴⁹ In addition to that, it was also decided that Russia would provide additional oil supply to Samsun - Ceyhan pipeline, which would decrease oil transit in Turkish straits. Among all other twenty protocols signed between the parties, the last important agreement was Turkish - Russian protocol proposing nuclear energy cooperation, however due to high costs this protocol did not vitalize subsequently. Furthermore, Turkey prolonged its gas agreement with Russia that would expire in 2011 during Russian Prime Ministers visit.¹⁰⁵⁰

¹⁰⁴⁷ "About Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey, Mr. Ahmet Davutoglu his working visit to the Russian Federation", Republic of Turkey Foreign Affairs Ministry,(source: www.mfa.gov.tr, <http://www.turkey.mid.ru/hron/pr_t_26.html>, January 2010).

¹⁰⁴⁸ Ibidem.

¹⁰⁴⁹ Güven Sak, "What Brings Erdogan, Putin and Berlusconi together", Economic Policy Research Foundation of Turkey, (source: www.tepav.org.tr, <<http://www.tepav.org.tr/en/kose-yazisi/s/187>>, March 2012).

¹⁰⁵⁰ "Erdogan, Putin, Berlusconi Discuss South Stream Project", *Today's Zaman*, 23 October 2009.

Another additional peculiarity of the meeting was Putin's respond to a question stating that Turkey's projects of turning an energy hub does not disturb Russia, he added that Nabucco project, which aims to carry Caspian oil to West is not the competitor of South Stream Project as there exist plenty of sources for both projects.¹⁰⁵¹ The statement of Russian Prime Minister indicated that Turkish site clearly explained its position in terms of energy transit issues and it was understood by Russia. The next high-level meeting between Russia and Turkey during Justice and Development government took place when Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan visited Russian Federation on 12 - 13 January 2010.¹⁰⁵² During his visit, Turkish PM met with Russian President Medvedev and his counterpart Putin. Among the top-level issues that came to agenda, the most important was nuclear energy project with Russia. In fact, Russia gained the Nuclear power plant from auction of the planned plant in Southern Turkey (Akkuyu). Nevertheless, Turkish justice objected the auction and decision was approved by state council, thus Turkish Prime Minister searched methods to atone Russia and tried to give nuclear plant project to Russia by state agreement without putting the deal to an open auction as it used to be experience in some cases with former Soviet Union.¹⁰⁵³

Another issue negotiated during the meeting was to buy or pay clause that existed in natural gas agreements signed with Russian Federation. Due to abrupt price raises and economic crisis Turkish consumers were using lesser gas than foreseen previously which caused Turkey to buy lesser gas than pledged in gas agreements signed. However, according to buy or pay clause even tough Turkey does not demand gas trough Russia, she should pay for the gas amount pledged in the agreement. Turkish and Russian officials in all levels undertook talks in order to soften this clause, which was processed against Turkey, but all in all, the sides did not reach an agreement at the end of talks, thus Prime Minister brought to agenda this issue during the following meetings as well.¹⁰⁵⁴ In addition to that, the Nagorno Karabagh topic as well came to agenda during the meetings. As Moscow appraised the Turkey's initiatives to relief its relations with Armenia it clearly declared that Karabagh conflict and Turkish - Armenian relations should be hand separately, which did not meet Ankara's expectance entirely, nonetheless Russia's constructive attitude indulged Turkey and

¹⁰⁵¹ "Rusya'yla Yakın Temas" ("Close Contact with Russia"), (source: www.ntvmsnbc.com, <<http://www.ntvmsnbc.com/id/24988352/>>, January 2010).

¹⁰⁵² "Foreign Policy Chronology: January", Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, (source: www.mfa.gov.tr, <<http://www.mfa.gov.tr/ocak.tr.mfa>>, March 2012).

¹⁰⁵³ Sinan Oğan, "Turk - Rus İlişkilerinde Yeni Yaklaşımlar ve Erdoğan'ın Moskova Ziyareti" ("New Approaches at Turkish - Russian Relations and Erdoğan's Moscow Visit"), (source: www.turksam.org.tr, <<http://www.turksam.org.tr/a1912l>>, January 2010).

¹⁰⁵⁴ "Turkey's Erdogan in Moscow on Energy Talks", *UPI*, 12 January 2010.

the healing of Turkish - Russian relations in future prospect positively contributed for the resolution of conflicts in Caucasus region.¹⁰⁵⁵ On the other hand, the Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Platform were well situated in the agenda. However, an abstract development did not take place during the meetings of Turkish Prime Minister.¹⁰⁵⁶

Following Turkish Prime Ministers visit, Dmitri Medvedev, paid his first official visit to Turkey as the President of Russian Federation with a crowded delegation, constituted of business people and high rank bureaucrats. During the visit Turkey - Russia relations recorded abstract advancements and many issues were discussed in previous meetings. Both states signed the "Agreement on Cooperation in Field of Nuclear Power Plant facility and operation in Akkuyu".¹⁰⁵⁷ The signed agreement in terms of nuclear cooperation found its deep reflection not only in Turkish and Russian mass media organs but also in world press, plus world public view as well followed Russian Presidents historical visit with a deep interest. Besides, parties agreed on "Mutual Trip Agreement Procedure of the Republic of Turkey and the Russian Federation Citizens "proposing visa exemptions for the citizens of both countries.¹⁰⁵⁸ The initialized documents proposing a visa free regime for Russian and Turkish citizens was highly crucial in order to understand present level of mutual relations, it is vital to add that at this moment the fact that Russia's initialization of visa free regime coincided to a tense period when Russia experienced a terror attack in Moscow causing heavy casualties.¹⁰⁵⁹

High-level relations between Turkish and Russian officials continued in the year of 2011 as similar to 2010. Prime Minister of Turkish Republic paid a visit to Russian capital in the spring of 2011, in order to attend High-level Joint Commission held between the parts at Kremlin.¹⁰⁶⁰ The theme of removing visa requirement came into agenda and the parts agreed on removal of visa requirements on April of 2011.¹⁰⁶¹ Another important feature of Prime Minister was his visit to Tatarstan autonomous Republic; hence Recep Tayyip Erdoğan

¹⁰⁵⁵ "Karabagh on Agenda of Erdogan's Visit to Moscow", *News Az*, (source: www.newsaz.com, <<http://news.az/articles/5964>>, March 2012)

¹⁰⁵⁶ Şaban Kardaş, "Erdogan's Moscow Visit Produces Mixed Result", *Eurasia Daily Monitor*, Vol.VIII Issue 54.

¹⁰⁵⁷ "Akkuyu Nuclear Power Plant", *Turkish Atomic Energy Authority*, (source: www.taek.gov.tr, <<http://www.taek.gov.tr/eng/services/206-akkuyu-nuclear-power-plant/789-akkuyu-nuclear-power-plant.html>>, January 2010).

¹⁰⁵⁸ "Medvedev'in Türkiye Ziyareti Gündeme Bomba Gibi Düştü" ("Medvedev's Visit Rocks the Agenda"), *Hürriyet*, 14 May 2010.

¹⁰⁵⁹ Habibe Özdal, "Medvedev'in Türkiye Ziyareti ve Gündemdeki Konular" ("Medvedev's Turkey Visit and Current Issues"), *USAK*, 14 May 2010.

¹⁰⁶⁰ Mehmet Ali Birand, "Ankara's Incredible Gesture to Moscow", *Hürriyet Daily News*, 17 March 2011.

¹⁰⁶¹ "Russia Removes Visa Requirements for Turks", *Hürriyet Daily News*, 15 April 2011.

became the first Turkish Prime Minister who visited Tatarstan in the history of Turkish - Russian relations. Tatars, as a Turkic nation, in the course of history always had close relations with Turks and the economic relations between Tatarstan Autonomous Republic and Turkey, particularly after the initial of goodwill relations with Russian Federation gained a positive acceleration.¹⁰⁶² Finally, under the frames of the visit steps that are more abstract were taken in terms of Turkey's participation to South Stream Pipeline Projects and Russia's support to Baku - Ceyhan pipeline.¹⁰⁶³ In addition to that, Ankara in order to influence Israel - Palestinian conflict tried to develop more cooperative politics with Moscow and in some meetings both parts initialized talks on Middle East conflict though an abstract development did not take place at this period in terms of Turkish - Russian initiative in Middle East.¹⁰⁶⁴

2. Southern Caucasus States

Southern Caucasus region from geopolitical point of view lies at the very heart of main energy and transport corridors of Eurasia.¹⁰⁶⁵ The Transcaucasia region is currently divided Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia. In the course of the history, the Southern Caucasus was ruled by Persians, Ottomans and within the 18th century by Russians, since the dissolution of Soviet Union.¹⁰⁶⁶ After the end of the Cold War and dissolution of Soviet Union, Southern Caucasus experienced both tough challenges and opportunities in the course of time.¹⁰⁶⁷ The region experiencing a power vacuum after USSR, turned to be a struggle square of outside powers searching intervention possibilities, additionally the local actors along with international system were not ready for a similar dissolution which agitated the situation in Southern Caucasus at all.¹⁰⁶⁸ The transition period to democracy, difficulties met during the adaptation to market economy, ethnic diversity of the region, the hardship of nation building

¹⁰⁶² "Turkey's Erdogan Pays Visit to Tatarstan", *Radio Free Europe News*, 17 March 2011.

¹⁰⁶³ C. Migdalovitz, "Turkey: Selected Foreign....", op. cit., p. 43.

¹⁰⁶⁴ "Turkey Russia Accelerate Cooperation", *Hürriyet Daily News*, 17 March 2011.

¹⁰⁶⁵ For detailed information regarding Caucasus in terms of geopolitics and energy issues see: Vicken Cheterian, *War and Peace in the Caucasus: Ethnic Conflict and the New Geopolitics*, Colombia University Press, New York 2008; Aleksandro I Kapidzade, *Caucasus Region: Geopolitical Nexus?*, Nova Science Publication Inc, Madison 2007; Frederic Mairat, *New Stakes in the Caucasus and Central Asia: Caspian Energy Resources and International Affairs*, Author House, Bloomington 2006; John Wright, Suzanne Goldenberg, Rychard Schofield, *Transcaucasian Boundaries*, UCL Press, London 1996; Emmanuel Karagiannis, *Energy and Security in Caucasus*, Routledge Curzon, London 2002.

¹⁰⁶⁶ Svante E Cornell, *Small Nations and Great Powers: A Study of Ethnopolitical Conflict in the Caucasus*, Curzon Press, United Kingdom 2001, p.11.

¹⁰⁶⁷ "Caucasus", in Encyclopedia Britannica Online, (source: www.britannica.com, <<http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/100270/Caucasus>>, March 2012).

¹⁰⁶⁸ Oumerserik Kasenov, „Russia and Transcaucasia: Oil, Pipelines and Geopolitics" in R. Z Sagdeev and S. Eisenhower (eds.) *Central Asia: Conflict, Resolution and Change*, Washington DC: Center for Political and Strategic Studies (source: www.cpss.org, <http://www.cpss.org/casiabk/chap6.ut>>, February 2011).

process for local identities, religious differences, threat of fundamentalist groups,¹⁰⁶⁹ economic inequalities and corruption caused deep instabilities for South Caucasus states that resulted in conflicts menacing stability of the region.¹⁰⁷⁰

The Caucasus became a transit route for Turkic people during their migrations from Central Asia to Anatolia. While some Turkic tribes passed via Caucasus to Anatolia some others stayed in North and East Caucasus.¹⁰⁷¹ In the year of 1475, Ottoman Empire became influential in Caucasus region, and till 1783, when Ottomans lost their sovereignty both in Crimea and Caucasus, although not totally, continued its effect in Caucasus.¹⁰⁷² Following the collapse of Ottoman Empire, Soviet Union and Republic of Turkey shared common borders through the Southern Caucasus states, plus the emergence of the Cold War increased the strategic position of region for both states as a natural border separating states. In the course of the Cold War, Turkey played the Southern flank role of the West as an ally of United States of America in the region.¹⁰⁷³ With the end of the Cold War, Turkish foreign policy decision makers were challenged with the risks and opportunities that emerged with breakdown of its Northern rival. Turkey, now that it was breathing a sign relief for not sharing a common border with Soviet Russia or its predecessor Russian Federation, applied all possible methods in order to prevent Russia's predomination of region. Ankara from the very beginning supported the independence, territorial integrity, sovereignty of newly emerged Azerbaijan, Georgia and Armenia and recognized their independence quickly,¹⁰⁷⁴ and established diplomatic missions -except for Armenia -.

Shortly after the fall of Soviet Union, Turkey as a bridge between West and East and was appreciated as a determinant actor and a "regional power"¹⁰⁷⁵ in South Caucasus. Not only Turkish decision makers but also Western alliances of Ankara underlined Turkey's role in the region referring to religious, historic, linguistic, cultural and ethnic liaisons. Furthermore it was proposed in the West that, the so-called Turkish model reconciling Islam

¹⁰⁶⁹ Thomas D Waal, *The Caucasus: An Introduction*, Oxford University Press, New York 2010, pp. 1-5.

¹⁰⁷⁰ Mustafa Aydın, "Geopolitics of Central Asia and the Caucasus: Continuity and Change since the End of the Cold War", *Turkish Yearly Book*, Vol. XXXLL, 2001, pp. 169-215.

¹⁰⁷¹ Jülide Akyüz, "Göç Yollarında; Kafkaslardan Anadolu'ya Göç Hareketleri" ("Migration Movements from Caucasus to Anatolia"), *Bilgi*, Summer, No. 46, 2008, pp. 37-56.

¹⁰⁷² Frederik Coene, *The Caucasus: An Introduction*, Routledge, Oxon 2010, pp. 89-139.

¹⁰⁷³ Zeyno Baran, "Turkey and the Caucasus", in İdris Bal (ed.) *Turkish Foreign Policy in Post Cold War Era*, Brown Walker Press, Florida 2004, p. 269.

¹⁰⁷⁴ Mustafa Aydın, "1990-2001 Kafkasya ve Orta Asya'yla İlişkiler", (,,Relations with Central Asia and the Caucasus, 1990-2001") in Baskın Oran (ed.), *Türk Dış Politikası (Turkish Foreign Policy)*, İletişim, İstanbul 2002, p. 406.

¹⁰⁷⁵ Shireen Hunter, *The Transcaucasus in Transition: Nation Building and Conflict*, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington D.C 1994, p. 162

with democracy under the secularity principle might prevent radical Islamic streams in the region, plus it was as well stressed that Turkish Islam concept might prevent Iranian influences and create a power balance against Russia in Southern Caucasus.¹⁰⁷⁶ On the other hand, Turkey was eager to participate joint policy-making process in accordance with its alliances toward Southern Caucasus and Central Asia due to the fact that its role as a strategic partner to West was relatively diminished since the collapse of Soviet Union. Therefore, Ankara at this period was always underlining Turkey's strategic role in the region and evaluated all possible opportunities so as to take initiatives in regional policies.¹⁰⁷⁷ On the other hand, Ankara, following the collapse of Iron Curtain, put a special emphasis on energy resources of Caspian that could be transferred via the South Caucasus - Turkey to Western Europe to strength its energy hub role increasing its influence in the region.¹⁰⁷⁸ In spite of the fact, Ankara did not directly intervene regional conflicts arose among South Caucasus states and tried to support stability of the region, due to fact that many Turkish citizens were ancestry of South Caucasus or due to kinship relations in Nagorno Karabagh - Armenia conflict,¹⁰⁷⁹ it engaged to regional conflicts among Southern Caucasus states.¹⁰⁸⁰

2.1 Georgia

Republic of Turkey and Georgia share 114 km long border.¹⁰⁸¹ Georgia constitutes a gateway for Turkey to Caucasus and Central Asia.¹⁰⁸² Diplomatic relations between Turkish Republic and Georgia commenced shortly after the Georgia's gain of independence in 1991,¹⁰⁸³ and both states initialized diplomatic relations and following that bilateral relations developed under the frames of good neighborhood principles.¹⁰⁸⁴ Yet, in some sporadic cases

¹⁰⁷⁶ Iver B Neumann, "The Caucasus between Russia, Turkey and Iran", *NUPI Working Papers*, No. 495, June 1993, p. 12.

¹⁰⁷⁷ Gareth Winrow, *Turkey and the Caucasus: Domestic Interests and Security Concerns*, Royal Institute for International Affairs, London 2000, pp. 60-67.

¹⁰⁷⁸ William Hale, "Turkey, the Black Sea and Transcaucasia" in Wright et al (eds.), *Transcaucasian Boundaries*, UCL Press, London 1996, pp. 54-71.

¹⁰⁷⁹ Bülent Aras, "Turkey's Policy in the Former Soviet South", *Turkish Studies*, Spring 2000, pp. 36-58.

¹⁰⁸⁰ Philip Robins, "Between Sentiment and Self-Interest: Turkey's Policy toward Azerbaijan and the Central Asian States", *Middle East Journal*, 1993, Vol. XLVII, No. 4, pp.593-610.

¹⁰⁸¹ Mithat Çelikpala, "Türkiye ve Kafkasya: Reaksiyoner Dış Politikadan Proaktif Ritmik Diplomasiye Geçiş" ("Turkey and Caucasus: From Reactionary Foreign Policy to Proactive Rhythmic Diplomacy"), *Uluslararası İlişkiler*, Vol.VII, No. 25, Spring 2010, p. 94.

¹⁰⁸² Mithat Çelikpala, "From a Failed State to a Weak One? Georgia and Turkish - Georgian Relations", *The Turkish Yearbook of International Relations*, 2005, Vol. XXXVI, pp.159-199.

¹⁰⁸³ "Relations with Turkey and Georgia", Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, (source: <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkey_s-political-relations-with-georgia.en.mfa>,) March, 2012).

¹⁰⁸⁴ Mustafa Aydın, *New Geopolitics of Central Asia and the Caucasus; Causes of Instability and Predicament*, Center for Strategic Research (SAM), Ankara 2000, pp. 81-84.

like Meskhetian Turks come back to their homelands issue, crisis in Adjara region and confiscation of Turkish ships caused tense periods. Ankara and Tbilisi have common oil and gas-pipeline transit project with the encouragement of European Union and United States by passing through Russia and Iran. Both states explicitly underlined their respect to territorial integrity and sovereignty, Ankara supported the Velvet Revolution in Georgia and helped its neighbor in the course of adaptation to NATO, supporting Georgia's membership and providing technical support in terms of modernization of Georgian army.

Apart from that, amid political relations existing between Georgia and Turkey, the economic relations as well played a deterministic role for the advancement of mutual relations. Particularly in 2003, the economic and commercial relations between two states highly increased reaching to 427 million United States Dollars. At the present, trade volume between Turkey and Georgia has hit 830 million dollars.¹⁰⁸⁵ Business activities of Turkish companies focused on telecommunication, manufacturing and build sectors contributed highly positively to the accessed number.¹⁰⁸⁶ Before the government of Justice and Development Party, Georgia commenced to turn out to be the next battlefield for global powers struggling for the influence in Caucasus. However due to economic crisis exhausting Turkey's whole energy and fluctuating political crisis, foreign policy decision making process pushed Turkey away from the regional politics and since the reign of AK Party, Ankara was obliged to follow a reaction based foreign policy towards Georgia.¹⁰⁸⁷ At the initial periods of Justice and Development Party government, international and local observers stated their concerns that Islamic agenda of AK Party might distort Turkish interest in Southern Caucasus, particularly with Georgia. However, on contrary to all fears Justice and Development Party succeed to launch economic oriented mutual relation perspective with Georgia enforcing it through strategic projects supported by Western alliance of Turkey as well. Besides, Justice and Development Party's foreign policy administration staff put a special stress on Turkey's historical background and the responsibilities related to this very historical relations in Turkish periphery, thus AK Party introduced its new rhetoric to relations with zero problem principle with Turkish neighbors, win - win, regional politics and regional integration under the frames of "rhythmic diplomacy".¹⁰⁸⁸ Consequently, Ankara put a special emphasis for the development of economic and trade relations with Tbilisi instead of developing culture

¹⁰⁸⁵ Ibidem, pp. 81-84.

¹⁰⁸⁶ Serkan Yalçın, "Turkish Investments in Georgia and Azerbaijan: Recent Trends and Future Prospects Caucasus", (source: [www.caucaz.com](http://www.caucaz.com/home_eng/breve_contenu.php?id=259), <http://www.caucaz.com/home_eng/breve_contenu.php?id=259>, January, 2010).

¹⁰⁸⁷ M. Çelikpala, "From a Failed State.....", op.cit., p. 95.

¹⁰⁸⁸ A. Davutoglu, "Stratejik Derinlik Türkiye.....", op.cit., pp. 1-20.

based politics. From the government period of Justice and Development Party, the trade volume between the states developed highly in comparison to pre 2003 period. Besides, as AK Party decision makers practiced in other neighbor countries, they also promulgated Free Trade Agreement with Georgia on 21 November 2007, in order to develop economic relations and facilitate import - export procedures.¹⁰⁸⁹

Ankara and Tbilisi recorded a highly positive advancement, initially at 2006, when former Turkish President Ahmet Necdet Sezer paid an official visit to Georgian capital where he met with his counterpart Michael Saakashvili.¹⁰⁹⁰ At this meeting, Turkish and Georgian official agreed to realize a common usage project of international airport situated in autonomous Adjara capital Batumi. Under the frame of the agreement, Turkish and Georgian citizens could use Batumi airport during their local and international flights without the obligation of bearing a passport or a visa. Besides, the agreement would give possibility for planes belong to both states to use Batumi airplanes for flights. Turkish companies undertook the renovation tasks at both Batumi and Tbilisi international project with the budget of hitting to 15 million US Dollars. In addition to that the officials of both states reached to an agreement proposing a “single counter”¹⁰⁹¹ application for road transports at Turkish – Georgian customs.

Another affiliation realized during the meeting was the signed memorandum of the principles of equality and mutual non - interference in domestic affairs, along with a visa free travel agreement for Georgian and Turkish citizens permitting both nationalities to stay up to 90 days. The timing of signature was highly staking as it coincided to period when Russian Federation declared that it would apply visa to Georgian citizens.¹⁰⁹² Ankara encouraged with the realization of “Baku - Tbilisi - Ceyhan”¹⁰⁹³ pipeline brought back to agenda, which was postponed at 1993 due to the funding problems proposing a railroad connecting South Caucasus with Turkey to connect Caspian basin energy resources to the West. In the inauguration ceremony of Baku - Tbilisi - Ceyhan pipeline project, the presidents of Turkey,

¹⁰⁸⁹ “Free Trade Agreement Signed with Turkey”, (source: www.wto.org, <<http://rtais.wto.org/rtdocs/636/TOA/English/main%20text.doc>, March 2012).

¹⁰⁹⁰ “Sezer Saakasvili Görüşmesi Tamamlandı” (“Sezer Saakashvili Meeting Ended”), *USAK*, 17 March 2006.

¹⁰⁹¹ “Turkey’s Political Relations with Georgia”, Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, (source: www.mfa.gov.tr, <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkey_s-political-relations-with-georgia.en.mfa>, March 2012).

¹⁰⁹² Ivane Chkhikvadze, “Zero Problem with Neighbors: The Case of Georgia”, *Turkish Policy Quarterly*, Vol.10 No.2, Summer 2011, pp. 1-9.

¹⁰⁹³ Zeyno Baran, „The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Pipeline: Implications for Turkey” in Frederick Starr, Svante E Cornell (eds.), *The Baku - Tbilisi - Ceyhan Pipeline: Oil Window to the West*, Central Asia - Caucasus Institute and Silk Road Studies Program, Washington 2005, p. 103.

Azerbaijan and Georgia voiced the possibility of a railroad project connecting three countries to each other.¹⁰⁹⁴ The project was called as Baku - Tbilisi - Kars railroad, and it was launched in 2007, shortly after the meeting of the Presidents and was planned to be finished in 2011. The railroad project with a planned 876 KM length was expected to transport, in initial stages, 1 million people and 15 Millions of freight.¹⁰⁹⁵

Foreign policy attitude of Justice and Development Party government towards Georgia experienced the utmost challenge, when Russian - Georgia war erupted. Turkish foreign policy proposing zero problem principles with Turkish in the course of war was congested between Western alliances -Russia and Turkey's domestic dynamics- due to Caucasus origin of Turkish citizens who mostly inhabited in the west of Turkey. Ankara was pressed between its strategic partner Georgia and economical partner Russia, along with US - NATO. As Bülent Alirıza underlines "One of the sides is our closest ally, the United States. The other side is Russia, with which we have an important trade volume. We would act according to what Turkey's national interests require".¹⁰⁹⁶ In addition to tune power balance between Russia - West and the position of Turkey, Ankara was obliged to take into consideration Turkish - Georgian relations as Georgia is Turkey's sole gateway to Azerbaijan and other Turkic origin Republics along with energy cooperation prospects of Georgia, which makes Turkey to become an energy hub. Hence, the territorial integrity was highly crucial for Turkey along with good condition of mutual relations with Tbilisi as Professor Mithat Çelikpala emphasizes, "Georgia's instability and civil war is more of a threat to Turkey than a Georgia without territorial integrity".¹⁰⁹⁷

Thus, at the initial period of crisis, Turkish foreign policy administration preferred to stay silent in order to keep current sensitive balances, besides the Justice and Development Party "¹⁰⁹⁸ had received criticism for failure to pursue an active policy since the crisis erupted", ¹⁰⁹⁹ however later on Turkey gained a relative wide maneuver as a side proposing Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Platform. Within the following days after the emerge of crisis between Russia and Georgia, Recep Tayyip Erdogan headed to Russia and Georgia in

¹⁰⁹⁴ Taleh Ziyadov, "Officials Meet to Discuss South Caucasus Rail System", *Eurasia Daily Monitor*, Vol. II: 232, 14 December 2005, pp. 212-224.

¹⁰⁹⁵ Samuel Lussac, "The Baku - Tbilisi - Kars Railroad and its Implications for the South Caucasus", *Caucasian Review of International Affairs*, Autumn 2008, Vol. II (IV), p.211-224.

¹⁰⁹⁶ Bülent Alirıza, "Turkey and the Crisis in the Caucasus", *CSIS Commentary Washington*, 9 September 2008.

¹⁰⁹⁷ Mithat Çelikpala, "Kafkaya'daki Son Gelişmeler, Küresel Hâkimiyet Mücadelesi ve Türkiye", ("Latest Developments in Caucuses, Global Power Struggle and Turkey"), *ASAM Stratejik Analiz*, 9 September 2008, No. 101.

¹⁰⁹⁸ "Erdoğan Holds Crisis Talks in Russia for Georgia", *Today's Zaman*, 13 August 2008.

¹⁰⁹⁹ Ibidem.

order to intervene to the crisis and to play a more active role in the course of resolution process. He proposed the ‘Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Platform’ while he was in Moscow in order to provide security and stability in South Caucasus. Actually, Turkish Prime Minister’s idea of creating a platform aiming to provide stability in Caucasus was not a new idea, former Turkish President Süleyman Demirel in 2000 suggested establishing “Stability Pact for Caucasus” but it was not implemented due to the second Chechen war¹¹⁰⁰. In fact, Ankara, since the collapse of iron curtain worried about stability that directly influenced Turkey and after the Russian - Georgian war the necessity of stability understood due to power vacuum arose aftermath the conflict that constitutes a serious treat against the stability of region.¹¹⁰¹ Eleni Fotiou notes Turkish perspectives toward Caucasus stability as follows:

In parallel, economic and energy interdependence and existing cooperation in bilateral or trilateral schemes, made the quest for crisis management even more urgent: Turkey’s aspiration to become an energy hub largely depends on Russian gas imports and on sustainable Azeri-Georgian-Turkish cooperation for the transportation of energy resources from Azerbaijan and the Caspian Sea to Turkey and then to Europe. Tourism, investments and trade relations are another parameter; Turkish direct investments in Georgia and Russia, the number of Russian tourists in Turkey, and the level of trade between Georgia and Turkey and between Russia and Turkey show that Turkey afford to lose any of its partners in the region.¹¹⁰²

When it comes to Georgia; As Tbilisi administration’s utmost priority to develop relations with European Union and become a NATO member in order to decrease its dependence to Russia and feel secure against it, they supported Turkey’s project appreciating it as a gateway toward Western integration, and gave positive engagement signals to the similar initiatives. All sort of initiatives proposing to prevent ethnic or religious tensions treating Georgia’s territorial integrity interested foreign policy priorities of Tbilisi, but it approached to the Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Platform cautiously as attributed a conflict resolution role to platform. Tbilisi, particularly after the war applied all methods in order to discard Russian press, but it also felt disturbed due to power struggle game on Caucasus while did not want to jeopardize positive military, strategic and economic relations with Ankara as a state playing bridge role for Georgia.

¹¹⁰⁰ Eleni Fotiou, “Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Platform. What is at Stake for Regional Cooperation?”, *ICBSS Policy Brief*, June 2009, No. XVI, p.4.

¹¹⁰¹ Adam Szymański, “Turcja wobec konfliktu Rosyjsko - Gruzynskiego” (“Turkey toward Russo - Georgian Conflict”), *Biuletyn Polish Institute of International Affairs*, No. 40 (508), 3 September 2008, pp.1-2.

¹¹⁰² Ibid.

2.2. Azerbaijan

Owing to the common cultural, religious and linguistic affinity, Republic of Azerbaijan has an exceptional place in terms of foreign affairs not only in Southern Caucasus region, but also in all other international relations prospects for Turkey's foreign policy decision makers. Former president of Azerbaijan Abulfayz Elchibey¹¹⁰³ described this very specific nature of mutual relation between sister countries as "one nation, two states"¹¹⁰⁴ and this statement of ex - president became a popular slogan for Turkish - Azeri relations, which bears a complicated nature that interfered with emotions and a plane of realpolitik.¹¹⁰⁵

Before its participation to Soviet Union, young Turkish Republic as well developed positive relations with Azerbaijan, though mutual relations experienced a recession in the course of Soviet regime,¹¹⁰⁶ after the fall of USSR, Turkey became the first country to recognize the independence of Azerbaijan Republic, thus it established high-level diplomatic relations with Baku.¹¹⁰⁷ Ankara supported the position of Baku, during "Nagorno - Karabagh"¹¹⁰⁸ conflict arose between Armenia and Azerbaijan,¹¹⁰⁹ and imposed economic embargo against Armenia closing Turkish border between Armenia.¹¹¹⁰ Economic relations between the states bloomed gradually in the course of years after Azerbaijan's independence and hit 1.2 billion USD in 2007 making Azerbaijan Turkey's biggest partner in terms of

¹¹⁰³ **Abulfaz Elchibey:** Azerbaijani historian and nationalist leader (b. June 7, 1938, Keleki, Nakhichevan A.S.S.R, U.S.S.R.-d. Aug. 22, 2000, Ankara, Turkey), was a leading anti-Soviet dissident and cofounder (1989) of the nationalist Azerbaijan Popular Front, before becoming the first democratically elected president of newly independent Azerbaijan in June 1992. He proved to be an ineffectual president, however, and after one year he was ousted in favour of former Azerbaijan Communist Party leader Heydar Aliyev. Elchibey, who had previously worked as an Arab philologist and a history professor, published more than 50 books on such subjects as philosophy, history, and religion. "Abufaz Elchibey", in Britannica Book of the Year, (source: www.britannica.com, <<http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/182183/Abulfaz-Elchibey/>>, November 2010).

¹¹⁰⁴ Yaşar Kalafat, Araz Arslanlı, *Türkiye - Azerbaycan İlişkileri (Turkey - Azerbaijan Relations)* in Idris Bal (eds) *21. Yüzyılda Türk Dış Politikası (Foreign Policy of Turkey in 21st Century)*, Lalezar Yayınevi, Ankara 2006, p. 407.

¹¹⁰⁵ Philips Robins, "Between Sentiment and Self Interest: Turkey's Policy toward Azerbaijan and the Central Asian States", *Middle East Journal*, Vol. XLVII (4), 1993, pp. 593-610.

¹¹⁰⁶ Tadeusz Świątochowski, *Russian Azerbaijan, 1905-1920: The Shaping of National Identity in a Muslim Community*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1985, pp. 1-10.

¹¹⁰⁷ "Relations with Turkey and Azerbaijan", Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs Ministry, (source: www.mfa.gov.tr, <<http://www.mfa.gov.tr/relations-between-turkey-and-azerbaijan.en.mfa>>, March 2012).

¹¹⁰⁸ Tadeusz Świątochowski, "Azerbaijan: Between Ethnic Conflict and Irredentism", *Armenian Review*, Summer - Autumn 1990, nr 43, pp. 35-49.

¹¹⁰⁹ Tamara Dragadze, "The Armenian - Azerbaijani Conflict: Structure and Sentiment", *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. XI (1), 1989, pp.55-71.

¹¹¹⁰ "Turkish - Azeri Economic Relations", Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs Ministry, (source: www.mfa.gov.tr, Turkey's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, <<http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkiye-azerbaycan-ekonomik-iliskileri.tr.mfa>>, March 2012).

trade.¹¹¹¹ Relationship in the energy sphere is a foundation stone of the economic cooperation between Turkey and Azerbaijan. Common projects implemented by the countries with joining Georgia - Baku - Tbilisi- Ceyhan oil pipeline and Baku - Tbilisi - Erzurum gas pipeline ensure present day energy security of both as well as other European countries.

Baku - Tbilisi - Ceyhan project was the first pipeline bypassing the territory of Russia. With the starting of exploitation, it greatly changed the geopolitical alignment of forces in the vast region, enveloping the Central Asia, Caucasus and basin of the Caspian Sea. Transportation of sizeable oil volume that could be realized by the territory of Russia with the using of existing pipeline Baku-Novorossiysk bypasses the Russia that caused long-expected decreasing of its influence in the region. Next huge project was Nabucco - South Caucasus natural gas pipeline with the length of 3,3 thousand km that has to deliver Caspian natural gas (Turkmen and Azerbaijani) to the EU markets.¹¹¹² The partners of this project have started to build the pipeline in 2011, finish it in 2014. Estimated cost of the project is € 7,9 billion. On 4 March 2010, Turkey has ratified its participation in the Nabucco project and approved construction of natural gas pipeline by its territory. Another common important project is Kars-Tbilisi-Baku railway project, which is under its realization and bypasses Armenia as well.¹¹¹³

Since, the beginning of war around the Nagorno-Karabakh between Azerbaijan and Armenia, Turkey supported the Azerbaijan side, advocating Azeri thesis in the international arena. After the occupation of Kelbajar district belong to Azerbaijan by the Armenian Armed Forces, Turkey called an extraordinary meeting of the UN Security Council on 6 April 1993. However, the UN Security Council rejected formulation “aggression of the Armenia against sovereign Azerbaijani Republic”¹¹¹⁴ presented by Ankara. In adopted resolution was only expressed grave concern on the subject of escalation of the hostile actions in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict”, and was told not about the aggression of the Armenia. Following the United Nations Security Council resolution from April 6, 1993, calling for the immediate withdrawal of Armenian forces from the occupied Azerbaijani territories, Turkey applied an embargo against Armenia, and the border between the two states was closed.¹¹¹⁵ The border subsequently remained closed as Turkey demanded Armenia to withdraw from Nagorno-

¹¹¹¹ Ibidem.

¹¹¹² Jim Nichol, “Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia: Political Developments and Implications for U.S. Interests”, *Congressional Research Service*, 2009, p.33.

¹¹¹³ Charlotte M Hille, *State Building and Conflict Resolution in the Caucasus*, Koninklijke Brill, Leiden 2010, p. 222.

¹¹¹⁴ “United Nations Security Council Official Records”, Vol. XLVIII, 1995, p. 155.

¹¹¹⁵ B. M Rubin, K. Kirişçi op. cit., p. 162.

Karabakh and seven surrounding districts of Azerbaijan occupied by Armenia. Ankara as well set this demand as a precondition for establishing diplomatic relations with its neighbor Armenia.

Military relations between Baku and Ankara emerged shortly after Azerbaijan's independence and since that day both countries have a close military cooperation as under the frames of NATO, Turkish officers educate Azerbaijan military forces and Ankara assisted Azerbaijani Military Force's modernization. Apart from political, economic and military relations, Turkey and Azerbaijan have deep affiliations in cultural and educational fields. Under the frames of signed agreements between two states, Turkish and Azeri students may receive university education in both states. Ankara supported Baku during transformation from Cyril alphabet to Latin providing all require technical support as Turkish is the mean of medium between nations. Turkey has middle and high schools and private universities in different places of Azerbaijan opened by the contribution of Turkish investment.¹¹¹⁶ In addition to that, Turkish TV channels play an important role in terms of cultural affiliation of people.

Justice and Development Party was in search of ameliorating relations with Baku and other capitals through interstate and inter- regional projects providing economic integration of region states in Turkish neighborhood. Henceforth, from AK Party's formation the 57th government at 2001 to the Russia - Georgia war, Turkish - Azeri relations along with other Southern Caucasus states continued in accordance with the frames of above-mentioned understanding, while traditional line of orthodox Turkish foreign policy toward region as well observed. Efeğil summaries AK Party's policy objectives to Azerbaijan and other Central Asian sister states as follows:

- Developing bilateral and multilateral cooperation in the fields of energy, economy, commerce, culture, society, politics, etc.
- Assisting them to find a peaceful solution to the frozen regional conflicts.
- Serving as an energy terminal.
- Providing assistance to the regional states in their nation- and state-building processes.
- Helping them develop and maintain close relations with the other countries.¹¹¹⁷

¹¹¹⁶ Helen R Ebaugh, *The Gülen Movement: A Sociological Analysis of a Civic Movement Rooted in Moderate Islam*, Springer Dordrecht Heilderberg, New York 2010, pp. 3-10.

¹¹¹⁷ Erhan Efeğil, "Turkish AK Party's Central Asia and Caucasus Policies: Critiques and Suggestions", *Caucasian Review of International Affairs*, Summer 2008, Vol. II (III), pp. 166-172.

On the other hand, due to the busy schedule of Turkish foreign policy mainly preoccupied to European Union and Middle East affairs until the Russia - Georgia war, Azerbaijan theme did not occupy a top-level agenda for Turkish foreign policy during the government period of Justice and Development Party. Ahmet Davutoğlu, as an academician and strategist was highly aware of strategic importance of Azerbaijan for Turkey, thus along with former Turkish Foreign Policy Ministers and in accordance with Turkey's traditional approaches toward Caucasus, he also contributed an exceptional mark to Southern Caucasus region countries calling it as Turkey's "gate door to Asia" handling the region in frames of Black Sea, relations with Russia and other Turkic states and policy balance between West and Russia.¹¹¹⁸ Davutoğlu qualified Caucasus as Turkey's "Close land basin" while appreciated Azerbaijan as "the backbone of Eurasian politics"¹¹¹⁹ poses Azerbaijan to a particular primary category. To highlight strategic position of Azerbaijan for Turkish foreign policy he notifies that "until Azerbaijan in Caucasus and Albania in Balkans would not gain a powerful regional position, it is impossible for Turkey to develop a cross border influence in Caspian and Adriatic region".¹¹²⁰

The Southern Caucasus issue came to agenda of Turkish foreign policy with the eruption of Russian - Georgian war, AK Party decision makers faced with the fact that the situation in Caucasus is highly fragile and Turkey should take more engagements in order to realize its zero problem principle with Turkish neighborhood. It was practically understood the difficulty of constructing amid relation with countries at odds. As Ankara accelerate this engagement and proposed the Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Platform, this fact one more time realized in terms of Turkish - Azerbaijan relations. From Azerbaijan's point of view, Baku was ready to participate in all initiatives or project in order to free its occupied territories by Armenia, besides Azeri officials in all platforms was repeatedly stating that they were ready to apply all options to free Nagorno - Karabagh not excluding military options. The sole reservation of Azerbaijan toward a similar project was not to loose her negotiation cards against Armenia that was approved by United Nation Security Council.¹¹²¹ In addition to Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Platform proposing cooperation with region states aiming to resolve frozen conflicts among Caucasus nations, Ankara commenced to melt ices

¹¹¹⁸ Ahmet Davutoğlu as cited in M Çelikpala, "Turkey and the Caucasus: Transition from Reactive Foreign Policy to Proactive Rhythmic Diplomacy", *Uluslararası İlişkiler*, Spring 2010, No. 7.25 p. 93.

¹¹¹⁹ Ahmet Davutoğlu, "Turkey's Foreign Policy Vision: An Assessment of 2007", *Insight Turkey*, 2008, Vol. X, pp. 77-96.

¹¹²⁰ Ibidem, pp. 77-96.

¹¹²¹ "Azerbaijan Ready to Use Other Options to Liberate Occupied Lands", *News Az*, 25 December, 2010.

with Erevan due to everlasting Armenian claims accusing Turkey committing genocide against Armenians referring to events in 1915. The potential presidency of Barack Obama and his previous election promises signaling USA's recognition of so - called Armenian genocide also played a determinant role in Ankara's decision. In addition to that, the so - called Armenian claims as an obstacle blocking Turkey's EU membership under the frames of zero problem rhetoric of Justice and Development Party played an essential role at Ankara's approach. Besides, AKP's new attitude toward Armenia was supported by Western alliance of Turkey;¹¹²² however AK Party decision makers faced with unexpected opposition of Aliyev administration along with severe critics of Turkish nationalists blaming Justice and Development Party for betraying Azerbaijan. Thus, in the course of history of Turkey - Azerbaijan relations experienced worst period at the eve of healing diplomatic relations with Armenia.¹¹²³

At the initial period of Turkish - Armenia thawing period, Baku did not indicate a negative attitude regarding the initiatives of Ankara, Justice and Development Party stressed explicitly that it would not damage the position of Azerbaijan in Karabagh conflict. Indeed, on 6 September 2008, when Turkish President Abdullah Gül attended Turkish - Armenia national football game and the affiliation process commenced to accelerate between Armenia and Turkey.¹¹²⁴ Baku attentively followed AK Party's opening policies toward Erevan, and did not oppose the historic visit of Turkish President, thus de facto agreed with Ankara's approaches from this respect.¹¹²⁵ In this period Justice and Development Party was highly cautious taking into consideration delicate structure of Caucasus and multi - dimensional perspective of Armenian - Azeri conflict. It is here vital to underline that Justice and Development Party owing to decided group decision of party, did not attend to match and AK Party was not represented in Erevan at political party level. Besides, Four days after the match, Turkish President paid an official visit to Azeri capital in order to meet Ilham Aliyev.¹¹²⁶ Behind the close doors, Turkey from the very highest level explained its approach to relations with Armenia, trying to remove concerns of Azerbaijan. During the meeting, Abdullah Gül evaluated his visit to Erevan and shared his impression acquired in Armenia

¹¹²² "AB Ziyaretten Memnun" ("EU is Happy with the Visit"), *Milliyet*, 07 September 2008.

¹¹²³ Bülent Aras, Pınar Akpınar, "The Relations between Turkey and the Caucasus", *Perceptions*, Vol. XVI, No. 3, Autumn 2011, pp. 53-68.

¹¹²⁴ "Soccer Diplomacy's Goal", *The Boston Globe*, 8 September 2008.

¹¹²⁵ Mithat Çelikpala, "Türkiye ve Kafkasya: Reaksiyoner Dış Politikadan Proaktif Ritmik Diplomasiye Geçiş" ("Turkey and Caucasus: From Reactionary Foreign Policy to Proactive Rhythmic Diplomacy"), *Uluslararası İlişkiler*, Vol. VII, No. 25, Spring 2010, p. 112.

¹¹²⁶ "Foreign Visits of Turkish President: Azerbaijan", (source: www.tcgb.gov.tr, <<http://www.tcgb.gov.tr/yurt-disi/254/49577/azerbaycan.html>>, March 2012).

causing him to hope that Armenia may voluntarily agree to leave all occupied Azeri territories; furthermore, Turkish President repeated that Turkey searches resolution methods in the so-called Armenian opening policy abiding to territorial integrity of Azerbaijan.¹¹²⁷ On his back way to Ankara, President Gül answered questions of journalists related to meeting enduring 8 hours; Gül stated that Azeri part does not disturbed due to Turkey's initiatives; moreover, he added that resolution of the conflict would contribute to stability of Caucasus. President's visit was also appreciated positively in Turkish and Azerbaijani public view.¹¹²⁸

Following that, Armenian and Azeri representatives came together in Moscow at the beginning of November and signed a common Karabagh declaration, which has been the first official paper signed by the parties since 1992. Hence, Justice and Development Party perceived these developments as the supporting development of Turkey's initiatives toward Armenia as a pushing factor Erevan to undertake talks with Baku, thus after this period Ankara accelerate diplomatic contacts with Erivan. Turkey and Armenia commenced to realize open and close talks in Switzerland in order to access an agreement in order to resolve current problems existing between the states and to draw a road map determining the future steps to normalize relations. On the other hand, Ankara was as well informing all new developments to Baku trying to engage Azerbaijan to the process as well.¹¹²⁹

Yet, Turkish - Azerbaijani diplomatic relations commenced to tense before the Barack Obama's historic visit to Turkey as the rumors increased claiming that either Turkey will open Armenian border symbolically or permanently, in order to show Turkish side's good intention, it was even claimed that both states (Turkey and Armenia) would launch diplomatic missions soon.¹¹³⁰ As for Baku, initially Azeri administration staff was highly careful and the statements of Azeri Foreign Ministry officials in the direction of evaluating the process as it was still early to state conclusive messages evaluating developments. Nevertheless, all of sudden Azeri President boycotted the United Alliance of Civilizations summit as a reaction to Turkey's negotiations with Armenia, owing to the possibility of Turkey opening Armenian borders and realized a surprise visit to Moscow in order to evaluate current situation with Russian President Medvedev. At the period coinciding the same time frame, some Non

¹¹²⁷ Enes Berberoğlu, "Ermeni Jargonu Değişti" ("Armenian Jargon has Changed"), (source: <<http://hurarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/goster/haber.aspx?id=9870725& tarih=2008-09-11>>, January 2011).

¹¹²⁸ Muharrem Sarıkaya, "Ermeniler Geri Çekilmeye Gönüllü" ("Armenians are Volunteer to Withdraw"), *Sabah*, 11 September 2008.

¹¹²⁹ Eldar Memmedov, "Turkish - Azerbaijani Relations: Reality Check", *Hürriyet Daily News*, 24 February 2011.

¹¹³⁰ Muharrem İnce, "Söylemden Reelpolitığe: Türkiye'nin Ermenistan Açılımı" ("From Rhetoric to Reel Politik: Turkey's Armenia Opening"), *SETA, Foundation for Political, Economic and Social Research*, 1 June 2009.

Governmental Organization delegations from Azerbaijan came to Ankara to demolish misunderstandings between countries. Their appointment demands were rejected by Foreign Ministry and Justice and Development Party officials under the pretext that they were on purpose sent by Aliyev in order to influence AK Party policies. Nevertheless, Left and Right wing opposition parties accepted delegation and criticized Justice and Development Party for losing control in Foreign policy toward Caucasus,¹¹³¹ accusing AK Party one more time for harming historic Turkey - Azerbaijan relations.¹¹³²

Ankara on the eve of 24 April, which is celebrated as the anniversary of so - called Armenian genocide, was afraid that Obama would mention the incident as genocide in accordance with his promises in the course of his election campaign, thus accelerated the healing procedure with Armenia. The Foreign Affairs Ministers of both sides signed a memorandum of understanding in Switzerland, which gained a historic dimension to Turkish - Armenian relations since 1923. At this point, President Abdullah Gül was engaged in the convergence process between Armenia and Turkey. He called Ilham Aliyev in order to inform about the details and repeated Turkey's position related to the Nagorno Karabagh and occupied Azerbaijani lands adding that opening of the borders between Azerbaijan and Armenia depend on the condition that Armenia should withdraw from occupied lands belong to Azerbaijan. After Armenia and Turkey declared that, they agreed on a framework towards the normalization of relations Baku one more time repeated its concerns underlying that the opening of the Turkish - Armenian border without progress in the Nagorno - Karabagh conflict might destroy regional stability in Caucasus.¹¹³³

On the other side, Azerbaijan administration as a reaction to Turkey's initiatives in domestic scale commenced to put pressure on Turkish companies existing in Azerbaijan, furthermore Baku closed the Turkish mosque under the pretext of restoration in Baku, though mosque officials stated that they were not informed about it, opened by Turkish Religious Affairs in 1995. Baku shortly after the signature publicly declared that the gas deal signed between Turkey and Azerbaijan was outdated implying an increase at oil and gas prices that Turkey buys, while Justice and Development Party Energy Minister called Azerbaijani move on prices as provocative. In addition to that, Azerbaijan aims to indicate their displeasure with Turkey dropped off Turkish flags hanged on Turkish martyrdom situated in Baku and

¹¹³¹ Halil M Karaveli, "The Turkish Nationalist Opposition and its Foreign Policy Views", *Turkey Analyst*, Vol. III, No. 6, (source: www.silkroadstudies.com, <<http://www.silkroadstudies.org/new/turkey.html>>, May 2010.

¹¹³² Şaban Kardaş, "Turkey Prioritizing its Relations with Azerbaijan", *Eurasia Daily Monitor*, Vol. VI, Issue 87, 6 May 2009.

¹¹³³ J. Nichol, op. cit., p. 15.

Azerbaijan officially announced that Baku abrogated visa application for Turkish citizens upon arrival or at the borders.¹¹³⁴

After the signature of memorandum between Turkey and Armenia, first time high-level talks realized between Ankara and Baku in Prague during the OSCE Minsk Summit. Turkish President after his meeting with Sargsyan came together with Ilham Aliyev in order to evaluate latest development and future road map in Caucasus. Following the meetings of Presidents, Turkish Prime Minister paid an official visit to Azerbaijan on 13 May 2010, in order to calm down tense Turkish - Azerbaijani relations that was experiencing the worst time in the course of diplomatic history present between the sister states. A high rank minister delegation including Turkish FM Ahmet Davutoğlu and Natural Resources Minister Taner Yıldız accompanied the visit. The main agenda of the visit was border issue, where both head of states discussed tête a tête in details along with current economic and energy issues. During the joint press conference held after the officials meeting Erdoğan respond to a question asking current situation “The Azerbaijan - Turkey fraternal relations have never been subject of discussions. The Turkey - Armenia border has been closed due to Nagorno - Karabagh's occupation and will not be solved until it will be liberated”.¹¹³⁵

In the same press conference, Turkish newspaper asked to Ilham Aliyev, Baku's demand on price rise to which Azerbaijani President related with oil prices and abstaining to connect it emerging crisis in Turkey, as for Azerbaijan's close relations with Russia, Azeri President contented with reminding historical relations with Russia and called Moscow as an important ally of Azerbaijan.¹¹³⁶ The following day of the visit, Turkish Prime Minister made a speech in Azerbaijan Parliament notifying that Turkey will not act against Azeri interest, while called Armenian origin news as a sabotage claiming Turkey will open doors with Armenia without precondition.¹¹³⁷ Shortly after Turkish PM's visit to Baku, Foreign Affairs Minister Davutoğlu paid the following visit in order to normalize relations with Azerbaijan meeting with his colleague Elmar Mammadyarov. During the visit, Davutoğlu tried to remove Azerbaijan's concerns and explained the principles and objectives of Justice and Development Party government's foreign policy attitude toward Caucasus. To indicate Turkey's position with Azerbaijan, Turkish FM in a joint press conference noted that “Our Azerbaijani brothers and sisters should know that, just as in the past, Turkey will be on the

¹¹³⁴ Maciej Falkowski, “Turecka gra o Kaukaz” (“Turkish Game on Caucasus”), *Center for Eastern Studies*, 10 April 2009, pp. 1-6.

¹¹³⁵ Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's Baku Visit: Relations Back on the Track”, *Turkish Weekly*, 13 May 2009.

¹¹³⁶ Ibid.

¹¹³⁷ Ibid.

side of Azerbaijan in the future”,¹¹³⁸ adding “Relations between Turkey and Azerbaijan are excellent. Turkey and Azerbaijan are not merely friends and neighbors. They are also strategic partners”.¹¹³⁹

Ultimately, after series of misunderstanding, speculations, that commenced with Turkey’s political rapprochement with Armenia and Baku’s harsh opposition against it, Turkey - Azerbaijan relations re-normalized in the 2010. Ankara and Baku signed a Strategic Partnership and Mutual Assistance agreement, which were presented to National Assemblies of both states in order to be ratified.¹¹⁴⁰ Ankara and Baku additionally signed a memorandum of understanding planning transfer Shah Deniz gas resources to Europe via Turkish territory, the signed memorandum of understanding also secured gas demand for Nabucco pipeline. Under the frames of achieved understanding Turkish and Azerbaijani sites agreed on the gas prices that previously became a theme of discussion as well, while Turkey guaranteed as well to buy “11 billion cubic meters natural gas from Azerbaijan”.¹¹⁴¹ Finally, both states signed an agreement on the establishment of Turkey - Azerbaijan High-level Strategic Cooperation Council,¹¹⁴² which explicitly proved the healed relation between sister countries.¹¹⁴³

2.3. Armenia

First contacts between Turks and Armenians were held in 10th century, when Turkic tribes migrated to Anatolian peninsula in masses. In battle of Manzikert (1071),¹¹⁴⁴ Armenians struggled in the rows of Seljuk Turks against despot Byzantine Imperium¹¹⁴⁵ In the course of time, Turks and Armenians lived together in Anatolia peacefully, besides Armenians were called by Ottomans as “loyal nation” in order to indicate their fidelity to Ottoman authority.¹¹⁴⁶ Until the decade period of Ottoman Empire, Armenians along with

¹¹³⁸ Ibid.

¹¹³⁹ “Azerbaijan’s Stability is Highly Important for Us, FM Davutoğlu”, *Today’s Zaman*, 26 May 2010.

¹¹⁴⁰ Ayhan Güney, “Is the Regional Economic Cooperation in South Caucasus Myth or Reality?”, *The Journal of Faculty of Economics and Administrative Sciences*, Vol.XVI, No.1, 2011, pp.133-145.

¹¹⁴¹ “Turkey, Azerbaijan Sign Shah Deniz Gas Agreement”, *Today’s Zaman*, 7 June 2010.

¹¹⁴² “Bilateral Relations”, Embassy of the Republic of Azerbaijan, (source: www.azembassy.org.tr, < <http://www.azembassy.org.tr/index.php?option=content&id=49>>, March 2012).

¹¹⁴³ Im Nichol, “Azerbaijan: Recent Developments and U.S. Interests”, *Congressional Research Service, Report for Congress*, 30 August, 2011, p.11.

¹¹⁴⁴ **Battle of Manzikert:** (1071), The battle in which the Byzantines were defeated by the Seljuq Turks led by the sultan Alp-Arslan. It was followed by Seljuq conquest of most of Anatolia and marked the beginning of the end for the Byzantine Empire as a militarily viable state. “Battle of Manzikert” in *Encyclopædia Britannica*, (source: www.britannica.com, <<http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/363349/Battle-of-Manzikert>>, November 2011).

¹¹⁴⁵ Alexander Mikaberidze, *Conflict and Conquest in the Islamic World*, ABC - CLIO, California 2011, p. 563.

¹¹⁴⁶ Ahmet Akgündüz, Said Oztürk, *Ottoman History: Misperceptions and Truths*, IUR Press. Rotterdam 2011, p. 355.

other nationalities enjoyed religious tolerance of Ottoman Empire rising high ranks both in military and civil, while Armenian artisans and businessmen played a crucial role in Ottoman socio economic life.¹¹⁴⁷

Towards to the collapse of Ottoman Empire, likewise other ethnic nationalities, Armenians as well start to ask for their independency, and due to religious and politic reasons Armenian demands were used as a political pressure method against Istanbul through Russian Empire, Great Britain and France, thus Armenian problem gradually became an international question. In fact, in comparison to Greeks or other Balkan nations Armenians were not settling in majority, which made their independence claim harder for them. Particularly, at the end of 19th century Ottoman Armenians and Russia developed tight relations and local Armenian revolts supported by Russian Empire aiming to create a Caucasus Armenian state in order to prevent Ottomans contact with Caucasus and Central Asian Turkic and Muslim nations. From this perspective, some radical Armenian groups due to nationalistic ambitions in order to create big Armenia participated in Russian Armies invading Eastern part of Anatolia. As a reaction to upcoming danger and due to increasing conflicts in the region Ottoman Administration in 1915, decided to relocate local Armenian population residing close to war zone in masses to the other Ottoman regions in order to prevent future Armenian supports toward Russian army. However, the mass relocation process of Armenians brought many troubles like epidemics, looting actions against Armenians, famines etc and as a consequence of disorder that worsening due to the war atmosphere and antagonism between Muslim population and Armenians many Armenians severely died in the process of relocation period headed by Ottoman Government.¹¹⁴⁸

It is an undeniable fact that as similar to many other great empires, the collapse period of Ottomans as well brought many tragedies to the people of the empire including the Armenians. In the following years, after the break down of Ottoman Empire, the relocation

¹¹⁴⁷ Mesrob K Krikorian, *Armenians in the Service of the Ottoman Empire, 1860-1908*, Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd., London 1977, pp. 1-18.

¹¹⁴⁸ For further reading on the so-called Armenian genocide issue see: Arnold Tonnybee, *The Morderous Tyranny of the Turk*, London 1917; Justin McCarthy, *Muslims and Minorities: the Population of Ottoman Anatolia and theEnd of the Empire*, New York University Press, New York and London, 1983; Arthur Beylerian, *Les Grandes Puissances L'Empire Ottoman et les Armeniens: dans les Archives Francaises, 1914-1918* (3 vols). Publications de la Sorbonne, Paris 1983; Lanin, E. B. "Armenia and the Armenian People", *Fortnightly Review* n.s. 48, No. 284, Aug. 1 1890, pp. 258-273; Selahi R Sonyel, *Displacement of the Armenians: Documents*, Baylan Matbaası, Ankara 1978; Humphry Sandwith, "How the Turks Rule Armenia", *Nineteenth Century*, 3, February, 1878, pp. 314-329; Levon Marashlian, *Politics and Demography: Armenians, Turks, and Kurds in the Ottoman Empire*, Zoryan Institute, Cambridge 1990; Pierce, Rev. James Wilson. *Story of Turkey and Armenia*, Woodward Company, Baltimore, 1896; Ataöv, Türkkaya, *A British Source (1916) on the Armenian Question*, Sistem Ofset, Ankara 1985; Arnold J. Tonybee, *Turkey: a Past and a Future*, George H. Doran Co., London - New York 1917; Idem, *Armenian Atrocities: Murder of Nation*, London 1915.

issue of Armenia became a hot topic for the foreign relations prospect for Turkey as 1915 incidents commenced to come agenda particularly after the World War II when the international community recognized the atrocities Nazis inhuman actions against European Jews. The Armenian Diaspora inspired by Holocaust, initialized genocide claims as refer to 1915 events. Respectively, Diaspora brought the 1915 events to the international agenda while in many countries where Armenians live in masses, the 1915 events due to supports of Armenia and domestic political concerns recognized in local and national levels as genocide. The so- called genocide claims constituted a problematic issue with United States of America and Turkey as Armenian Diaspora continuously brought genocide bills to House of Representatives. Besides, Diaspora achieved to celebration of 24 April as the date of genocide memorial day, during which American Presidents undertake public speeches, the content of American President's speech has been a theme of discussion between Washington and Ankara. But, since that day none of USA President has used the word of genocide referring to 1915 incidents while they preferred to call it as the big tragedy. In addition to that, the negative relations between Turkey and Armenia constitutes a big obstacle for Turkey's full membership prospects toward European Union, furthermore the EU countries recognizing 1915 incidents as genocide like France injured bilateral relations, thus since France's recognize the so - called genocide that affected the relations highly negative.¹¹⁴⁹

On the other hand, from 1975 until the end of 1980's, Leftist - Nationalist Armenian groups living in Diaspora, established an illegal terrorist organization called as the Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA) in order to compel Turkey to recognize 1915 events as a genocide initialized terror acts particularly against Turkish Foreign Ministry members on duty abroad. Aftermaths many bloody terror acts ending in 46 death and 299 injuries, due to counterattacks of Turkish inelegancy and changing international conjecture, the ASALA terrorist organization was dissolved.¹¹⁵⁰ Another issue, directing the mutual relations towards the deadlock, is Armenian territory claiming and harsh attitude performed by Armenian governments was not to recognize territorial integrity of Turkish Republic. From this perspective Turkey along with Armenia's withdraw from Nagorno - Karabagh and other occupied Azeri territories demands from Yerevan to recognize its territorial integrity and to abandon genocide claims as well stop anti - Turkish activities. After the collapse of Soviet Union, Turkish Republic recognized independence of Armenia, though it did not

¹¹⁴⁹ Presently Twenty states all around the world officially recognize Armenian genocide claims, they are: Argentina, Armenia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Cyprus, France, Greece, Italy, Lebanon, Lithuania, The Netherlands, Poland, Russia, Slovakia, Sweden, Switzerland, Uruguay, Vatican City and Venezuela.

¹¹⁵⁰ M. Kibaroglu, A. Kibaroglu, op.cit., p. 167.

establish diplomatic relations with Armenia.¹¹⁵¹ As a reaction of Armenia's aggressive position in the course of Karabagh conflict, Turkey to support Azerbaijan closed its land border with Erivan, which influenced Armenia very negatively in terms of economics while isolated it in total.¹¹⁵² On the other hand, there is a huge amount of illicit trade volume between Turkey and Armenia through Iranian and Georgian borders of both countries,¹¹⁵³ and it has been claimed that 40.000 Armenian citizens are working in Turkey illegally while there are direct flights between Turkish cities and Armenian capital.

The first contact between Armenian and Turkish officials was made when Turkish Prime Minister addressed to his counterpart Kocharian to establish a joint independent history commission to investigate 1915 events that Armenian part prefer to call persistently as genocide. However, both Yerevan and Diaspora vehemently refused Ankara's proposal under the pretext that it might cause doubts and debates about the genocide.¹¹⁵⁴ In 2007, when a Turkish nationalist assassinated an Armenian descent Turkish journalist Hrant Dink, Turkish - Armenian relations came into view of Turkish public view one more time. The funeral of Dink caused an indignation in Turkey and thousands of Turks attended his funeral to protest assassination, however the most striking feature of the funeral was placards held by Turks "We are all Hrant, We are all Armenians"¹¹⁵⁵ to indicate solidarity with Armenian minority residing in Turkey.¹¹⁵⁶ The funeral of Armenian journalist caused public debates while signaling thawing Turkish - Armenian diplomatic relations. "A positive spirit in high-level political relations between Armenia and Turkey became perceptible in the beginning of 2008, when Turkish President Abdullah Gül congratulated warmly his newly elected Armenian counterpart Serzh Sargsyan on his victory. Serzh Sargsyan invited Turkish President to football game that would take place between Armenia and Turkey in Yerevan under the frame of World Cup qualifications; additionally he added that Armenia would apply a visa free regime to Turkish fans who want to watch the game in Yerevan. The international Crisis Group reported the developments between Ankara and Yerevan as:

¹¹⁵¹ Rachel Goshgarian, "Breaking the Stalemate: Turkish - Armenian Relations in the 21st Century", *Turkish Policy Quarterly*, Vol. IV, No. 4, Winter 2005, pp. 4-5.

¹¹⁵² Asbed Kotchikian, "Border Politics: the Geopolitical Implications of Opening the Turkish - Armenian Border," *Working Paper of Armenian International Policy Research Group*, January 2005, p. 3.

¹¹⁵³ Burcu Gültekin, "The Stakes of Opening the Armenian - Turkish Border; The Cross-Border Contacts between Armenia and Turkey", *French Institute of Anatolian Studies, Research Program on Turkey Caucasus*, October 2002, p.3.

¹¹⁵⁴ Diba N Goksel, "The Rubik Cube of Turkey - Armenian Relations", *UNISCI Discussion Papers*, May 2010, No. 23, p. 201.

¹¹⁵⁵ "Murdered Editor Mourned in Istanbul", *Al Jazeera*, 23 January 2007.

¹¹⁵⁶ Vahram T Matevosyan, "The Armenian Community and the AK Party: Finding Trust under the Crescent", *Insight Turkey* Vol. 12, No. 4, 2010, p. 101.

Armenian-Turkish reconciliation is not only an elite driven process; public opinion in both countries is also ready for it. Two thirds of Turks supported President Gül's Yerevan visit. According to a think tank director in Ankara, "there is a lot about the visit on opposition websites; it is a domestic political football, but public opinion is ready. They're saying, open it [the border] and be done with it. It is a question of timing, not preparation." In Armenia support for a border opening even without Turkish recognition of an Armenian genocide has grown to more than half of the population. Even the once fiercely anti-Turkish Armenian Diaspora now has a more nuanced approach.¹¹⁵⁷

In the aftermath of Russian - Georgian war, Turkey invited Armenia as well to take part in Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Platform which was highly welcomed by Yerevan,¹¹⁵⁸ however Azerbaijan put strict reservation toward Turkey's invitation notifying that it would not take part any organization with Armenia till it would leave occupied territories.¹¹⁵⁹

Due to the invitation of Armenian side, Turkish President attended to soccer game held in Yerevan.¹¹⁶⁰ Turkish President was met trough his counterpart in the course of his historical visit to Armenia, the visit of Turkish President found a wide reflection as well on world press. After the visit, the term "football diplomacy"¹¹⁶¹ as well found its place in the literature of diplomacy history and international relations. Following that, both sides issued a notification stating that they agreed on a "comprehensive framework for the normalization of their bilateral relations."¹¹⁶² Nevertheless, Baku stated its concern as regard to affiliation between Ankara and Yerevan with a threatening tone that it might cause unrecoverable damages in terms of Turkish - Azeri relations if the Turkey would open Armenian border before Armenia stops occupation in Nagorno Karabagh. Turkey's foreign policy at this period highly snookered between Armenia and Azerbaijan, on one hand Ankara was trying to continue negotiation with Yerevan while on the other hand keep its positive relations with sister state Azerbaijan. However, Turkey and Armenia went further and foreign ministries of both countries under the meditation of Switzerland signed the "Protocol on Development of

¹¹⁵⁷ Ibidem, p. 103.

¹¹⁵⁸ Burcu Gültekin Punsmann, "The Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Platform: An Attempt to Foster Regional Accountability", *ICBSS, Policy Brief*, April 2009, No. 13 p. 2.

¹¹⁵⁹ Muharrem Ekşi, "From Process of Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Platform to the Normalization of Turkish - Armenian Relations", *Wise Men Center for Strategic Studies*, (source: www.bilgesam.org),

<http://www.bilgesam.org/en/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=209:from-the-process-of-caucasus-cooperation-and-stability-platform-to-the-normalization-of-turkish-armenian-relations&catid=86:analizler-kafkaslar&Itemid=145>, March 2012)

¹¹⁶⁰ "Cumhurbaşkanı Abdullah Gül Erivan'da" ("President Gul in Yerevan"), *BBC Turkish*, 06 September, 2008.

¹¹⁶¹ "Football Diplomacy", *The Economist*, 3 September, 2009.

¹¹⁶² C. Migdalovitz, "Turkey: Selected Foreign....." op.cit, p. 33.

Relations between the Republic of Turkey and the Republic of Armenia”¹¹⁶³ on the level of Foreign Affairs Ministries along with the attendance of Hillary Clinton, Sergey Lavrov, Foreign Affairs Minister of Switzerland and high-level EU represents.¹¹⁶⁴ Both sides under the so-called Zurich protocols agreed to:

Conduct regular political consultations between the Ministries of Foreign Affairs of the two countries; implement a dialogue on the historical dimension with the aim to restore mutual confidence between the two nations, including an impartial scientific examination of the historical records and archives to define existing problems and formulate recommendations; make the best possible use of existing transport, communications and energy infrastructure and networks between the two countries, and to undertake measures in this regard; develop the bilateral legal framework in order to foster cooperation between the two countries; cooperate in the fields of science and education by encouraging relations between the appropriate institutions as well as promoting the exchange of specialists and students, and act with the aim of preserving the cultural heritage of both sides and launching common cultural projects; establish consular cooperation in accordance with the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations of 1963 in order to provide necessary assistance and protection to the citizens of the two countries; take concrete measures in order to develop trade, tourism and economic cooperation between the two countries; engage in a dialogue and reinforce their cooperation on environmental issues. Agree on the establishment of an intergovernmental bilateral commission which shall comprise separate sub-commissions for the prompt implementation of the commitments mentioned in operational paragraph 2 above in this Protocol. To prepare the working modalities of the intergovernmental commission and its sub-commissions, a working group headed by the two Ministers of Foreign Affairs shall be created 2 months after the day following the entry into force of this Protocol. Within 3 months after the entry into force of this Protocol, these modalities shall be approved at ministerial level. The intergovernmental commission shall meet for the first time immediately after the adoption of the said modalities. The sub-commissions shall start their work at the latest 1 month thereafter and they shall work continuously until the completion of their mandates.¹¹⁶⁵

Shortly after the signature of protocols, Armenian President attended second leg of world cup qualifying match this time held in Turkey.¹¹⁶⁶ He was met by Turkish President upon his arrival to Turkey and along with Presidents, Foreign Ministers of both countries organized a closed meeting where they discussed current situation of bilateral relations.¹¹⁶⁷ On the other hand, there appeared a huge opposition wage against Justice and Development Party due to its policies towards Azerbaijan. Opposition parties, particularly Nationalist Action Party

¹¹⁶³ “Protocol on Development of Relations between The Republic of Turkey and the Republic of Armenia”, European Parliament, (source: [www.europarl.europa.eu](http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2009_2014/documents/d-tr/dv/1006_10_/1006_10_en.pdf), <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2009_2014/documents/d-tr/dv/1006_10_/1006_10_en.pdf>, March 2012).

¹¹⁶⁴ “Turkey Takes Bold Step for Change of Status Quo in Caucasus”, *Today’s Zaman*, 2 September 2008.

¹¹⁶⁵ “Protocol on Development of Relations between The Republic of Turkey and the Republic of Armenia”, *European Parliament*, (source: [www.europarl.europa.eu](http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2009_2014/documents/d-tr/dv/1006_10_/1006_10_en.pdf), <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2009_2014/documents/d-tr/dv/1006_10_/1006_10_en.pdf>, March 2012).

¹¹⁶⁶ “Türkiye - Ermenistan Maçında Dostluk Kazandı” (“Friendship Won in Turkish - Armenia Football Game”), *Radikal*, 14 October 2009.

¹¹⁶⁷ *Ibidem*.

(Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi, MHP) gave a parliamentary question to ask AK Party whether it would permit Azerbaijan flags to enter to match or not, and the general secretary of party realized a fierce speech at Turkish Great National Assembly criticizing Armenian President's planned visit to Turkey.¹¹⁶⁸

The visit of Armenian President caused fervent discussions in Turkish public view as well, though the majority of Turks (65.6 %) regarded Governments policies positive.¹¹⁶⁹ Turkish nationalists who wanted to protest Armenia tried to enter football match with Azeri flags, however, due to decision of FIFA, Turkish officials had to ban Azeri flags from entering the match. When Turkish police used force to scatter crowds holding Azeri flags and threw Azeri flags to garbage bin not to permit them to enter stadium. In order to soften tensed relations and to remove Azeri sides concerns, Foreign Minister Davutoğlu notified that "Turkey does not differentiate between Azeri and Turkish flags"¹¹⁷⁰ calling the case as a provocation. However, Azeri side vehemently reacted against Turkey where it as reprisal banned foreign flags in Azerbaijan and dropped down Turkish flags at Turkish martyrdom in Baku. Nonetheless, on contrary to all gained progress in terms of Turkish - Armenian talks, Armenian side declared that the signed protocols with Turkey could not be commented to question genocide issue while Turkish Prime Minister notified that without the halting the Armenian occupation in Azeri territories the signed protocols would not be send Turkish Parliament to be ratified. Henceforth, in this period the efforts to normalize reciprocal relations between the Republic of Turkey and Armenia failed.¹¹⁷¹

3. Central Asian Republics

Due to ethnic, kinship, cultural, linguistic and religious ties, the Central Asian republics¹¹⁷² have been an important agenda for Turkish foreign policy since the breakdown of Soviet

¹¹⁶⁸ Tarek Hohberg, "When Diplomats Score: The Role of Football in the Turkish - Armenian Rapprochement", *Heinrich Boll Stiftung*, 4 June 2009.

¹¹⁶⁹ Ibidem.

¹¹⁷⁰ "Ahmet Davutoğlu: The Tape Featuring Azerbaijani Flag Thrown into a Garbage Bin is a Provocation!", *News Az*, 22 October 2009

¹¹⁷¹ Jorris Gjata, "Lessons from the Turkish - Armenian Protocols", *Turkey Analyst*, Vol. III, No. 7, 12 April 2010.

¹¹⁷² For a detailed reading on Central Asian Turks in terms of history and ethnography see: Maria A Czaplicka, *The Turks of Central Asia in History and at the Present Day, An Ethnographical Inquiry into the Pan-Turanian Problem, and Bibliographic Material Relating to the Early Turks and the Present Turks of Central Asia*, Curzon Press, New York, 1973.

Union.¹¹⁷³ After the dismantlement of USSR in 1991,¹¹⁷⁴ the newly emerged sister states issue occupied an important agenda for Turkish foreign policy decision makers. Ankara fearing to lose its strategic position (being a buffer zone against Soviet Union during the Cold War period) with the end of Cold War put a special stress on Central Asia politics adopting a big brother role.¹¹⁷⁵ It opened an alternative foreign policy dimension as regard to spoiled European Union relations, Cyprus Question, pressures of international community due to human right abuses and extension of Kurdish problem to the international arena.¹¹⁷⁶

Initially, the bilateral relations between Turkey and Central Asian republics mostly developed on an emotion base perspective in accordance with the popular quote, “Turkish world from Adriatic sea to Great Wall of China”¹¹⁷⁷ of Turkish foreign policy of that time, which gave birth severe trust crisis between Russia as regard to Moscow’s concerns over Ankara’s nationalistic interest in Central Asia.¹¹⁷⁸ On the other hand, Turkey’s initiatives have been supported by United States of America and West European countries¹¹⁷⁹ in order to compensate power vacuum emerged in the region emerged after the collapse of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Moreover, Turkey was promoted as a role model for newly independent states during the transition period.¹¹⁸⁰ Plus, influence of Iran aimed to be

¹¹⁷³ Mustafa Aydın, “Turkey and Central Asia: Challenges of Change”, *Central Asian Survey*, Vol.XV (2), 1996, pp. 157-177.

¹¹⁷⁴ Nadia Diuk, Adrian Karatnycky, *New Nations Rising: The Fall of the Soviets and the Challenge of Independence*, John Wiley and Sons, Inc., New York 1993, p. 173.

¹¹⁷⁵ Graham E Fuller, *The New Turkish Republic: Turkey as a Pivotal State in the Muslim World*, United States Institute of Peace, Washington 2008, p. 134.

¹¹⁷⁶ For further reading on Central Asia see: Bennigsen, A. and Marie Broxup, et.al., “Central Asia in the 1980s: Strategic Dynamics in the Decade Ahead”, *Foreign Area Research Inc.*, New York, FAR/NA-1001, July 1984, pp. 21-54; Dawisha and Bruce Parrott. *Conflict, Cleavage and Change in Central Asia and the Caucasus*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1997; Bruce Pannier, “The Shrinking Shores of Central Asia’s ‘Island of Democracy’”, *Transition* 2, 7,1996, pp. 56-59, 64; John Anderson, “Constitutional Development in Central Asia,” *Central Asian Survey*, Vol XVI(3), 1997, pp. 301-320; Mohammed E Ahrari, "The Dynamics of the New Great Game in Muslim Central Asia", *Central Asian Survey*, Vol. XII (4), 1994, pp. 525-539; "Control of Central Asia Oil Reserves", *Oil and Gas Journal*, Vol. XCIV(11), March 1996, pp. 104-105; Stephen Blank, "Russia, the Gulf and Central Asia in a New Middle East", *Central Asian Survey*, Vol. XIII (2), 1994, pp. 267-281.,

¹¹⁷⁷ İdris Bal, „Soğuk Savaş Sonrası Türk Dış Politikası İçin Türk Cumhuriyetlerinin Önemi” („Importance of the Turkic Republics for the Turkish Foreign Policy after the Cold War”) in İdris Bal (ed.) *21. Yüzyılda Türk Dış Politikası (Turkey’s Foreign Policy at 21Century)*, Lalezar Yayınevi, Ankara 2004, p. 365-378.

¹¹⁷⁸ Nasuh Uslu, “The Russian, Caucasian and Central Asian Aspects of Turkish Foreign Policy in the Post Cold War Period”, *Alternative: Turkish Journal of International Relations*, Fall-Winter 2003, 2, No. 3-4, p.172.

¹¹⁷⁹ İdris Bal, *Turkey’s Relations with the West and the Turkic Republics: Rise and Fall of the Turkish Model*, Aldershot England, Ashgate 2000.

¹¹⁸⁰ Nilüfer Narlı, “Cooperation or Competition in the Islamic World: Turkish - Iranian Relations from Islamic Revolution to the Gulf War and After”, *Cahiers d’études sur la Méditerranée Orientale et le Monde Turco-Iranien (CEMOTI)*, January-June 1993, No. 15, p. n.d.

balanced suggesting “Turkish model” as a unique country reconciling Islam with democracy under the roof of a secular state structure.¹¹⁸¹

Turkey became the first country recognizing the newly independent Central States like Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan and established diplomatic relations with Central Asian republics. Shortly after the reorganizations, high-level visits between the states started.¹¹⁸² President of Kazakhstan visited Ankara in September, while former President of Turkmenistan, and Kyrgyzstan and Islam Kerimov of Uzbekistan were in Ankara in December of 1991.¹¹⁸³ Ankara in order to enforce its relations with newly emerged independent states in Central Asia initialized the First Turkic Summit in 1992. In addition to that, shortly after the dissolution of Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Turkey initialized close economic ties with new sister states and signed commerce and trade agreements. In order to promote private enterprise in the region Ankara established Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency, (TIKA).¹¹⁸⁴

Turkey developed a highly motivated cultural policies toward Central Asian sister republics as well. Turkey launched both state supported and private schools in the region in to spread Turkish language and culture. Due to bilateral agreements, university attracted students and in return, universities gave opportunities for Turks to study in Central Asia. In addition to that, Turkey established public universities in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan while Turkish businessmen established private universities in Bishkek, Alma-Ata and Ashgabat. Another initiative of Turkish Republic was to realize transition to Latin alphabet and constitute a common Turkish language with new sister states though in the course of time the difficulties related to dialect differences appeared. In this period, Turkish TV channels as well played a crucial role in the course of disseminating influence of Turkish language and culture.¹¹⁸⁵

Because of ethnic, cultural and religious ties among Turkey and region states in the initial period of the collapse of USSR, Turkish foreign policy makers assumed that Turkey would be the leading player in Central Asia in the power vacuum emerged due to Russia's

¹¹⁸¹ Graham E Fuller, *Iran and Turkey: Rivals for Central Asian Leadership* in Graham E. Fuller, The Center of the Universe: *The Geopolitics of Iran*, Westview Press, Boulder, Colorado 1991, pp.191-208.

¹¹⁸² Michael Frenchman, “Turkey Reaches out to the Central Asian Republics”, *Turkish Review: Quarterly Digest*, Vol. VII (31), spring 1993, pp. 21-23.

¹¹⁸³ “Turkey's Relations with Central Asian Republics”, (sources: www.mfa.gov.tr, <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkey_s-relations-with-central-asian-republics.en.mfa>, March 2012).

¹¹⁸⁴ “Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency”, (source: www.tika.gov.tr, <<http://www.tika.gov.tr/tika-hakkinda/tarihce/1>> March 2012).

¹¹⁸⁵ Phar K Beng, “Turkey's Potential as a Soft Power: A Call for Conceptual Clarity”, *Insight Turkey*, Vol. X, No. 2, 2008, pp. 21-40.

weakening at region politics.¹¹⁸⁶ Yet, due to the international conjecture emerged in bipolar world, particularly after mid 1990's Turkey deserted emotional foreign policy approaches toward regional states stopped appreciating regional powers like China, Iran and Russia as rivals,¹¹⁸⁷ besides she searched for partnership and cooperation prospect in the region with these states. Turkey staying an important player in the region launched a soft power policy based on the mutual benefits of both region states and regional actors and avoided to drive a 'zero sum game policy' in the region.¹¹⁸⁸

Turkey's foreign policy relations with Central Asian republics did not experience a radical change in the course of Justice and Development Party governments. During the government periods of AK Party, the high-level visit continued as it used to be in previous governments to the region states. As parallel to Justice and Development Party's "zero problem principle" Ankara at this period supported a policy in order to reinforce security and cooperation with her neighborhood and periphery, thus in this respect regarding Central Asia, Justice and Development Party promote democracy, human rights and peaceful resolution methods of conflict resolution among region countries.¹¹⁸⁹ In the party program of Justice and Development Party in terms of relations with Central Asian republics, it is stated that, in spite of our (Turkey's) close ties with Central Asia due to historic, cultural and social reasons, it is an undeniable fact that the current level of bilateral relations is far a way meeting mutual expectations. In this respective, Justice and Development Party strive in order to convert current relations into a wide cooperation platform. In the programs of Turkish Republic governments established by Justice and Development Party under the similar texts were used in terms of party's relation prospects with Central Asian Turkic republics.¹¹⁹⁰

3.1. Kazakhstan

Turkish Republic recognized independence of Kazakhstan Republic on the same day (after two hours) of decision in 1991, thence established diplomatic relations with Kazakhstan in 1992, since then between both states due to different means many high-level

¹¹⁸⁶ Graham E. Fuller, *Central Asia: Turkey's New Geopolitics*, RAND Corporation, Santa Monica 1992, pp. 1 - 10.

¹¹⁸⁷ Lerna K Yanik, "Allies or Partners: An Appraisal of Turkey's Ties to Russia, 1991-2007", *East European Quarterly*, September 2007, p.351.

¹¹⁸⁸ Tarık Oğuzlu, "Soft Power in Turkish Foreign Policy", *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. LXI, No.1, 2007, p.88.

¹¹⁸⁹ Ertan Efeğil, "Turkish AK Party's Central Asia and Caucasus Policies: Critiques and Suggestions", *Caucasian Review of International Affairs*, Summer 2008, Vol. II (III).

¹¹⁹⁰ "58. Hükümet Programı" ("58th Government Program"), (source: <<http://www.belgenet.com/hukumet/program/58-3.html>>, April 2010).

visits took place.¹¹⁹¹ Turkish - Kazakhstan relations in general terms continued its traditional path during the Justice and Development Party government. In 2003, between 21 and 23 May President of Kazakhstan Republic Nursultan Nazarbayev visited Turkey where he attended high-level talks with Turkish officials including President and Prime Minister.¹¹⁹² Under the framework of NATO summit which was held in Istanbul, high-level contacts between the head of states one more time realized. Turkey, in order to provide closer relations and to concrete these relations with a strategic partnership agreement accelerate her relations with friend and brother state Kazakhstan and Turkish Prime Minister in order to hold talks in details with Kazakh officials headed to Astana in the May of 2005.

Following that, former Turkish President Ahmet Necdet Sezer attended Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia (CICA), which was inspired by Kazakh President Nazarbayev in order to gather Asian states under a roof. In the course of time, personal initiative of Kazakh President became a regional forum where region states discuss security, stability and peace related issues. Turkey participated actively at CICA organization and support toward the forum in all platforms has been highly appreciated at Kazakh site, plus Turkey's getting the periodical presidency of CICA in 2010 put an additional dynamic to bilateral relations.¹¹⁹³ In 2008, Turkey moved her embassy to new capital Astana, and opened a new consulate in Aktau. At the following visit of President Nazarbayev, which took place in 2009 to Turkey, as a consequence of long time endeavors, both states agreed to sign a strategic partnership treaty, thus Kazakhstan became the first Central Asian Turkic state with whom Turkish Republic signed such agreement.¹¹⁹⁴ Turkey supported Kazakhstan's presidency at OSCE, while Kazakhstan supported Turkish temporary membership at United Nations. Turkish President visited Kazakhstan in order to attend OSCE summit and in 2011 to attend Kazakh President's 70th birthday ceremony.¹¹⁹⁵ Both states continued high-level relations under the framework of Turkic Speaking Countries Summit, Cooperation Council of Turkic Speaking Countries and Parliamentarian Assembly of Turkic Speaking Countries.¹¹⁹⁶ Turkey's relations during Justice and Development Party

¹¹⁹¹ "Türkiye - Kazakistan Siyasi İlişkileri" ("Political Relations between Turkey and Kazakhstan"), (source: <<http://www.kazakhstan.org.tr/>>, April 2010).

¹¹⁹² "Turkey a Leader Country", *Yeni Safak*, 25 May 2003.

¹¹⁹³ "About Cica", (www.cica.org, source: <http://www.s-cica.org/page.php?page_id=7&lang=1>, April 2010).

¹¹⁹⁴ "Turkey's Political Relations With Kazakhstan", (source: www.mfa.gov.tr, <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkey_s-political-relations-with-kazakhstan.en.mfa>, April 2010).

¹¹⁹⁵ "President Abdullah Gül's Foreign Visits", (source: www.tccb.gov.tr, <<http://www.tccb.gov.tr/yurt-disi/254/78237/kazakistan.html>>, April 2010).

¹¹⁹⁶ Ibidem.

governments in terms of economic and commerce as well increased as the trade volume between the states hit 2.3 Million United States Dollars in the year of 2007.¹¹⁹⁷ As Turkish companies were engaged various projects in Kazakhstan and vice versa, Turkey at this period tried to increase tourist number from Kazakhstan.

3.2. Turkmenistan

Turkish Republic recognized Turkmenistan's independence shortly after Ashgabat declaration of independence and established diplomatic relations in 1992.¹¹⁹⁸ During the Presidency of former President Turgut Özal, Turkey and Turkmenistan developed close relations due to Özal's personal initiatives and personal efforts. However, Turkey – Turkmenistan reciprocal relations gaining a dynamic with Özal lost the velocity after the death of Özal. In the mid 1990's, Turkey's critical preference of Russia in terms of gas purchase instead of Turkmenistan caused a serious disappointment in Turkmenistan, what made the situation worse was Turkish diplomacy's insufficiency while explaining the situation to Turkmen colleagues with a diplomatic manner. Following this, bilateral agreements between the states though not declared experienced chilling as Turkmenistan converted a firm visa regime including business visas, which caused serious problems for Turkish business people activating in Turkmenistan.

Justice and Development Party government tried to initiate a recovery process in terms of relations with Turkmenistan. Former Foreign Minister Abdullah Gül took personal initiative to contribute to the healing relation between the sister states.¹¹⁹⁹ Shortly after JDP's coming to power Tayyip Erdoğan paid a visit to Ashgabat in 2003 as the general secretary of AK Party.¹²⁰⁰ Turkey's relation with Turkmenistan experienced a healing after the death of former Turkmen leader Saparmurat Niyazov. In spite of the retrograded relation with Turkey under his presidency, Ankara at top level took part at his funeral with Prime Minister Erdoğan's presence.¹²⁰¹ Justice and Development Party, in order to indicate importance attributed to Turkmenistan as well took part at presidency ceremony of second President of

¹¹⁹⁷ "Turkey's Commercial And Economic Relations With Kazakhstan", (source: [www.mfa.gov.tr, <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkey_s-commercial-and-economic-relations-with-kazakhstan.en.mfa>](http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkey_s-commercial-and-economic-relations-with-kazakhstan.en.mfa), April 2010).

¹¹⁹⁸ "Turkey's Political Relations with Turkmenistan", (source: [www.mfa.gov.tr, <canlive.tv/en/live.asp?iData=12211&iCat=291&iChannel=19&nChannel=TV>](http://www.mfa.gov.tr/canlive.tv/en/live.asp?iData=12211&iCat=291&iChannel=19&nChannel=TV), March 2012).

¹¹⁹⁹ Halil I Bahar, "Türkiye - Türkmenistan İlişkileri" ("Turkey - Turkmenistan Relations"), (source: www.usak.org.tr, <<http://www.usak.org.tr/makale.asp?id=786>>, April 2010).

¹²⁰⁰ "AKP Genel Bakanı Recep Tayyip Erdoğan Azerbaycan, Türkmenistan ve Kazakistan'ı Ziyaret Etti" ("General Secretary of AKP Recep Tayyip Erdoğan Visited Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan"), *Avrasya Bülteni*, 6 January, 2003.

¹²⁰¹ "FM Gül: The Entire Turkish World Sad at Passing of Turkmenbasi", *Hürriyet Daily News*, 21 December, 2006.

Turkmenistan Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedov in 2007. Following the election of new President, acceleration at mutual relations experienced in terms of Turkish - Turkmenistan relations. Turkish President Abdullah Gül paid an official visit to Turkmenistan and came together with the fresh President. At the visit of Turkish President Turkey and Turkmenistan signed a “common vision document” in order to provide the initials of Strategic Partnership between the states.

New President of Turkmenistan Berdimuhamedov paid an official visit to Turkey in 2008 as regard to invitation of his counterpart. Under the frames of his visit, both states signed a visa easement agreement in order to accelerate affiliation between the states as regard to economic and cultural relations. Shortly after the visit of Turkmen President, Turkish Prime Minister paid a two-day official visit to Turkmenistan between 4 and 6 October 2008. Erdogan attended to meeting of Turkish - Turkmenistan Business Council and met with Turkish businesspersons living in Turkmenistan,¹²⁰² while he came together with Berdimuhamedov in order to undertake talks on Turkmenistan - Turkey related matters along with regional and international issues.¹²⁰³ After the spoiled relations with Turkmenistan due to Turkey’s signature Blue Stream Gas deal with Russia, the energy cooperation one more time came to agenda after 2007 period. As it has been in other meetings Erdogan visited Turkmenistan with a crowded delegation including Minister of Energy and Natural Resources in order to participate state heads talk about energy related issues. Turkey and Turkmenistan realized high-level talks in terms of transferring Turkmen gas trough an underground pipeline project via Caspian Sea (Trans-Caspian) connecting it with Nabucco. Turkey’s foreign diplomacy attacks during Justice and Development Party governments turn Turkey an energy hub and to reinforce her role being a global and regional strategic energy base resource coincided with the Turkmenistan’s interest that was looking for export diversities.

Turkish - Turkmenistan relations during Justice and Development Party increased slowly but steadily. The bilateral relations gained a relative acceleration particularly after the Presidency of Berdimuhamedov as in the course of his 18-month rule Turkish investment to Turkmenistan increased hit \$ 2.7 million,¹²⁰⁴ while aftermath his Presidency the frequency of high-level visits increased including the visit of President and Foreign Ministers. The Trans - Caspian pipeline project that has been promoted by Turkish Republic at this period planning to carry Turkmen gas to Western markets through Turkey attributed a positive dynamic to

¹²⁰² “Erdogan Visits Turkmenistan, Mongolia in Central Asia Tour”, *Today’s Zaman*, 3 October 2008.

¹²⁰³ John C Daly, “Erdogan Goes to Turkmenistan”, *Eurasia Daily Monitor*, Vol. V, Issue 193 8 October 2008.

¹²⁰⁴ *Ibidem*.

mutual relations. In addition to energy cooperation, Turkmenistan's newly initialized tourism expansion project planning to open Caspian shores to international market and investment prospect emerged due to project as well contributed to relation prospects remarkably positive.

3.3. Kyrgyzstan

Turkey's diplomatic relations as similar to other sister Turkic Central Asian countries started in 1991 and both sides established their diplomatic missions in 1992.¹²⁰⁵ Former President of Kirgizstan Republic, Askar Akayev paid his first official foreign trip to Turkey in order to indicate his countries relation toward Turkey.¹²⁰⁶ Both states shortly after Bishkek's acquiring independence signed an "Economy and Trade Cooperation Agreement" thus further trade and commerce relation between the states developed on the basis of this agreement. In the same "Turkish - Kirgiz Business Council" as well vitalized and Turkish International Cooperation Agency as well launched its activities in the terrain of Kirgizstan. Since the establishment of bilateral relations, Kirgizstan has been an attractive market for middle size Turkish entrepreneurship.

Shortly after the Justice and Development Party's coming to power, Turkey's foreign policy related to Kirgizstan challenged with the turmoil causing a social and economic disorder in Kyrgyzstan. After the so-called "Tulip Revolution" took place in the country, incumbent President obliged to leave his post and fled to Russia. Ankara at this period did not take a visible initiative preferring not to highly engage quickly changing conjecture; in addition to that, Ankara at the very hot moments of incidents did not contact with the leaders of opponent groups who downed former President Akayev. Turkey's taciturn attitude toward Bishkek incident caused adamant critiques-, particularly from the rows of opponent nationalist party and institutions and columnists close to ideology of Nationalist Action Party-accused the Government not for not having a definite policy foreseeing future Turkish foreign policy prospects with Bishkek.¹²⁰⁷ After the Tulip Revolution, Ankara recognized the authority of new President Kumanbek Bakiyev and the incumbent President of Kyrgyzstan paid an official visit to Ankara after his acceding to power in 2006. Following the visit of Kyrgyz President, former Turkish Foreign Minister *Ali Babacan* visited Kyrgyzstan together with Bakiyev and attended other high-level meetings in order to evaluate current situation of

¹²⁰⁵ "Relations with Turkey and Kirizstan", (source: www.mfa.gov.tr, <<http://www.mfa.gov.tr/relations-between-turkey-and-kyrgyzstan.en.mfa>>, April 2010).

¹²⁰⁶ "Kirgizistan - Türkiye İlişkileri" ("Kirgizstan - Turkey Relations"), (source: www.kyrgyzembassy.org.tr, <<http://www.kyrgyzembassy.org.tr/html/iliskiler.htm>>, April 2010).

¹²⁰⁷ Sinan Oğan, "Kirgizistan'da Yağma Devrimi" ("The Loot Revolution in Kyrgyzstan"), (source: <<http://www.turksam.org.tr/a293.html>>, April 2010).

bilateral relations during the period after the revolution. Under the frame of his visit, Turkish FM came together in a breakfast program with the Turkish businessperson investing in Kyrgyzstan who suffered severely -in the course of disorder of Bishkek incidents many Turkish work places were looted by protesters - during the Tulip revolution unrests.

Following the visit of Turkish Foreign Minister, President Abdullah Gül paid his first official visit to Kyrgyzstan Republic as the President of Turkish Republic. During his visit, Abdullah Gül met his counterpart and discussed current situation in Turkish – Kyrgyz relations and methods to improve mutual relations prospects along with regional issues, along with upcoming Kyrgyzstan elections.¹²⁰⁸ After 5 years of Presidency, due to discontent directed to Kumanbek Bakiyev administration, Kyrgyzstan one more time evidenced uprisings, riots and clashes along with violent crashes between the crowds protesting Second President of Kyrgyzstan Republic and police, which resulted in death and heavy casualties of many Kyrgyz in 2010. Due to incidents, Kumanbek Bakiyev announced his resignation and left his country for asylum in Belarus. As it was in Tulip Revolution causing resignation of Akayev, Ankara preferred not to actively engage uprising incidents causing the end of Bakiyev administration.

Following the overthrow of Bakiyev regime as a consequence of 2010 April uprisings, Turkish Republic in order to contribute to the stabilization process of Kyrgyzstan, initialized high-level contacts with the representatives of new administration, hence Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu attended inauguration ceremony of 3rd Kyrgyz President Roza Otunbeyova.¹²⁰⁹ During his visit to Bishkek, Turkish FM signed two agreements with Kyrgyzstan proposing 21 Million U.S. Dollars financial aid 10 Million U.S. Dollars as donation,¹²¹⁰ while another project to be realized by Turkish International Cooperation Agency. Turkish Prime Minister paid an official visit to Bishkek in 2011. In comparison with previous diplomatic visits between the states -including other Central Asian Turkic states- the sincere dialogues between Erdoğan and his counterpart Almazbek Atambayev publicly was interpreted as an opening of a new term as regard to Turkish - Kyrgyz relations. Prime Minister of Kyrgyz Republic's method of welcoming his Turkish colleague was very unconventional in terms of diplomatic tradition. Referring Tayyip Erdoğan "ağbi" -a Turkish word, which means elder brother often used in order to express respect or an addressing style

¹²⁰⁸ President Gül: "Turkey and Kyrgyzstan have Identical Aims", (source: www.tccb.gov.tr, <<http://www.tccb.gov.tr/news/397/47955/president-gul-turkey-and-kyrgyzstan-have-identical-aims.html>>, April 2010).

¹²⁰⁹ "Turkish FM Davutoglu Meets Kyrgyzstan's Otunbeyova", *Trend Az*, 5 July 2010.

¹²¹⁰ "Turkey Offers \$ 21 Million Financial Aid to Kyrgystan", *Today's Zaman*, 4 July 2010.

preferred in close acquaintances-, Atambeyev has tight business connections in Turkey and speaks fluent Turkish said that he could not sleep upon arrival of Turkish Prime Minister due to his excitement.¹²¹¹ Turkish Prime Minister's visit to Kyrgyzstan and usage of elder brother in diplomatic circles appreciated as Turkey's approach to newly independent Turkic states after the dissolution of Soviet Union as Turkey assumed elder brother role and tried to play leader country in Central Asia in economic and political respect. However, the 2011 approach of Erdoğan appraised more realistic and far a way being emotional as new policy attitudes of Turkey toward Central Asia does not appreciated the other big brother Russia as a rival but a partner with whom Turkey launched region based policies in coordination.¹²¹² During his high-level contacts, Turkish Prime Minister stressed Turkey's good will in order to support Kyrgyzstan on the path of democracy, stability and economic welfare. In the course of his speech, Prime Minister mentioned the future cooperation prospects with a strong Eurasia tone, underlining the necessity of maximum free movement and mobility necessity among the Turkic nations referring to historic and kinship relations between two states, as it had been done through Turkish politics at the preliminary periods of relations between Central Asian newly independent states, however, in terms of economic and political relations, he applied more rationalist approaches trying to engage Russia between Turkish - Kyrgyz relations aiming to establish a triple structure in order to conserve delicate balances present in the region.¹²¹³ One additional issue coming into agenda was the visa free regime for Turkish and Kyrgyz citizens and in the course of meeting it was announced that the bilateral talks continues in order to remove visa requirements between the states.¹²¹⁴

Shortly after Turkish Prime Minister's significant visit to Kyrgyzstan, his counterpart Almazbek Atambeyev came to Turkey and was met with official ceremony. The close atmosphere commenced in Bishkek continued between Erdoğan and Atambeyev as they called each other brother and elder brother in public. Turkish and Kyrgyz officials organized several meetings in order to discuss actual themes between the states along with regional and global affairs. After the meeting, Kyrgyz Prime Minister voiced his satisfaction related to his visit and expressed his gratitude to Turkey for donations provided to Kyrgyzstan whose economy seriously damaged due to uprising and global economic crisis.

¹²¹¹ Erica Morat, "Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan Visits Kyrgyzstan", *Eurasia Daily Monitor*, Vol. VIII, Issue 27, 8 February 2011.

¹²¹² Altay Atli, "A Fraternal Welcome for Erdoğan in Kyrgyzstan", (source: www.atimes.com, <http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Central_Asia/MB17Ag01.html>, April 2010).

¹²¹³ Ibidem.

¹²¹⁴ Hasan Kanpolat, "PM Erdoğan Visits Kyrgyzstan", *Today's Zaman*, 1 February 2011.

3.4. Uzbekistan

Along with other Central Asian Turkic newly independent states, Turkey after the collapse of iron curtain initialized close relations with Uzbekistan and recognized the independence while established diplomatic mission with Tashkent shortly after the independence.¹²¹⁵ In the course of time, high-level visits including Turkish Presidents, Prime Ministers and incumbent President of Uzbekistan Republic took place. After the death of former President, relations with Uzbekistan evidenced a recession, and after the bomb attack aiming to kill incumbent Uzbek President, due to alleged attacker's connection with Turkey, the relations between Ankara and Tashkent experienced a relative freeze, however due to initiatives of Turkish sites the political and economical relations continued. In addition to that, mutual relations with Uzbekistan were deteriorated due to political asylums provided by Turkey to the opposition leaders activating in Uzbekistan against Islamov regime.¹²¹⁶

The low-level relations of Turkey with Uzbekistan during the government period of Justice and Development Party did not experience a radical change and Uzbekistan among Central Asian Turkic speaking countries continued to stay weak ring of Turkey's in terms of Turkic world. Prime Minister Erdogan paid an official visit to Uzbekistan in 2003 in order to gain a new dimension to mutual relations; the Meskhetian Turks issue along with the problems of Turkish businessmen residing in Uzbekistan came into agenda of Turkish Prime Minister under the frames of official visit.¹²¹⁷ Turkey's critical approach toward bloody Andijan events and positive vote of denounce incumbent government in United Nations caused the de facto cut of mutual relations between Uzbekistan. Tashkent as a reaction to Turkey's positive vote at United Nations did not send its official representative to attend summit of Turkish Speaking Nations as since the death of former President Özal, Uzbekistan was represented at the lowest level. On the other hand, the trade volume between Turkey and Uzbekistan had increased during the Justice and Development Party government.

¹²¹⁵ "Relations between Turkey and Uzbekistan", Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, (source: www.mfa.gov.tr, < <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/relations-between-turkey-and-uzbekistan.en.mfa>>, April 2010).

¹²¹⁶ Hasan Kanpolat, "Turkey - Uzbekistan Relations on the 20th Anniversary of Uzbekistan's Independence", *Today's Zaman*, 23 September 2011.

¹²¹⁷ "Turkish PM Erdogan to travel to Uzbekistan", (source: www.turks.us, <<http://www.turks.us/article.php?story=2003121608185569&mode=print>>, April 2010).

3.5. Tajikistan

Along with other Central Asian republics, Ankara following the collapse of Soviet Union recognized the independence of Tajikistan in 1991¹²¹⁸. Afterwards, the diplomatic relations settled between Dushanbe and Ankara, meanwhile high level visits among the high rank officials of the states commenced. Ankara in the post-Cold War period in order to complete its integral policies toward the Central Asia region did not exclude Tajikistan while paid a special attention to the country due its strategic location. In spite of the fact that unlike to other Turkic Central Asian republics Turks and Tajiks are not belong to the same ethnic group, there exists a common cultural and religious heritage between the nations due to secular affiliation.

Under the rule of AKP governments in 2002-2011 periods the main character of Turkey - Tajikistan relations followed its traditional path. Turkish President Abdullah Gül paid a highly important visit to Dushanbe in 30 - 31 May 2009 to boost political and economic relations between the states.¹²¹⁹ Under the frame of his visit, Turkish President met with his colleague where both Presidents talked about the future prospects of bilateral relations. Similar to previous visit took place between the states; the main agenda was the development of economic relations while regional themes also came to agenda.

Following the visit of Abdullah Gül, Tajik President Emomoli Rahman visited Istanbul where he attended the summit of Economic Cooperation Organization in 2010. Within the frames of the visit, Turkish - Tajik Joint¹²²⁰ Business Forum was held where representatives of both sides shared their views on the development of mutual commerce and trade relations of states. Finally in this period, to attend 37th meeting of Islamic Conference that took place in Tajik capital, a high rank Turkish delegation consist of Ministers paid a visit to Tajikistan.

4. Conclusions

Turkish - Russian relations in the course of government period of Justice and Development Party continued its positive line that determined after 90's, which aims the maximum collaboration instead of rivalry with Russian Federation both in bilateral relations and regional politics not excluding Balkans, Black Sea region, Caucasus as well as Central Asia. Thus, AK Party continued the traditional Turkish foreign policy outlook at this period while it

¹²¹⁸ "Relations between Turkey and Uzbekistan", Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, (source: www.mfa.gov.tr, <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/relations-between-turkey-and-tajikistan.en.mfa>, June 2012)

¹²¹⁹ Ibid.

¹²²⁰ Ibid.

was enriched thanks to mutual relations with bilateral agreements, energy cooperation. Eventually the visa free regimes between the countries strengthen reciprocal relations increasingly. The high-level visits realized at Presidents and Prime Ministers level as well as the level of trade volume level that reached to its peak level at this period also constitutes an affirmative argument for the positive constructive structure of Turkish - Russian reciprocal relations during Justice and Development Party Government periods.

On the other hand, the historical problems that existed between the countries continued to keep its problematic nature while both countries keep on being perpetual opponents in regional politics. Notwithstanding to that fact, the attempts of JDP foreign policy decision maker's to build a constructive relation prospect with Moscow was interpreted as an alternative alliance model against West along with Chine and Muslim states, Russian Federation and Turkey are far a way of being strategic partners as refer to nature of bilateral relations. On contrary to Turkey's Northern connection, Justice and Development Party attempted to change Caucasus paradigm of Turkey. Ankara at this period due to official and unofficial advices of EU and USA as well as to take an advantageous position both in European Union negotiations and toward Armenia initialized a softening process with Erivan. Nevertheless, the sides could not agree on a common base that satisfying their interests as well as public views, besides the unexpected reaction of Azerbaijan caused AK Party to withdraw all its initiatives as it jeopardized strategic energy agreements along with Turkey's role of being an energy hub.

The following deadlock of JDP foreign policy appeared at Caucasus due to the sudden eruption of Russian - Georgian War. Ankara leaving between two strategically important neighbors one more time experienced the fragile nature of Caucasus region politics. Following the flaming atmosphere of the war, AK Party came up with Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Platform project, due to current conjecture tough the project has not completely canceled; it has lost its actuality. As for the Turkish foreign policy orientation toward Central Asian Turkic Republics, Justice and Development Party foreign policy decision makers continued the traditional foreign policy at the period of their rule. On contrary to previous governments, AK Party, as regard to its constructive positive relations with Russian Federation elaborately hesitated to use a nationalist - Islamist rhetoric. AK Party at this period instead of stressing to strategic, military or political engagements with region countries preferred to continue economy, trade, commerce and culture based affiliations with Central Asian Turkic republics.

Chapter VI

Relations with Emerging Global Powers

The chapter analyzes Turkey's foreign policy connection with emerging powers of the world in Justice and Development Party government periods between 2002 and 2011. The main objective of the chapter is to examine bilateral relations between Turkey and emerging global actors. Within the frame of the chapter Turkey's relation with People's Republic of China, India and Brazil from political, economic, military and diplomatic relations are studied chronologically in order to figure out foreign policy practice of Turkey in Justice and Development Party governments.

The chapter seeks answers to questions such as whether Turkey's foreign policy in the course of Justice and Development Party government periods experienced a change in comparison to traditional Turkey's foreign policy orientation or Justice and Development Party continued the traditional Turkish foreign policy line toward BRICS group states. The first section of the chapter analyzes Turkish - Chinese relations, while the second section analyzes Turkey's relations with India. The third section of the chapter analyzes Turkey's relations with Brazil throughout Justice and Development Party government periods in 2002 - 2011 periods under the light of historical background. The final section of the chapter consists of the conclusion.

As a consequence of changing conjecture of the world politics and globalization process, the bipolar structure of global politics arose after the end of the Cold War commenced to change gradually particularly with the start of the new millennium. The indisputable place of United States of America as the gendarme of the world order along with its enormous economic dominance commenced to be shaken with the emerge of new global actors. China,¹²²¹ India,¹²²² and Brazil¹²²³ due to their dynamic young demographics,

¹²²¹ For more information about literature on "China as an Emerging Global Actor" see: Garrett, Banking, Bonnie S Glaser, "Chinese Assessments of Global Trends and the Emerging Era in International Relations," *Asian Survey*, Vol. XXIX, No. 4, April 1989, pp. 347-362; Ivan Tselichtchev, *China Versus the West: The Global Power Shift of the 21st Century*, John Wiley & Sons Singapore Pte. Ltd., Singapore 2012; Martin A Smith, *Power in the Changing Global Order: The US, Russia and China*, Polity 2012; Harsh V Prant, *China's Rising Global Profile: The Great Power Tradition*, Sussex Academic Press, Sussex 2012; Gerald Chan, Pak K. Lee, Lai-Ha Chan, *China Engages Global Governance: A New World Order in the Making?*, Routledge, Oxon 2012; Carol L Hamrin *China and the Challenge of the Future: Changing Political Patterns*, Westview Press, Boulder, Colo 1990; Lu Ning, *The Dynamics of Foreign Policy Decisionmaking in China*, Westview Press, Boulder, Colo 1997; Elizabeth Economy: *China Confronts the Challenge of Globalization*, Rockefeller Brothers

economic developments and their success in technology, communication along with other related issues came out to be the new power centers in international relations sphere creating new power momentums around their regions, thus they have started to shape international politics gradually.

As regard to newly emerged global powers issue, Global Economics Paper issued by Goldman Sachs Group Inc. the term BRIC was first time used “to describe the four large developing countries of Brazil, Russia, India, and China that will overtake the G6 (US, Japan, UK, Germany, France, and Italy) in terms of GDP (in US\$) by 2050”.¹²²⁴ The main thesis of BRIC forecast theory, “Dreaming with BRICS: The Path to 2050”,¹²²⁵ posits on the argument that China and India would be the main suppliers of world in terms of good and service while Brazil and Russia would be the dominant suppliers of raw materials.¹²²⁶ Following that, the BRIC group member states initialized regular meetings at Foreign Ministry Level, taking various decisions and turned out to be an international political organization thanks to their developing industries and blooming economies with an economic and political influence both in regional and global politics.¹²²⁷ In addition to Brazil, Russia, India, and China, in 2010, South Africa was included to BRIC group where the acronym was changed to BRICS.¹²²⁸

Republic of Turkey, as a regional power with global ambitions mostly based its foreign policy perspectives to close relations with West as regard to political heritage objectives of its founder Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. Nonetheless, particularly within mid 90's in accordance with the changing paradigms, Turkey initialized an affiliation process with the

Fund 1998; David Bachman, *Domestic Sources of Chinese Foreign Policy* in Samuel Kim (ed.), *China and the World: Chinese Foreign Relations in the Post-Cold War Era*, Westview Press, Boulder, Colo 1994.

¹²²² For detailed information on resources regarding “India as an Emerging Global Actor” see: Piya Mahtaney, *India, China and Globalization: The Emerging Superpowers and the Future of Economic Development*, Palgrave Publishers Ltd, London 2010; Arvind Panagariya, *India: The Emerging Giant*, Oxford University Press, London 2010; Stephen P Cohen, *India: Emerging Power*, Brookings Institution Press, Washington D.C. 2001; Kanti Bajpai, *India's Global Role for the 21st Century: Politics of Community, Order and Co-operation* in Mansingh, Lalit et al, eds., *Indian Foreign Policy: Agenda for the 21st Century*, Vol. I, Konark, Delhi, pp. 3-20; Babbage Ross, Sandy Gordon, *India's Strategic Future: Regional State or Global Power?*, Oxford University Press, Delhi 1992.

¹²²³ For detailed information on resources regarding “Brazil as an Emerging Global Actor” see: Jordon M Jung, *Brazil, Emerging World Power*, Krieger Pub Co., New York 1991; Lincoln Gordon, *Brazil's Secondo Chance: En Route Toward the First World*, Brookings Institution Press, Washington 2001; Julia E Sweig, “A New Global Player: Brazil's Far-Flung Agenda”, *Foreign Affairs*, 2010; Riordan Roett, *The New Brazil*, Brookings Institution Press, Washington D.C. 2010; Rex Hudson, *A Brazil: A Country Study*, Library of Congress, Washington 1997; Bertha K Becker, Claudio A G Eckler, *Brazil: A New Regional Power in the World Economy*, Cambridge University Press, New York 1992

¹²²⁴ Holly A Bell, “Status of the ‘BRICs’: An Analysis of Growth Factors”, *International Research Journal of Finance and Economics*, Issue 69, 2011, p. 19.

¹²²⁵ Dominic Wilson, Roopa Purushothaman, “Dreaming with BRICS: The Path to 2050”, *Goldman Economics Paper*, No 99, October 2003, p.1.

¹²²⁶ Jim O'Neill, *Brics and Beyond*, The Goldman Sachs Group, 2007, pp. 5-9.

¹²²⁷ Ibidem, pp. 5-9.

¹²²⁸ “South Africa Invited to Join BRIC Group”, *Reuters*, 24 December 2010.

emerging actors of the world. Turkey's foreign policy administrators, while focusing their attentions to Turkey's European Union membership and accelerating convergence prospects with United States of America in terms of strategic relations, commenced to develop mostly economy and commerce based associations with China and India. As for Brazil, due to the distance and weak links in the past, it was difficult to start a strategic relation.

Throughout its government periods, Justice and Development Party, as regard to its new foreign policy discourse aimed to bring a versatile character to foreign policy concept by putting a special stress to economic and political relations of Turkey's with emerging global actors. Doing so, it aimed to enforce multi-dimensional structure of Turkey's foreign policy and to find wider policy maneuver areas mostly tighten to relations with European Union and United States as refer to changing dynamics of the world politics.

1. China

Being a Central Asia nation, the genealogy of Turks relations with China goes back to Han Dynasty of China and Hun Empire of Turks.¹²²⁹ The relationship between two countries continued during the Tang Dynasty and Göktürk state in Central Asia.¹²³⁰ Despite of the fact that, Ottoman Empire used to be a Balkan - Mediterranean located empire, due to its global vision and claims, Ottomans advanced close relevancies with Far East Asian Muslims including Muslims¹²³¹ in China.¹²³² Throughout the reign period, Sultan Abdulhamid II, in order to find equilibrium to European politics put a unique focus to Far East and South Asian Muslim nations, plus he used his Caliphate authority in order to create deep moves at international politics. For instance, Sultan Abdulhamid assigned his special agents to encourage Chinese Boxer rebellion,¹²³³ which heavily jeopardized English colonies in Far East.

Republic of Turkey officially recognized Peoples Republic of China in 1971, thus diplomatic relations between the states established.¹²³⁴ During the Korea war, Turkey and

¹²²⁹ Hebert Franke, *The Cambridge History of China: Alien Regimes and Border States, 907-1368*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1994, p. 159

¹²³⁰ Wolfram Eberhard, *A History of China*, University of California Press, Berkeley and Los Angeles 1977, p. 151.

¹²³¹ Jean A Berlie, *Islam in China: Hui and Uighurs: Between Modernisation and Sinicization*, White Lotus Publishing, Bangkok, Thailand 2004, pp. 1-10.

¹²³² Colin Imber, *The Ottoman Empire, 1300-1650: The Structure of Power*, Palgrave Macmillan, New York 2002, pp. 8-66.

¹²³³ Sean M Mekiin, *The Berlin - Baghdad Express: The Ottoman Empire and Germany's Bid for World Power*, Penguin Books Ltd, United States of America 2010, p. 42.

¹²³⁴ "Turkey's Political Relations with China", (source: www.mfa.gov.tr,

China located at hostile parts and both states throughout the Cold war too were situated at adverse sides. In 1984, the preliminary high-level visit took place between Beijing and Ankara when Chinese President Li Xiannian settled to Turkey,¹²³⁵ on reply former Turkish Prime Minister Turgut Özal settled to China in 1985, in order to pay an official visit.¹²³⁶ Succeeding the end of Cold War,¹²³⁷ Turkey's head of state Süleyman Demirel strengthened relation with China aligning with a deeper dimension to two - sided relations in order to boost the collaboration outlooks at information exchange and cultural issues along with to council at regional matters. Ankara at this period tried to prevent political actions so as not disturb Beijing, on the other hand, at the initial emotional atmosphere raised after many Central Asian Turkic states gained sovereignty with the breakdown of Soviet Union. The populist nationalist oratory "Turkish World from Adriatic to China Wall"¹²³⁸ pushed Turkey to follow a pro Uighur policy supporting Uighur Turks independency and Diaspora's activities in Turkey. For instance, in a meeting with previous Uighur politicians and activities, former President Turgut Özal noted that after the dismantlement of USSR,¹²³⁹ it is high time for Uighur Turks to gain independency.¹²⁴⁰ In the thick of the changing general conjecture in the world, former Turkish Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit's official visit to Peking has an exceptional place. It was a crucial visit as the economic aspect of relations and "Uighur Turks" issue came to into agenda of leaders under the framework of this visit. In accordance to talks with China, Turkey continued a friendly policy observing Chinese's sensibilities in terms of Chinese integrity and acceptance of Beijing as the sole representative of China (as regard to China - Taiwan conflict).¹²⁴¹

The liaisons between China and Turkey accelerated with the year of 1997, as Ankara intended to enter Chinese market in order to enjoy trade and commerce prospects in Asia Pacific market as well as to asset alternatives at foreign policy and to collect support in Cyprus question, therefore two-sided relations evidenced a blossom at this period. Coalition government put a special accent on relations with China and in the coalition protocol a

<http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkey_s-political-relations-with-china.en.mfa>, March 2012).

¹²³⁵ "China - Turkey relations", *China Daily*, 28 September 2010.

¹²³⁶ S. Laçiner, "Turgut Özal Period ...", op.cit., pp. 153-205.

¹²³⁷ Graham E Fuller, *From Eastern Europe to Western China: The Growing Role of Turkey in the World and its Implications for Western Interests*, RAND Corporation, Santa Monica 1993, p. 2.

¹²³⁸ Hakan Fidan, "Turkish Policy toward Central Asia", *Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies*, Vol. XII, Issue 1, 2010, pp. 109-121.

¹²³⁹ Mehmet Ögütçü, "Turkey and China", *Perceptions*, Vol. I (3), September - November 1996, pp. 155-179.

¹²⁴⁰ Fatih Fortun, *Uygur Sorunu Golgesinde Türk - Çin İlişkileri, (Turkish - Chinese Relations under the Shadow of Uighur Question)*, Global Political Trends Center, 2010, p. 6.

¹²⁴¹ "Reactions Grows against Ecevit on China", *Hürriyet Daily News*, 18 April 2002.

phrase caring the relations with China and providing a versatile dynamic to Turkish foreign policy.¹²⁴² Through a secret notice, Turkish government banned the use of East Turkestan flags and restricted activities of Uighur Diaspora in Turkey. Besides, 10 members of East Turkistan Independence Organization were detained and former Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit overtly announced that the Uighur issue may not lay as an obstacle throughout the Turkish – Chinese relations hinting Turkey’s new policy approximations toward People’s Republic of China. Thus, Turkish - Chinese relationship speeded up with an aligning bloomed in 1999 - 2002 periods.¹²⁴³

In 2000, under the framework of Chinese President Jiang Zemin, Ankara and Beijing consented to sign a Joint Communiqué and Energy Cooperation Protocol, and Memorandum of Understanding on Economic issues. In addition to that, both sides released a common declaration on terrorism as well Turkish Republic rewarded Chinese President with a golden medal due to his inputs to bilateral relations.¹²⁴⁴ As with many other developing countries, there is a huge disproportion between the import and export ratio of Chinese - Turkish economic relations. Turkey's exportation amount to China is roughly 693 million United States Dollars, while the import amount is striking 9.6 billion United States Dollars. In order to balance detrimental composure versus it, Turkey focuses on tourist flow from China, as well appeal to direct investments from China and develop joint ventures with Beijing.¹²⁴⁵

It is stated in the party program of AK Party that “Dynamic economies in China and South East Asia will be handled on a multiple base and Turkey will work to tighten its relations with these countries”¹²⁴⁶ referring to relations with China with a special emphasis on economic dimension of bilateral relations. In the 59th Turkish Republic party program constituted by AK Party, it was affirmed that “relations with China will be developed under the basement of mutual respect and will be forwarded parallel to this principle”.¹²⁴⁷ However, at the 60th government program, which was prepared during the second term of Justice and Development Party government, contains the expression “The developing relations with Russia, India, China and Japan, as the key actors of Eurasia are not an alternative for Turkey’s

¹²⁴² “Turkey’s Political Relations with China”, (source: www.mfa.gov.tr, <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkey_s-political-relations-with-china.en.mfa>, March 2012).

¹²⁴³ Ibidem.

¹²⁴⁴ Ibidem.

¹²⁴⁵ Ibidem.

¹²⁴⁶ “Party Program of Justice and Development Party”, (source: www.akparti.org.tr, <http://www.akparti.org.tr/vi-dis-politika_79.html?piD=50>, March 2012).

¹²⁴⁷ “Government Program of 60th Turkish Government”, (source: www.baybul.com.tr, <<http://baybul.com/genel-konular/254635-59-hukumet-programi-erdogan-hukumeti.html?langid=1>>, March 2012).

institutionalized relations with European Union and United States of America”¹²⁴⁸. This statement is highly remarkable in order to conceptualize the Justice and Development Party’s approach to relations with East - West balance.

Shortly after Justice and Development Party’s accession to rule, first time high-level touch took place between the countries, when Chinese Prime Minister Zhu Rongji paid a two-day official visit to Ankara in 2002. It was, as usual, an economy focused visit and both sides signed memorandum of understandings in agriculture, import taxes and information issues¹²⁴⁹. On respond to Prime Minister’s visit, former Turkish Foreign Affairs Minister Abdullah Gül paid a 5 working day official visit to China in 2005. Under the borders of his visit, former FM realized high-level meetings with Chinese officials, principally in economic and business oriented issues. The imbalance commerce relations between the states and Turkey’s trade tariffs against China came into an agenda as a warm topic during the meetings. 2009 became a historic year for Turkish - Chinese relations. After 14 years of the break, Turkish Chief of state paid an official visit to China between 24 and 29 June of 2009. It was also immensely influential as it was the first highest-level visit undertook during Justice and Development Party Government in terms of relations with China. Visiting Beijing as the President of Turkey, Abdullah Gül noticed on an interview with Turkish state channel Turkey’s involvement in distant regions of the globe in terms of political and economic relations, while highlighted that it does not suggest that Turkey's engagements in South East Asia is an alternative preference for Turkey’s liaison with EU and USA.¹²⁵⁰

Throughout his visit in Beijing, Turkish President came together with his counterpart Hu Jintao, where both states put endorsements on several accords. During his executive visit, head of state attended a business council meeting with Turkish business people and Abdullah Gül one more time took into the agenda the instable situation of Turkish - China relations in terms of commerce and noticed that China has investments worth billions of dollars across the world. It made investments worth 90 billion U.S. dollars abroad last year. The country's investments in Turkey amount to only 60 million U.S. dollars. Turkey has more investments in China”.¹²⁵¹ He repeatedly dwelled the demand of Chinese direct invest to Turkey and the need to boost the number of Chinese tourists to Turkey.

¹²⁴⁸ “The Party Program of 60th Government”, (source: www.byegm.gov.tr, <http://www.byegm.gov.tr/docs/60_Hukumet_prog.pdf>, April 2011).

¹²⁴⁹ “Turkey’s Political Relations with China”, (source: www.mfa.gov.tr, <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkey_s-political-relations-with-china.en.mfa>, March 2012).

¹²⁵⁰ “Turkey Willing to be in Close Touch with Far East”, (source: www.aa.com.tr, <<http://www.aa.com.tr/en/turkey-willing-to-be-in-close-touch-with-far-east.html>>, April 2011).

¹²⁵¹ “Turkish - China Relations in 2009”, (source: www.turkishweekly.net,

On the final leg of Turkish President's trip, he visited the Urumqi, the capital of Xinjiang - Uighur autonomous region. Abdullah Gül became the first Turkish President who visited the Xinjiang autonomous region in history of Turkish - Chinese relations where he met with regional authorities and addressed to students of Xinjiang University.¹²⁵² In an open public speech, Turkish President notified, "Xinjiang constitutes one of the most important bonds between the two countries, and that the Uighur people in Xinjiang forms a bridge of friendship between China and Turkey".¹²⁵³

2009 July Urumqi Riots

The Uighur people with a population approximately 9 Million, are ethnic Muslim - Turkic group who live in the northwestern part of China chiefly inhabited in Xinjiang - Uighur autonomous region.¹²⁵⁴ The Uighur issue has been a theme of discussion since the initial of Turkish - Chinese diplomatic relations. The heavy human right violations, assimilation policies of Beijing government against Uighur Turks, demographic changes applied to the region, the ethnic tensions between Han Chinese and Uighur Turks, economic underdevelopment of the territory, integration problems are the main issues causing the raise of tension in the region.¹²⁵⁵

Along with Tibet issue, the human right violation concerns in East Turkistan came into the agenda of United Nations a couple of times. Regardless of that, Beijing did not accept the allegations appreciating it as the internal problem of China as well blamed foreign states to agitate the situation and interfering internal affairs of People's Republic of China. The Uighur question entered to a complete different path after 9/11 terror attacks and gained a more international character as China's government issued reports retaining Al Qaida – East Turkistan Islamic Movement connection.¹²⁵⁶ United States of America initially warned Beijing not to put press ethnic minorities under the pretext of struggle against terror

<<http://www.turkishweekly.net/news/94787/turkey-china-relations-in-2009.html>>, April 2011).

¹²⁵² "Turkish President Arrives in Urumchi", *Anadolu Agency*. 29 June 2009.

¹²⁵³ Igor Torbakov, Matti Nonojen, "China - Turkey and Xinjian: a Frayed Relationship", (source: [www.opendemocracy.net](http://www.opendemocracy.net/article/china-turkey-and-xinjiang-a-frayed-relationship), <<http://www.opendemocracy.net/article/china-turkey-and-xinjiang-a-frayed-relationship>>, April 2011).

¹²⁵⁴ For more detailed information on Uighurs see: Dru C Gladney, *Muslim Chinese: Ethnic Nationalism: In the People's Republic*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge 1991; Denis Sinor, "The Uighurs", in *The Cambridge History of Early Inner Asia*, ed. Denis Sinor, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1990, pp. 335-342;

¹²⁵⁵ Barry Sautman, "Preferential Policies for Ethnic Minorities in China: The Case of Xinjiang", *Working Papers in Social Sciences*, No. 32, 30 September 1997, pp. 1-10.

¹²⁵⁶ Rohan Gunaratna, Kenneth George Pereire, "An Al-Qaeda Associate Group Operating in China?", *China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly*, Vol. IV, No. 2, 2006, pp. 55-61.

throughout the military operations held in Afghanistan.¹²⁵⁷ US forces obtained East Turkistan Islamic Movement - Al Qaida connection while arrested Taliban militants with Uighur origins, therefore Washington declared many East Turkistan political organizations in Diaspora as illegal as well as added them into terrorist organizations list. Moreover, United Nation as well applied the similar policy of United States of America the result of which narrowed Uighur Turks struggle against China.¹²⁵⁸

Along with other world countries, Uighur issue as well caused concerns of Turkey due to its ethnic and religious affinity to Uighur Turks. The Uighur community residing in Turkey and nationalist - Islamist fractions ceaselessly became a press factor for Turkish governments. Yet, Ankara as regard to fragile construction of the issue, favored to advent to East Turkistan question as an internal matter of Peoples' Republic of China. On the other hand, Turkish Republic, constantly hesitated to engage with Uighur problem due to its Kurdish separatist problem, as well as owing to the fact that China being a constant United Nations member and Peking's support for Turkish thesis in Cyprus issue. These factors always stimulated Ankara to approach Uighur Turks question delicately in order not to deteriorate the sensitive relations with China.

Due to ethnic tension raising in the course of history of the region between Han Chinese and Uighur Turks (% 45 Uighur Turks and % 40 Han Chinese) the East Turkistan gradually draw to a chaos atmosphere.¹²⁵⁹ In 2009, first flame of ethnic conflict – though there existed similar cases previously - of ethnic conflict fired in the violence incident in Shaougan city at Guangdong region. A group of Uighur Turks who went to work to the region was alleged for raping a Han woman and due to raised rumors in the city Han Chinese attacked to Uighur killing 2 men in the incidents between 25 and 26 June. As respond to incidents, at the capital of Xinjiang region Urumqi, ethnic Uighur Turks commenced to organize protest against the killings and oppressive politics of Chinese government. The Uighur Turks hitting number of 1000 initially gathered to protest the incident, however at the following phases of protest, the action turned out to be a riot where the angry crowds targeted Han Chinese watching the protests. The crowd attacked Han Chinese to beat to death and burn cars, shops and houses of Han Chinese. When the incident was heard in the Han discreet,

¹²⁵⁷ William Ide, "What is the East Turkestan Islamic Movement", *Voice of America*, 4 August 2011.

¹²⁵⁸ Brian Fishman, "Al-Qaeda and the Rise of China: Jihadi Geopolitics in a Post-Hegemonic Word", *The Washington Quarterly*, Summer 2011, pp.47-62.

¹²⁵⁹ Gardner Bovingdon, *Autonomy in Xinjiang: Han Nationalist Imperatives and Uyghur Discontent*, Policy Studies, East - West Center, Washington 2004, pp.3-5.

in respond to Uighurs they as well started to attack Uighur Turks, therefore the incidents turned out to be the most bloody ethnic conflict in the history of region.¹²⁶⁰

As a reaction to riot Chinese police intervened in order to take control and the incident ended with the toll of 197 dead and 1.721 injured. The severe attitude of Beijing government against the protesters was harshly criticized by Human Rights Watchdogs and Uighur Diaspora at abroad. The Chinese armed force deployed to region was criticized for practicing disproportional violence against the Uighur protester and aftermath searches realized in Uighur districts, while regional authorities blamed them for reacting slow deliberately in order to prevent Han Chinese attacks against Uighur regions.¹²⁶¹ Beijing and Ankara, achieved a positive economic and political affinity in recent years with Justice and Development Party and this accelerations yielded with Turkish Presidents historical visit to China. Thus, the most important and attracting part of 2009 June riot was the Turkish Presidents historical visit to China and Xinjiang region. The 2009 Urumqi incidents from the very first stages reflected widely in Turkish media, particularly the nationalist wing of mass media, which put a special emphasis on East Turkistan (Uighur Turks) issue. On the other hand, the opposition parties criticized JDP government to keep motionless against Urumqi massacres while mass protests in various Turkish cities supported by conservatives, nationalist and Islamist put a heavy pressure on AK Party government.

Ankara, in the course of history with China had kept silence many times when similar cases occurred, when China violated human rights of Uighur Turks severely. Previous Turkish governments preferred to call Xinjiang as an integral part of China and put a stance toward the related issues, nevertheless this time; Ankara followed a totally unorthodox path and from the top level of government criticized Beijing. Turkish Prime Minister along with President Hu Jintao (due to unrest Chinese President returned to Beijing leaving the summit suddenly) was attending the G - 8 summit in Italy and there called the events as “almost genocide” and asked China to stop assimilation against Uighur minority, while President Gül called the events as “massacre”¹²⁶². Turkish PM asked Chinese government not to remain as a spectator to the incidents. He continued his critics saying, “No state, no society that attacks the lives and rights of innocent civilians can guarantee its security and prosperity. Whether they are Turkic Uighurs or Chinese, we cannot tolerate such atrocities. The suffering of the

¹²⁶⁰ Dan Chung, “Unrest in Urumqi, China”, *The Guardian*, 6 July 2009.

¹²⁶¹ Edward Wong, “Riots in Western China Amid Ethnic Tension”, *The New York Times*, 5 July 2009.

¹²⁶² “Turkey’s President Urges China to Prosecute Perpetrators of Xinjiang Massacre”, *Anatolia*, 10 July 2009.

Uighurs is ours”¹²⁶³. He noticed that Turkey, as a non-permanent member of the United Nations Security Council, was determined to bring the issue of the Chinese crackdown onto the council's agenda.¹²⁶⁴ Erdoğan, upon return to home, during an interview on a private TV channel comment the incident as “the incidents in China are, simply but, genocide. There’s no point in interpreting this otherwise”.¹²⁶⁵

The unexpected attitude of Turkish President supported by the high rank members of Justice and Development Party as some AK Party members of Turkish – China Friendship Group as some ministers suggested boycotting goods made in China. One additional reaction of Turkish government as respond to the incidents was Rebiya Kadeer. Rebiya Kadeer is an influential figure in Uighur issue living in political exile in United States. Being a millionaire businesswoman as well the advocate of Uighur question, Kadeer is also the President of World Uighur Congress. In 2009 riot events, the name of Kadeer came into public view often as Chinese government accused her to mastermind and provoke the ethnic separatism. Rebiya Kadeer applied two times for a Turkish visa but Ankara in order not to influence her relations with China refused her visa demands, but Justice and Development Party from the highest level (Prime Minister) told that if she wants to visit Turkey again a visa should be issued signaling an invitation to Turkey, which did not take place.

The official respond to Turkish government’s sour criticism came trough diplomatic channels from China demanding withdrawal Erdoğan’s words blaming Peking administration to undertake genocide.¹²⁶⁶ The state owned China Daily evaluated Turkish Prime Minister’s words “irresponsible and groundless”¹²⁶⁷ hinting that majority victim of incidents were Han Chinese. The most interesting part of the article was the suggestion for China as a respond to Turkish Prime Minister Outcry to support Kurdish separatism and accept so called Armenian Genocide proposal. The Foreign Affairs Minister of China called Ahmet Davutoğlu in order to convey his sorrow related with Turkish Prime Minister’s words and asked to retract these harsh comments. Beijing, to restore spoiled relations with Turkey sent a high-level diplomat to Ankara. Qin Gang, the spokesman of Chinese Foreign Ministry underlined the fact that in the incident more Han Chinese dead than Uighurs and it could not be called as genocide. In

¹²⁶³ Ibidem.

¹²⁶⁴ Ibidem.

¹²⁶⁵ “China Demands Turkish Retraction”, *BBC*, 14 July 2009.

¹²⁶⁶ Ibidem.

¹²⁶⁷ Ibidem.

addition to that, China dismissed Turkish Prime Minister's proposal in order to discuss Urumqi events in United Nations Security Council.¹²⁶⁸

On contrary to bitter critics of Turkish Prime Minister, Turkish Foreign Affair Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu approached the case cold bloodedly and diplomatically. In the turmoil of tense moments of crisis, Turkish diplomacy conveyed concerns of Turkey via diplomatic channels and through a telephone conversation lasted 1 hour and 15 minutes affirmed his counterpart that Turkey did not want to interfere with internal issues of China, Turkish FM also stressed Turkey's high respect toward territorial integrity of China. He added that the Uighur Turks constitutes a bridge for dialogue and close relations with China, while affirmed that Turkey hands the issue from human rights perspective, plus conveyed his wishes to investigate the issue quickly. As for the indignation in Turkish media and public, Minister connected it to Turkey's affinities with Uighur Turks and appreciated it as the sensitiveness of Turkish society. Both Ministers as well agreed to send a Turkish journalist delegation in order to visit places where incidents took place.¹²⁶⁹

Following the strained period of relations due to 2009 Urumqi riots, Turkish - Chinese relations soon reconciled and high-level visits along with bilateral agreements signature restarted. In October 2010, Chinese Prime Minister Wen Jiabao visited Ankara. Under the frames of visit, both sides signed agreements in trade and technology issues. Chinese PM met with his Turkish counterpart where both Prime Ministers pledged to realize high speed rail way project which will connect Turkish capital to Istanbul. Besides, the historical Silk Road connecting both countries in terms of mercantile relations initialized to revitalize due to Silk Road Railway, which aims to connect China with Turkey. After the tensions of last year for many observers and political analysts, the visit of Chinese Prime Minister accepted as the initial of Turkish - Chinese strategic partnership.

In October 2010, Turkey invited Chinese jets to take part in Anatolian Eagle military exercise which held in Turkish territory, what made the issue more controversial was Chinese air forces used air space of Iran. In October again, the Interior Minister of Turkish Republic visited Peoples' Republic of China in order to develop bilateral relations between security forces of countries in the struggle against illegal narcotic trafficking. In the November of 2010, Chinese and Turkish armies underwent a joint training, which was recorded to history

¹²⁶⁸ "China Dismiss Turkish PM's Genocide Remarks", *Hürriyet Daily News*, 14 July 2009.

¹²⁶⁹ "Turkish Foreign Minister Davutoglu Talk to His Chinese Counterpart on the Phone", (source: [www.aa.com.tr,<http://www.aa.com.tr/en/turkish-foreign-minister-davutoglu-talks-to-his-chinese-counterpart-on-the.html>](http://www.aa.com.tr/en/turkish-foreign-minister-davutoglu-talks-to-his-chinese-counterpart-on-the.html), April 2011).

as China deploying armies to a North Atlantic Treaty Organization member state territory for the first time.¹²⁷⁰

Following that, Turkish Minister of Trade Zafer Çağlayan settled to China in order to soften tensed relations due to Urumqi riots, though the mutual critics of statesmen, the trade and commerce relations did not severely harmed, which signified Turkey's intention to continue good will relations with Beijing that worsen due to public remarks of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. Çağlayan visit caused different commentaries in Turkish and Chinese media. Chinese evaluated Trade Minister's visit as Turkey's initiatives to ameliorate relations while Turkish media approached it as the high-level conveyer to pass Turkish concerns on the Uighur issue.¹²⁷¹ Shortly after the visit of Ven Ciabao, Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu paid a six-day long visit to China in 2010¹²⁷². Turkish Minister visited Beijing, Shanghai along with Urumqi and Kashgar. The visit was highly important as Davutoğlu started his visit from Urumqi and Kashgar, which was symbolically important in order to indicate China's good will, trust and intention to develop close relations with Turkey as Beijing previously permit Turkish parliamentary delegation, Turkish journalists and state minister for Foreign Trade. The visit of Davutoğlu evidenced many first time events; for instance during Ahmet Davutoğlu's first leg of visit in Urumqi, he attended a Friday prayer in central mosque of Urumqi along with Uighur Muslims though Chinese officials passed their security concerns. The Kashgar visit was meaningful in order to understand new level of relations as Kashgar was a symbolic city in Turkish - Islam tradition which hosts many historic personalities important for Turkey, moreover Ahmet Davutoğlu visited the tombs of Mahmud al Kashgari the prominent Turkish scholar and lexicographer of Turkish language and Yusuf Balasaghun an important Turkish writer and philosopher.¹²⁷³ Though symbolically, the visits to historic places were important as coincided with the Urumqi riots, hence the Uighur question commenced to be a secondary issue between Turkish - Chinese relations. The visit of Turkish Foreign Affairs Minister played a crucial role in the process of reconciliation of relations with China as Turkey publicly declared its idea to open a consulate in Urumqi, which was a political taboo till the current level of relations.

¹²⁷⁰ "Turkish FM Stresses Need to Free Turkish - PRC Ties of 'Cold War' Paradigm", *Anatolia*, 1 November 2010.

¹²⁷¹ "Turkey Vows to Stamp Out Activity Detrimental to China", *Xinhua News Agency*, 1 September 2009.

¹²⁷² "Davutoğlu to Visit China for Talks on Boosting Cooperation", *Today's Zaman*, 23 October 2010.

¹²⁷³ "Turkish FM's Cultural Tour to China Kicks off in Kashgar", *Hürriyet Daily News*, 28 October 2010.

2. India

As a nation, Turks' relations with India go back to the medieval era as many Turkish originated tribes established various state in different scales in today's India. Among these states, Ghaznavids and Babur states played an important role in the history of India, while Turkic people contributed a lot to Indian culture, literature, language civilization, art, architecture and cuisine of India.¹²⁷⁴ During the Ottoman Empire bilateral relations continued and first diplomatic relations took place in 15th century, because Ottoman Empire was holding Caliphate institution, there appeared a constant relation between Indian Muslims and Ottoman Empire. Toward the collapse period of Ottoman Empire, the level of relations experienced a decrease, however, Indian Muslims supported materially (providing huge amounts of gold and cash) Ottoman Empire during the very heavy moments of Balkan and Turkish Independence War periods thanks to which Turks favored in the course of independence war. The diplomatic relations between Turkish Republic and Republic of India was established shortly after India gained of independence in 1947.¹²⁷⁵ Since then, mutual relations between both states developed gradually. Both India and Turkey being democratic and secular states and part of G-20 reinforced bilateral relations thanks to high-level visits of head of states.

Mutual relations gained a positive momentum with 1990's and from each side high-level visits including that of Prime Ministers and Presidents took place. Due to strategic location of India, Turkey and India cooperated in Central Asia, Afghanistan, naval issues and war against terrorism. Besides there exist many dialogue mechanism between Turkey and India in order to coordinate political and economic relations. As for commerce and economic relations, on contrary to the close relations between the states the economic relations followed a low profile. Within 1990's due to developed relations there was a mobility parallel to political affiliation.¹²⁷⁶ Turkey - India relations in the course of history highly influenced India - Pakistan conflict on Kashmir, because Pakistan was a close of alliance and supporter of Turkey in many international issues like Cyprus, Turkey always attentively observed Pakistan's priorities and shaped her relations in accordance with these sensibilities. Sarah Akram regarding Turkish - Indian reciprocal relations notifies:

¹²⁷⁴ "India - Turkey Relations", (source: www.indembassy.org.tr, <<http://www.indembassy.org.tr/eng/Relations.aspx?link=3>>, April 2011).

¹²⁷⁵ "Turkey's Political Relations with India", (source: www.mfa.gov.tr, <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkey_s-political-relations-with-india.en.mfa>, April 2011).

¹²⁷⁶ Ibidem.

Both the countries have expanding economies, growing industrial infrastructures and the attention of global powers trying to make important investments in their potential. Previously, the Cold War strategic calculus kept both the countries at a significant distance, along with the Pakistan factor, as Pakistan and Turkey have enjoyed strong ties and Turkey's historic support of Pakistan in its stance on the Kashmir issue has also been an irritant in Indo-Turkish cooperation. Similarly, Turkey's military ties with Pakistan have also been a stumbling block and prevented the two countries from coming closer to each other in the past.¹²⁷⁷

However, after the new conjecture emerged after the Cold War, India commenced to occupy a central place in Asian politics, becoming second crowded world country and increasing economic power turned to be a global actor with an increasing influence. Thus, with 1990's Turkey gradually shifted her traditional distinctive towards India, while continued to held her tight relations with Pakistan with whom Turkey has many cooperation in terms of struggle against terror, Central Asia politics and Afghanistan.

With Justice and Development Party's coming to power in Turkey, new political attitude of Ankara towards New Delhi continued in the same line in comparison to previous Turkish governments. The level of economic and commerce relations initialized to be compensated, furthermore parallel to Justice and Development Party's new foreign policy alternatives Ankara prioritized Turkish - Indian relations to increase trade volume, while developing political affiliations. It is an undeniable fact that, since AK Party, there were high-level visits between Ankara and New Delhi but Justice and Development Party's new rhetoric and attempts to practice this new foreign policy discourse brought outcomes that are more fruitful at this period. At this perspective, AK Party's policies toward South Asian countries including India brought a new dynamic to Turkish foreign policy at this period.

Parallel to this, Justice and Development Party in order to accelerate economic relations with India and other South Asian countries launched "The Trade and Economic Relation Development Strategy with Asia Pacific Countries",¹²⁷⁸ and put a special stress on trade issues with India. Since Justice and Development Party's constituting the government 2002 high-level visits from Indian side gradually increased in comparison to past. However, neither at Indian Prime Minister nor President visited Turkey. Turkish Prime Minister paid a Three day visit to India in 2008 and Turkish President went to India in 2010. Since 2002, Turkey hosted various Indian Minister mostly economy, trade and commerce related issues like the visits of; Culture and Tourism Minister's (2002), Commerce and Industry Minister's

¹²⁷⁷ Sarah Akram, "Turkey - India Relations Redefined", *Perceptions*, No.4, 2010, p.1.(1-3)

¹²⁷⁸ "Türkiye - Hindistan Ekonomik İlişkileri" ("Economic Relations between Turkey and India"), (source: www.mfa.gov.tr, <<http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkiye-hindistan-ekonomik-iliskileri.tr.mfa>>, April 2011).

(2009) or Minister of Textiles in 2009.¹²⁷⁹ As respond previous visits, Turkish Foreign Minister Ali Babacan and State Minister responsible for Foreign Trade visited India. Between 21 and 24 November 2008, Erdoğan paid an official visit to India, 8 years after former Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit. During Prime Minister's visit, State Minister, Minister of Commerce and Industry, Minister of Energy and Natural Resources took place at the official delegation of Turkey, along with a huge number of business people – which turned out to be a tradition during the Justice and Development Party government- seeking business opportunities in Indian market.

Turkish Prime Minister met with Indian President Prathiba Patil and his counterpart Manmohan Sing along with Indian Foreign Minister Pranab Mukherje. As it was uttered by Turkish Prime Minister, the top agenda of the visit was developing economic and trade relations between Turkey and India. Erdoğan during the press conference held after his meeting mentioned the historical affinity between the states and stressed the fact that there is no present political conflict between two countries. He appreciated India as a global actor highly determinative both in regional and global politics and suggested to increase cooperation prospect with Turkey due to strategic importance of Turkey that deepened during their government.¹²⁸⁰ He invited Indian Businessmen to invest to Turkey, reminding Turkey's role as a civilization bridge and geopolitical location situating at a strategic point linking energy resources between East and West. Under the frame of his visit, Turkish Prime Minister attended the Turkish - Indian Forum. He underlined Turkey's eagerness to increase trade volume between India and informed journalist about the works in order to create a free trade zone between the states. Among one of attracting points of the visit was New Delhi's wish to take part at Turkish - Israeli Med Stream Project. Hilmi Güler, Minister of Energy and Natural Resources stated that Turkey Israel and India initialized talks on joint project planned to accomplish in 2011 proposing to connect Red Sea to Turkish Ceyhan Port. In addition to that, Turkish and Indian sides conducted executive talks on nuclear issue due to India's experience in nuclear energy in accordance to Turkey's nuclear program in order to produce alternative energy supplies for domestic market.

Following the Prime Minister's visit, second high-level visit to India was paid by Turkish President two years after, in 2010. Under the frame of his South Asia visit program - parallel to Turkey's new South Asia openings - President Gül as the first stop of his visit went

¹²⁷⁹ "Bilateral Visits to India to Turkey", (Economic Relations between Turkey and India), (source: www.mfa.gov.tr, <<http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkiye-hindistan-ekonomik-iliskileri.tr.mfa>>, May 2011).

¹²⁸⁰ Şaban Kardaş, "Erdogan Visits India: Bilateral Trade and Turkish - Israeli - Indian Energy Cooperation on the Agenda", *Eurasia Daily Monitor*, Vol. V, Issue 226, 2008.

to India. As it was expected, the main agenda of Turkish President was economy and trade issues, additionally the cultural issues as well came to agenda as at the Turkish delegation were present famous Turkish director seeking cooperation with Indian movie sector.¹²⁸¹ The timing of Turkish President's was significant as it was coinciding India's ignorance of invitation to Friendship and Cooperation in the Heart of Asia held in Istanbul due to Pakistan's suggestions. Turkish President coming together with his counterpart expressed Turkey's attitudes and invited India to upcoming events, while on the other hand Turkish Foreign Affairs informed Turkey's stance in order to keep the delicate balance momentum in the region. Following his meeting with Indian President, Abdullah Gül came together with opposition leaders and continued his visit in Bombay where he realized economy and trade weighted meetings.

President Abdullah Gül, throughout his stay in India came together with Turkish business people who have different investments in the region. Referring to India's growing economy and huge population potential and increasing power of India in world politics as a global actor Gül promised to solve all trade and economy related problems of Turkish businesspersons in Turkey like visa easement, and free trade agreement with India.¹²⁸² Following his meetings, Turkish President went to Bangladesh. The trade volume between India and Turkey increased relatively during Justice and Development Party government. In 2010, Turkish export to India has increased 47 % in comparison to 2009 hitting 606 Million US Dollars, as import percentage as well increased 79 % hitting 3.4 Billion US Dollars. In spite of the developing relations in terms of trade and economy, Turkey now has a disadvantageous shortcoming in import - export balance with India.¹²⁸³ Therefore, Justice and Development Party government launched different mechanisms in order to turn current trade volume toward Turkey's advantage; like Turkish - Indian Business Forum which held in Istanbul (2009) or Turkish - Indian Joint Economic Commission took place in Ankara and Indian - Turkish Cooperation Platform held in New Delhi.¹²⁸⁴ In addition to that, opening a

¹²⁸¹ "President Abdullah Gul's Official Visit to India", (source: [www.turkishweekly.net](http://www.turkishweekly.net/news/97379/president-abdullah-gul%E2%80%99s-official-visit-to-india-.html), <<http://www.turkishweekly.net/news/97379/president-abdullah-gul%E2%80%99s-official-visit-to-india-.html>>, April 2011).

¹²⁸² "Cumhurbaşkanı Gül, Hindistan'da Türk İş Adamlarıyla Bir Araya Geldi" ("Turkish President Met with Turkish Businessmen in India"), (source: www.tccb.gov.tr, <<http://www.tccb.gov.tr/haberler/170/48698/cumhurbaskani-gul-hindistanda-turk-is-adamlariyla-bir-araya-geldi.html>>, April 2011).

¹²⁸³ "Türkiye - Hindistan Ekonomik İlişkileri" ("Economic Relations between Turkey and India"), (source: www.mfa.gov.tr, <<http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkiye-hindistan-ekonomik-iliskileri.tr.mfa>>, April 2011).

¹²⁸⁴ Ibidem.

Turkish consulate in Bombay as the heart of business in India was an indicator of Turkey's endeavors in order to create maximum cooperation with India in economic meaning.

On the other hand, Turkey seeking advantageous opportunities for Turkish companies at transport sector in Indian market as India is the second most crowded country in the world, which has a very low rate of communication and transport possibilities. Another attempt of Turkey during this period was to promote tourism and recreation opportunities in Indian market, thus there will be a stable increase at Indian tourist quantity visiting Turkey as it reached 63. 000 people in 2011.¹²⁸⁵ Justice and Development Party throughout its reign paid an exceptional attention to Turkey's relations with third states and emerging global actors of the world along with other regions that Turkey used to have poor relations. From this perspective, South East Asian and Far East Asian, countries like China and India settled top-level agenda of Ankara between 2002 and 2011 period.

In spite of the fact that, in the course of reciprocal relations between China, the Uighur Turks issue did not come to the agenda and Turkish statesmen called China's attitude as a massacre, the trade and commerce side of Turkish- China's relations did not experience negative impact on contrary to expectations. Turkish foreign policy under AK Party administration developed high-level economic relations between Beijing and signed strategic agreements in terms of communication, transport, energy issues. One attracting feature of developing mutual relations and trust between the countries was the high-level of Turkish officials visit to East Turkistan, which was accepted as a political taboo in the framework of Turkish - China's relations previously.

Turkey - Brazil relations, which did not indicate a sign of healing since mid 90's hit its top level during Justice and Development Party government and Brazil, became Turkish most close ally not only in regional politics but also in global issue. Thanks to the latest achievements that took place in terms of relations with Brazil. Turkey entered to South America market slowly while both countries displayed a good performance in Iranian nuclear crisis engaging to a long lasted problem and gained an advantageous position. Additionally, Turkey and Brazil agreed on much energy related issues along with starting joint venture projects in third-world countries. Turkish policies toward India since AK Party mostly engaged to Pakistani reserves gained an independent feature at this term as JDP foreign policy makers succeed to explain Turkey's position diplomatically to Pakistani colleagues. Ankara interested in realizing investments in the India's market effort to turn negative balance

¹²⁸⁵ Ibidem.

equilibrium, sought transport based investments in India while promoted Turkish tourism and recreation opportunities in Indian market.

3. Brazil

Turkey's relations with Brazil date back to Ottoman Empire, when both states signed a friendship, trade and maritime agreement in 1888 in London. Due to Brazil's immigration policies toward the latest period of Ottoman Empire, many Ottoman citizens particularly from Syria and Lebanon immigrated to Brazil, which gained a deeper dimension to relations. After the collapse of Ottoman Empire, Turkish Republic and Brazil signed a friendship in Rome and both states opened their diplomatic missions in capitals in the following years.

As a consequence of the distance and rare contacts like many other Latin American countries, Turkey could not develop tense frequency economic, political and diplomatic relations with Brazil. Furthermore, because of low-level associations, the basic trade agreements easing the trade opportunities between the countries did not overcome, therefore the trade volume between the Brazil and Turkey remained a relatively low level far below from real potential of countries. Being a prominent political and economic actor in Latin America and a global power in world politics particularly after the 1990, Brazil entered Turkish Foreign policy agenda in recent years. The low-level relations relatively accelerated thanks to historical visit of former Turkish President Süleyman Demirel, who became the first Turkish President visiting Brazil in 1995, he also visited other Latin American countries like Chile and Argentina. Following the visit of Turkish President, in 1998 former Turkish Foreign Minister Ismail Cem too paid an official visit to Brazil.¹²⁸⁶

With the Justice and Development Party's taking the power, the relations between Turkey and Brazil gained a more dynamic feature, first of all the direction of reciprocal relations focused on economy and trade, secondly though gradually it gave more opportunities in terms of political cooperation's and partnership prospects. Similar openings of AK Party's foreign policy decision makers were parallel to multi dimensional foreign policy concept and in order to favor Latin American markets, plus to develop tighter economic and trade oriented relations with Latin America region.

¹²⁸⁶ "Türkiye Cumhuriyeti - Brezilya Federal Cumhuriyeti İlişkileri" ("Relations between Turkish Republic and Federative Republic of Brazil"), (source: www.mfa.gov.tr, <<http://brasilia.emb.mfa.gov.tr/ShowInfoNotes.aspx?ID=108346>>, April 2011).

In 2003, Defense Minister of Justice and Development paid an official visit to Brazil where both states signed a common defense agreement.¹²⁸⁷ Thanks to goodwill based relations between the parliamentary friendship commissions of Turkey and Brazil a Joint Economic Commission Mechanism was built, hence first meeting of the Joint Economic Commission Mechanism met in October of 2004, to the first meeting of joint commission, Finance Minister of Justice and Development Party attended. On respond, Development, Industry and Foreign Trade Minister of Brazil visited Ankara in order to talk with Turkish counterparts in terms of economic and trade relations.

In 2006, former Turkish Foreign Minister Abdullah Gül paid an official visit to Federative Republic of Brazil due to the invitation of Brazilian Foreign Minister along with a crowded delegation constituted of Ministers responsible foreign trade and business people seeking business opportunities in Brazil. Under the frames of his official visit, he met with Brazilian officials including Industry and Foreign Trade Minister, his counterpart Celso Amorim and former President Luiz Inacio Lula Da Silva in capital Brasilia. After the former Foreign Minister Gül's meeting with Celso Amorim, both states signed a memorandum of understanding on creating a "High Level Cooperation Commission" and "Cooperation between the Diplomacy Academies of Foreign Ministries".¹²⁸⁸ Additionally, Abdullah Gül in order to accelerate Turkey's relations with South American countries organized a coordination meeting with incumbent Turkish embassies on duty in Latin American countries. During the second step of his visit, Foreign Affairs Minister, Gül visited Sao Paolo where he attended opening ceremony of Turkish Consulate in Sao Paolo and attended the first meeting of Turkish - Brazil Joint Business Council. Turkish FM as well visited Brazil's world famous airplane factory Empraer in order to seek alternatives for Turkey in terms of airplane tenders. Justice and Development Party, starting in 2006 reactivated the Action Plan for Latin America, which was initialized in 1998 after the series of meeting held in Foreign Affairs ministry analyzing the region from all aspects thanks to brainstorming of high-level bureaucrats, honorary consulates, academicians and specialist in order to develop fruitful relations with South American region countries. During his visit Abdullah Gül reminded this Action for Latin America plan aiming to focus political, economic, commerce, trade relations with South American countries.

¹²⁸⁷ Ibidem.

¹²⁸⁸ "Dış İşleri Bakanı Gül Brezilyada", ("Turkish Foreign Minister in Brazil"), *Hürriyet*, 07 May, 2012.

On May 20 - 23, 2009, President of Federative Republic of Brazil visited Turkey with a delegation of Economy ministers and businessmen; it was the first time visit in the course of bilateral relations on head of state level. Economic issues between the states was occupying top level agenda of President Lula da Silva, hence his official visit commenced in Istanbul where he met with Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges, Minister of Finance, and attended the special session of Business Partnership Seminary organized by Foreign Economic Relations Council. Brazilian President also met with Turkish Prime Minister and attended Turkish - Brazilian Business Council meeting in accordance with his program in Istanbul.¹²⁸⁹

Turkish President and his Brazilian counterpart met in Ankara in order to realize talks in bilateral and international issues along with economy and trade. Both Presidents announced that Turkish and Brazilian state owned energy companies agreed to sign an agreement for oil and natural exploration in Black Sea. President Gül as well conveyed his concerns on the necessity of a free trade agreement in order to eliminate trade barriers between the states blocking the development of larger trade volumes. Apart from the cooperation, prospects held in energy sector, an affiliation as well provided in aviation sector.¹²⁹⁰ A high-level director taking part in Brazilian delegation realized talks with the officers of Turkish state owned Aviation Company Turkish Airlines and the director undertook talks for future projects like producing jets through cooperation projects. Furthermore, high-level talks took place between the officials of both states in order to realize joint projects in third states. Shortly after the historic visit of Brazilian President, in July 2009, Foreign Trade Minister of Turkey paid a 6 day visit to Brazil and Chile along with Turkish businesspersons seeking business opportunities in South America. On respond, Foreign Minister Celso Amorim visited Ankara.

With the emergence of Iran's nuclear program crisis the current relations line between Turkey and Brazil gained an entire different character. As it has been mentioned previously, the Iranian nuclear program became a hot debate since Geneva talks. A reasonable solution template was achieved as Tehran accepted to enrich its uranium in France and Russia at these countries after realizing the required procedure send back it to Iran. Nonetheless, due to conservative press directed to government in domestic politics and distrust to international community in Iran the conversion and stocking of uranium issue entered to a deadlock. As a

¹²⁸⁹ "Brezilya Cumhurbaşkanı Türkiyede" ("Brazilian President in Turkey"), (source: www.cnnturk.com/2009/turkiye/05/21/brezilya.cumhurbaskani.turkiyede.tema-slarda/527428.0/index.html), April 2011).

¹²⁹⁰ Şaban Kardaş, "Turkey and Brazil to Explore Oil in the Black Sea", *Eurasia Daily Monitor*, Vol VI, Issue 100, 26 May, 2010.

result, due to mutual trust shortcomings Tehran tried different methods like proposing to barter uranium in the territories of Iran, or to barter it in different amounts, to realize barter in third countries like Turkey, Brazil or Japan.¹²⁹¹ Hence, Turkey and Brazil commenced to engage to Iran's nuclear program issue gradually as Turkey did not want a following military intervention like Iraq which potentially threatens its political and economic stability.

Turkey and Brazil at the very critical moment of deadlocked talks engaged to process and initialized a tight diplomacy attempt, on contrary to United States and international community pressures insisting putting heavy sanctions or economic enforcements against Iran. Both states stood on the idea to hold further talks with Iran instead of isolating it from international community. The initiatives commenced by Brazil and Turkey appraised by some states while others approached it suspiciously appreciating it as Iran's time gain tactics. Turkey and Brazil coexisting under the roof of United Nations with veto right a controversial process in order to provide a dialogue ground with Iran. In April, shortly after Turkish Prime Minister paid a visit to Brazil to evaluate current situation regarding Iranian issue along with other related issue, FM paid a visit. After the meeting with his counterpart Amorim, Turkish FM Davutoğlu announced that Turkey and Brazil had common intention in terms of Iran's nuclear plan though did not share the details with public. He also added that, Turkey and Brazil in Foreign Affairs level organized mini summits with President Obama conveying their attitudes related to the issue. As regard to matter, Turkish Foreign Minister underlined the fact that it was not a newly initiated attempt to overcome trust problem existing Iran and among third countries, plus stressed the necessity of diplomatic solution of the question.¹²⁹²

Following the talks held among Iran, Brazil and Turkey, officials from Tehran declared that they could discuss the details with Brazil and Turkey in a triple meeting. Shortly after the declaration the Foreign Ministers of Turkey, Iran and Brazil came together in Tehran in order to discuss uranium barter issue in details. In order to find a common solution, the ministers undertook talks lasting in 2,5 hours after which continued by high-level special technocrats of three countries. One more time in order to resolute Iran's nuclear program crisis, Foreign Affairs Ministers of Iran, Turkey and Brazil came together in Tehran and discussed the solution proposals. After 18 hours of talks, the sites agreed on an understanding framework. After long hours of talks, Turkey and Iran urged Iran to accept International Atomic Energy Association's barter plan with five constant members of United Nation plus

¹²⁹¹ Arzu C Ekinci, "Türkiye - Brezilya - İran ve Beklenen Üçlü Zirve" ("The Expected Triple Summit among Turkey - Brazil and Iran"), *USAK*, 14 May 2010.

¹²⁹² "Türkiye - Brezilya, İran Konusunda Hemfikir" ("Turkey and Brazil are Unanimous in Iran Deal"), *CNN TURK*, 16 April 2010.

Germany. (5 +1). Following active hours and meetings at Turkish Foreign Ministry parallel to Tehran, Turkish Prime Minister postponed his visit to Azerbaijan and fled to Iran in order to take part at the signature ceremony of Iran's nuclear resolution along with Brazilian President Da Silva.

The so-called fuel swap deal was proposing a great amount of uranium which was enriched in Iran firstly to Turkey and then to Russia or France. Iran would give 1200 kg uranium as deposit to Turkey on condition that Tehran might get all these uranium at one time, which was put on agreement text as "In case the provisions of this Declaration are not respected Turkey, upon the request of Iran, will return swiftly and unconditionally Iran's LEU to Iran".¹²⁹³ While all similar barter would take place in Turkey. Turkish side announced her pleasure related to sign of agreement stressing the success of diplomacy, while Davutoğlu called it as a historic event as there will be no need for United Nations sanctions against Iran.¹²⁹⁴

The agreement held thanks to endeavors of Turkey and Brazil surprised United States of America and those parties who supported the United Nations sanctions against Iran, while Russia and China approached the deal attentively. State Secretary Hilary Clinton appreciated the deal as Iranian tactics in order to evade upcoming United Nations sanctions and softly criticized Turkey's and Brazil's engagement to the Iran case, though both states well aware of the fact that unless meeting requirements of US it is very difficult to achieve a constant deal in Iran's nuclear program -. Notwithstanding to the fact that the resolution model United States of America was quite similar to deal agreed now with Iran - Turkey and Brazil but could not be achieved due to trust shortcoming between Iran and international community. What made the agreement highly crucial was the fact that, Iran accept 1200 kg uranium be kept in Turkey, it would not have changed to create a bomb as it does not have Low Enriched Uranium, thus the deal was quite crucial against the claims and fears of Iran's possibility to use low enriched uranium to make a nuclear bomb. Another, important feature of the agreement was the affiliation between Turkey and Brazil as emerging global actors undertaking cooperative indispensable projects in Middle East, and the fact that after five years of talks on Iran's nuclear program the resolution axis shifted from Transatlantic - European to Turkish - Brazilian side.

¹²⁹³ "Text of the Iran - Brazil - Turkey Deal", *The Guardian*, 17 May 2010.

¹²⁹⁴ "Türkiye, Brezilya ve İran'dan Çalım" ("Soccer Fake of Turkey, Brazil and Iran"), *Radikal*, 17 May 2010.

Turkish - Brazilian affiliation strengthening with the signature of Iranian nuclear program resolution brought the Turkish and Brazil issues to world agenda as the new indispensable global actors who achieved to take initiatives in third issues indirectly to bilateral relations. The developing relations gained a deeper dimension with the historic visit of Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's to Brazil. Erdoğan in order to attend Third session of Civilization's Alliance meeting, which held in Brazil between 28 and 29 May 2010 went to Brazil along with ministers of Foreign Affairs, Culture and Tourism, Transport, Energy and Natural Resources, Vice Prime Minister and Foreign Trade Minister which was openly indicating the importance of visit for Turkish Brazilian bilateral relations.

Under the frames of the visit, both sites agreed to sign a memorandum of understanding preventing double taxation, which was the most important trade barrier between Brazil and Turkey. Thanks to personal initiatives of Former President Da Silva Turkey and Brazil had signed a Free Trade Agreement. Turkey also signed trade treaty with other South American countries like Uruguay, Paraguay and Argentina. Erdoğan being the first Prime Minister, who visited Brazil, came together with former Brazilian President under the frame of Civilization Alliance meeting. Turkish Prime Minister, in order to seek alternative business opportunities came together with Brazilian businesspersons and visited Brazilian aircraft factory. Following that, he attended the inauguration ceremony of Turkish consulate in Sao Paolo along with Turkey Export Goods Fair that held first time by Istanbul Chamber of Commerce in order to promote Turkish products in Mercosur region. During the meeting of Turkish - Brazilian Business forum, Turkish Prime Minister, for the first time mentioned that Turkey and Brazil are improving their relations and the aim of the bilateral relations is to constitute a strategic partnership.¹²⁹⁵ At the same session Turkish Minister was responsible for foreign trade stressed the business possibilities between the states while underline that Turkey and Brazil are not opponents in terms of trade.¹²⁹⁶

4. Conclusions

Republic of Turkey as a natural consequence of the new demands that emerged at global politics level adopted its foreign policy priorities to be compatible with the new conjecture. Turkey's foreign policy decision makers who used to be highly engaged with West in terms

¹²⁹⁵ "Turkey, Brazil Cement Strategic Partnership with Focus on Trade", *Today's Zaman*, 28 May 2010.

¹²⁹⁶ *Ibidem*.

of foreign policy relations (European Union and United States) particularly with the start of 1990 initialized to seek close affiliations with the new actors of the world emerging as global actors both influential in regional and global politics. The main motivation of Turkey's foreign policy makers was to gain alternative options for Turkey's foreign policy that solely engaged to one dimension as well as to enrich negotiations with EU and to find alternative economic and trade opportunities as regard to changing dynamics.

Justice and Development Party, similarly to traditional line of Turkey's foreign policy line during its government periods followed a resembling foreign policy towards the emerging global actors. Yet, in this period Turkish - Chinese relations dissimilar to past experienced a tough challenge due to Uighur Turks in the course of Urumqi riots. AK Party, unlike to previous Turkish governments explicitly expressed its position as regard to issue and publicly criticized Peking administration. Following the incidents, bilateral agreements tensed due to Urumqi riots healed due to initiatives of Turkish Foreign Ministry and high-level visits realized by Turkish authorities including the Uighur region. Apart from that, Justice and Development Party tried to balance trade deficit against Turkey tough an abstract progress was not recorded.

Turkey - Brazil relations that followed a low profile due to the distance between countries, during Justice and Development Party experienced a remarkable advancement. Thanks to engagement took place between the states regarding Iran nuclear crisis both countries took the initiative during the talks that was drawn to deadlock. Ankara and Brasilia gained an advantageous position in international arena sidelining both EU and Russia in the course of talks. Besides, thanks to liaisons realized with Brazil, Turkey during Justice and Development Party government period entered South American markets gradually.

When it comes to relations with India, in the course of government period between 2002 and 2011, Turkish - Indian relations did not experienced a radical shift in comparison to past. Yet, at this period, Ankara initialized to develop more policies independent of Pakistani reservations as regard to relations with India.

Chapter VII

Evolution of Turkey's Foreign Policy of the Justice and Development Party Governments in 2002-2011

The chapter analyzes Turkey's foreign policy relations with its Eastern, Western and Northern connections along with emerging global actors in the course of Justice and Development Party governments in 2002–2011 periods. The main objective of the chapter is to evaluate general character of Turkey's foreign policy in a comparative manner regarding the traditional line of foreign policy concept of Turkey. The first section of the chapter analyzes Turkey's relations with the East. The second section dissects relations with the West, while the third section examines Turkey's relations with its Northern direction. The fourth and final section of the chapter analyzes Republic of Turkey's relations with the emerged global actors like China, India and Brazil in Justice and Development Party rule in 2002-2011.

1. Relations with the East

Due to the Islamist roots of ruling AKP, the controversies regarding the axis shift of Turkey's foreign policy occupied a huge volume of agenda in this period. Therefore, the Eastern connection of Turkey's foreign policy as similar to relations with the West became a theme of debate in the course of AK Party's office period in 2002-2011. Regarding Turkey's increasing affiliation with Middle East, AK Party foreign policy decision makers permanently advocated the point that, initiatives of Republic of Turkey aim to gain a deeper dimension to Turkey's foreign policy in order to reinforce its European Union negotiation as the EU would prefer a Turkey with a minimum problem with its vicinity. Besides, high rank AKP foreign policy makers repeatedly underlined that a similar foreign policy engagement of Turkey in this period should not be appreciated as an attempt of alternative model search to replace the EU nor it is a sort of Neo-Ottomanist, Pan-Islamist foreign policy approach.

Turkish - Iraqi relations during Justice and Development Party governments in 2002-2011 continued its traditional path, as reciprocal relations between Turkey and Iraq did not experience any radical change. Justice and Development Party in terms of direct relations with Iraq did not encounter a high level diplomatic crisis or conflict under its rule. The integrity of Iraq, PKK camps in Northern Iraq and attacks directed against Turkey, Iraqi Turkmens and their status in Iraq, Kirkuk issue, Iraqi oil as well as relations with Northern

Iraq continued to be the top level agendas of reciprocal relations. Though, Justice and Development Party in the course of its rule period preferred to continue and protect the status quo as regard to relations with Iraq; it introduced some alternative approaches in comparison to previous Turkish governments.

Ankara instead of focusing its attention to solely on PKK terror or Turkmen issue developed more integrating policies toward the whole of Iraq including all religious, sectarian and ethnic units of Iraq. On one hand, Ankara became a mediator among Iraqi Sunnis and Shiites; while on the other hand, it took regional initiatives where tried to mediate Syria and Iraq. AKP foreign policy makers also initialized summit of countries neighboring Iraq in order to contribute to peace prospects of the region. Apart from that, AK Party foreign policy decision makers developed highly positive relations with Northern Iraqi Kurdish administration. Opposed to previous Turkish governments, Justice and Development Party government enriched reciprocal relations with Iraqi Kurdish administration thanks to economic and commerce oriented relations that used to singularly engage to terror and security issues. Turkish companies in this time period gained big tenders in Northern Iraq, while Turkish State Oil Company obtained a license to search petroleum in the North of Iraq. The disputes regarding PKK entity in Northern Iraq to some degree caused harsh disputes, yet AK Party's new approached appreciated by Northern Iraq Kurdish administration more constructive. Besides, Justice and Development Party thanks to its increasing power developed more abstract collaborations with the United States of America in terms of terror directed to Turkey which caused a relative reduce of attacks.

Thus, it may be presumed that Turkish - Iraqi relations at the office period of Justice and Development Party government continued its traditional path. AK Party instead of degrading mutual relations to security issues developed a more containing policy orientation putting alternative dimensions to relation perspectives. Nevertheless, the referendum in Kirkuk, Iraqi constitution, future of Iraq after the United States of America, integrity of Iraq, potential of a Kurdish state as well as PKK camps in Northern Iraq continued to be problematic issues between Iraq and Turkey.

Turkish - Syrian relations in the course of government periods of Justice and Development Party in 2002-2011 gained a constructive change initially. A country that a decade ago Turkey came to the edge of war, Syria, in the course of Justice and Development Party government period turned out to be Turkey's best allies in the Middle East. Damascus and Ankara in this period realized such an affiliation that in the history of the Republic of Turkey, Syria became the first country which Council of Minister organized joint meetings.

Still, particularly toward the end of AK Party's second government period due to the Arab Spring inspired protests demanding democracy and Assad regimes measureless interventions Turkish - Syrian relations were heavily wounded. In fact, the affiliation period that started with Ankara and Damascus carried a pure pragmatic feature instead of being ideological or pro-Islamist due to security languor that menaced both countries as a consequence of Iraqi occupation. The American intervention to Iraq, changing ethnic and sectarian dynamics as well highly contributed to the warming of mutual relations. When Turkey and Syria obtained a consensus in chronic Hatay problem, the nature of mutual relations radically changed. The affiliation process that started with Turkish Presidents historical visit to father Assad's funeral against all recommends of the West, in the course of time gave it fruitful consequences in terms of reciprocal relations.

Following that both countries initialized free custom regime as well enabling commerce activities freely that highly demised the increase of trade volume. By the same token, in terms of diplomacy both countries opened consulates in border cities to ease similar facilities; eventually the initial of a free visa regime for the citizens of both countries extremely accelerated the reciprocal relations between Syria and Turkey. Damascus and Ankara apart from peregrinating a long distance in terms of mutual relations as well engaged to regional politics as regard to Middle East. In addition to that, AK Party foreign decision makers searched further methods of influences via Syria through mediator role in historical conflicts as well in the region.

All in all, the positive acquisitions obtained in this period as a consequence of zero problem principle with the popular motto of Turkish FM lost its momentum in the course of the Arab Spring. When Syrian army commenced to suppress opposition protests disproportionally and it caused a mass migration wave toward Turkish borders. Ankara asked Damascus to realize democratic reforms as respond to demands of opposition and stop violence against civilians. On contrary to harsh press of Ankara and international community, Assad regime blamed Turkey and other countries to intervene internal affairs of Syria that caused to spoil relations that experienced its golden era. Turkey, along with the pressure of its Western allies applied all methods against Syria to stop violence, besides when Ankara allowed opposition activities in Turkish territory mutual relations with Assad regime wounded heavily.

In comparison to previous Turkish governments, Turkey - Israel relations also evidenced unorthodox developments in comparison to previous Turkish governments under AKP rule that ended with Turkey's decision of putting diplomatic relations to minimum level.

Turkey - Israel relation that hit its top level with 90's experienced a graduate recession process during the previous governments; however when Israel army killed 9 Turkish activists in international waters reciprocal relations between the countries hit the bottom. It is an incontrovertible reality that Turkish - Israeli relations till Israel's attack against Gaza performed a highly positive line. Ankara was developing constructive relations both with Israel and Syria as it engaged to peace talks that would change the destiny of the Middle East. Apart from that, Ankara parallel to support of European and United States also tried to continue its peacemaking role in Palestine - Israel conflict.¹²⁹⁷ Nevertheless, the gradual tension between the allies started when Khalid Meashal paid a visit to Ankara in 2006. Following that, the Cast Lead Operation reasoned a deep feeling of deceive of Turkish side directed towards Israel. AK Party criticized Israel due to the unbalanced violence used against Palestine in the course of the Gaza operations, while political tension in this period found its reflection in public as anti-Israel sentiments raised against Israel attacks to Gaza district.

Respectively, the diplomatic relations agitated through the highest level when Turkish Prime Minister burst into anger in Davos due to Gaza blockade. Thereupon, the lower chair crisis one more time tensed the mutual relations, after Turkey's menace to pull diplomatic relations to a lower level; Israel Foreign Ministry expressed its apology. The diplomatic relations recovered back but the Gaza issue continued to be a theme of discussion between the parts in this period. Israeli - Turkish relations experienced its worst time not only in the

¹²⁹⁷ For further reading on Palestine - Israel conflict and roles of USA and EU in the peace process see: Justyna Zajac *Role Unii Europejskiej w regionie Afryki Północnej i Bliskiego Wschodu (The Role of EU in North Africa and Middle East)*, Wydawnictwa Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego, Warsaw 2010; Justyna Zajac, 'The EU's Role in the Middle East Peace Process' in *Current Issues of International Politics Through the Eyes of Young Europeans*, University of Economics, Prague 2003, pp. 191-204; Justyna Zajac, 'The Barcelona Process and Beyond', in Katarzyna Żukrowska, Anna Konarzewska (eds.), *External Relations of the European Union - Determinants, Casual, Links, Areas*, Instytut Wiedzy, Warsaw 2004, pp. 183-198; Justyna Zajac, 'Destabilizująca rola USA na Bliskim Wschodzie' ('Destablizing Role of USA in the Middle East'), in Irena Stawowy-Kawka (ed.), *Czynniki stabilizacji i destabilizacji w stosunkach międzynarodowych na początku XXI wieku (Stablizing and Destablizing Factors in International Relations at the Beginning of XXI Century)*, Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego, Craków 2009, pp. 359-368; Justyna Zajac, 'EU - US in the Middle East Peace Efforts: to What Extent Cooperation?', in Andrzej Mania, Paweł Laidler, Łukasz Wordliczek (eds.), *US Foreign Policy: Theory, Mechanism and Practice*, Cracow 2007, pp. 235-248; Justyna Zajac, *Środki i metody oddziaływania USA w Bliskowschodnim procesie pokojowym (1991-2000) (Means and Methods of USA Engagement in Middle East Peace Process)*, Wydawnictwa Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego, Warsaw 2004.

course of Justice and Development Party but also all the times due to Israel's attack against Gaza Flotilla where Israeli armed forces killed 9 Turkish activists. Following the case, Ankara blamed Israel regarding the violence to be a pirate state where it denounced the act from the highest level of the state. Foreign Ministry of Turkey asked Israel to apologize for the act and pay compensation to families of victims. Yet, Tel Aviv advocated its action appreciating it as a natural motion as a right of self protection. Ankara explained that it will apply a pack of sanctions toward Tel Aviv as regard to attacks.¹²⁹⁸ In the course of reciprocal relations tough both states experienced diplomatic crisis the economic, military and strategic have never pushed a lower level as similar to crisis experienced following the Flotilla crisis.

Relations with Iran in this period also kept its characteristic feature. In the course of AKP rule, Ankara engaged with Brazil to Iran's nuclear swap deal. In 2010, when Ankara urged Tehran in Nuclear barter issue Turkey's increasing regional came to agenda in Western public view. Similar initiatives of Ankara though followed with cautiousness as well were supported by the West regarding Turkey's contribution to diplomatic resolution of the crisis. AKP's close engagement with Middle East under the "rhythmic diplomacy" and "zero problem principle" in its rule period, on one hand gave to birth to question "is Turkey's leaving of the West?"¹²⁹⁹ On the other hand, some other observers appreciated a similar engagement in Middle East politics not a political preference of AKP as it was initialized by Turgut Özal following the end of the Cold War upon the newly emerged regional and international conjecture as a result of Gulf War.¹³⁰⁰

Apart from that, during the Foreign Affairs Ministry of Ismail Cem Ankara gradually left aside security based foreign policy interactions with Middle East as a versatile intercourse between Turkey and region states commenced. What is more, especially when the leader of PKK, Abdullah Öcalan was deported thanks signed Adana Protocols with Damascus; Ankara's security based skeptic approach toward the Middle East has changed entirely. Before AKP came to power in 2002, Ankara settled significant problems with its Eastern neighborhood apart from the PKK settlements in Northern Iraq. To analyze Justice and Development Party's foreign policy orientation properly, it is vital to take into consideration international and regional dynamics emerged prior to AKP rule. The 9/11 terror attacks, along with occupation of Afghanistan and Iraq aftermaths played a crucial role in the very

¹²⁹⁸ "Türkiye'den İsrail'e 5 yaptırım" ("Five Sanction of Turkey toward Israel"), *Radikal*, 2 September 2011.

¹²⁹⁹ Ariel Cohen, "Washington Concerned as Turkey Leaving the West", *Turkish Policy Quarterly*, Vol. IX, No. 3, 2009, pp. 25-35.

¹³⁰⁰ Sabri Sayarı, "Turkey and the Middle East in the 1990s", *Journal of Palestine Studies*, Vol XXVI, No.3, Spring, pp. 44-55.

conjectural change. Hereafter, foreign policy makers of Turkey parallel to these very developments developed compatible policies regarding the newly emerged conjecture. Thereby, out of similar explanations it may be concluded that Turkey's foreign policy practice toward the Middle East is not emerged in AKP rule, but AK Party foreign policy decision makers under the administration of Davutoğlu regarding the changing international and regional conjecture diversified relation prospects with Middle East states. The new conjecture coincides the AK Party's taking the office in this period made Turkey to develop versatile and multi dimensional foreign policy practices. Turkey's close affiliations with Middle East in this period may not be concluded as an axis shift or a leaving of Turkey's Westernization principle as similar policy initiatives were highly supported by Ankara's Western allies.

Chiefly, in the course of Arab Spring, so as to tempt newly established regimes to democracy Turkey's role as a Muslim predominant states that coincides Islam with democracy promoted by the West as Turkey's relations toward Tunis, Egypt and Libya after the coups highly encouraged. Furthermore, AKP as a new political entity constituted of former Islamists became a role model that promoted also by West and USA for the Islamist of the Middle East that reconciles democracy with Islam.

2. Relations with the West

Republic of Turkey's relation with the West, in this term, relations with the United States of America, the European Union, and the Balkans continued to be the highest level agendas of Turkey's foreign policy in the government period of Justice and Development Party. In spite of the fact that Turkey's relations with the West became to be a highly controversial theme regarding the Islamist roots of AK Party. Quite contrary to the all negative predictions, AK Party shortly after its office period continued the reform process that initialized through previous governments. Furthermore, the radical reform process ended with Turkey's gain of official membership status for full European Union membership. Relation perspectives with the United States of America, especially in the rule period of George W. Bush experienced serious troubles due to 1 March bill crisis and hood event, however the reciprocal relations kept its traditional orientation and regained its natural character following the election of President Obama.

Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, as the founder and the general secretary of AKP, developed highly constructive relations with the U.S. when he used to be the head of Welfare Party in

Beyoğlu district of Istanbul.¹³⁰¹ His initial contacts with the U.S. officials commenced when he was visited by the former U.S. ambassador Abramowitz many times, besides similar visits took place following Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's election for mayor of Istanbul.¹³⁰² Notwithstanding to the fact that ultra-nationalist wing interpreted similar contacts as a U.S. conspiracy to imply that Erdoğan would be the follower of mild Islamist policies of Washington in the Middle East,¹³⁰³ it is a non contentious fact that, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan as a requirement of the current conjecture put a special stress on relations with the United States of America before and after AKP's coming to rule in Turkey. Additionally, in 2001, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan visited the United States of America where he came together with the members of Jewish Congress and Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs to find support.¹³⁰⁴

Following the establishment of AKP, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan visited Washington as the general secretary of the Party, where he realized a speech in Center for Strategic and International Studies. In his speech, he explicitly highlighted that his party is not against USA and would support the development of Turkey - U.S. relations if elected.¹³⁰⁵ Notwithstanding to the fact that foreign policy decision makers of Turkey, prior to AKP government supported U.S. during its occupation of Afghanistan so as to contribute international and regional stability.¹³⁰⁶ When the scope of the U.S. war directed t against Iraq, Justice and Development faced a tough dilemma in the course of Iraqi occupation as regard to relations with the United States of America. On one hand, the grassroots and at parliamentary level Justice and Development Party was not that eager to engage to occupation of Iraq, while the realpolitik and the requirements of strategic partnership was highly dominant. Moreover, the future of the Northern Iraq, PKK terror, economical factors were the other factors influencing the decision making process of AK Party foreign policy makers. As the permission letting USA army to use Turkish land, port and air space was not accepted at grand assembly, Turkish - USA relations experienced a historical crisis that caused a deep disappointment at neoconservative politicians of Pentagon and Washington.

¹³⁰¹ Dia Rashwan, *The Spectrum of Islamist Movements*, Al-Ahram Center for Strategic Researches, Frederic Ebert Stiftung, Cairo 2006, p. 203.

¹³⁰² Ibidem, p. 203.

¹³⁰³ "Abrahamowitz Erdoğan'ı Erbakan'ın Yerine Hazırlıyor" ("Abrahamowitz Prepares Erdoğan Instead of Erbakan"), *Aydınlık*, 20 October 1996.

¹³⁰⁴ David B MacDonald, *Identity Politics in the Age of Genocide: The Holocaust and Historical Representation*, Routledge, Oxon 2008, p. 123.

¹³⁰⁵ İ. Uzgel, "Dış Politikada AKP.....", op.cit., pp. 69-84.

¹³⁰⁶ Füsün Türkmen, "Turkish - American Relations: A Challenging Transition", *Turkish Studies*, Vol.X, No.1, 2009, pp.109-129.

Tough the rejection of bill was appreciated as an anti-American act of ruling AKP, Turkey's former Minister of Defense notified that "tough we did not accept the bill we did permit 4300 sorties".¹³⁰⁷ What is more, Turkish Prime Minister in his article published in Wall Street Journal implied that the rejection of bill was not entirely depending on AKP where he called Turkey as the loyal friend and ally of the United States.¹³⁰⁸ In his article Turkish PM stressed that as refer to Gulf War experience of Turkey, the economic and social factors played a determinant role in the rejection of bill hinting that the action was not bearing an anti- American character, besides he also underlined that Turkey following the rejection of bill opened its air space to coalition forces during their operations in Iraq.¹³⁰⁹ The worsening relations between Ankara and Washington found its deep reflection in terms of Turkey's struggle against PKK terror. Besides, Turkey lost its strategic acquisitions gained since the Gulf War. Following the negative decision of Turkish Grand National Assembly, Turkish Special Forces realizing anti-terror activities in Northern Iraq was detained through U.S. forces in a sardonic manner which agitated the reciprocal relations entirely. Justice and Development Party at the very heart of crisis atmosphere, on one hand tried to satisfy public view while on the other hand tried to keep constructive relations with the United States of America in terms of Iraq issue which highly managed the national security of Turkey.

Additionally, this period coincided to a time sequence where Turkish military headquarters became the open target of PKK militants who leaked to Turkish border through Northern Iraq. AK Party at this period was on the target of public view and opposition to realize cross border operation against PKK camps situated in Northern Iraq, while the United States of America warned Ankara not realize any land or air operation so as not to harm stability of Iraq. (Actually, the Iraqi Kurds who turned out to be the best allies of USA in Iraq highly press United States not to permit Turkey to realize operation toward Northern Iraq) Nevertheless, tough the fact that Turkey - USA relations highly tensed since 2003 particularly regarding the cooperation in terms of Northern Iraq, under AKP rule, it is not possible to conclude that reciprocal relations between Ankara and Washington had cut. Thanks to Bush - Erdoğan meeting that took place in 2007, relations between Ankara and Washington had highly relieved. The meeting was highly essential as both sides agreed on intelligence share against Kurdistan Worker Party (PKK) leakages versus Turkey as the United States of

¹³⁰⁷ "Tezkereyi Geçirmedik ama 4300 Uçusa İzin Verdik" ("We did not Pass the Bill but Permitted 4300 Sorties"), *Hürriyet*, 18 May 2005.

¹³⁰⁸ Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, "My Country is Your Loyal Friend and Ally", *The Wall Street Journal*, 21 April 2003.

¹³⁰⁹ Ibidem.

America guaranteed Turkey to collaborate its struggle with Terror. Hence, USA - Turkish Relations experienced a positive direction in terms of softening afterward the 1 March permission crisis.

Reciprocal relations between Republic of Turkey and the United States of America entered to a new phase following the election of Barack Obama as the President of USA. In spite of the Obama's election promises regarding the so-called Armenian genocide issue, Turkish - USA relations experienced highly positive developments as the countries agreed on signature of partnership agreements in terms of strategic partnership. On the other hand, USA supported Turkey more efficiently in terms of Ankara's fight against separatist Kurdish terror in this period.

Henceforth, Turkey - U.S. relations under AKP rule may be appreciated as a reflection of Westernization principle of Turkey's foreign policy was kept. Turkey - USA relations continued its traditional characteristic feature that mostly based on regional cooperation in terms of strategic and military relations. The United States of America continued to be the most powerful ally of Republic of Turkey, while Ankara supported the U.S. military operations in Afghanistan under the umbrella of NATO. In spite of the fact that, in the course of Justice and Development Party government periods in 2002-2011, Turkey and the United States of America came across in terms of Iraqi occupation as regard to 1 March permit crisis and the hood event, the principal nature of the bilateral relations did not undertake a radical change. Prior to AK Party government, Ankara and Washington experienced many political, diplomatic and military challenges like Johnson letter, USA embargo against Turkey due to Cyprus or Opium crisis, the strategic partnership in terms of economic, military, political and diplomatic spheres kept its essential character. Although many Western analysts and journalist suggested the hidden Islamist agenda of JDP aims Turkey to shift from its Western axis as regard to AK Party's new foreign policy concept aiming maximum collaboration in Turkish neighborhood, Turkey's rhythmic diplomacy with Syria, Iran and with many other geographies were de facto approved and supported through Washington. Besides, when Ankara and Tel Aviv came across due to tensing relations at this period, The United States of America as the best allies of continuously pushed its closest allies to recover relations.

Parallel to relations with the United States of America, the European Union became to be the utmost foreign policy agenda of Justice and Development Party in the course of its rule period in 2002-2011. In this period, Turkey's accession to full membership to the EU continued to be the highest priority for Turkey's foreign policy. Chiefly, during the first government period of AKP in 2002-2007., on contrary to all expectations highly engaged to

relations with the European Union where Turkey finally achieved the official candidate status for full European Union membership. The EU reform processes initialized by Ecevit government continued by AKP that is highly crucial to understand importance of the EU agenda for JDP,¹³¹⁰ as two adaptation packages were enacted quickly. In this time period, high level visits of high rank Turkish officials not excluding Turkish Prime Minister and Foreign Affairs Minister frequently appeared in Brussels and other EU capitals. To add, when Turkey was given an official candidate status for full membership, Turkish delegation was met by crowds celebrating the decision.

Nonetheless, mainly following the 2007 general elections, relations with the European Union entered to a recession as the EU theme gradually swept out of AK Party's foreign policy agenda. It is an obvious fact that, Turkey's full membership status was an exceptional case in comparison to other candidate states as it was bearing an expression that the consequence of negotiations may not end with full membership, which made Turkish case in total different. AK Party foreign policy decision makers harshly criticized the EU to apply different standard for Turkey while called the European Union to proof it not to be a Christian Club.¹³¹¹ Furthermore, regardless of all positive attempts of AKP and political risks peculiarly in domestic politics, proposing a new paradigm toward Cyprus issue since 1974, its feeling of deceive as regard to Greek side's acceptance to the European Union tough its rejection of Annan Plan gradually froze the relations between the European Union and Turkey. Moreover, the election of Sarkozy and Merkel agitated the situation entirely, as both Presidents fiercely opposed Turkey's future EU membership.

Turkish - EU relations indicated a serious breaking particularly during the period following the second land slide of AK Party in 2007 general elections. Turkish - EU relations that were driven to a deadlock due to blockades, opening chapters and Turkey's reluctance to open its port toward Greek Cypriots brought the situation to a more complex structure than ever. Parallel to this period, Justice and Development Party put a special stress on relations wit Middle East countries which gave birth to popular fears of Turkey's axis shift that found deep reflection in periodical progress reports of the EU, while JDP foreign policy decision makers were blamed to create an alternative formation against the European Union.

¹³¹⁰ Ramazan Gözen, "Türk Dış Politikasının Avrupa Birliği'ne Doğru Dönüşümü" ("Transformation of Turkey's Foreign Policy toward European Union"), *Uluslararası Hukuk ve Politika*, Vol. II, No.6, 2002, pp. 1 - 16.

¹³¹¹ Many AK Party high rank politicians used to oppose Turkey's EU membership under the pretext of Union's being a Christian Club while they were under the roof of National Vision Movement, however when they changed their political outlook this time they asked EU to proof its diverse and non religious identity.

Turkish - EU relations during the government period of Justice and Development Party may be shared into two periods, the 2002-2007 and 2007-2011 period. The 2002-2007 period coincided to initial period of JDP government evidenced an intensive interaction between the parts while the 2007 - 2011 periods were a time of recession. AK Party has been blamed to utilize the European Union process as an instrument in order to gain power against Turkish military under the pretext of democratic reforms; besides it was accused when eliminated the Turkish Army Forces along with the % 50 percentage of population with 2007 general election, to put aside the EU reforms and accession process and initialized its Islamic agenda highly engaging to Middle East direction. Justice and Development Party regarding the claims repeatedly proposed that better relation prospects with Turkish vicinity would enforce Turkey's hand as a Turkey with minimum problem with its neighborhood would be a more attractive candidate for the EU. Additionally, Turkey's tight engagement with Iraq, Syria and Iran would be to the benefits of the EU that seek further influence in the Middle East region.

Moreover, due to economic crisis in Euro zone as well as the decrease of public support along with the Turkey's increasing gravity among Arab nations, the European Union issue lost its public support in this period. Even through the rows of Justice and Development Party discourses stating that Turkey is not in need of the European Union voiced. Nonetheless, Justice and Development Party so as to indicate its position toward the EU assigned Egemen Bağış as Minister for the European Union affairs and chief negotiator to coordinate the EU accession from a unique center. Notwithstanding to all controversies, accession to the European Union with a full membership target continued to be the main objective of Turkey's foreign policy during the Justice and Development Party government period in 2002-2011. Regardless of the fact that within the second term of AKP, Turkish - EU relations have experienced a recession, it cannot be interpreted as a cut. Henceforth, taking into account the current situation of reciprocal relations one may not interpret it as Turkey's shift from its Western axis. In spite of all alignments accusing AKP to seek alternative alliance models in replacement of the European Union, Turkey's political and economic engagement with Middle East as well was supported by the European Union. The so-called Turkish model with the AK Party model as a successful example coinciding Islam and democracy has been promoted and supported by Turkey's, particularly AK Party model inspired Tunisia and Egypt after the Arab Spring as Islamist sought ways to reconcile with international community referring to AK Party example in Turkey.

In terms of relations with Balkans, Republic of Turkey's foreign policy attitude that mostly shaped following the 90s also kept its traditional line under the rule of AKP. High level visits of Turkish officials continued,¹³¹² plus Ankara to contribute regional peace supported initials like Southern Europe Cooperation Process and Regional Cooperation Council. Additionally, to provide a long term security in Balkans, Ankara under its rule period brought Serbia - Bosnia Herzegovina and Croatia thanks to triple council meetings.

In epitome, Republic of Turkey's foreign policy concept toward the West regarding the frames of Westernization and Status Quo principles -as the fundamental principles of Turkey's foreign policy concept- kept its main character under the rule of AKP in 2002-2011. In addition to that, like in relations prospects in Balkans, Cyprus and Greek examples, thanks to newly introduced foreign policy rhetoric of AKP, Turkey applied good will and dialogue based tools toward its interlocutors. In this respect through the main goals of foreign policy making process did not change the methods of reaching to the goals experienced a change.

3. Relations with the North

Turkish - Russian relations in the course of Justice and Development Party government periods in 2002-2011 experienced a golden age both politically, economically as well as in terms of energy, trade and tourism issues. All the same, it is obligatory to emphasize that the fundamentals of positive relations with Russian Federations mostly established particularly toward 2000s when both countries instead of developing rivalry based politics commenced to concentrate on regional cooperation prospects. Hence, AKP principally followed Turkey's traditional foreign policy orientation toward Russia that constituted with the new millennium. In spite of all positive developments and affiliation took place in this period many problematic issues between the countries kept its nature as the historical Turkish - Russian competition in region politics did not experience a radical shift.¹³¹³ The joint energy projects like Blue Stream Pipeline Project highly contributed to the affiliation between neighbors, thanks to Blue Stream mutual relations mostly engaged on political issues gained a diverse

¹³¹² Muzaffer Vatansever, "Türkiye'nin Balkanlar Stratejisi: Türk Dış Politikasında Değişen Dinamikler", ("Turkey's Balkan Strategy: Changing Dynamics in Turkey's Foreign Policy"), *USAK Stratejik Gündem*, 21 September 2010.

¹³¹³ Lerna K Yanık, "Allies or Partners? An Appraisal of Turkey's Ties to Russia 1991 - 2007", *East European Quarterly*, Fall, Vol., XXXXI, No.3, 2007 p. 354.

character. Nonetheless, the similar cooperation prospects within the new millennium did not achieve an entire consensus in Balkans, Black Sea, Caucasus and Central Asia.¹³¹⁴

Justice and Development Party without any radical shift continued the positive relation prospects with Russian Federation during its rule period. High rank officials of both countries during this time period many times visited each other where they signed significant agreements highly influential in the determination of mutual relations both in economic and political meaning. As it used to be in the past, the energy dimension continued to be the spine and main dynamic of mutual relations during Justice and Development Party government periods. In this time period, on one hand Turkey due to signed energy agreements with Russian Federation became the biggest energy purchaser, while on the hand Russia enjoyed strategic position of Turkey that give energy access to South European and North African countries. Additionally, the Akkuyu nuclear energy plant constituted an important liaison in this period for bilateral relations between Ankara and Moscow.¹³¹⁵

Commercial and Economical relations between Moscow constituted another engine for the development of mutual relations in this period as well. The humble trade facilities commenced with shuttle trade opened gate for Turkish companies particularly in construction sector. During Justice and Development Party governments' period the trade volume between the states reached a significant level as Russian Federation turned Turkey's second biggest trade partner following Germany. Apart from the tight cooperation initiatives in energy sector and trade traditional good relations in tourism as well kept its characteristic features between Russia and Turkey under the rule of Justice and Development Party governments. Besides, the positive relations gained a dynamic after the enactment of visa free regime for Russian and Turkish citizens.

Yet, in spite of all positive developments that were mentioned above, the traditional rivalry in many other fields continued to keep its problematic characteristic feature. In 2004, shortly before the referendum of so-called Annan Plan, Moscow's veto had highly negative influenced Turkey's position as the veto highly favored Greek Cypriots, besides Russia continued to veto General Secretary's report on post-referendum period in Cyprus. In 2005, Russian Duma recognized the allegedly Armenian genocide claims which constituted a serious barrier for the future prospect of bilateral relation. Furthermore, Russia's ban of Turkish poultry at the same year as well severely harmed commerce based relations. In

¹³¹⁴ Robert O Freedman, "Russia and the Middle East under Putin", *Ortadoğu Etütleri*, Vol. II, No 3, July 2010, pp. 9-13.

¹³¹⁵ Fiona Hill, Ömer Taşpınar, "Turkey and Russia Axis od Excluded", *Survival*, 2006, pp. 81-92.

addition to that, Moscow still has not put Kurdish separatist terrorist organization PKK to terrorist list which concerns Ankara. The traditional character of Turkish - Russian relations that mostly based on regional rivalry and mistrust with historical traces continued its nature in the course of Justice and Development Party government in 2002-2011. The affiliation period that hit its peak at this period is a continuation of policy that applied toward the end of 90's, besides the post 9/11 period as well pushed the countries develop joint projects in order to continue regional power balance system. In spite of the fact that, there existed many positive developments in terms of energy, trade, commerce, politics as well as diplomacy and tourism both countries have still have diverse military paradigms and Russia and Turkey are the biggest regional rivals in Southern Caucasus, Central Asia and Balkans. Tough strategic partnership rhetoric has commenced to be used even at the highest level, both strategically and militarily Russia and Turkey are belonging to different poles. The energy politics of the countries as well bear a competitive character regardless of present bilateral energy agreements signed between the states.

The foreign policy orientation of the Republic of Turkey in the Justice and Development Party government periods toward Southern Caucasus experienced a tough challenge. In Southern Caucasus case, opposite to other foreign orientations of classical Turkish Republic foreign policy, Justice and Development Party tried to adjust against to status quo but regardless of all attempts AK Party could not bring a new dynamism. As it has been mentioned previously, the zero problem principle of JDP faced a tough complication as a result of Russian - Georgian war. Justice and Development due to sudden eruption of war stayed between Russia and Georgia. On the one hand, Ankara was initializing highly positive relations in many respects with Russian Federation; on the other hand it supported territorial integrity of Georgia. Ankara at the early period of war preferred to take any reaction long afterwards proposed Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Platform which did not bring an abstract result in long term.

Apart from Russia - Georgia war, regardless of all endeavors of AK Party foreign policy decision makers to create a positive dynamism at Southern Caucasus region. And to create a new paradigm breaking the status quo character in Southern Caucasus politics of traditional foreign policy line of Turkey, it brought the Ankara to the versus of breaking all positive relation gains with Azerbaijan. Justice and Development Party, particularly as a result of non official demands of the European Union as well as the United States of America initialized a peace making process with Armenia, however as a consequence of sensitive and fragile structure of Southern Caucasus it met with unexpected and strong resistance of Baku.

Consequently, in the government periods of Justice and Development Party, the Southern Caucasus policy orientation of Republic of Turkey did not experience a radical shift in spite of all attempts of AK Party. Ankara as a result of sudden war erupted between Tbilisi and Moscow evidenced the fragile structure of Southern Caucasus.

Though, Ankara searched methods to reconcile with Armenia on a common ground in this period, the power balance parameters which was miscalculated almost cause the cancelation of energy politics of Turkey that planned Turkey to turn an energy hub within last decade. The regional power balance and status quo in Southern Caucasus determined among Russia, Iran and Turkey did not shift at this time period as the limits of Ankara's regional politics proofed. As a consequence of all unsuccessful attempts AKP reproached its traditional position where it advocated Baku's thesis against Armenia regarding Nagorno Karabagh. As for Georgia, Turkey continued to support the NATO membership of Tbilisi both to secure its national security against Russia and to guarantee energy routes. Although in the course of all tension Turkey and Russia did not face each other the problematic nature of Turkish - Russian relations as regard to Southern Caucasus evidenced one more time in spite of all good will political rhetoric.

When it comes to Central Asia Turkic states, it may be claimed that traditional foreign policy orientation of Turkey toward the region did not experience a radical change. Justice and Development Party during its government periods in 2002-2011, as similar to previous Turkish governments followed the routine Central Asian policy that Turkey formulated with the end of 90's. Justice and Development Party in order not to spoil sensitive balances with Russian Federation and China on purpose hesitated to use a nationalist or Islamist rhetoric in the course of its government period, while it put a stress on economy and culture based soft policy appliances. High rank official visits between sister states and Ankara continued at this period while close energy cooperation between Turkey and Turkmenistan as well as Kazakhstan occupied the foreign policy agenda as it would enforce Turkey's traditional energy strategy that aim to turn it to an energy hub without any alternative. In addition to that, the traditional Turkic speaker countries summits as well continued while Turkey also supported all similar initiatives inspired by Central Asian states.

Ankara did not highly engaged to political clashes in Kyrgyzstan though it recognized the newly elected Prime Minister without reservation with whom Prime Minister Erdoğan than developed close personal contacts. Relation levels did not accelerate with Uzbekistan due to legacies of the past. As for Turkmenistan, an abstract acceleration did not provided, but Turkey thanks to its Western support engaged energy diplomacy so as to urge Ashgabat to

take part in Nabucco project aiming to connect Turkmen gas via Caspian. As for the Kazakhstan, due to its more democratic structure became the engine state with which Ankara developed its relations.

4. Relations with Emerging Global Powers

Justice and Development Party under its government period between the years of 2002 -201, put a special emphasis on Turkey's foreign policy priorities between the distant countries that Turkey did not achieve to develop required contacts in terms of economic, diplomatic and political relations. The main motivation of Turkey's foreign policy at this period ruled by Justice and Development Party decision makers was to bring a more dynamic approach to Turkey's foreign policies as regard to changing demands of the current world conjecture.

From this perspective, the global actors gradually becoming the new powerhouses in international arena thanks to their economic and political might entered to the foreign policy agenda of Justice and Development Party. Yet, it is an incontrovertible fact that, Turkey's openings toward the new global actors did not start during the AK Party governments. The initials of Turkey's relations at this meaning, for instance toward China, with a high frequency coincides the end of the Cold War period as a mandatory obligation for Turkey after the dissolution of Soviet Union and independence of Turkic nations of Central Asia. In general terms, it may be argued that Turkey's foreign policy attitude toward China, Brazil and India did not shift from its general path. Yet, Sino - Turkic relations due to Uyghur question Ankara and Peking experienced tough challenges, besides Turkey and Brazil performed an unorthodox affiliation in terms of Iran nuclear crisis. As for relations with India, though gradually, Turkey's foreign policy gained a more independent feature that used to mostly depend on priorities of Pakistan.

Turkey's relations with China, in the course of Justice and Development Party in accordance with Turkey's traditional attitude to Peoples' Republic of China kept its traditional line, which is mostly, depend on economic and commerce based relation prospects. The mutual high level visits between top level representative of states realized between 2002 and 2011 as Turkish President, Prime Minister, Foreign Affairs Minister along with other Ministers visited People's Republic of China and vice versa. Both parties in the course of mutual meetings signed various bilateral agreements in technology, communication, commerce issues. Beijing searched to increase the volume of export proportion toward

Turkey, while Ankara endeavored to balance negative trade deficit against itself concentrating to attract direct investment to Turkey, realizing joint projects in third countries and attracting tourist number to Turkey. Sino - Turkic relations in the course of bilateral associations at this period encountered the most serious crack during 2009 Urumqi riots. Justice and Development Party, on contrary to previous Turkish governments reacted Urumqi incidents in a harsh manner and blamed Chinese government to perform massacre and genocide against Uyghur Turks from the highest level of state, while some AK Party government ministers called to boycott Chinese goods.¹³¹⁶ The crisis emerged between Turkey and China due to Urumqi riots amended due to rational and diplomatic oriented approaches of Turkey's Foreign Ministry and shortly after the incident bilateral relations between Ankara and Beijing normalized. China sent various delegations to Turkish capital in order to express Beijing's approach to the issue while invited Turkish official and journalist delegations in order to realize visits in Xinjiang region.

What made the Turkish - Chinese relations interesting following the Urumqi riot was the strategic and military affiliation between the countries. Turkey and China realized a common military exercise which it was highly criticized by the United States of America and Israel. Afterwards, Foreign Affairs Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu settled to China starting from Urumqi and visited many historical regions important for Turkish - Islam history. Attitude of Beijing, though symbolically was highly significant in order to present its outlook toward Turkey afterward the Urumqi riots.

Brazil as a power turning out to be a global actor influencing global politics, occupied a high level agenda for Turkey's foreign policy especially due to emerge of Iranian nuclear crisis. Bilateral relations with Brazil experienced a boom during the government periods of Justice and Development Party. Turkey - Brazil relations initially performed an affiliation period in terms of economic and commerce based issues, Turkey at this period mostly focused to eliminate double taxation barrier in order to ease Turkish business based engagements in Brazil and searched methods to disseminate Turkey's economic activities in South America. On the other hand, as similar to policy approach toward China, Turkey looked for joint initiatives in third countries with Brazil while seek methods to attract direct Brazilian investment to Turkey.

Turkey's relations with Brazil that commenced at this period through economical relations entered to an entire different course due to raised Iran nuclear crisis. On contrary to

¹³¹⁶ "Turkish Industry and Trade Minister Calls on Population to Boycott Chinese Goods", *APA*, 9 July 2009.

international community pressing Iran in terms of its nuclear program and pushing to apply additional embargo and sanctions, Turkish and Brazilian Foreign Ministers took a surprising initiative in Iran case and agreed on a deal matching the demands of both sides. Thanks to proposed agreement, Iran continued its nuclear program compatible to the demands of National Atomic Agency, while the concerns of international community headed by the United States of America and Israel were removed as in accordance with the compromised agreement Iran's conversion its enriched uranium to a nuclear bomb eliminated. Turkey and Brazil at this period in accordance to converged political attitudes toward Iran, rejected United Nation decision proposing additional sanctions against Iran related to Tehran's uranium enrichment policy, still Justice and Development Party at this perspective explored intensive critics by Turkey's Western alliance (mostly by Israel and the United States of America) and domestic opposition centers blaming Justice and Development Party's foreign policy to follow an Islamist character seeking allies with Islamic Republic of Iran. In addition to convergence in Iran's nuclear program, both countries agreed to initialize close relations in commerce and trade relations, moreover Turkish and Brazilian stated owned oil companies started to oil seeking facilities in Black Sea.

When it comes to Turkey's relations with India due its strategic location and increasing impacts both in Eurasian and global politics, New Delhi as well constituted a top priority country in foreign policy agenda of Justice and Development Party, thus during the government periods, AK Party endeavored to accelerate Turkish - Indian relations. Turkey's foreign policy mostly shaped due to Pakistani sensitiveness, as a country supporting all sort of Turkish thesis in international arena, constituting a barrier for Turkey's foreign policy initiatives toward India in this period indicated a more independent character. Ankara since the very beginning of the conflict supporting Pakistani side in Kashmir conflict, with the Justice and Development Party government performed a more enthusiastic behavior in order to engage resolution of Indian - Pakistani conflict in Kashmir.

In conclusion, in spite of the fact that Turkey's foreign policy developed close ties with the emerging global actors that are highly influential both in regional and global scale, traditional line of Turkey's foreign policy did not experience a radical shift from the traditional path mostly established by the end of the Cold War. Justice and Development Party aiming to gain a multi dimensional and versatile character to Turkey's political approaches in the course of its power period, constantly continued consultations with Washington and Brussels in order to express Turkey's position while in different platforms many Justice and Development Party high rank officials including Prime Minister and

President publicly declared that Turkey's openings in Far East and South America does not propose an alternative for Turkey's institutional relations with the West.

Additionally, although in some cases like common military exercise with China Ankara drew the reaction of the West, foreign policy of Turkey under JDP administration watched out the red lines of the United States of America as did not permit Turkish jets to participate military exercise due to Pentagons reservations. On contrary to alleged claims charging Justice and Development Party a pro Iran policy along with Brazil, as it has been mentioned above Turkish and Brazilian Foreign Ministers came together with President Obama in order to council Turkish - Brazilian joint initiative regarding the issue. Republic of Turkey's foreign policy orientation toward new global actors of the world developed as a state reflection due to strengthen its foreign policy perspectives and peculiarly as a reaction to degrading relation traffic with the European Union. What is more, Turkey's isolation in Cyprus and increasing security concerns as a result of rising PKK terror that was tolerated in most European countries also highly contributed to this process. The public view along with Turkey's foreign policy elites mostly influenced by Leftist and Nationalist ideologies at this period initialized to build an alternative foreign paradigm for Turkey proposing new allies with Eurasian countries keeping in mind China - Iran and Russia. (this fraction called as Ulusalçılar continuously propagated to Turkey's leave for NATO and to be a member state of Shanghai Cooperation Organization and became highly influential in Turkish public view in a definite period).

Therefore, the traditional foreign policy line of Republic of Turkey toward emerging global actors like China, India and Brazil continued in the course of Justice and Development Party governments the essentials of which shaped after the Cold War period due to the new demands and challenges of the world conjecture.

Findings and Conclusions

3 November 2002 general elections became a milestone for Turkish democracy; the unexpected result and absolute victory of AKP was articulated as a “political earthquake” both in public and scholar level.¹³¹⁷ Following the landslide victory of Justice and Development Party, due to the Islamist identity and possible performance of JDP in the government, AKP phenomenon has been a subject of fierce debates both in Turkey and abroad. Therefore, Turkey and its position in international relations have turned out to be a more prominent theme than ever.¹³¹⁸

Regardless of the fact that Justice and Development Party was preferred to be identified as an Islamist Party, high rank JDP leaders consistently refused to utilize a similar articulation while labeled the new party as the follower of conservative democracy. Thus, from the very beginning of its government term, JDP’s performance in terms of foreign policy choices, particularly the EU stance of the Party and its relations with USA as well as Israel were discussed profoundly. The main concern of the dissertation was to analyze Turkey’s foreign policy under Justice and Development Party governments in 2001-2011 periods. More precisely, it intended to present political, economic, diplomatic and military aspects of relation prospects between Turkey and its surrounding both in close and far meaning as well as along with the international actors not excluding emerging global powers, so as to implement a proposed understanding of Turkey’s foreign policy in this period in a comparative manner by examining traditional patterns and practices of Turkey’s foreign policy to the period during in which AKP was in rule. Out of similar explanations, the dissertation aimed to suggest responds toward research question of the emerges as such “whether or to what extent changed Turkey’s foreign policy during Justice and Development Party government periods in 2002-2011 and if Turkey’s foreign policy experienced an axis shift under AKP rule.

Thence, as a consequence of realized objective scientific research under the framework theory and guidance of methodological approaches, the dissertation acquired bellow mentioned findings:

¹³¹⁷ Oğuzhan Yanarışık, *The Analysis of Turkish Foreign Policy under Justice and Development Party Government in the post 9/11 World*, Unpublished MA thesis, Bilkent University, 2008, Ankara, pp. 1-13.

¹³¹⁸ Pınar Bilgin, Ali Bilgiç, “Turkey's 'New' Foreign Policy towards Eurasia”, *Eurasian Geography and Economics*, 2011, Vol. 52, pp. 173-195.

- 1- As it is suggested through the hypothesis of the dissertation, the study rests upon the assumption that there was not a foreign policy change in Turkey's foreign policy paradigm under the rule of Justice and Development Party governments in 2002-2011. Contrary to mainstream literature blaming AKP to shift Turkey's traditional Western oriented foreign policy, although Turkey experienced some tune changes in terms of foreign policy in comparison to past practices, referring to Charles Hermann¹³¹⁹ a similar quantity change may not be interpreted as an axis shift that caused a radical shift of Turkey's traditional foreign policy orientation in accordance with the "change within continuity"¹³²⁰ theory formulated by Mesut Özcan and Ali Resul Usul.
- 2- The dissertation concludes that Justice and Development Party in the course of its rule period in 2002-2011 followed a similar foreign policy objective in terms of Western connection of Turkey's foreign policy similar to traditional foreign policy paradigm of Republic of Turkey.
- 3- AKP under its rule applied principles of Strategic Depth doctrine that shaped Turkey's foreign policy orientation to a large extent.¹³²¹
- 4- As a continuation of reform process commenced with 57th Turkish government, AKP Party undertook many significant legislative reforms to access full EU membership. The fact that full membership negotiations with the European Union commenced under the rule of AKP in 2005 explicitly indicates AKP's foreign policy decision makers' intention to gain a full membership at the end of negotiations. In this period, following acquisition of candidate status, Ankara's accession to full European Union membership followed a steady line parallel to its Westernization principle that constituted the fundamental principle of Turkey's foreign policy concept. When it comes to Cyprus though it constituted the weak ring of Turkey's foreign policy, as a reflection of status quo principle Ankara deliberately hesitated to develop revisionist policies regarding the Cyprus issue. Notwithstanding the fact that AKP's popular foreign policy rhetoric regarding the Cyprus issue "deadlock is not a solution" may be appreciated as a shift through Turkey's traditional line, nevertheless in particular foreign

¹³¹⁹ Charles Hermann, op. cit., pp. 3-21.

¹³²⁰ M. Özcan, R. Usul, op. cit., p. 110.

¹³²¹ Adam Szymański, "Turkish Foreign Policy in 2007-2009: Continuity or Change", *SInAN Working Paper Nr 3*, Center for European Studies, METU, Ankara, September 2009, pp. 1-24.

policy configurations toward Cyprus issue under the rule of Özal as well indicated similar tendencies. To ease Turkey's accession to European Community, Turgut Özal as well tried to bypass status quo in Cyprus as an issue constituting a huge obstacle in front of Turkey's full membership to European Community.

- 5- In terms of Turkey's reciprocal relations with the United States of America, it may be concluded that Justice and Development continued Turkey's foreign policy tradition with Washington that restructured at the post Cold War following the conjecture radically shifted after 11 September 2001. Although bilateral relations highly tensed under Presidency of Bush as it was highly harden to unilateralist approaches of White House. It is highly essential to note that as a consequence of Turkish Parliament's rejection of motion opening of Northern Front for the U.S. caused a considerable tension between Ankara and Washington. Additionally, as a consequence of Iraq's occupation and the process aftermaths also tensed reciprocal relations. Yet, peculiarly within the Presidency of Obama Turkey - U.S. reciprocal relations launched back to its historical path, moreover as refer to Iraq crisis in terms of relations between Ankara - Washington, both sides since the establishment of reciprocal relations opposed seriously tough similar conflicts did not harm the nature of mutual relations. The fact that President Obama's first time oversea visit took place in Turkey and new level of relations called as "model partnership" is an explicit indicator of Turkey's foreign relations toward the U.S. under the rule of AKP.
- 6- It is an incontrovertible reality that Justice and Development Party for the time of its government terms in 2002-2011 caught on an unorthodox amalgamation practice with Middle East states adverse to traditional Turkey's foreign policy that favored to advent the region merely through a national-security standpoint. Yet, Turkey's foreign policy attitude toward the Middle East in this period mostly shaped under the rule of Turgut Özal parallel to Gulf War. Towards the initial of the new millennium Turkey's engagement with Middle East in terms of political and economic relations highly increased. Softening relations with Syria aftermath of Adana Protocols, natural gas agreements with Iran and close affiliation with Israel in this period are good samples to figure out Ankara's engagement with the Middle East in this period as a consequence of newly emerged regional and international conjecture. Collapse of Soviet Union also deeply influenced Turkey's foreign policy attitude toward Russia,

Southern Caucasus and Central Asian states following the end of the Cold War. Turkic states in Central Asia and South Caucasus as well highly contributed Turkey to develop a multidimensional foreign policy orientation in the region upon a balance policy among Russia - China and Iran triangle not excluding Western interests in the region. Taken into consideration Turkey's foreign policy engagement in post 2002 period under the AKP rule, Turkey's foreign policy affiliation with diverse regions including the Middle East may not be considered as an axis shift.

- 7- AKP's relation prospects with Russian Federation as well is a continuation of Turkey's traditional foreign policy concept that most shaped following the end of the Cold War. The melting relations with Moscow that initially bore a rivalry character soon diversified with economic and trade based relations, besides thanks to cooperation prospects in energy issues reciprocal relations highly reinforced. Similar to this very line towards Russia, AKP continued Turkey's traditional foreign policy towards Russia. In spite of all affiliations the traditional character of mutual relation that based on a strict rivalry on Balkans, Caucasus, Black Sea and Central Asia did not change in the course of rule period of AKP in 2002-2011.
- 8- AKP under its rule period tried to keep traditional foreign policy concept of Ankara towards Southern Caucasus as a region highly essential for Turkey's national security perceptions regarding Russian expansion. Although, converse to post-Cold War paradigm of Turkey's foreign policy, AKP decision makers proved to change status quo in terms of relation with Armenia, however a similar shift did not realize due to fragile structure of Southern Caucasus. It is vital to highlight that a similar foreign policy engagement of AKP was highly encouraged by European Union and United States of America. Additionally, regarding the foreign policy relations with Central Asian Republics, Justice and Development Party under its office terms kept Republic of Turkey's foreign policy line that shaped following the end of the Cold War. It may be argued that as a part of continuity of the current status quo, AKP in this period evaded experiencing conflicts with Russia, while preferred to apply trade, business, and culture based policies toward Central Asia.
- 9- As a requirement of changing conjecture Ankara aimed to gain diversity to its foreign policy particularly in terms of economics developing constructive relations with the emerging global actors like China, India and Brazil that are known as BRICS. Yet, it

is mandatory to state that Turkey's close engagement with BRICS is not a political preference specific solely to Justice and Development Party as similar engagement as well commenced with the end of the Cold War as a demand of new world order.

10- The dissertation holds the point that regarding traditional continuity principle of foreign policy under the rule of AKP, the "westernization" as an essential principle of Turkey's foreign policy was kept. What is more, the "status quo" principle of Turkey's foreign policy was highly observed as Turkey under AKP government in 2001-2011 did not follow a revisionist foreign policy concept.

11- Another remarkable finding of the dissertation regarding the AKP rule is Turkey's preference of using soft power applications and its increasing role as a mediator towards conflicts arose its vicinity.

12- The dissertation argues that, though, under the rule of AKP, Ankara developed alternative paradigms in foreign policy sphere with the "zero problem principle" or "rhythmic diplomacy" rhetoric, Turkey's constructive engagement in foreign policy had initialized by previous governments. Many new foreign policy application dynamics that seemed to be introduced by Ahmet Davutoğlu as an example of active foreign policy, rhythmic diplomacy, regionalism, trade and commerce based relations, energy policies and encouragement of direct foreign investment essentially have its roots in Özal period where Turkey restructured its foreign policy concept upon the demands of newly emerged international and regional dynamics arose following the end of the Cold War.

Henceforth, based on similar findings and following all similar foreign policy analysis within the scope of the dissertation, it may be concluded that under the rule of Justice and Development Party government in 2002-2011, on contrary to all mainstream critics accusing Justice and Development Party to follow an Islamist - Neo-Ottomanist foreign policy which resulted in an axis shift of Turkey's Western oriented foreign policy line, Turkey's foreign policy did not lead towards any major changes. Justice and Development Party, similar to previous Turkish governments followed a rationalist, pragmatic; initiative based proactive foreign policy supported by rhythmic diplomacy toward Turkey's natural periphery. It is an undeniable fact that, a similar rhythmic diplomacy seem to be an unaccustomed foreign policy

reflex for traditional foreign policy paradigm of Ankara, however as regard to changing internal and external dynamics that emerged following the end of the Cold War, a similar practice is visible in Turkey's foreign policy practices. Turkey's soft power based peaceful endeavors and engagements in Turkish periphery and in its vicinity as well as its role model was de facto supported through its Western alliance's -the United States of America and the European Union- in this period.

A similar foreign policy orientation of Justice and Development Party was appreciated as an axis shift of Turkey's Western orientation while AK Party foreign policy decision makers called it as a special political maneuver to create a balance against spoiling relations with the European Union. Though, in all means high rank AK Party officials highlighted that Turkey is not in search of a alternative alliance model instead of its Western direction, particularly Turkey's Foreign Minister Davutoğlu through its academic writings indicated that Middle East is Turkey's natural periphery the importance of which should not be underestimated. On the other hand, the regional and international dynamics following the 9/11 attacks and Afghanistan and Iraq war pushed Turkey's foreign policy decision makers to follow a similar policy. Additionally, the "neighborhood forum" initialized by 57th government prior to AK Party initialized an active diplomacy process with the Middle East neighbors of Turkey to repair spoiled relations.

In spite of the recessing relations with the EU converse to highly blooming associations with Syria, Iran, and Palestine as well as other Arabic countries of the Middle East, it may not be argued that Turkey's foreign policy had shifted to East under Justice and Development Party government. Although, along with AK Party government's, in particular, Prime Minister Erdoğan's harsh critics against Israel that resulted with the minimizing relations with Tel Aviv as well as Turkey's open rejection against the United States of America in terms of opening its territories the nature of Turkey's foreign policy's Eastern direction did not change radically. Turkey's foreign policy decision makers, as it was experienced in AK Party example, previously many times realized similar attempts so as to strengthen its hand and to imply alternative options for Turkey's foreign policy. On the other hand, regardless of all positive and constructive affiliations with Syria, for instance, where both countries turned out to be strategic allies, following the Arab Spring mutual relations turned back to 90's level as both countries came to edge of war due to strained relations. Presently, as a consequence of 2011 uprisings all positive gains of the affiliations obtained in the course of Justice and Development Party came back to zero point. Syria closed its

consulate as well as border customs while suspended all trade and commerce agreements as regard to Turkey's initiatives to apply sanctions against Assad regime through Arab League.

The blooming relations with Iran that initialized due to Iranian Uranium enrichment crisis as well came to a deadlock as a result of Tehran's reluctance to propose abstract resolution models. Besides, when Turkish government accepted NATO missile shield radars in its territories that appreciated as an act against Iran, thus from the highest level Iran authorities menaced Turkey in case of a potential attack the radars would be primary targets. Furthermore, religious authorities of Iran Islam Republic criticized Turkey to promote secularist policies following the Arab Spring as well as Ankara's policies against Syria and closed its air space to Turkish Air Forces against operation that Turkey used against its struggle with PKK terror.

On contrary to severe criticism accusing AK Party to follow an Islamist or Neo Ottomanist foreign policy agenda toward Middle East, Turkey's foreign policy behaviors in the course of Arab Spring as well constituted disproving arguments. Ankara at Libya example, for instance, instead of following a religious brotherhood policy in solidarity with Muslim Libya, applied a rational foreign policy along with international community. Republic of Turkey strongly backed opponents of Gaddafi at this period while advocated the role of NATO as well joined operations to consolidate embargo against the ports held by the supporters of Colonel Muhammed Ghaddafi.

In general terms, the dissertation concludes the idea that Justice and Development Party made a successful analysis of the new international context that emerged at post 9/11 conjecture. AK Party decision makers pragmatically perceived the major chances took place both in international and regional scale and posed Turkey's foreign policy parallel to this very situation. It can be argued that JDP's new foreign policy discourse and active diplomacy is a continuation of Turkey's foreign policy that arose following the end of the Cold War, besides it may be appreciated as a product of post 9/11 international system that bears heavy traces of Afghanistan and Iraq occupation.

Bibliography

Books:

Abramowitz Morton, „The Complexities of American Policy Making on Turkey” in *Turkey's Transformation and American Policy* in Abramowitz Morton (ed.), The Century Foundation, New York 2000.

Aburish Said K., *Nasser, the Last Arab*, St. Martin's Press, New York 2004.

Akdağ Mustafa, *Türkiye'nin Batılılaşmasını Zorunlu Kılan Tarihsel Koşullar (The Conditions Made Westernization a Must for Turkey)*, Ankara Üniversitesi, Ankara 1973.

Akdoğan Yalçın, *AK Parti ve Muhafazakar Demokrasi (AK Party and Conservative Democracy)*, Alfa Yayınları, İstanbul 2004.

Akdoğan Yalçın, *Tarihe Düşen Notlar, 17 Aralık AB Zirvesinin Perde Arkası (Notes Taken to History, The Backstage of 17 December European Summit)*, Alfa Yayınları, 2010.

Akdoğan Yalçın, „The Meaning of Conservative Democratic Political Identity” in Hakan Yavuz (ed.), *The Emergence of a New Turkey: Democracy and AK Parti*, The University of Utah Press, Utah 2006.

Akgündüz Ahmet, Oztürk Said, *Ottoman History: Misperceptions and Truths*, IUR Press. Rotterdam 2011.

Akman Murat N., *Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi Hükümetleri Döneminde Türkiye - Avrupa Birliği İlişkileri (Turkey - EU Relations during Justice and Development Party Government Period)* Kitap Atelyesi Yayınları, Ankara 2010.

Akram Salima, *Turkey, Old and New*, Charles Scribner's Sons, New York 1947.

Aksan Virginia H., *Ottoman Wars 1700 - 1870: An Empire Besieged*, Pearson, Harlow 2007.

Akşin Apdulahat, *Atatürk'ün Dış Politika İlkeleri ve Diplomasi (Atatürk's Foreign Policy Principles and Diplomacy)*, Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, Ankara 1991.

Akşin Sina, *Atatürk'un Dış Politika İlkeleri ve Diplomasisi (Foreign Policy Principles of Atatürk and his Diplomacy)*, İnkılap ve Aka Kitapevleri, İstanbul 1964.

Akyol Taha, *Ama Hangi Atatürk? (But which Atatürk?)*, Doğan Kitap, İstanbul 2008.

Alexandris Alexis, *The Greek Minority of Istanbul and Greek - Turkish Relations 1918-1974*, University of South Carolina, Columbia 1994.

Alford Jonathan, *Greece and Turkey: Adversity in Alliance*, Gover Publishing, Guildford 1984.

Allin Dana, *NATO's Balkan Intervention*, Oxford University Press, New York 2002.

Altunışık Meliha B., Tür Özlem, *Turkey: Challenges of Continuity and Change*, Routledge Curzon, Oxon 2005.

Amikam Nachmani, *Israel Turkey and Greece: Uneasy Relations in the East Mediteranean*, Frank Cass, London 1987.

Arı Tayyar, *Geçmişten Günümüze Orta Doğuda Siyaset Savaş ve Diplomasi (From History to Present Peace and War in Middle East)*, MKM Yayınları, İstanbul 2008.

Armağanoğlu Faik, *Siyasi Tarih: 1789 - 1960 (Political History: 1789 - 1960)*, Sevinç Matbaası, Ankara 1964.

Arman Murat N., *Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi Partisi Hükümetleri Döneminde Türkiye - Avrupa Birliği İlişkileri (Turkish - European Union Relations during Justice and Development Party Governments)*, Kitap Atelyesi, Ankara 2010.

Armstrong Harold C., *Grey Wolf, Mustafa Kemal: An Intimate Study of a Dictator*, Arthur Barker Ltd., London 1932.

Aron Raymond, *Peace and War: A Theory of International Relations*, Anchor, New York 1973.

Arsan Nimet, *Atatürk'ün Söylev ve Demeçleri, I, II, III, IV, (Atatürk's Discourses and Interviews)*, Türk Inkılap Tarihi Enstitüsü Yayınları, Ankara 1964.

Ataöv Türkkaya, *Turkish Foreign Policy, 1939-1945*, Ankara Üniveristesi Basımevi, Ankara 1965.

Atatürk Mustafa K., *Nutuk (Discourse)*, Akvaryum Yayınevi, İstanbul 2008.

Ateş Toktamış, *Ulusal Kurtuluş Savaşında Türk Dış Politikası (Turkish Foreign Policy during Independence War)*, Der Yayınları, İstanbul 1989.

Avcı Gamze, *Turkish Political Parties and the EU Discourse in the post-Helsinki Period: a Case of Europeanization in Turkey and European Integration: Accession Prospects and Issues*, Routledge, London & New York 2004.

Avşar Servet, *İkinci Dünya Savaşı ve İsmet İnönü'nün Uyguladığı Dış Politika (Second World War and Foreign Policy of İsmet İnönü)*, Genel Kurmay Başkanlığı Yayınları, Ankara 1999.

Aydemir Şevket S., *Tek Adam (One Man)*, Remzi Kitabevi, İstanbul 1974.

Aydın Mustafa *New Geopolitics of Central Asia and the Caucasus; Causes of Instability and Predicament*, Center for Strategic Research (SAM), Ankara 2000.

Aydın Mustafa, *Turkish Foreign Policy Framework and Analysis*, Center for Strategic Analysis, Ankara 2004.

Bachman David, „Domestic Sources of Chinese Foreign Policy” in Samuel Kim (ed.), *China and the World: Chinese Foreign Relations in the Post-Cold War Era*, Westview Press, Boulder, Colo 1994.

Bağ Meltem M., *Turkey's Relation with a Changing Europe*, Manchester University Press, New York 1997.

Bağcı Hüseyin, „Turkish Foreign Policy in Post Cold War Era: New Problems and Opportunities”, in Idris Bal (ed.) *Turkish Foreign Policy in Post Cold War Era* Brown Walkers Press, Florida, 2004.

Bajpai Kanti, „India's Global Role for the 21st Century: Politics of Community, Order and Co-operation” in Mansingh, Lalit et al, (eds.) *Indian Foreign Policy: Agenda for the 21st Century*, Vol. I, Konark, Delhi.

Bal İdris, *Turkey's Relations with the West and the Turkic Republics: Rise and Fall of the Turkish Model*, Aldershot, Ashgate 2000.

Bal İdris, *Turkish Foreign Policy in Post Cold War Era*, Brown Walker Press, Florida 2004.

Balcer Adam, *Turcja po rozpoczęciu negocjacji z Unia Europejska - relacje zagraniczne i sytuacja wewnętrzna (Turkey after the Start of Negotiations with European Union: Foreign Relations and Internal Situation)*, Osrodek Studiów Wschodnich, Warsaw 2008.

Baran Zeyno, „The Baku - Tbilisi - Ceyhan Pipeline: Implications for Turkey” in Frederick Starr, Svante E Cornell (eds.), *The Baku - Tbilisi - Ceyhan Pipeline: Oil Window to the West*, Central Asia - Caucasus Institute and Silk Road Studies Program, Washington 2005.

Barker Henri J., *Iran and Turkey*. United States Institute of Peace, The Iran Primer, *Power, Politics and U.S. Policy*, DC: USIP, Washington 2010.

Barkey Henri J., „Under the Gun: Turkish Foreign Policy and the Kurdish Question” in Olson Robert (ed.) *The Kurdish Movememnts in 1990s: Its Impacts on Turkey and Middle East*, The University of Kentucky Press, Kentucky 1996.

Bartold Vasilii V., *Turkistan: Down to the Mongol Invasion*, Luzac & Co.Ltd, London 1968.

Becker Bertha K., Eckler Claudio A. G., *Brazil: A New Regional Power in the World Economy*, Cambridge University Press, New York 1992.

Bengio Ofra, „The Historical Evolution of the Israeli - Turkish Relationship”, in Maddy Bruce W., Susser Asher (eds.) *Turkish - Israeli Relations in a TransAtlantic Context: Wider Europe and the Greater Middle East*. Conference Proceedings, The Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies, Tel Aviv University, 2005.

Bengio Ofra, *The Turkish - Israeli Relations: Changing Ties of Middle Eastern Outsiders*, Palgrave Macmillan, New York 2004.

Beriker Nimet, *Negotiating Styles of the Minor Parties in Multilateral Peace Negotiations: Greece and Turkey at the Lausanne Peace Conference, 1922-23*, Unpublished Ph.D dissertation at George Mason University, 1993.

Berlie Jean A., *Islam in China: Hui and Uighurs: Between Modernisation and Sinicization*, White Lotus Publishing, Bangkok, Thailand 2004.

Beylerian Arthur, *Les Grandes Puissances L'Empire Ottoman et les Armeniens: dans les Archives Francaises, 1914-1918*, Publications de la Sorbonne, Paris 1983.

Bienek Karol, *Polityka Zagraniczna Turcji wobec Państw Balkańskich (Turkey's Foreign Policy towards Balkan States)*, Wydawnictwo Adam Marszałek, Toruń 2008.

Bilal Şimsir N., *İngiliz Belgelerinde Atatürk (British Documents on Atatürk)*, Türk Tarih Kurumu, Ankara 1975.

Bilge Suat A., *Güç Komşuluk: Türkiye - Sovyetler Birliği İlişkileri 1920-1964 (A Hard Neighbourhood: Turkish-Soviet Union Relations 1920 - 1964)*, Ofset Repromat, Ankara 1991.

Bilge Suat A., *Büyük Düş: Türk-Yunan Siyasi ilişkileri: 1919-2000, (Big Dream: Political Relations between Turkey and Greece: 1919 – 2000)*, 21. Yüzyıl Yayınları, Ankara 2000.

Bilge Yavuz, *Türk Kurtuluş Savaşı Esnasında Türk - Fransız İlişkileri (Turkish - French Relations during the Independence War)*, Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, Ankara 1994.

Bovingdon Gardner, *Autonomy in Xinjiang: Han Nationalist Imperatives and Uyghur Discontent, Policy Studies 11*, East - West Center, Washington 2004.

Bölükbaşı Deniz, *1 Mart Vakası Irak Tezkeresi ve Sonrası (The Case of 1st March , Iraq Motion and Its Aftermath)*, Doğan Kitap, İstanbul 2008.

Brockelman Carl, *History of Islamic People*, Routledge, London 2000.

Brzezinski Zbigniew, *The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperative*, Basic Books, New York 1998.

Çakır Ruşen, *Ne Seriat, Ne Demokrasi: Refah Partisini anlamak (Neither the Shari'a Nor Democracy: Understanding the Welfare Party)*, Metris Yayınları, İstanbul 1994.

Campany Richard C., *Turkey and the United States the Arm Embargo Period*. Prager, New York 1982.

Çandar Cengiz, „Turkish Foreign Policy and the War on Iraq” in Martin G. Leonore, Dmitris Kredis (ed.), *The Future of Turkish Foreign Policy*, MIT Press, London 2004.

Çarkoğlu Ali, Rubin Barry M., *Religion and Politics in Turkey*, Routledge, Oxon 2006.

Çarkoglu Ali, Rubin Barry M., *Turkey and the European Union, Domestic Politics, Economic Integration and International Dynamics in Who Wants Full Membership? Characteristics of Turkish Public Support for EU membership*, Frank Cass, London 2003.

Casin Mesut H., *Rus imparatorluk Stratejisi (Russian Imperial Strategy)*, Okumuş Adam, İstanbul 2006.

Çay Abdülhaluk, *Her Yönüyle Kürt Dosyası (Kurdish Case with all Aspects)*, Turan Yayıncılık, Ankara 1993.

Cebesoy Ali F., *Moskova Hatıraları (The Moscow Memories)*, Vatan Neşriyatı, İstanbul 1955.

Chan Gerald, Lee Pak K., Chan Lai-Ha, *China Engages Global Governance: A New World Order in the Making?*, Routledge, Oxon 2012.

Cheterian Vicken, „War and Peace” in *The Caucasus: Ethnic Conflict and the New Geopolitic*, Colombia University Press, New York 2008.

Çiftçi Yasemin, *Contemporary Turkish Foreign Policy*, Praeger Publishers, Westport 1999.

Cleveland William L., *A History of the Modern Middle East*, Westview Press, San Francisco 1994.

Coene Frederik, *The Caucasus: An Introduction*, Routledge, Oxon 2010.

Cohen Stephen P., *India: Emerging Power*, Brookings Institution Press, Washington D.C. 2001.

Collier David, *The Comparative Method in Political Science: The State of Discipline II*, American Political Science Association, Washington DC 1993.

Cook Steven A., Sherwood - Randall Elizabeth, *Generating Momentum for a New Era in U.S.-Turkey Relations*, Council on Foreign Relations, New York 2006.

Cooper Briton, *Mudros to Lausanne: Britain's Frontier in West Asia, 1918-1923*, State University of New York Press, Albany, New York 1976.

Cornell Svante E., *Small Nations and Great Powers: A Study of Ethnopolitical Conflict in the Caucasus*, Curzon Press, United Kingdom 2001.

Czaplicka Maria A., *The Turks of Central Asia in History and at the Present Day, An Ethnographical Inquiry into the Pan-Turanian Problem, and Bibliographic Material Relating to the Early Turks and the Present Turks of Central Asia*, Curzon Press, New York, 1973.

Dağı İhsan, *Özallı Yıllarda Türk Siyaseti İnsan Hakları Demokrasi ve Avrupa Birliği (Turkish Policy in Özal Period: Human Rights, Democracy and European Union)*, Boyut Kitapları İstanbul 2001.

Davutoğlu Ahmet, *Stratejik Derinlik: Türkiye'nin Uluslararası Konumu (Strategic Depth: International Location of Turkey)*, Küre Yayınları, İstanbul 2001.

Denis Sinor, „The Uighurs in Denis Sinor in Denis Sinor (ed.), *The Cambridge History of Early Inner Asia*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1990.

Deringil Selim, *Denge Oyunu: İkinci Dünya Savaşında Türkiye'nin Dış Politikası, (Balance Game: Turkey's Foreign Policy during the Second World War)*, Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, İstanbul 1994.

Deringil Selim, *Turkish Foreign Policy during the Second World War: An "Active" Neutrality*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1989.

Devlin John F., *Syria: Modern State in an Ancient Land*, Westview Press Inc, Colorado 1983.

Diuk Nadia, Karatnycky Adrian, *New Nations Rising: The Fall of the Soviets and the Challenge of Independence*, John Wiley and Sons, Inc., New York 1993.

Donaldson Dwight M., *The Shi'ite, Religion, A History of Islam in Persia and Iraq*, Gordon Press Publishers, New York, 1976.

Dorransoro Gilles, *The EU and Turkey*, in *European Union Foreign and Security Policy*, Routledge, London 2004.

Duman Doğan, *Çok Partili Dönemde Türkiye’de İslamcılık (Islamism in Turkey during Multi Party Period in Turkey)*, Dokuz Eylül Üniversitesi, Atatürk İlkeleri ve İnkılap Tarihi Enstitüsü, Unpublished PhD Thesis, İzmir 1996.

Durmuş Yılmaz, *Musul Meselesi Tarihi (Mosul Issue History)*, Çizgi Kitabevi Yayınları, Konya 2003.

Ebaugh Helen R., *The Gulen Movement: A Sociological Analysis of a Civic Movement Rooted in Moderate Islam*, Springer Dordrecht Heilderberg, New York 2010.

Eberhard Wolfram, *A History of China*, University of California Press, Berkeley and Los Angeles 1977.

Economy Elizabeth, *China Confronts the Challenge of Globalization*, Rockefeller Brothers Fund 1998.

Eligür Banu, *The Mobilization of Political Islam in Turkey*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2010.

Eralp Atila, *Turkey and the European Union in the post - Cold War Climate in Parameters of Partnership*, Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, Baden - Baden 2003.

Erhan Çağrı, *Türk - Amerikan İlişkilerinin Tarihsel Kökenleri (Historical Roots of Turkish - American Relations)*, İmge Yayınları, Ankara 2001.

Eroğlu Ahmet H., *Osmanlı Devletinde Yahudiler: XIX Yüzyılın Sonuna kadar (Jews in Ottoman Empire: Till the end of XIX Century)*, Alperen, Ankara 2000.

Eugene Schuyler, *American Diplomacy and the Furtherance of Trade*, Charles Scribner's Sons, New York 1886.

Evans Laurence, *US Policy and the Partition of Turkey, 1914-1924*, John Hopkins University, Studies in Historical and Political Science Series 82, No.2, Johns Hopkins Press, Baltimore 1965.

Fadhil Hussain, *The Mosul Problem: A Study in Anglo - Iraq - Turkish Diplomacy and Public Opinion*, Asad Press, Baghdad 1967.

Faroqhi Suraiya, *The Ottoman Empire and the World around It*, I.B. Tauris and CO Ltd., London 2006.

Feroz Ahmad, „The Historical Background of Turkey’s Foreign Policy” in Martin Lenore G. and Keridis, Dimitris (eds.) *The Future of Turkish Foreign Policy*, MIT Press, London 2004.

Feroz Ahmad, *The Making of Modern Turkey*, Routledge, London; New York 1993.

Fisher Alan W., *The Russian Annexation of Crimea 1772 - 1783*, Cambridge University Press, London 1970.

Fortun Fatih, *Uygur Sorunu Golgesinde Türk - Çin İlişkileri, (Turkish - Chinese Relations under the Shadow of Uighur Question)*, Global Political Trends Center, 2010.

Fox Annette B., *The Power of Small States: Diplomacy in World War II*, University of Chicago Press, Chicago 1959.

Franke Hebert, *The Cambridge History of China: Alien Regimes and Border States, 907 - 1368*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1994.

Fuller Graham E., *Central Asia: Turkey's New Geopolitics*, RAND Corporation, Santa Monica 1992.

Fuller Graham E., *From Eastern Europe to Western China: The Growing Role of Turkey in the World and its Implications for Western Interests*, RAND Corporation, Santa Monica 1993.

Fuller Graham E., *The New Turkish Republic: Turkey as a Pivotal State in the Muslim World*, United States Institute of Peace, Washington 2008.

Fuller Graham E., *Turkey Faces East: New Orientations toward the Middle East and Old Soviet Union*, RAND Corporation, Santa Monica 1992.

Fukuyama Francis, *The End of History and the Last Man*, Free Press, New York 1992.

Gaur Mahendra, *Foreign Policy Annual, 2004*, Kalpaz Publication, Delhi 2005.

Gellner Ernest, *Muslim Society*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1981.

Giray Burcu, „Turkish Policy Toward the Israeli - Palestinian Conflict” in Moshe Ma’oz (ed.) *Muslim Attitudes to Jews and Israel; The Ambivalances of Rejection, Antagonism, Tolerance and Cooperation*, Sussex Academic Press, Sussex 2010.

Gladney Dru C., *Muslim Chinese: Ethnic Nationalism: In the People’s Republic*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge 1991.

Golembowski Franciszek, *Droga Turcji do Unii Europejskiej: stan i perspektywy (Turkey’s Way to European Union: State and Perspectives)*, Polski Instytut Spraw Międzynarodowych, Warsaw 1994.

Gordon Lincoln, *Brazil’s Secondo Chance: En Route Toward the First World*, Brookings Institution Press, Washington 2001.

Gönlübol Mehmet, *Turkish Participation in the United Nations, 1945-1954*, Ankara University Publication of Political Science Faculty, Ankara 1963.

Gönlübol Mehmet, Kürkçüoğlu Ömer, *Olaylarla Türk Dış Politikası (Turkish Foreign Policy with Events)*, Siyasal Kitapevi, Ankara 1987.

Gözen Ramazan, *Amerikan Kışkırtıcılığında Dış Politika: Körfez Savaşı, Turgut Özal ve Sonrası (Foreign Policy under American Engagement: Gulf War, Turgut Özal and aftermaths)*, Liberte, Ankara 2000.

Grabill Joseph, *Protestant Diplomacy and the Near East: Missionary Influence on American Policy 1810-1927*, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis 1971.

Graves Philip P., *The Question of the Straits*, E. Benn, London 1931.

Gruen Cooper, *The Water Crisis: is the Next Middle East Conflict?*, Simon Wissenthal Center, 1992.

Gül Muhittin, *İkinci Dünya Savaşı Sırasında Müttefikler arasında Yapılan Önemli Toplantılarda Türkiye (Turkey in the Course of Important Meetings Realized among Alliances during the Second World War)*, Genel Kurmay Başkanlığı Yayınları, Ankara 1999.

Gül Muhittin, *İsmet İnönü’nün İlk Diplomatiği Yılları: Mudanya ve Lozan (First Years of İsmet İnönü as a Diplomat: Mudanya ve Lozan)*, Gazi University, Ankara 1994.

Gurtov Mel, *Superpower on Crusade: The Bush Doctrine in US Foreign Policy*, Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder 2006.

Gürün Kamuran, *Türk - Rus İlişkilerinde 500 Yıl: 1491 - 1992, (500 Years in Russo - Turkish Relations, 1491-1992)*, TTK Yayınları, Ankara 1999.

Gürün Kamuran, *Türk - Sovyet İlişkileri (Turkish - Soviet Relations)*, TTK Yayınları, Ankara 1991.

Hacker Joseph R., *Ottoman Policies towards the Jews and Jewish Attitudes towards Ottomans during the Fifteenth Century in Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire*, Holmes and Meier Publisher, New York 1982.

Hale William, „Turkey, the Black Sea and Transcaucasia” in Wright et al. (eds.), *Transcaucasian Boundaries*, UCL Press, London 1996.

Hale William, *Turkey, The U.S. and Iraq*, Saqi & London Middle East Institute, London, 2007.

Hale William, *Turkish Foreign Policy (1974-2000)*, Frank Cass, Portland 2000.

Harari Maurice, *The Turco - Persian Boundary Question: A Case Study in Boundary Making in the Near and Middle East*, unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, Columbia University, 1958.

Harris Howard, *Turkey, the Straits and U.S. Policy*, Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore 1974.

Hasanlı Jamil, *Stalin and the Turkish Crisis of the Cold War, 1945 - 1953*, Lexington Books, Plymouth, 2011.

Herbut Maciej, „Turcja między wschodem a zachodem”, („Turkey between the East and the West”), in Teresa Łoś-Nowak Teresa (ed.), *Polityka Zagraniczna: aktorzy - potencjały - strategie (Foreign Policy: Actors - Potentials - Strategies)*, Poltext, Warsaw 2011.

Hille Charlotte M., *State Building and Conflict Resolution in the Caucasus*. Koninklijke Brill, Leiden 2010.

Hoffmeister Frank, *Legal Aspects of Cyprus Problem: Annan Plan and EU Accession*, Martinus Nijhof Publishers, Leiden 2006.

Holsti Kalevi J., *Why Nations Realign? Foreign Policy Restructuring in Postwar World*, Allen & Unwin Inc, London 1982.

Holsti Ole R., *To See Ourselves as Others See Us: How Publics Abroad View the United States after 9/11*, The University of Michigan Press, Michigan 2011.

Hunter Shiiren, *The Transcaucasus in Transition: Nation Building and Conflict*, Washington D.C., Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1994.

Hurewitz Jacob C., *The Background of Russia's Claims to the Turkish Straits*, TTK, Ankara 1964.

Imber Colin, *The Ottoman Empire, 1300-1650: The Structure of Power*, Palgrave Macmillan, New York 2002.

Jung Dietrich, Piccoli Wolfango, *Turkey at the Crossroads: Otoman Legacies and Greater Middle East*, Zed Books Ltd, London 2001.

Jung Jordon M., *Brazil, Emerging World Power*, Krieger Pub Co., New York 1991.

Kafesoğlu İbrahim, *Türk Milli Kültürü (Turkish National Culture)*, Ötüken Neşriyat, İstanbul 1984.

Kara İsmail, *Türkiye'de İslamcılık Düşüncesi (Islamist Ideology in Turkey)*, Risale Yayınları, İstanbul 1986.

Karagiannis Emmanuel, *Energy and Security in Caucasus*, Routledge Curzon, London 2002.

Karal Halil, *Turkish Relations with Soviet Russia during the National Liberation War of Turkey, 1918-1922: A Study in the Diplomacy of the Kemalist Revolution*, University of California Press, Los Angeles 1967.

Karal Halil, *Turkish Relations with Soviet Russia during the National Liberation War of Turkey, 1918-1922: A Study in the Diplomacy of the Kemalist Revolution*, University of California Press, Los Angeles 1967.

Karal Ziya, *Atatürk ve Devrim (Atatürk and Revolution)*, ODTU, Ankara 1998.

Kardaş Şaban, *Turkey and the Iraq Crisis: JDP Between Identity and Interest*, in Hakan Yavuz (ed), *Emergency of New Turkey*, The University of Utah Press, Salt Lake City 2006.

Karpat Kemal, *The Politicization of Islam. Reconstructing Identity, State, Faith and Community in the Late Otoman State*, Oxford University Press, Oxford. 2001.

Karpat Kemal, *Turkey's Foreign Policy in Transition: 1950-1974*. E. J. Brill, Netherlands 1975.

Kasım Kamer, *Türkiye - İsrail İlişkileri: İki Bölgesel Gücün Stratejik Ortaklığı (Turkish -Israel Relations: Cooperation of Two Regional Powers)*, Alfa, İstanbul 2001.

Kaymaz Nejat, *Misak-ı Millî Üzerinde Yapılan Tartışmalar Hakkında (On Discussion National Oath)*, VIII. Türk Tarih Kongresi, Ankara 1977.

Keridis Dimitris, Triantafyllou Dimitris (eds.) *Greek - Turkish Relations in the Era of Globalization*, DC: Brassey's, Washington 2001.

Keskin Mustafa, *Hindistan Müslümanlarının Milli Mücadeleye Yardımları, 1919 - 1923. (Supports of Indian Muslims' to the Turkish National Struggle)*, Erciyes University, Kayseri 1999.

Keşler Ayşe, *Dimensions of Foreign Policy in Turkey: A Comparative Analysis of AKP Government and DSP - MHP - ANAP Coalition*, unpublished MA Thesis at Sabanci University, 2005.

Kıbaroğlu Mustafa, Kıbaroğlu Ayşe, *Global Security Watch - Turkey: A Reference Book*, Greenwood Publishing Group, Westport 2009.

Kirisçi Kemal, *World Politics and Emerging Multiregional Power*, Boğaziçi University Press, Istanbul 2002.

Kılıç Remzi, *XVI. ve XVII. Yüzyıllarda Osmanlı - İran Siyasi Antlaşmaları (Ottoman-Iranian Political Agreements in 16th and 17th Century)*, Tez Yayinlari, Ankara 2001.

Knudsen Erik L., *Syria, Turkey and Changing Power Configurations*, Ashgate Publishing Limited, Aldershot 2003.

Kołodziejczyk Dariusz, *Turcja (Turkey)*, Trio, Warszawa, 2000.

Kösebalan Hasan, *Turkish Foreign Policy: Islam, Nationalism and Globalisation*, Palgrave Macmillan, New York 2011.

Kowalski Tadeusz, *Turcja Powojenna (Postwar Turkey)*, Wydaw. Zakładu Narodowego im. Ossolińskich, Lviv 1925.

Krikorian Mesrob K., *Armenians in the service of the Ottoman Empire, 1860-1908*, Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd., London 1977.

Kula Onur B., *Türkiyede'ki Siyasi Partilerin Avrupa Politikaları (Euro Politics of Political Parties in Turkey)* Sosyal Demokrasi Vakfı Yayınları, 2004, İstanbul.

Kumins Lawrence, *Iraq Oil: Reserves, Production, and Potential Revenues*, Congressional Research Service, The Library of Congress, 2003.

Kurubaş Erol, *Kürt Sorununun Uluslararası Boyutu ve Türkiye (International Dimension of Kurdish Problem and Turkey)*, Nobel Yayın Dağıtım, Ankara 2004.

Kushner David, „Conflict and Accommodation” in A. Yaniv Moozm (ed.) *Turkish - Syrian Relations in, Syria under Assad*, Croom Helmn, London 1986.

Laçiner Sedat, *Türk Dış Politikası (Turkish Foreign Policy)* Türk Dış Politikası, Sempozyum Tebliği. USAK Yayınları, Ankara 2009.

Landau Jacob M, *The Politics of Pan Islam: Ideology and Organization*, Clarendon Press, Oxford 1990.

Larrabee Stephen F., *Turkey as a US. Security Partner*, Rand Cooperation, Pittsburgh 2008.

Lee Stephen J., *Peter the Great*, Routledge, London 1993.

Lenczowski George, *Iran under Pahlavis*, Hoover Institute Publication, California 1978.

Lesser Ian, *Bridge or Barrier? Turkey and the West after the Cold War*, CA: RAND, Santa Monica 1992.

Levy Avigdor, *The Jews of the Ottoman Empire*, Darwin Press, Michigan 1994.

Levy Avigdor, *The Sephardim in the Ottoman Empire*, Darwin Press, Michigan 1992.

Lewis Bernard, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*, Royal Institute of International Affairs Series, Oxford University Press, London 1961.

Lewis Bernard, *The Jews of Islam*, Princeton University Press, New Jersey 1984.

Lindsay James K., *Crisis and Conciliation: A year of Rapprochement between Greece and Turkey*, I. B. Tauris, London 2007.

Łoś-Nowak Teresa, *Polityka zagraniczna: aktorzy - potencjały - strategie (Foreign Policy: Actors - Potentials - Strategies)*, Poltext, Warszawa 2011.

Löwy Albert, *The Jews of Constantinople: a Study of their Communal and Educational Status*, Wertheimer, Lea & Co, London 1890.

Luca Anthony R., *Great Power Rivalry at the Turkish Straits: The Montreux Conference and Convention of 1936*, Eastern European Monographs, Colombia University, New York 1981.

Lukes Harry C., *Mosul and its Minorities*, M. Hopkins, London 1925.

MacDonald David B., *Identity Politics in the Age of Genocide: The Holocaust and Historical Representation*, Routledge, Oxon 2008.

Mahtaney Piya, *India, China and Globalization: The Emerging Superpowers and the Future of Economic Development*, Palgrave Publishers Ltd, London 2010.

Mairet Frederic, „New Stakes” in *The Caucasus and Central Asia: Caspian Energy Resources and International Affairs*, Author House, Bloomington 2006.

Mango Andrew, *Atatürk: The Founder of Modern Turkey*, Overlook Press, New York 2002.

Marashlian Levon, *Politics and Demography: Armenians, Turks, and Kurds in the Ottoman Empire*, Zoryan Institute, Cambridge 1990.

Mardin Şerif, *İslamcılık, (İslamizm), Tanzimat'tan Cumhuriyete Türkiye Ansiklopedisi*, İletişim Yayınları, İstanbul 1958, Vol. V.

Marquies Ronnie, Yıldızoğlu Ergin, „The Resurgence of Islam and the Welfare Party in Turkey” in Joel Beinin, Joe Stork (eds.) *Political Islam: Essays from Middle East Report*, University of California Press, California 2005.

McCarthy Justin, *Muslims and Minorities: the Population of Ottoman Anatolia and the End of the Empire*, New York University Press, New York and London, 1983.

McDannald Alexander H., *2005 Americana Annual*, Americana Corporation, New York 2005.

Meeker Michael E., *A Nation of Empire: The Ottoman Legacy of Turkish Modernity*, University of California Press, California 2002.

Mekiin Sean M., *The Berlin-Baghdad Express: The Ottoman Empire and Germany's Bid for World Power*, Penguin Books Ltd., United States of America 2010.

Meray Seha, *Lozan Barış Konferansı, Tutanaklar - Belgeler (Lausanne Peace Conference, Records and Documents)*, Ankara University Political Science Publications, Ankara 1969.

Merrit Richard, Rokkan Stein, *Comparing Nations: The Use of Quantitative Data in Cross National Research*, Yale University Press, New Haven 1996.

Micallef Roberta, *Hatay Joins the Motherland in State frontiers: Borders and Boundaries in the Middle East*, Brandell, I. I.B. Tauris & Co Ltd, London 2006.

Michalski Krzysztof, *Religion in the New Europe*, CEU Press, Hungary 1996.

Mikaberidze Alexander, *Conflict and Conquest in the Islamic World*, ABC - CLIO - LLC., California 2011.

Milton Edwards B., *Contemporary Politics in Middle East*, Polity Press, Cambridge 2006.

Misiągiewicz Justyna, *Polityka zagraniczna Turcji po zimnej wojnie (Turkey's Foreign Policy after the Cold War)*, Wydawnictwo Adam Marszałek, Toruń 2009.

Mısıroğlu Kadir, *Lozan Zafer mi? Hezimet mi? (Is Lausanne a Victory or a Defeat?)*, Sebil Yayınları, İstanbul 1992.

Morawski Wojciech, *Wojny Rosyjsku - Tureckie od XVII do XX wieku (Turkish Russian Wars from XVII to XX Century)*, Wydawnictwo TRIO, Warszawa, 2006.

Moustakis Fotios, *Greek -Turkish Relationship and NATO*, Frank Cass Publishers, New York 2003.

Nakdimon Şalom, *Irak ve Ortadoğu'da Mossad (Mossad in Iraq and Middle East)*, Elips Yayınları, Ankara 2008.

Nation Craig, *War in the Balkans, 1991 - 2002*, Strategic Studies Institute, Carlisle 2003.

Ning Lu, *The Dynamics of Foreign-Policy Decisionmaking in China*, Westview Press, Boulder, Colo 1997.

Olson Robert, *Turkey - Iran Relations, 1974 - 2004: Revolution, Ideology, War, Coupe and Geopolitics*, Mazda Publishers, California 2004.

O'Neill Jim, *Brics and Beyond*, The Goldman Sachs Group, 2007.

Oran Baskın, *Atatürk Milliyetçiliği: Resmi İdeoloji Dışı Bir İnceleme (The Nationalism of Atatürk, a non - Official Ideological Study)*, Dost Kitabevi, Ankara 1988.

Oran Baskın, *Türk Dış Politikası (Turkish Foreign Policy)* İletişim Yayınları, İstanbul 2001, İletişim Yayınları, İstanbul 2001.

Ortaylı İlber, *İmparatorluğun en Uzun Yüzyılı (The Longest Century of the Empire)*, İletişim Yayınları, İstanbul 1998.

Owen Roger, *State, Power and Politics in the Making of the Modern Middle East*, Routledge, London 1992.

Özcan Ahmet, *Pan - Islamizm: Indian Muslims, the Ottomans and Britian, 1877 - 1924*, Koninklijke Brill, Leiden 1997.

Özipek Bekir B., *Muhafazakarlık, Akıl, Toplum, Siyaset, (Conservatism, Mind, Society, Politics)* Liberte Yayınları, Ankara 2004.

Öztuna Yılmaz, *Başlangıcından Zamanımıza kadar Türkiye Tarihi (From Intial to Present Turkish History)*, Hayat Kitapları, İstanbul 1967.

Panagariya Arvind, *India: The Emerging Giant*, Oxford University Press, London 2010.

Park Bill, „Turkey and U.S”, in Andrew M. Dorman, Joyce P. Kaufman (eds.) *The Future of Transatlantic Relations: Perceptions, Policy and Practice*, Stanford University Press, Stanford California 2011.

Parrott Dawisha and Bruce, *Conflict, Cleavage and Change in Central Asia and the Caucasus*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1997.

Peters Edward, *Inquisition*, University of California Press, California 1989.

Pipes Daniel, *Greater Syria: The History of an Ambition*, Oxford University Press, Oxford 1990.

Prant Harsh V., *China's Rising Global Profile: The Great Power Tradition*, Sussex Academic Press, Sussex 2012.

Quataert Donald, *The Ottoman Empire: 1700 - 1922*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2005.

Rabasa Angel, Larrabee Stephen F., *The Real Rise of Political Islam in Turkey*, Rand Corporation, Pittsburg 2008.

Rashwan Diaa, *The Spectrum of Islamist Movements*, Al - Ahram Center for Strategic Researches, Frederic Ebert Stiftung, Cairo 2006.

Redmond John, Rosenthal Glenda G., *The Expanding European Union: Past, Present, Future*, Lynne Rienner Publishers, London 1998.

Rex Hudson, *A Brazil: A Country Study*, Library of Congress, Washington 1997.

Reychman Jan, *Historia Turcji (History of Turkey)*, Zakł. Nar. im. Ossolińskich, Wrocław 1973.

Richardson Lewis, F., *Statistics of Deadly Quarrel*, Quadrangle Books, Chicago 1960.

Robins Robert P., *Suits and Uniforms, Turkish Foreign Policy since the Cold War*, Hurst & Company, London 2003.

Rockmore Tom, *Before and After 9/11: A Philosophical Examination of Globalization, Terror and History*, The Continuum International Publishing Group, New York 2011.

Roett Riordan, *The New Brazil*, Brookings Institution Press, Washington D.C. 2010.

Rosati Jerel, Hagan Joe, Sampson Mart, *Foreign Policy Restructuring: How Governments Respond to Global Change*, University of South Carolina Press, South Carolina 1994.

Rose Gideon, *The New Arab Revolt: What Happened, What It Means, and What Comes Next?*, Council on Foreign Affairs, New York 2011.

Rosenau James N., *The Study of Political Adaptation: Essays on the Analysis of World Politics*, Nichols Publishing, New York, 1981.

Ross Babbage, Gordon Sandy, *India's Strategic Future: Regional State or Global Power?*, Oxford University Press, Delhi 1992.

Rozakis Christos, Stagos Petros L., *The Turkish Straits*, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht 1987.

Rubeinstein Alvin Z., Smolansky Oles M., *Regional Power Rivalries in the New Eurasia: Russia, Turkey and Iran*, M.E.S. Sharpe Inc, New York 1995.

Rustow Dunkar A., *Turkey: America's Forgotten Ally*, Council on Foreign Relations, New York 1987.

Salahi Salih, *Türk Kurtuluş Savaşı ve Dış Politika (Turkish Independence War and Foreign Policy)*, Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, Ankara 1991.

Sander Oral, *Türk - Amerikan İlişkileri. 1947 - 1967 (Turkish - American Relations 1947- 1967)*, AUSBF, Ankara 1967.

Sander Oral, *Türkiye'nin Dış Politikası (Foreign Policy of Turkey)*, Imge Kitapevi, Ankara 1998.

Sanjan Avedik, *The Sanjak of Alexandretta (Hatay): Its Impact on Turkish - Syrian Relations, 1939-56*, Middle East Journal Publications, New York 1956.

Saray Mehmet, *Atatürk'ün Sovyet Politikası (Atatürk's Soviet Policy)*, Acar Yayınları, İstanbul 1987.

Saray Mehmet, *Türk - İran İlişkileri (Turkish - Iranian Relations)*, Atatürk Araştırmalar Merkezi, Ankara 2006.

Sarındy Yusuf, *Türkiye'nin Batı İttifakına Yönelişi ve NATO'YA Girişi (Turkey's Reading toward the West and Enterance to NATO)*, Kültür ve Turizm Bakanlığı Yayınları, Ankara 1998.

Sarwar Ghulam, *History of Shah Isma'il Safawi*, AMS Press, New York 1975.

Şen Serdar, *Refah Partisi'nin Teori ve Pratiği: Adil Düzen ve Kapitalizm (The Teory and Practice of Welfare Party: Fair Order and Capitalism)*, Sarmal Yayınevi, İstanbul 1995.

Sezel İhsan, Dağı İhsan, Özal, *Siyaset, İktisat, Zihniyet (Özal, Politics, Economy, Mentality)*, Boyut Kitapları İstanbul 2001.

Siemisław Jerzy Ł., *Ojciec Turków: Kemal Atatürk (Father of the Turks: Kemal Atatürk)*, Społeczny Instytut Historii i Kultury Turcji, Kraków 1994.

Silberhorn Thomas, „Tertium Datur: Turkey's Application for EU Membership” in Constantine Arvanitopoulos, Nikolaos Tzifakis (eds.) *Turkey's Accession to the European Union: an Unsual Candidancy*, Springer - Verlag, Heidelberg 2009.

Skalmowski Wojciech, *Atatürk, Reza Shah and Pilsudski: Paralelism and Differences in Cultural Horizons* a Festschrift in honor of Talat S. Halman, Syracuse University Press, New York 2001.

Skykes Percy, *History of Persia*, Routledge Curzon, London, 1921.

Smith Martin A., *Power in the Changing Global Order: The US, Russia and China*, Polity 2012.

Soner Cagaptay, *Turkey at a Crossroads: Preserving Ankara's Western Orientation*, Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Washington 2005.

Sönmezoğlu Faik, *ABD'nin Türkiye Politikası (1964-1980) (Turkey Policy of United States of America 1964 - 1980)*, Der Yayınları, İstanbul 1995.

Sonyel Salahi, *Kurtuluş Savaşı Günlerinde Batı Siyasamız (Our Western Policy during the Independence War)*, Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, Ankara 1986.

Sonyel Salahi, *Displacement of the Armenians: Documents*, Baylan Matbaası, Ankara 1978.

Sosyal İsmail, *Türkiye'nin Siyasal Anlaşmaları (Political Agreements of Turkey)*, Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, Ankara 1983 .

Soydan Mehmed A., *Dünden Bugüne ve Yarına Refah Gerçeği (Refah Reality, From Yesterday to Today and Tomorrow)*, Birey Yayıncılık, İstanbul 1994.

Soysal İsmail, *Türkiye'nin Siyasal Andlaşmaları, (Political Agreements of Turkey)*, A.Ü.SBF Yayınları, Ankara 1989.

Spreitzhofer Gisela, *The Ottoman Legacy in Balkans*, Grin Verlag, Norderstedt 2007.

Stavros Leften, *The Balkans since 1453*, C. Hurst & Co., London 2000.

Şükrü Esmer A., *Yalta' da Türkiye (Turkey at Yalta)*, Siyasal İlimler Mecmuası, Ankara 1955.

Şükrü Esmer Ahmet, Sander Oral, *İkinci Dünya Savaşında Türk Dış Politikası, Olaylarla Türk Dış Politikası (Foreign Policy of Turkey with Incidents)*, Siyasal Kitabevi, Ankara 1996.

Sümer Faruk, *Safevi Devleti'nin Kuruluşu ve Gelişmesinde Anadolu Türklerinin Rolü* (*Role of Anatolian Turks in the Establishment and Development of Safevites*), Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, Ankara 1976.

Szymański Adam, *Turcja i Europa: wyzwanie i szanse* (*Turkey and Europe: Challenges and Chances*), Polski Instytut Spraw Międzynarodowych, Warszawa 2011.

Szymański Adam, *Między Islamem a Kemalizmem. problem demokracji w Turcji* (*Between Islam and Kemalism: Democracy Issue in Turkey*), PISM, Warsaw 2008.

Swietchowski Tadeusz, *Russian Azerbaijan, 1905-1920: The Shaping of National Identity in a Muslim Community*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1985.

Tanty Mieczysław, *Bosfor i Dardanele w polityce mocarstw* (*The Bosphorus and Dardanelles in Power Politics*), Państwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe, Warsaw 1982.

Terzi, Özlem *The Influence of the European Union on Turkish Foreign Policy*, Ashgate Publishing Company, Surrey 2010.

Tevetoğlu Fethi, *Atatürk's Soviet Policy*, Cultura Turcica, Vol. II (1), 1965.

Titscher Stefan, Mayer Michael, Woda Ruth, Vetter Eva, *Methods of Text and Discourse Analysis*, Sage Publications Ltd, London 1998.

Tocci Nathalie, *EU Accession Dynamics and Conflict Resolution*, Ashgate, Hampshire 2004.

Tonybee Arnold, *Armenian Atrocities: Murder of Nation*, London 1915.

Tonybee Arnold, *The Morderous Tyranny of the Turk*, London 1917.

Tonybee Arnold, *Turkey: a Past and a Future*, George H. Doran Co., London - New York 1917.

Toprak Binnaz, *Islam and Political Development in Turkey*, E.J.Brill, Netherland 1981.

Toprak Sinan, *The Evolution of Turkey's Foreign Policy: The Truman Doctrine and Turkey's Entry into NATO*, unpublished MA thesis, Western Michigan University, 1987.

Tselichtchev Ivan, *China versus the West: The Global Power Shift of the 21st Century*, John Wiley & Sons Singapore Pte. Ltd., Singapore 2012.

Türkkaya Ataöv, *A British Source (1916) on the Armenian Question*, Sistem Ofset, Ankara 1985.

Türküne Mümtazer, *Siyasi İdeoloji Olarak İslamcılığın Doğuşu*, (The Birth of Islamism as a Political Ideology), İletişim Yayınları, İstanbul 1991.

Ulman Haluk, *Türk - Amerikan Diplomatik Münasebetleri 1939-1947 (Turkish - American Diplomatic Relations 1939 - 1947)*, AUSBF, Ankara 1961.

Uslu Nasuh, *The Turkish - American Relationship between 1947 and 2003: the History of Distinctive Alliance*, Nova Science Publishers, New York.

Utku A Alpaydin, *Softpower in Turkish Foreign Policy under the AKP Government: 2002 - 2009*, unpublished Master Thesis, Bilkent University, Ankara.

Van Dijk Teun, *Discourse, Power and Access* in Caldas Coulthard (eds.) *Texts and Practices: Readings in Critical Discourse Analysis*, Routledge, London 1996.

Varvana Andrekos, Faustmann Hubert, *Reunifying Cyprus: The Annan Plan and beyond*, I.B. Tauris & Co Ltd, London 2009.

Vertigans Stephen, *Islamic Roots and Resurgence in Turkey; Understanding and Explaining the Muslim Resurgence*, Praeger Publishers, United States of America, Westport, 2003.

Visuizi Dontas D., *Greece and Turkey: The Regime of the Straits, Lemnos, and Samotrache*, G. C. Eleftheroudakis, Athens 1987.

Waal Thomas D., *The Caucasus: An Introduction*, Oxford University Press, New York 2010.

Weber Frank G., *The Evasive Neutral: Germany, Britain and the Quest for a Turkish Alliance in the Second World War*, University of Missouri Press, Columbia 1979.

Weiker Walter F., Yerushalmi Merkaz H., *Ottomans, Turks and the Jewish Polity: A History of Jews of Turkey*, University Press of America, Michigan 1992.

Weisband Edward, *Turkish Foreign Policy, 1943-1945: Small State Diplomacy and Great Power Politics*, Princeton University Press, Princeton 1973.

Welch Dawid A., *Painful Choice: A Theory of Foreign Policy Change*, Princeton University Press, New Jersey. 2005.

White Jenny B., *Islam and Politics in Contemporary Turkey* in *The Cambridge History of Turkey*, Volume 4, *Turkey in the Modern World*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2008.

Wilson James, Rev Pierce, *Story of Turkey and Armenia*, Woodward Company, Baltimore, 1896.

Winrow Gareth, *Turkey and the Caucasus: Domestic Interests and Security Concerns*, Royal Institute for International Affairs, London 2000.

Wright John, Goldenberg Suzanne, Schofield Rychard, *Transcaucasian Boundaries*, UCL Press, London 1996.

Wright Robin, *In the Name of God: The Khomeini Decade*, Simon & Shulster, London 1989.

Yavuz Hakan, *Islamic Political Identity in Turkey*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2003.

Yerrasimos Stefanos, *Milliyetler ve Sınırlar (Nations and Borders)*, İletişim Yayınları, İstanbul 1994.

Yerrasimos Stefanos, *Secularism and Muslim Democracy in Turkey*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2009.

Yeşilada Birol A., *Comparative Political Parties and Party Elites*, Essays in honor of Samuel J. Eldersweld, The University of Michigan Press, Michigan 2002.

Yeşilbursa Behçet K., *The Baghdad Pact: Anglo American Defense Policies in the Middle East, 1950-1959*. Frank Cass, Oxon 2005.

Zajac Justyna, „The Barcelona Process and Beyond”, in Katarzyna Żukrowska, Anna Konarzewska (ed.), *External Relations of the European Union - Determinants, Casual, Links, Areas*, Instytut Wiedzy, Warsaw 2004.

Zajac Justyna, „Destabilizująca Rola USA na Bliskim Wschodzie” („Destabilizing Role of USA in the Middle East”), in Irena Stawowy-Kawka (ed.), *Czynniki stabilizacji i destabilizacji w stosunkach międzynarodowych na początku XXI wieku (Stablizing and Destablizing Factors in International Relations at the Beginning of XXI Century)*, Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego, Cracow 2009.

Zajac Justyna, „EU - US in the Middle East Peace Efforts: to What Extent Cooperation?”, in Andrzej Mania, Paweł Laidler, Łukasz Wordliczek (ed.), *US Foreign Policy: Theory, Mechanism and Practice*, Cracow 2007.

Zajac Justyna, *Polityka zagraniczna USA po zimnej wojnie (US Foreign Policy after the Cold War)*, Wydawnictwo Adam Marszałek, Torun 2005.

Zajac Justyna, *Role Unii Europejskiej w regionie Afryki Północnej i Bliskiego Wschodu (EU Roles in MENA Region)*, Wydawnictwa Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego, Warsaw 2010.

Zajac Justyna, *Środki i metody oddziaływania USA w Bliskowschodnim procesie pokojowym (1991–2000) (Means and Methods of US Interations in Middle East Peace Process (1991–2000))*, Wydawnictwa Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego, Warsaw 2004.

Zengin Gürkan, *Hoca: Türk Dış Politikası'nda Davutoğlu Etkisi (Teacher: Impact of Davutoğlu on Turkey's Foreign Policy)*, İnkilap Yayınları, İstanbul 2010.

Zeyno Baran, *Torn Country: Turkey between Secularism and Islamism*, Hoover Institution Press Publication, California 2010.

Zięba Aleksandra, *Rola Niemiec w rozszerzaniu Unii Europejskiej (Germany's Role in the EU Enlargement)*, Poltext, Warsaw 2010.

Zięba Ryszard, *Wstęp do teorii polityki zagranicznej państwa (ed.) (Introduction to Theory of Foriegn Policy)*, Wydawnictwo Adam Marszałek, Toruń 2004.

Zielonka Jan, *Paradoxes of European Foreign Policy*, The Hague and London: Kluwer Law, International 1998.

Zohar Michael B, *Ben Gurion: A Biography*, Wiedenfeld and Nicolson, London 1977.

Zürcher Eric J., *Turkey: A Modern History*, I.B. Tauris, London 1993.

Articles:

“Chronology January 1 - December 31, 2002”, *The Turkish Year Book*, Vol. XXXIII, pp.328-370.

“Europe on the Move: More Unity and More Diversity”, The European Union’s Biggest Enlargement. Directorate - General for Press and Communication Manuscript completed in November 2003.

“Presidency Conclusion, Copenhagen, 12 and 13 December 2002”, Council of European Union, 29 January 2009.

“Western Thrace Turks issue in Turkish - Greek Relations”, *International Affairs Agency*, İstanbul 1992.

Abazi Enika, “Kosovo/a Conflict and Post - Cold War Order: Russia and Turkey Policies”, *Turkish Review of Balkan Studies*, Vol.VII, 2002, pp. 217-236.

Açıkalın Serpil, “Gaza Attacks: The US, Its Arab Allies and Turkey”, *Usak YearBook*, Vol. 2, 2009, pp. 425-429.

Aghsan Ali R., “Turkey’s EU Quest and Political Cleavages under AKP”, *Review of European Studies* Vol. III, No. 1, June 2011, pp. 43-53.

Ahmadow Ahmed S., “Les Antagonismes Interalliés sur les Problèmes Turcs après l'armistice de Moudros Jusqu'au Traité de Sèvres”, *Etudes Balkaniques*, Vol. XIX (1), 1983, pp.27-48.

Ahrari Mohammed E., “The Dynamics of the New Great Game in Muslim Central Asia”, *Central Asian Survey*, Vol. XII (4), 1994, pp. 525-539.

Akbaba İskender, “Lozan Barış Andlaşması” (“Lousanne Peace Treaty”), *Askeri Tarih Bülteni*, Vol. VII, No. 13, 1982, pp. 103-109.

Akçakoca Amanda, “Turkish Foreign Policy between East and West?”, *European Policy Centre, Policy Brief*, October 2009, pp.1-4.

Aktuğ Yılmaz, “Lozanda Sınırlar Sorunu” (“Border Problem in Lausanne”), *Belgelerle Türk Tarihi Dergisi*, No. 34, 1970, pp.36-47.

Akyüz Jülide, “Göç Yollarında; Kafkaslardan Anadolu’ya Göç Hareketleri” (“Migration Movements from Caucasus to Anatolia”), *Bilig*, Summer, 2008, No. 46. pp. 37-56.

Alexandrov Vitali, “Soviet - Turkish Cooperation”, *International Affairs* (Moscow), No. 12, December 1986, pp. 33-38.

Alırıza Bülent, “Turkey and the Crisis in the Caucasus”, *CSIS Commentary Washington, D.C. CSIS*, 9 September 2008, pp. 1-3.

Altunışık Meliha B., “The Role of Turkey in Middle East”, *Mediterian Politics*, 2009, pp.210-213.

Anderson John, “Constitutional Development in Central Asia”, *Central Asian Survey*, Vol XVI (3), 1997, pp. 301-320.

Aral Berdal, “Dispensing with Tradition? Turkish Politics and International society: During the Özal Decade 1983-1993”, *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. XXXVII, No.1, January 2001, pp.77-88.

Aras Bülent, “Davutoğlu Era Period in Turkish Foreign Policy”, *Insight Turkey*, Vol: 11, No.3, pp. 127-142.

Aras Bülent, “Turkey between Syria and Israel: Turkey’s Rising Soft Power”, *SETA Policy Brief No 15*, May 2008, pp.1-6.

Aras Bülent, “Turkey’s Policy in the Former Soviet South”, *Turkish Studies*, Spring 2000, pp. 36-58.

Aras Bülent, “Türkiye ve Rusya Federasyonu: Çok Boyutlu Ortaklık” (“Turkey and Russia: Multi-Dimensial Cooperation”), *SETA Analiz*, August 2009, pp. 1-14.

Aras Bülent, Akpınar Pınar, “The Relations between Turkey and the Caucasus”, *Perceptions*, Volume XVI, No. 3, Autumn 2011, pp. 53-68.

Aras Bülent, Karakaya Polat Rabiya, “From Conflict to Cooperation: Desecuritization of Turkey’s Relations with Syria and Iran”, *Security Dialogue*, Vol. XXXIX, No. 5, October 2008, pp. 495-515.

Aras Bülent, Köni Hasan, "Turkish - Syrian Relations Revisted", *Arab Studies Quarterly*, Vol. XXIV, No. 4, Fall 2002, pp. 47-60.

Armanoğlu Faik, "Atatürk Diplomasisi" ("Atatürk Diplomacy"), *Kemalizm*, Vol. XIV, No. 165, 1976, pp. 20-21.

Armanoğlu Faik, "İkinci Dünya Harbinde Türkiye" ("Turkey in the Second World War"), *SBF Dergisi*, No. 13 (2), pp. 139-179.

Arnakis George G., "Turanism: An Aspect of Turkish Nationalism", *Balkan Studies*, Vol. I, 1960, pp.19-32.

Askeroğlu Ali, "The Bosnia - Herzegovina Question in Turkish Foreign Policy: 1992 - 1995. Has it been Successful?", *Journal of Qafqaz University*, Vol.II, No.2, 1999, pp.99-106.

Aslıhan Çelenk Ayşe, "Democratization of the National Security Discourse and the Political Parties in Turkey". *Erciyes Üniversitesi İktisadi ve İdari Bilimler Fakültesi Magazine*, No. 33, July - December 2009, pp.119-134.

Athanassopoulou Ekavi, "Ankara's Foreign Policy Objectives after the End of the Cold War: Making Policy in a Changing Environment", *Orient (Hamburg)*, Vol. XXXVI (2), June 1995, pp.269-285.

Avcı Gamze, "The Justice and Development Party and the EU: Political Pragmatism in a Changing Environment", *South European Society and Politics*, Vol.XVI, Issue 3, 2011, pp.409-421.

Aybet Gülnur, Müftüler Meltem, "Transformations in Security and Identity after the Cold War: Turkey's Problematic Relationship with Europe", *International Journal*, Vol. LV, No. 4, Autumn 2000, pp.567-582.

Aydın Mustafa, "Cacophony in the Aegean; Contemporary Turkish - Greek Relations", *Turkish Yearbook of International Relations*, No. 27, 1997, pp.110-140.

Aydın Mustafa, "Geopolitics of Central Asia and the Caucasus: Continuity and Change since the End of the Cold War", *Turkish Yearly Book*, Vol. XXXLL, 2001, pp.167-215.

Aydın Mustafa, "The Determinants of Turkish Foreign Policy and Turkey's European Vocation", *The Review of International Affairs*, Vol. 3, No. 1, 2003, pp.197-222.

Aydın Mustafa, "Turkey and Central Asia: Challenges of Change", *Central Asian Survey*, Vol. XV (2), 1996, 157-177.

Aydın Mustafa, "Turkish Foreign Policy at the End of Cold War: Roots and Dynamics" *The Turkish Yearbook*, Volume XXXVL, 2005, pp.1-36.

Bacık Gökhan, Aras Bülent, "Turkey's Inescapable Dilemma: America or Europe?", *Alternatives: Turkish Journal of International Relations*, Vol. III, No. 1, 2004, pp. 56-74.

Bağcı Hasan, Kardaş Şaban, "Post September 11 Impact: The Strategic Importance of Turkey Revisited", *CEPS/IISS European Security Forum*, Brussels 2003, pp.19-48.

Bal İdris, "Axis Shift or Boom of Self Confidence?", *USAK Yearbook of International Politics and Law*, No 4, 2011, 303-306.

Balcı Ali, Yeşiltaş Murat, "Turkey's New Middle East Policy: The Case of the Meeting of the Foreign Ministers of Iraq's Neighboring Countries", *Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. XXIX, No. 4, Summer 2006, pp.18-38.

Bali Aykan M., "The Turkish - Syrian Crisis of October 1998: a Turkish View", *Middle East Policy*, Vol. VI, No. 4, 1999, pp. 174-191.

Banking Garrett, Glaser Bonnie S., "Chinese Assessments of Global Trends and the Emerging Era in International Relations," *Asian Survey*, Vol. XXIX, No. 4, April 1989, pp. 347-362.

Bar Nevi Eli, "The EU: Policies towards Israels and Turkey" in Bruce M Weitzman, Asher Susser, "Turkish - Israeli Relations in a Trans Atlantic Context", *Wider Europe and the Greater Middle East Conference Proceedings*, The Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies, Tel Aviv University, pp. 97-103.

Batu Hamit , "La Turquie dans la Détente", *Politique Etrangère*, Vol. XLI (5), 1976, pp. 459-483.

Baykal Hülya, "Kurtuluş Savaşında Türk - Fransız İlişkileri ve bir Fransız; Bir Türk Dostu Albay Mougin" ("Turkish - French Relations during the Independence War and a French; a Friend of Turkey, Colonoel Mougin"), *Atatürk Yolu*, Vol. II, No. 7, 1991, pp.457-510.

Beaman Hulme A., "Lausanne and Its Lessons", *Nineteenth Century and After*, Vol. XCIII, March 1923, pp.318-327.

Beck Peter J., "A Tedious and Perilous Controversy: Britain and the Settlement of the Mosul Dispute, 1918-1926", *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. XVII (2), 1981, pp. 256-276.

Bell Holly A., "Status of the 'BRICs': An Analysis of Growth Factors", *International Research Journal of Finance and Economics*, Issue 69, 2011, pp.19-25.

Beng Phar K., "Turkey's Potential as a Soft Power: A Call for Conceptual Clarity", *Insight Turkey*, Vol. X, No. 2, 2008, pp. 21-40.

Bengio Ofra, Özcan Gencer, "Old Grievances New Fears: Arab Perceptions of Turkey and its Alignment with Israel", *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol.XV, No. 2, pp.50-92.

Beriker Nimet, Daniel Druckman, "Simulating the Lausanne Peace Negotiations, 1922-1923: Power Asymmetries in Bargaining", *Simulation and Gaming*, Vol. XXVII (2), June 1996, pp. 160-183.

Bennigsen, A., Broxup Marie, "Central Asia in the 1980s: Strategic Dynamics in the Decade Ahead", *Foreign Area Research Inc.*, New York, FAR/NA-1001, July 1984, pp. 21-54.

Bertrand Gilles, "Greek - Turkish Relations: From Cold War to Rapprochement", *Observatory of European Foreign Policy*, pp.1-3.

Bilici Hasret D., "Foreign Policy Orientation of Turkey's Pro-Islamist Parties: A Comparative Study of AKP and Refah", *Turkish Studies*, Vol.IX, Issue 3, 2008, pp. 407-421.

Birsel Mahmut, "Büyük Devlet Adamı İnönü ve Lozan Anlaşması" ("Great Statesman İnönü and Lozan Agreement"), *Ege Üniversitesi İktisadi ve Ticari Bilimler Fakültesi Dergisi*, Vol.VIII, No. 12, 1974, pp.47-57.

Blank Stephen, "Russia, the Gulf and Central Asia in a New Middle East", *Central Asian Survey*, Vol. XIII (2), 1994, pp. 267-281.

Boll Michael, "Turkey between East and West: The Regional Alternative" *World Today*, Vol. XXXV (9) September 1979, pp.360-368.

Bölme Selin N., "The Politics of Incirlik Airbase", *Insight Turkey*, Vol. IX, No. 3, 2007, pp.82-91.

Bölükbaşı Süha, "The Johnson Letter Revisted", *Middle Eastern Studies*, July 1993, Vol. XXIX, No.3, pp. 505-525.

Bölükbaşı Süha, "Turkey Challenges Iraq and Syria: The Euphrates Dispute", *Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. XVI (4), 1993, pp. 9-32.

Brown Cameroon S., "Turkey in the Gulf Wars of 1991 and 2003", *Turkish Studies*, Vol. VIII, Issue 1, 2007, pp.85-119.

Brown James, "Turkey and the Persian Gulf Crisis", *Mediterranean Quarterly*, Vol. II, 1991, pp.46-54.

Brown Philip M., "The Lausanne Conference", *The American Journal of Law*, Vol. XVII. No. 12, April 1923, pp.503-505.

Burgin Alexander, "Ongoing Opposition in the West, new Options in the East: Is Turkey's EU Accession Process Reversible?", *Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies*, Vol.XII , Issue 4, 2010.

Buzan Barry, "The Status and the Future of the Montreux Convention", *Survival*, November -December 1976, pp. 242-247.

Cohen Ariel, "Washington Concerned as Turkey Leaving the West", *Turkish Policy Quarterly*, Vol. IX, No. 3, 2009, pp. 25-35.

Çağatay Soner, "The November 2002 Elections and Turkey's New Political Era", *Middle East Review of International Affairs Journal*, Vol. VI, No. 4, December 2002, pp. 42-48.

Çakır Hamza, "Tezkere Dönemi ve Sonrası Türk - ABD İlişkileri'nin Medya Temsili" ("The Media Presentation of Turkish - USA Relations during and after the Bill Period"), *Social Science Magazine*, Vol. XXI, 2006, pp.153-172.

Camp Glen D., "Greek - Turkish Conflict over Cyprus", *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. XCV, No.1, Spring 1980, pp.43-70.

Çandar Cengiz, "Ataturk's Ambitious Legacy", *The Wilson Quarterly*, Vol. 24, Autumn 2000, pp. 95-105.

Celenk Ayşe A., "The Restructuring of Turkey's Policy towards Cyprus: The Justice and Development Party's Struggle for Power", *Turkish Studies*, Vol.VIII, Issue 3, 2007, pp.349-363.

Çelikpala Mithat, "From A Failed State to a Weak One? Georgia and Turkish-Georgian Relations", *The Turkish Yearbook of International Relations*, 2005, Vol. XXXVI, pp.159-199.

Çelikpala Mithat, "Turkey and the Caucasus: Transition from Reactive Foreign Policy to Proactive Rhythmic Diplomacy", *International Relations*, Spring 2010, Vol. VII, pp.93-126.

Çetinkaya Gökhan, "Essential Friends and Natural Enemies: the Historic Roots of Turkish - Iranian Relations", *Middle East Review of International Affairs*, Vol. VII, No. 3, September 2003, pp.116-132.

Chkhikvadze Ivane, "Zero Problem wit Neighbors: The Case of Georgia", *Turkish Policy Quarterly*, Vol.10 No.2, Summer 2011, pp.1-9.

Coşar Nevin, Demirci Sevtap, "The Mosul Question and the Turkish Republic: Before and After the Frontier Treaty, 1926", *The Turkish Year Book*, Vol. XXXV, 2004, pp.43-59.

Craig Richard B., Michael A Turner, "A Failure of the Turkish Opium Ban: Toward an Explanation", *Orient* (Opladen), Vol. XIX (1), 1978, pp.53-69.

Cross Nur B., "Parameters of Turkish Foreign Policy Under the AKP Governments", *UNISCI Discussion Papers*, No. 23, pp.9-25.

Cruickshank Alex A., "International Aspects of the Kurdish Question", *International Relations*, Vol. III (6), October 1968, pp. 411-430.

Davison Roderic H., "Middle East Nationalism: Lausanne Thirty Years After", *MiddleEast Journal*, Vol. VII (3), Summer 1953, pp.324-348.

Davison Roderic H., "Russian Skill and Turkish Imbecility: The Treaty of Kuchuk Kainardji Reconsidered", *Slavic Review*, Vol. XXXV, No.3, September 1976, pp.463-483.

Davutoğlu Ahmet, "Turkey's Foreign Policy Vision: An Assessment of 2007", *Insight Turkey*, 2008, Vol. 10:1, pp. 77-96.

Deringil Selim, "Aspects of Continuity in Turkish Foreign Policy: Abdülhamid II and İsmet İnönü", *International Journal of Turkish Studies*, Vol. IV (1), 1987, pp.39-54.

Deringil Selim, "Turkey's Diplomatic Position at the Outbreak of the Second World War", *Boğaziçi Üniversitesi Dergisi*, Vol. VIII-IX, 1980-81, pp.63-86.

Destree Annette, "Reformisme "Laïcisant" en Iran, Turquie et Afghanistan 1920-1930", *Civilisations*, Vol. XXXII (1), 1982, pp.167-186.

Dima Nicholas, "The Black Sea Region: New Economic Cooperation and Old Geopolitics", *The Journal of Social, Political and Economic Studies*, 2003, Vol. XXVIII, No. 1, pp.77-96.

Dragadze Tamara, "The Armenian - Azerbaijani Conflict: Structure and Sentiment", *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. XI (1), 1989, pp.55-71.

Drath Viola, "The Cyprus Referendum: an Island Divided by Mutual Mistrust", *American Foreign Policy Interests*, 26, 2004, pp.342-351.

Dzisiów Szuszczykiewicz A., "Polityka zagraniczna Turcji w kontekście Czerwcowych Wyborów parlamentarnych i Arabskiej Wiosny" ("Turkey's Foreign Policy in the Context of June Parliamentary Elections and Arab Spring"), *National Security Bureau*, 29 July 2011, pp.1-13.

Efegil Erhan, "AK Party's Policies about the PKK Terrorism, Northern Iraq and Kurdish Issue", *Review of Social, Economic & Business Studies*, Vol. IX/X, pp.115-140.

Efegil Erhan, "Turkish AK Party's Central Asia and Caucasus Policies: Critiques and Suggestions", *Caucasian Review of International Affairs*, Summer 2008, Vol. II (III), pp.166-172.

Eligur Banu, "Are Former Enemies Becoming Allies? Turkey's Changing Relations with Syria, Iran, and Israel Since the 2003 Iraqi War", *Middle East Brief Series*, August 2006, No. 6, pp.1-6.

Eligur Banu, "Turkish - American Relations since the 2003 Iraqi War: A Trouble Partnership", *Brandeis University Crown Center for Middle East Studies*, No.6, May 2006, pp.1-6.

Eralp Doğa U., Beriker Nimet, "Assessing the Conflict Resolution Potential of the EU: The Cyprus Conflict and Accession Negotiations", *Security Dialogue*. Vol. XXXVI No 2, June 2005, pp.175-192.

Ertem Barış, "Türkiye - ABD İlişkilerinde Truman Doktrini ve Marshall Planı" ("Truman Doctrine and Marshall Plan in Turkey-USA Relations"), *Balıkesir University Social Sciences Magazine*, June 2009, pp.377-397.

Fernau Friedrich W., "La Turquie, l'alliance Atlantique et la Détente", *Orient*, Vol. XII, No. 47-48.

Fidan Hakan, "Turkish Policy toward Central Asia", *Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies*, Vol. XII, Issue 1, 2010, pp. 109-121.

Fishman Brian, "Al-Qaeda and the Rise of China: Jihadi Geopolitics in a Post-Hegemonic Word", *The Washington Quarterly*, Summer 2011, pp.47-62.

Flam Harry, "Turkey and EU: Politics and Economics of Accession", *Ces Info Economic Studies*, 50 (1), 2004, pp. 151-171.

Font Nuria, "Why the European Union Gave Turkey the Green Light", *Journal of Contemporary European Studies*, Vol.XIV, Issue 2, 2006, pp.197-212.

Fotiou Eleni, "Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Platform. What is at Stake for Regional Cooperation?", *ICBSS Policy Brief*, June 2009, No. XVI, pp. 1-10.

Freedman Robert O., "Russia and the Middle East under Putin". *Ortadoğu Etütleri*, Vol. II, No 3, July 2010, pp.9-55.

Frenchman Michael, "Turkey Reaches out to the Central Asian Republics", *Turkish Review: Quarterly Digest*, Vol. VII (31), Spring 1993, pp. 21- 23.

Funk Nathan C., "Peace Making between America and the Muslim World", *Insight Turkey*, Vol. XI, No.4, 2009, pp.131-150.

Fuller Graham E., "Brazil and Turkey Shift Global Politics", *New Perspectives Quarterly*, Vol. XXVII, No 3, Summer 2010, pp. 23-25.

Fuller Graham E, Iran and Turkey: Rivals for Central Asian Leadership [in:] Fuller Graham E., *The Center of the Universe: The Geopolitics of Iran*, Westview Press, Boulder, Colorado 1991, pp.191-208.

Fuller Graham E, "Turkey's Strategic Model: Myths and Realities", *The Washington Quarterly*, Summer, 2004, pp. 51-64.

Gjata Jorris, "Lessons from the Turkish - Armenian Protocols", *Turkey Analyst*, Vol. III, No. 7, 12 April 2010, nd.

Godchot Jacques, "Mustafa Kemal Atatürk et la France", *Mondes et Cultures*, Vol. XLVIII (4), 1988, pp.595-610.

Golliard Claude, "La Convention de Montreux, Nouvelle Solution", *Revue de Droit International*, 1936.

Goshgarian Rachel, "Breaking the Stalemate: Turkish - Armenian Relations in the 21st Century", *Turkish Policy Quarterly*, Vol. IV, No. 4, Winter 2005, pp. 4-5.

Gönlübol Mehmet, "Yurtta Barış, Cihanda Barış" ("Peace at Home, Peace at the World"), *Atatürk Araştırmaları Merkezi Dergisi*, Vol. 9, No. 25, November 1992, pp.9-21.

Gözen Ramazan, "The Turkish - Iraqi Relations: From Cooperation to Uncertainty", *Foreign Policy*, Vol. XIX (3-4), 1995, pp.49-98.

Gözen Ramazan, "Turkey - American Relations in 2009", *Perceptions*, Vol. XV, No. 3-4, Autumn-Winter 2010, pp. 49-77.

Grew Joseph, "The Peace Conference of Lausanne, 1922-1923", *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society*, Vol. XCVIII, 1954, pp.1-10.

Grigoriadis Ioannis N., "The Davutoğlu Doctrine and Turkish Foreign Policy", *Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy*, 2010, pp. 1-12.

Gruen George, "Turkey's Relations with Israel: From Ambivalence to Open Cooperation", *Studies on Turkish Jewish History*, 1993, pp.33-43.

Gunter Michael M, "Kurdish Militancy in Turkey: The Case of PKK", *Crossroads*, No. 29, 1989, pp.440-472.

Guzansky Yoel, Lindenstrauss Gallia, "Turkey and Iran", *Strategic Assessment*, Vol.XIV, No.1, April 2011, pp.1-12.

Hakov, Jim H., "The Great States, Turkey and the Issue Concerning the New Regime of the Straits During the First Years of World War Two", *Archiv Orientální*, Vol. LIV (1), 1986, pp.47-60.

Hale William, "Turkish Foreign Policy after the Cold War", *Turkish Review of Balkan Studies*, Vol. I, 1993, pp. 5-25.

Halliday Fred, "Iraq and its Neighbors: The Cycles of Insecurity", *World Today*, Vol. 46, June 1990, pp.104-106.

Han Ak, "From Strategic Partnership to "Model Partnership "AKP, Turkish - US Relations and the Prospects under Obama", *Unisci Discussion Papers*, May 2010, No. 23, pp. 77-112.

Harris George S., "The Bureaucratic Reform: Atatürk and the Turkish Foreign Office", *Journal of American Institute for the Study of Middle Eastern Civilization*, 1980-1981, Vol. III, No. 1, pp.39-51.

Hermann Charles, "Changing Course: When Governments Choose to Redirect Foreign Policy" *International Studies Quarterly*, 1990, pp. 3-21.

Hill Fiona, Taşpınar Ömer, "Turkey and Russia Axis od Excluded", *Survival*, 2006, pp.81-92.

İnalçık Halil, "Turkey Between West and the Middle East Perceptions", *Journal o International Relations*, 1998, Vol. III, No. 1, pp. 5-18.

İnan Kamuran, "Dış Politika", ("Foreign Policy"), *Yeni Türkiye*, 1995, Vol. I, No. 3, pp. 90-100.

Inbar Efraim, "Regional Implications of Israeli - Turkish Strategic Partnership", *Middle East Review of International Affairs*, Vol. V, No. 2, June 2001, pp. 48-65.

Kantat Buğra K., "AK Party's Foriegn Policy: Is Turkey Turning a way from the West?", *Insight Turkey*, Vol. 12, No. 1, 2010, pp. 205-220.

Kalleberg Arthur, "The Logic of Comparison: A Methodological Note on the Comparative Study on Political System". *World Politics*, 1966, Vol. XIX, pp. 69-82.

Kardaş Şaban, "Turkey: Redrawing the Middle East Map or Building Sandcastles?", *Middle East Policy*, Volume XVII, No.1, Spring 2010, pp.115-116.

Kardaş Şaban, "Turkish - Iranian Economic Ties Flourish", *Eurasia Daily Monitor*, Vol.VIII, Issue 35, 18 February 2011, pp. 35-47.

Karpat Kemal, "The Personality of Atatürk", *The American Historical Review*, Vol. XC, No. 4., October 1985, pp. 893-899.

Kasalak Kadir, "Milli Mücadele Başlarında Türk - Rus İlişkileri" ("Turkish - Russian Relations at the Initial Period of Independence War"), *Askeri Tarih Bülteni*, 1994, Vol. XIX, No. 37, pp. 30-40.

Kıbaroğlu Mustafa, "Clash of Interest over Northern Iraq Drives Turkish-Israeli Alliance to a Crossroads", *Middle East Journal*, Vol.LIX, No. 2, Spring 2000, pp.246-264.

Kıbaroğlu Mustafa, "Turkey and Israel Strategize" *Middle East Quarterly*, Vol. IX, No. 1, Winter 2002, pp.61-65.

Kıbaroğlu Mustafa, Çağlar Barış, "Implications of a Nuclear Iran for Turkey". *Middle East Policy*, Vol. XV, No. 4, Winter 2008, pp. 246-264.

Kirişçi Kemal, "The End of the Cold War and Changes in Turkish Foreign Policy Behaviour", *Foreign Policy* (Ankara), Vol. XVII (3-4), 1993, pp.236-273.

Kirişçi Kemal, "The Politics of Trade and Turkish Foreign Policy", *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol.XLVII, Issue 5, 2011, pp.705-724.

Knight Jonathan, "America's International Guarantees for the Straits: Prelude to the Truman Doctrine", *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. XIII (2), 1977, pp.241-250.

Kösebalaban Hasan, "The Crisis in Turkish - Israeli Relations: What is its Strategic Significance?", *Middle East Policy*, Vol. XVII, No. 3, Fall 2010, pp. 36-50.

Kujawa Karol, "The Turkish Reaction to Events in North Africa", *The Polish Institute of International Affairs Bulletin*, 2 June 2011, No. 57 (274), pp. 514-515.

Kujawa Karol, "Turcja wobec kryzysu w Syrii" (Turkey on Syria Crisis), *The Polish Institute of International Affairs Bulletin*, No 81 (830), pp. 2506-2507.

Kuşku Eda, "The Shadow of Past Rivalry: Limits of post-1999 Dynamism in Greco - Turkish Relations", *Caucasian Review of International Affairs*, Vol. II (3) - Summer 2008, pp. 156-165.

Kwiatkiewicz Piotr, "Turcja a kwestia importu Kaspiskiej ropy i gazu do Europy. Wieloaspektowy zarys problemu" ("Turkey and Import of Caspian Oil and Gas to Europe Issue. Multifaceted Outline of Problem"), *Polityka Energetyczna*, Vol. XII, 2/2, 2009, pp. 333-340.

Laçiner Sedat, "Turgut Özal Period in Turkish Foreign Policy: Özalism". *USAK Yearbook of International Politics and Law*, 2009, Vol. II, pp. 150-160.

Lanin, E. B., "Armenia and the Armenian People", *Fortnightly Review*, No. 284, Aug. 1 1890, p. 258-273.

Larrabee Stephen F., "How Turkey is re-discovering its Middle East Role", *Europe's World*, Autumn 2009, pp.1-10.

Larrabee Stephen F., "Troubled Partnership: US - Turkish Relations in an Era of Global Geopolitical Change," *RAND Corporation*, 2010, pp.1-128.

Lebedev Alexander, "Russia and Turkey at 21st Century: What is behind Us and What is ahead?", *Insight Turkey*, April - June 2002, Vol. IV, No. 2, pp.5-15.

Lesser Ian, "Turkey, the U.S. and the Delusion of Geopolitics", *Survival*, Vol. XLVIII, No 3, Autumn 2006, pp.1-12.

Lijphart Arend, "Comparative Politics and Comparative Analysis", *The American Political Science Review*, Vol. LXV, No. 3, September 1971, pp. 682-693.

Litwak Meir, "Iran", *Middle East Contemporary Survey*, Volume XXIV, 2000, pp.220-240.

Lucius Thayer, "The Capitulations of the Ottoman Empire and the Question of Their Abrogation as it Affects the USA", *American Journal of International Law*, Vol. XVII, April 1923, pp.207-233.

Lussac Samuel, "The Baku - Tbilisi - Kars Railroad and its Implications for the South Caucasus", *Caucasian Review of International Affairs*, Autumn 2008, Vol. II (IV), pp.212-224.

Macfie A L., "The Straits Question: The Conference of Lausanne, November 1922 - July 1923", *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. XV (12), May 1979, pp. 238-248.

Markushin Vadim, "Russia - Turkey: Doomed to Eternal Neighbourhood", *Perceptions*, Vol. II (1), March - May 1997, pp. 90-100.

Masayuki Yamauchi, "The Foreign Policy of Turkey and her Relations with the East During the National War of Independence, 1920-1921: The Turco - Soviet Relationship over the Batum Crisis", *Journal of Asian and African Studies*, Vol. XIII, 1977, pp. 67-76.

Matevosyan Vahram T., "The Armenian Community and the AK Party: Finding Trust under the Crescent", *Insight Turkey* Vol. 12, No. 4, 2010, pp.93-111.

Migdalovitz Carol, "AKP's Domestically Driven Foreign Policy", *Turkish Policy Quarterly*, Vol.IX, No. 4, pp. 37-45.

Migdalovitz Carol, "Cyprus: Status of U.N. Negotiations and Related Issues", *CRS Report for Congress*, 20 July 2010, pp.1-24.

Migdalovitz Carol, "Greece Update", *CRS Congressional Research Service*, December 2009, pp.1-13.

Migdalovitz Carol, "Israel's Blockade of Gaza, the Mavi Marmara Incident, and Its Aftermath", *CRS Congressional Research Service*, 2010, pp.1-17.

Migdalovitz Carol, "Turkey: Issues for U.S. Policy", *CRS Report for Congress*, May 2002, pp.1-19.

Migdalovitz Carol, "Turkey: Selected Foreign Policy Issues and U.S. View's", *Congressional Research Service*, November, 2010, pp.1-55.

Migdalovitz Carol, "Turkey's 2007 Elections: Crisis of Identity and Power", *CRS Report for Congress*, Updated 10 September 2007, pp. 1-15.

Müftüler Meltem S., "Turkey's Predicament in the post - Cold War Era", *Futures*, Vol. XXVIII, April 1996, pp. 255-268.

Murinson Alexander, "The Strategic Depth Doctrine of Turkish Foreign Policy", *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. XLII, No. 6, November 2006, pp.945-964.

Nachmani Amikam, "The Remarkable Turkish - Israeli Tie", *Middle East Quarterly*, Vol. II, No.2, June 1998, pp. 61-65.

Niell Nugent, "The EU's Response to Turkey's Membership Application", *European Integration*, September 2007. Vol.XXIX (4), pp. 481-502.

Oğuzlu Tarık, "Soft Power in Turkish Foreign Policy", *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. LXI, No.1, 2007, pp.81-97.

Oktay Özden Z., "Changing Security Perceptions in Turkish - Iranian Relations", *Perceptions*, Summer 2004, pp. 113-117.

Olson Robert, "The Kurdish Question and Turkey's Foreign Policy, 1991-1995: from the Gulf War to the Incursion into Iraq", *Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. XIX (1), 1995, pp.106-118.

Olson Robert, "Views from Turkey: Reasons for the United States War against Iraq", *Journal of Third World Studies*, Fall 2005, pp. 141-160.

Olson Robert, "The Kurdish Question and Chechnya: Turkish and Russian Foreign Policies since the Gulf War", *Middle East Policy*, Vol. IV (3), March 1996, pp.106-118.

Oran Baskın, "Türkiye'nin Balkan ve Kafkas Politikası" ("Turkey's Balkan Politics"), *Ankara Üniversitesi Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Journal*, Vol. L, No.1, pp. 271-278.

Öğütçü Mehmet, "Turkey and China", *Perceptions*, Vol. I (3), September- November 1996, pp. 155-179.

Öniş Ziya, "Luxembourg, Helsinki and Beyond: Towards an Interpretation of Recent Turkey -EU Relations", *Government and Opposition*, Vol. XXXV, Issue 4, October 2000, pp.463-483.

Öniş Ziya, "Turkey and Central Asia: Challenges of Change", *Central Asian Survey*, Vol. XV (2), 1996, 157-177.

Öniş Ziya, Yılmaz Şuhnaz, "Between Europeanization and Euro - Asianism: Foreign Policy Activism in Turkey during the AKP Era", *Turkish Studies*, Vol. X, No.1, March 2009, pp. 1-13.

Özcan Mustafa, Usul Resul, "Understanding the "New" Turkish Foreign Policy: Changes within Continuity Is Turkey Departing From The West?", *Uluslararası Hukuk ve Politika*, Vol. VI, No. 1, 2010, pp. 101-123.

Özdağ Ümit, "Türk - Amerikan İlişkilerinde Irak Krizi" ("Iraq Crisis at Turkish - USA Relations"), *Stratejik Analiz*, 2003, Vol. IV, No. 40, pp. 69-75.

Özel Soli, "The AKP's Foreign Policy in Context" in "What does Turkey Think?", *European Council on Foreign Relations*, London 2011, pp.69-75.

Özkan Mehmet, "Turkey - Brazil Involvement in Iranian Nuclear Issue: What is the Big Deal?", *Strategic Analysis*, Vol.XXXV, Issue 1, 2010, pp.26-30.

Padelford Norman J., "Solutions to the Problems of Turkish Straits: a Brief Appraisal", *Middle East Journal*, Vol. 2 (2), April 1948, pp.175-190.

Pannier Bruce, "The Shrinking Shores of Central Asia's Island of Democracy", *Transition* 2, 7, 1996, pp. 56-59.

Patton Marcie J., "AKP Reform Fatigue in Turkey: What has Happened to the EU Process?", *Mediterranean Politics*, Vol. XII, Issue 3, 2007, pp. 339-358.

Punsmann Gultekin B., "The Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Platform: An Attempt to Foster Regional Accountability", *ICBSS, Policy Brief*, April 2009, No.13, pp. 1-8.

Punsmann Gultekin B., "The Stakes of Opening the Armenian-Turkish Border; the Cross-Border Contacts between Armenia and Turkey", *French Institute of Anatolian Studies, Research Program on Turkey Caucasus*, October 2002, pp. 1-56.

Ramazan Gözen, "Türk Dış Politikasının Avrupa Birliği'ne Doğru Dönüşümü" ("Transformation of Turkey's Foreign Policy toward European Union"), *Uluslararası Hukuk ve Politika*, Vol. II, No.6, 2002, pp. 1 – 16.

Raphalides Samuel J., "The United States and the Question of the Greco Turkish War, 1919 - 1922", *Byzantine and Modern Greek Studies*, Vol. VIII, 1982-83, pp.171-189.

Reynolds Michael,"Russian - Turkish Relations and Chechenya", *Insight Turkey*, April - June 2002, Vol. IV, No. 2, pp. 60-62.

Roach Morgan L., McNamara Sally, "How the EU's Prevarication Advances the AKP's Agenda in Turkey", *Webmemo*, No. 3131, 2 February 2011, pp.1-2.

Robins Philip, "Between Sentiment and Self-Interest: Turkey's Policy toward Azerbaijan and the Central Asian States", *Middle East Journal*, 1993, Vol. XLVII, No.4, pp. 593-610.

Robins Philip, "The Opium Crisis and Iraq War: Historical Parallels in Turkey - US Relations", *Mediterranean Politics*, March Vol.XII, No. 1, 2007, pp.17-38.

Rosati Jerel, "The Frustrating Study of Foreign Policy Analyze", *International Studies Review*, Vol. VI, No. 1, March 2004, pp. 109-111.

Rubab Hasan, "Role of Turkey in the Central Asian Republics", *Journal of European Studies*, Vol. IX (1), Jan. 1993, pp. 97-108.

Rumelili Bahar, "The European Union's Impact on the Greek - Turkish Conflict" in "EU Border Conflicts Studies", University of Birmingham, Occasional Paper 6, 2004, pp. 1-31.

Rumford Chris, "Human Rights and Democratization in Turkey in the Context of EU Candidature", *Journal of European Area Studies*, Vol. IX, Issue 1, 2001, pp. 93-105.

Sander Oral, "Türkiye'nin Dış Politikasında Sürekliliğin Nedenleri" ("The Reasons of Continuity in Turkey's Foreign Policy"), *A.U. Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Dergisi*, 1982, Vol. XXXVII, No. 3-4, pp. 110-138.

Sadurski Wojciech, "Accession's Democracy Dividend: The Impact of the EU Enlargement upon Democracy in the New Member States of Central and Ekstern Europe", *European Law Journal*, July 2004 Vol. X (4), pp. 371-401.

Sandwith Humphry, "How the Turks Rule Armenia", *Nineteenth Century*, 3, February, 1878, p. 314-329.

Sambur Bilal, "The Great Transformation of Political Islam in Turkey: The Case of Justice and Development Party and Erdogan", *European Journal of Economic and Political Studies*, Volume II, 2009, pp.117-127.

Satterthwaite Joseph "The Truman Doctrine: Turkey", *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences*, No. 401, May 1972, pp. 74-84.

Sautman Barry, "Preferential Policies for Ethnic Minorities in China: The Case of Xinjiang", *Working Papers in Social Sciences*, No. 32, 30 September 1997, pp. 1-65.

Sayari Sabri, "Turkish Foreign Policy in the Post-Cold War Era: The Challenges of Multi Regionalism", *Journal of International Affairs*, Fall 2000, No.54, pp. 169-198.

Sayari Sabri, "Turkey and the Middle East in the 1990s", *Journal of Palestine Studies*, Vol XXVI, No.3, Spring, pp. 44-55.

Sever Ayşegül, "Turkey and the Syrian - Israeli Peace Talks in the 1990s", *Middle East Review of International Affairs*, Vol. V, No.3, pp. 87-99.

Siegl Erik, "Greek - Turkish Relations: Continuity or Change?", *Perspectives: Central European Review of International Affairs*, No. 18, 2002, pp. 40-52.

Slomski Wojciech, "The Philosophy of Culture and European Identity", Speech presented at Forum Philosophicum Ignatianum, Cracovia August 2003, pp.13-20.

Stivachtis Yannis A., "The Demilitarisation of the Greek Eastern Aegean Islands; The Case of the Central Aegean and Dodecanese Islands", *The Turkish Year Book*, Vol. XXI, pp.100-130.

Swietchowski Tadeusz, "Azerbaijan: Between Ethnic Conflict and Irredentism", *Armenian Review*, Summer - Autumn 1990, No. 43, pp. 35-49.

Szymański Adam, "Argumenty przeciwko przyjęciu Turcji do Unii Europejskiej - krytyczny punkt widzenia" ("Arguments against the Adaptation of Turkey to European Union: A Critical Point of View"), *Rocznik Instytutu Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej*, 5/2007, pp. 81-94.

Szymański Adam, "Turcja wobec konfliktu Rosyjsko - Gruzńskiego" ("Turkey toward Russo - Georgian Conflict"), *Biuletyn Polish Institute of International Affairs*, No. 40 (508), 3 September 2008, pp.1-2.

Szymański Adam, "Turkey's Potential Added Value to the EU: Resolution of Regional Conflicts", *Turkish Policy Quarterly*, Fall 2009, pp. 125-138.

Szymański Adam, "Turkish Foreign Policy in 2007–2009: Continuity or Change", *SInAN Working Paper No. 3*, Center for European Studies, METU, Ankara, Wrzesień 2009, pp. 1-24.

Torbakov Igor, "Making Sense of Current Phase of Turkish - Russian Relations", *The Jamestown Foundation, Washington D.C., Occasional Paper*, October 2007, pp.1-20.

Torbakov Igor, "The Georgia Crisis and Russia - Turkey Relations", *The Jamestown Foundation, Washington D.C.*, 2008, pp.1-34.

Trenin Dmitri, "Russia and Turkey: a Cure from Schizophrenia", *Perceptions*, Vol. II (2), June - August 1997, pp. 57-65.

Türkkaya Ataöv, "Atatürk: More Than a National Leader", *Darshana International*, Vol. XX, No. 1, 1982, pp.16-20.

Türkkaya Ataöv, "The Policy of the Great Powers towards Turkey on the Eve of the Second World War", *Turkologischer Anzeiger*, Vol. III, 1972, pp.321-328.

Türkmen Füsün, "Turkish - American Relations: a Challenging Transition", *Turkish Studies*, Vol.X, No.1, 2009, 109-129.

Uslu Nasuh, "1947'den günümüze Türk - Amerikan İlişkilerinin Genel Portresi", ("The General Portrait of Turkish - American Relations since 1947"), *Avrasya Dosyası*, 2000, No. 6, pp.203-232.

Uslu Nasuh, "The Russian, Caucasian and Central Asian Aspects of Turkish Foreign Policy in the Post Cold War Period", *Alternative: Turkish Journal of International Relations*, Fall-Winter 2003, 2, No. 3-4, pp.164-187.

Uzgel İlhan, "Dış Politikada AKP: Stratejik Konumdan Stratejik Modele" ("AKP in Foreign Policy, From Strategic Location to Strategic Model"), *Mülkiye Dergisi*, Volume XXX, No. 252, pp. 62-84.

Üstün Çiğdem, "Energy Cooperation between Import Dependent Countries: Cases of Italy and Turkey", *Perceptions*, Spring 2011, Vol. XVI, No. 1, pp. 71-89.

Vitali Alexandrov, "Soviet - Turkish Cooperation", *International Affairs* (Moscow), No. 12, December 1986, pp. 33-38.

Warhola James W., William A Mitchell, "The Warming of Turkish - Russian Relations: Motives and Implications", *Demokratizasiya*, Vol. XIV, Issue 1, Winter 2006, pp.127-143.

Waxman Dov, "Turkey and Israel: A New Balance of Power in the Middle East", *Washington Quarterly*, Vol. XXII, No. 1, pp.25-32.

Webster Craig, "Division or Unification in Cyprus? The Role of Demographics, Attitudes and Party Inclination on Greek Cypriot Preferences for a Solution to the Cyprus Problem", *Ethnopolitics*, Vol. 4, No. 3, 2005, pp. 299-309.

Wilson Dominic, Purushothaman Roopa, "Dreaming with BRICs: The Path to 2050", *Goldman Economics Paper*, No 99, 1 October 2003, pp.1-23.

Wright Philip Q., "The Mosul Dispute", *American Journal of International Law*, Vol. XX, 1926, pp. 464-480.

Yanik Lerna K., "Allies or Partners: An Appraisal of Turkey's Ties to Russia, 1991-2007", *East European Quarterly*, September 2007, pp.349-370.

Yeşilyurt Nuri, Akdevelioğlu Atay, "Turkey's Middle East Policy under the JDP Rule", *The Turkish Yearbook of International Relations*, Vol. XL, 2009, pp. 39-69.

Yılmaz Bahri, "The Relations of Turkey with the European Union: Candidate Forever?", *Center for European Studies Working Paper*, 2008, Series No.167, pp. 1-26.

Yılmaz İhsan, "Muslim Democrats in Turkey and Egypt: Participatory Politics as a Catalyst", *Insight Turkey*, Vol. XI, No.2, pp. 93-102.

Yılmaz Türel, "Türkiye - İsrail İlişkileri: Tarihten Günümüze" ("Turkish - Israel Relations: Past and Present"), *Akademik Ortadoğu*, 2010, Vol. V, No. 1, pp. 20-23.

Yurdusev Nuri, "Osmanlı Mirası ve Türk Dış Politikası Üzerine" ("About Ottoman Heritage and Turkish Foreign Policy"), *Yeni Dönemde Türk Dış Politikası: Uluslar arası IV. Türk Dış Politikası Sempozyumu Tebliğleri*, Usak Yayınları, Ankara 2010, pp. 47-54.

Zajac Justyna, "Konflikt Arabsko - Izraelski w świetle teorii konfliktów", ("Arab - Israel Conflict under the Light of Conflict Theory"), *Stosunki Międzynarodowe - International Relations*, 2009, Vol. 39, No. 1-2, pp. 177-191.

Zajac Justyna, "The EU's Role in the Middle East Peace Process", *Current Issues of International Politics Through the Eyes of Young Europeans*, University of Economics, Prague 2003, pp. 191-204.

Zalewski Piotr, "Missile Defense: a View from Turkey", *Center For European Policy Studies*, 2009.

Ziyadov Taleh, "Officials Meet to Discuss South Caucasus Rail System", *Eurasia Daily Monitor*, Vol. 2:232, December 14, 2005, pp. 212-224.

Zdulski Krzysztof, "W obronie Status Quo Ante? Polityka Turcji wobec wojny domowej w Libii i kryzsu politycznego w Syrii" („To Defend Status Quo Ante? Turkey's Policy toward the Civil War in Libya and Political Crisis in Syria") The text presented at expert seminar on Arab Spring of Nations in 16.06.2011 at Tichner European University under the frames of Peace and Development Studies, pp. 1-13.

Zetner Joseph, "The 1972 Turkish Opium Ban: Needle in the Haystack Diplomacy", *World Affairs*, 1973, No. 136, pp.36-47.

Newspapers:

Al Ahram, 23 February 2006.

Aljazeera English, 16 June 2011.

Al Akhbar English, 13 December 2011.

Anadolu Agency, 29 June 2009.

Anatolia, 10 July 2009, *August 11, 2009*, 1 November 2010. *Arab News*, 14 May 2010.

Asharq Alasswat, 6 February 2009.

Asia Times, 31 January 2004.

Associated Press Worldstream, 17 June, 2002, 6 January 2009.

Avrasya Bülteni, 6 January, 2003. *Backgrounder*, 2, July 2010.

Bugün, 30 August 2004, 24 November 2009.

China Daily, 25 June 2004, 5 December 2004.

Der Spiegel, 6 April 2009.

Financial Times, 14 August 2008.

Forbes, 30 January 2009. *Foreign Policy*, 6 April 2009.

Gazeta Wyborcza, 27 August, 2009.

Haaretz, 14 November 2010. 2 December 2010. 5 December 2010, 13 January 2010.

Haberturk, 14 February 2009.

.Hürriyet 17 June 2002, 6 May 2002, 1 December 2003, 23 December 2004, 15 March 2007, 13 October 2009, 13 January 2010 1 March 2011, 24 April 2011.

Hürriyet Daily News, 21 December, 2006, 23 June 2009. 7 April 2009, 27 October 2009, 14 May, 2010, 28 October 2010, 23 November 2010, 17 December 2010, 17 March 2011, 15 April 2011.

International Herald Tribune, 12 June 2010. *IRNA*, 11 June 2009.

Jerusalem Post, 11 May 2007, 1 February 2009, 25 November 2010, 12 January 2010, 2 January 2011, 5 January 2011.

Los Angeles Times, 17 February 2006.

Milliyet, 16 February 2006, 12 March 2007, 21 May, 2008, , 7 September 2008, 30 December 2008, 13 January 2010. 2 June 2010.

Payvand Iran News, 28 October 2009.

Radical 17 June 2002, 15 April 2004, 2 September 2004. 14 August 2008, 14 October, 2009, 17 May 2010, 13 August 2010, 4 April 2011, 25 April 2011, 2 September 2011, 11 January 2012.

Reuters, 18 December 2008, 17 December 2008, 3 June 2010.

Sabah, 22 June 2004. 24 June 2004 13 November 2007, 4 March 2010.

Spiegel International, 30 January 2009. *Star*, 12 January 2005, 30 January 2009.

Sunday's Zaman, 2 February 2011. *Takvim*, 27 December 2010. *The Armenian Reporter*, 10 April 2009. *The Boston Globe*, 8 September 2008.

The Christian Science Monitor, 12 January 2010.

The Economist, 10 July 2003, 24 June 2004, 6 April 2006, 3 September, 2009, 3 March 2011.

The Guardian, 29 June 2004, 14 April 2006. 4 April 2009, 6 July 2009, 26 October 2009, 5 March 2010, 17 May 2010, 31 May 2010.

The Huffington Post, 6 April 2009.

The Journal of Turkish Weekly, 6 December, 2004, 22 December 2004, 12 January 2005, 24 January 2008.

The Majalla, 26 November 2010.

The New Yorker, 28 June 2004.

The New York Times, 11 December 2002, 24 January 2008, 13 November 2007, 29 January 2009, 6 April 2009, 15 September 2011.

The Telegraph, 12 September 2003, 17 May 2010, 27 July, 2010, 29 November 2010.

The Times, 3 January 2009.

The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 16 February 2006.

Todays Zaman, 1 July 2008, 2 September 2008, 3 October 2008, 23 December 2008, 23 October 2009, 22 February 2009, 5 March 2010, 18 May 2010, 26 May 2010, 28 May 2010, 7 June 2010, 4 July 2010, 6 July 2010, 17 August, 2010, 23 October 2010, 17 December 2010, 23 September 2011, 1 February 2011. 20 September 2011, 24 October 2011.

Trend Az, 5 July 2010. *Turkish Probe*, 10 November 2002.

Turkish Review, 01 January 2011.

Turkish Weekly, 30 April 2005, 2 May 2005, 13 May 2009

Voice of America, 4 August 2011.

Wall Street Journal, 16 February 2005, 2 June 2010, 24 July 2010.

Washington Institute Report 3 March 2003.

Washington Post, 27 January 2007, 14 September 2011.

Weekly Standard, 16 December 2002.

World Bulletin, 17 January 2010.

Xinhua News Agency, 24 March 2004, 1 September 2009.

Yenişafak, 25 May 2003, 23 February 2004, 13 August 2008.

Zaman, 18 June 2002, 27 August 2003, 1 June 2004. 23 December 2004, 28 November 2009, , 17 September 2010, 1 February 2011 .

Web Sites:

Anadolu Ajansı, www.aa.com.tr

Current Trends, www.currenttrends.org

Euroasia Daily Monitor, www.jamestown.org

Ntv Msnnc, www.arsiv.ntvmsnbc.com

Sabah, www.arsiv.sabah.com.tr

Los Angeles Times, www.articles.latimes.com

Ataturk University, www.atauni.edu.tr

Asia Times Online, www.atimes.com

Baybul, www.baybul.com.tr

Belgenet, www.belgenet.com

Wise Man Strategic Research Center, www.bilgesam.org

Britannica Online Encyclopedia, www.britannica.com

Brookings Institute, www.brookings.edu

Black Sea Economic Cooperation, www.bsec-organization.org

Office of Primer Ministry Diroctorate General of Press and Information, www.byegm.gov.tr

Official Web Site of President of Republic of Turkey's House, www.cankaya.gov.tr

CNN, www.cnnturk.com

Center for Political and Strategic Studies, www.cpss.org

Ankara University Journals, www.dergiler.ankara.edu.tr

Dunya Bülteni, www.dunyabulteni.net

Official Web Site of AK Party, www.eng.akparti.org.tr

EU-Georgia Business Council, www.eugbc.net

Official Web Site of European Parlaieiment, www.europarl.europa.eu

Internet FAQ Archives, www.faqs.org

Foreign Policy Magazine, www.foreignpolicy.com

Global Journal, www.global-ejournal.org

Embassy of Greece, www.greekembassy.org

Haber Vitriini, www.habervitrini.com

International Herald Tribune, www.hri.org

Hurriyet, www.hurarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr

Hurriyet, www.hurriyet.com.tr

Official Web Site of International Monetary Fund, www.imfstatistics.org

Embassy of India in Turkey www.indembassy.org.tr

Israel Politik, www.israelpolitik.org

Jamestown, www.jamestown.org,

Embassy of Kazakhstan in Turkey www.kazakhstan.org.tr

Embassy of Kyrgyzstan in Turkey www.kyrgyzembassy.org.tr

Mediterranean Climate Change Initiative, www.medclimatechangeinitiative.org

Middle East Review of International Relations, www.meria.idc.ac.il

Official Website of Merve Kavakci, www.mervekavakci.net

Official Web Site of Turkish Foreign Affairs Ministry, www.mfa.gov.tr

Milliyet, www.milliyet.com.tr

Official Website of Necmettin Erbakan, www.necmettinerbakan.org

News Az, www.news.az

Open Democracy, www.opendemocracy.net

Oxford Islamic Studies Online, www.oxfordislamicstudies.com

Radikal, www.radikal.com.tr

Silk Road Studies, www.silkroadstudies.com

Siyaset Ekonomi ve Toplum Araştırma, www.setav.com

Star, www.stargazete.com

Stosunki Międzynarodowe, www.stosunki.pl

Strategic Öngörü, www.stratejikongoru.org

Turkish Atomic Energy Authority, www.taek.gov.tr

Official Site of President of Republic of Turkey, www.tccb.gov.tr

TIKA, www.tika.gov.tr

Armenian News, www.times.am

Today's Zaman, www.todayszaman.com

Transatlantic Academy, www.transatlanticacademy.com

Official Website of Turkish State Channel, www.trt.net.tr

Embassy of Russian Federation in Turkey, www.turkey.mid.ru

Turkish Weekly, www.turkishweekly.net

Turk US, www.turks.us

Turksam, www.turksam.org

Turk Trade, www.turktrade.org.tr

International Strategic Analysis Center, www.usak.org.tr

International Strategic Analysis Center, www.usakgundem.com

Hürriyet, www.web.archive.org

Hürriyet, www.webarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr

Official Website of USA Presidency, www.whitehouse.gov

World Bulletin, www.worldbulletin.net

Yenişafak, www.yenisafak.com.tr

Zaman, www.zaman.com.tr